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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates processes of ecosystem emergence. Ecosystem research has thus far 
focused on understanding the structure and dynamics of already existing ecosystems. However much 
less attention has been devoted to the emergence of ecosystems. I first theoretically develop an 
institutional approach to ecosystems, arguing that the ecosystem is an organisational field which has 
value co-creation as its recognised area of institutional life. Synthesising the theories of dominant 
design, social movements, and institutional entrepreneurship, I identify four activities that drive the 
processes of ecosystem emergence: resource, technological, institutional and contextual activities. 
Empirically, I compare the emergence sequences of six digital service ecosystems – Amazon, eBay, 
Facebook, Google, Salesforce and Wikipedia – using a narrative explanation methodology, applying 
event colligation, optimal matching, direct inspection, frequency analysis and an innovative statistical 
bootstrapping technique. I find that emergence sequences of each case are significantly dissimilar and 
that there are three phases of emergence – Initiation, Momentum, Control. The first of these phases is 
similar across cases, but subsequent phases exhibit increasing dissimilarity as the ecosystem evolves 
and takes on idiosyncratic characteristics. To explain these findings, I develop an ecosystem perspective 
that explicitly integrates value co-creation processes as an important regulator of the evolution of 
ecosystems. I suggest that idiosyncratic logics of value co-creation result in differing value creation 
processes. I show that the three distinct phases of ecosystem emergence form a coherent, distinctive 
whole when considered from the perspective of value co-creation. Emphasising that value appropriated 
must first be co-created, I propose the ‘ecosystem model’ as an analytic tool to better conceptualise 
value co-creation and appropriation in ecosystems. I discuss the implications of these contributions for 
ecosystem research, institutional theory, and strategic management practice. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
For many years Nokia reigned as the unassailable market leader in mobile phones. In 2006 it sold 
hundreds of millions of phones, had a market capitalisation of €110 billion, tightly controlled its supply 
chains and had a close relationship with telecommunications carriers. In the same year Apple launched 
a phone and Google announced an alliance to create an open source mobile operating system. Nokia 
was aware of the threat that these players represented. It released its own operating system, Symbian, 
as an open source project and jointly launched (with Symbian) an app store called Horizon. In 2009, 
after the failure of Horizon, it launched the Ovi app store in 36 countries simultaneously. However, 
Symbian suffered from an unwieldy governance structure and was perceived as being unwelcome to 
app developers. And neither app store was particularly successful – Horizon only garnered 60 apps after 
six months and Ovi was discontinued in 2012. While Apple and Android were able attract other 
organisations, developers and individuals to their mobile platform, Nokia closed down the Symbian 
open source project in 2011. By May 2012 Nokia’s market capitalisation had fallen to €14.8 billion and 
Apple and Android had come to dominate the market for smartphones. While Apple and Google had 
created vibrant ecosystems, Nokia languished. 
As the example of Nokia demonstrates, the emergence of ecosystems can rapidly undermine 
apparently unassailable positions in seemingly matured and settled industries. The continuous diffusion 
of information and communication technologies (ICT) across industry sectors and the associated spread 
in the use of ‘platform strategies’ (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002, 2008) increasingly focuses managerial 
attention on ‘business ecosystems’ or ‘innovation ecosystems’ (Adner, 2006; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b; 
Iyer & Davenport, 2008; Moore, 1993). Reflecting this uptake in managerial attention, research 
attention also seems to be increasing (see for instance Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Gulati, 
Puranam, & Tushman, 2012; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Tiwana, Konysnski, & Bush, 2010). In 
strategy research, the term ‘ecosystem’ has often been used to refer to a network of interconnected 
organisations that are linked to or operate around a focal firm or a platform (Adner, 2012; Adner & 
Kapoor, 2010; Iansiti & Levien, 2004a, b; Moore, 1993, 1996; Teece, 2007). The attractiveness of the 
ecosystem construct rests on its ability to evoke and highlight interdependencies between organisations 
and the collectivities in which they operate, and to provide a fresh way to think about specialisation, 
co-evolution, and co-creation of value (Adner, 2012; Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Autio & Thomas, 
forthcoming; Frels, Shervani, & Srivastava, 2003; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b). 
Ecosystems generally incorporate a central focus around which production and use side 
participants are organised; either a focal firm (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Teece, 2007), a central hub firm 
(Iansiti & Levien, 2004a, b; Moore, 1993, 1996), or a platform (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2002). Following Autio and Thomas (forthcoming), I define an ecosystem as: a network of 
interconnected organisations, connected to a focal firm or a platform, that incorporates both 
production and use side participants, and creates and appropriates value. The explicit inclusion of use 
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side participants differentiates the ecosystem from other network constructs in strategy literature, such 
as clusters, innovation networks, and industry networks, all of which are focused on the production side. 
Similarly, the combination of use and production side participants differentiates the ecosystem from 
those of user networks and communities, which focus on the use side. On the other hand, ecosystems 
research can be considered part of a wider and heterogeneous body of network literature in strategy 
research. In this literature, the inclusion of both production and use side participants is not a unique 
characteristic of ecosystems, as both sides are also included in strategic networks (Gulati, Nohria, & 
Zaheer, 2000; Jarillo, 1988), business networks (Anderson, Hakansson, & Johanson, 1994; Möller & 
Svahn, 2006), value nets (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996), value networks (Christensen & 
Rosenbloom, 1995; Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998) and value constellations (Normann & Ramirez, 1993). 
Strategy scholars have been recently revisiting issues concerning the collectivities within which 
organisations operate, introducing such concepts as the meta-organisation (Gulati et al., 2012), which 
explicitly includes ecosystems in its typology, and actor-oriented architectures (Fjeldstad, Snow, Miles, 
& Lettl, 2012).  
Thus far, much of the ecosystem literature has focused on understanding the interdependent 
structure and dynamics of already existing ecosystems, with research attention focused on issues such 
as value co-creation and value appropriation (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 
2006; Pierce, 2009), network structure (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2009; Ginsberg, Horwitch, Mahapatra, & 
Singh, 2010; Jacobides et al., 2006; Luo, Baldwin, Whitney, & Magee, 2012), platform leadership 
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Schilling, 2009), governance (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Tiwana et al., 
2010) and the economics of multisided markets (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2009; Evans, 
2009). Much less attention has been devoted to the emergence of ecosystems, however. The early 
ecosystem literature proposed a four stage model of an ecosystem lifecycle (Moore, 1993), and more 
recently Gawer (2009) has suggested an evolutionary typology of platform leadership, further 
developed by Thomas, Autio, and Gann (forthcoming) who proposed an evolutionary dynamic driven 
by varying levels of architectural openness and logics of value creation. Other literatures also appear to 
offer useful insight for addressing this issue. The industrial economics literature offers insights into 
participant adoption strategies in multi-sided market contexts (Eisenmann, 2008; Eisenmann, Parker, & 
Van Alstyne, 2006; Hagiu & Eisenmann, 2007), and the alliance formation literature offers insights into 
the social context of prior alliances and interdependence (Gulati, 1995, 1999). In addition, the 
behavioural strategy literature has indirectly considered ecosystem emergence strategies, suggesting 
alliance portfolio creation strategies (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009), manipulation of organisational 
boundaries and market construction (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009), and strategies to catalyse network 
formation (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012). However, although these provide valuable insight, these earlier 
approaches generally consider ecosystem creation – the intentional actions by a hub firm to create an 
ecosystem – as distinct to the more nuanced perspective of ecosystem emergence – how complex 
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systems arise out of a set of interactions. In addition, none specifically examines the processes 
underlying ecosystem emergence.  
The lack of research on ecosystem emergence represents an important gap, given that many 
organisations, particularly in sectors where ICT has a significant influence, explicitly seek to create 
ecosystems and drive these to their advantage. Understanding both ecosystem emergence as well as 
ecosystem creation are vital to understanding industrial performance in todays’ highly specialised 
industrial landscape. As value creation processes become increasingly intertwined (Moore, 1996; 
Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996; Normann & Ramirez, 1994), it is worthwhile to start considering 
how ecosystems emerge in the first place, what activities and dynamics characterise ecosystem 
emergence and evolution, and under which conditions could ecosystem innovators stand a realistic 
prospect of achieving success. It is my ambition in this thesis to investigate the emergence processes of 
ecosystems. 
Providing insight into this gap is important not only for ecosystem theory, but also for managerial 
practice, as both entrepreneurial start-ups and industry incumbents seek to promote and facilitate 
ecosystem emergence to gain strategic edge over rivals. The ecosystem is becoming a new referent for 
competitive strategy, with the locus of competition shifting from the firm to the network (Doz & 
Kosonen, 2008; Gulati et al., 2000; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b; Iyer, Lee, & Venkatraman, 2006; Moore, 
1993; Normann & Ramirez, 1993). An example is the current competitive battle between operating 
systems for smartphones – namely Apple iOS, Blackberry OS, Google Android, and Microsoft 
Windows Phone. The competition between these smartphone operating systems is not simply between 
Google, Apple, Blackberry and Microsoft as hub firms; it is also between the participants in their 
respective ecosystems, and the ecosystems as a whole. 
To explore ecosystem emergence requires a coherent theoretical framework with which to 
structure the investigation. To date ecosystem research has adopted complementary theoretical 
perspectives that reflect its emphasis on interdependent networked organisations engaged in value co-
creation. In their review, Autio and Thomas (forthcoming) illustrate how existing ecosystem literature 
has drawn on the notion of networks as a distinct ‘mode’ of organisation as compared to markets and 
organisational hierarchies (Hennart, 1993; Thorelli, 1986); emphasised the social embeddedness of 
economic action (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997); adopted the ideas of ‘network organisation’ and 
‘virtual organisation’ (Miles & Snow, 1986); incorporated value chain, market structure and value 
appropriation considerations (Jacobides et al., 2006; Porter, 1980, 1985; Teece, 1986); echoed ideas 
from the resource-based, core competence and relational views (Barney, 1991; Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Prahalad & Hamel, 1990); and recognised the differing sources of innovation (Von Hippel, 1988). In 
an attempt to introduce some coherence into this heterogeneity, Autio and Thomas (forthcoming) 
identify three dominant theoretical lenses that drive current ecosystem research. The value creation lens 
focuses on value creation processes, building upon and extending industrial organisation frameworks 
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of strategic management, notably those addressing industry structure, industry value chains and value 
appropriation in industry contexts. The network embeddedness lens emphasises the structural and 
relational aspects of networks, and considers prerequisites and constraints of operation within 
ecosystems. Finally, the network management stream lens focuses on the management strategies and 
tactics for coordinating and managing within network contexts. 
Although these theoretical underpinnings have provided a fertile soil for ecosystem thinking to 
develop, they have not yet coalesced into a coherent theoretical framework to help understand 
ecosystem emergence processes. This is a shortcoming, as however useful the ecosystem construct may 
be, it also has limits, and sometimes the strong mental images evoked by this attractive metaphor may 
obscure differences between a given phenomenon and the metaphor used to make sense of it. Powerful 
and attractive metaphors such as the ecosystem do not negate the need for coherent theory that has been 
explicitly developed to describe the phenomenon of interest and not some analogous phenomenon. 
Given that the ecosystem is increasingly being utilised to portray a model of the collectivity, if not the 
environment (see for instance, Teece, 2007), in which an organisation operates, one potential theoretical 
lens to understand this complex construct is provided by organisation theory. 
Within organisation theory there is a rich history of study of the collectivities and populations 
within which organisations operate (hereafter ‘organisational collectivities’), and of the 
interdependencies between organisations within these collectivities. Much of this research has 
considered the influence of the collectivity on the structure of an organisation. For instance, resource 
dependency theory examines power relations between an organisation and the providers of its resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978); organisational ecology seeks to understand how populations of 
organisations are transformed by the differential success of constituent members (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977); and institutional theory considers how organisations conform to their institutional environment 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Similarly, transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975) and network 
approaches (Granovetter, 1973; Kilduff & Tsai, 2003), although not strictly organisation theory, have 
also provided insight into the relationships within organisational collectivities. These theories have 
resulted in a diverse collection of conceptual models, including the ‘organisational set’ (Evan, 1966; 
Thompson, 1967); ‘interorganisational field’ (Litwak & Hylton, 1962; Warren, 1967); 
‘interorganisational collectivity’ (Van De Ven, Emmett, & Koenig, 1974); ‘organisational population’ 
(Astley, 1985; Carroll, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 1977); ‘interorganisational community’ (Astley, 
1985; Carroll, 1984); ‘interorganisational network’ (Benson, 1975); ‘interorganisational domain’ (Trist, 
1983); ‘industry system’ (Hirsch, 1972, 1985); ‘societal sector’ (Scott & Meyer, 1983); and 
‘organisational field’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Hence, given the maturity and sophistication of 
organisation theory approaches to modelling and understanding the relationships between organisations 
within collectivities, the adoption of an organisation theory approach to ecosystems could provide the 
theoretical coherence and operationalisation techniques required for a comprehensive investigation of 
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the emergence processes of ecosystems. Therefore, my second ambition is to develop an organisation 
theory approach to ecosystems. 
1.1 Research questions and approach 
The overarching question addressed by this thesis is: why and how do ecosystems emerge? 
Ecosystem emergence considers how complex systems arise out of a set of interactions. The focus of 
attention is not particularly on the activities of a particular actor, but of the more generalised processes 
which result in ecosystem emergence. I do not directly consider ecosystem creation, the actions and 
strategies through which a hub firm constructs an ecosystem. As a consequence I aim to develop a 
theory of ecosystem emergence, not of ecosystem creation. 
I have both theoretical and empirical goals. In terms of theory, I aim to develop an organisation 
theory approach to ecosystem research, and, from this basis, identify the types of activities that shape 
ecosystem emergence. As there exist a variety of theoretical frameworks that have been applied to 
ecosystem contexts, my first theoretical goal is to provide a coherent theoretical framework with which 
to structure an investigation into why and how ecosystems emerge. My second theoretical goal is to 
take this theoretical framework and analytically develop an understanding of the activities which drive 
the emergence of ecosystems. The identification of these activities enables an empirical analysis of 
ecosystem emergence. Empirically, as there has been limited research into the emergence processes of 
ecosystems, my goal is to investigate if the emergence processes of ecosystems exhibit similarities 
across different ecosystems. Although extant research suggests that there are a number of stages to 
ecosystem emergence (Moore, 1993), the existence of these has not been verified empirically. 
Moreover, by comparing the emergence processes of ecosystems across cases, I seek to provide for 
more systematic future research on ecosystem emergence processes, and also, provide rich insight that 
guides practitioner action in this domain. To create this contribution, I compare the emergence 
sequences of selected ecosystems using process methods. Specifically, I investigate three research 
questions:  
1. How can organisation theory be applied to understand ecosystems? 
2. What activities drive the emergence processes of ecosystems? 
3. Do ecosystem emergence processes exhibit similarities across cases? 
In addition to these three questions, I also consider the question of why the emergence processes 
under investigation are similar or different, seeking to shed light upon any causal mechanisms that 
might help explain similarities or differences across cases. 
1.2 Method and data 
This thesis employs a narrative explanation process approach, which takes the contributions of 
events to a particular outcome and then configures them into a coherent, complete episode 
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(Polkinghorne, 1988). Put differently, narrative explanation conceptualises development and change 
processes as a sequence of events which exhibit unity and coherence over time (Poole, Van De Ven, 
Dooley, & Holmes, 2000). Ecosystem emergence will be explained as the result of the order in which 
events unfold, and of particular conjunctions of events and contextual conditions. Given the limited 
theory and understanding of the emergence processes of ecosystems in digital service contexts, I use a 
case study based design, as rich detailed data is required (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Siggelkow, 
2007). Case studies provide rich detail (Langley, 1999; Van De Ven, 1992; Weick, 2007), capture 
multiple levels of context and recurrent patterns in process data (Pettigrew, 1992), and contain the same 
narratives that organisations use to plan, enact, interpret and evaluate their own actions and those of 
others (Pentland, 1999).  
The research setting is digital services. Digital services are often designed as incomplete systems 
(Garud, Jain, & Tuertscher, 2008), necessitating their inclusion in a network (ecosystem) of other 
complementary services. As a consequence many digital services are not necessary consumed directly 
or alone, but instead are consumed by other services, or jointly consumed. Digital services also exhibit 
many of the characteristics of a high velocity environment, in that there are rapid changes in demand, 
competition, and technology (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988). Six successful ecosystem emergence 
processes are investigated – Amazon, eBay, Facebook, Google, Salesforce, Wikipedia – which together 
illuminate the phenomenon of interest and cover a range of polar types (Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 1984). 
These six cases are heterogeneous within the context of digital services and potentially provide a level 
of generalisability beyond their context (Leonard-Barton, 1990).  
Methodologically, the analysis relies on coding and reduction of raw narrative case data to 
sequences of objectively coded events. These events are then analysed and compared using phasic 
analysis. To create the temporal sequence of events that explains an observed stream of incidents (Poole 
et al., 2000), event colligation is applied to incident data extracted from the case narratives (Abbott, 
1984, 1990a; McCullagh, 1978; Walsh, 1958; Whewell, 1847). Distinguishing between an incident as 
a raw datum and an event as a theoretical construct (Abbott, 1984), event colligation is a technique 
where any number of incidents are selected as indicators of an event. Thus, whereas an incident is an 
empirical observation, an event is not directly observed; it is a construct that explains a pattern of 
incidents. These constructed events are then coded using the activities of ecosystem emergence 
theoretically derived in Chapter 3. 
The primary process method applied to these event sequences is phasic analysis, where each case 
sequence is analysed with the goal of discerning sub-sequences. Put differently, phasic analysis attempts 
to capture the overall coherency of development and change at a higher level than fine-grained micro-
level structure (Poole et al., 2000). The fundamental assumption of phasic analysis is that the overall 
process can be described in units larger than the underlying events. Three different phasic analysis 
techniques are applied to the coded event data. Optimal matching compares whether any two sequences 
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have similarities in the code patterns, with statistical significance bootstrapped through the generation 
and analysis of ten thousand random sequences for each case. Direct inspection, a qualitative technique, 
enables the determination of phases through interrogation of the case narratives, related theory, and the 
manual discernment and sorting of pattern sequences into higher level sequences. Frequency analysis 
consists of the quantitative analysis of the occurrences of codes, such as code counts per period or within 
a moving window. Together these three techniques enable a comparison of the emergence processes of 
the six digital service ecosystems. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured as a monograph and comprises seven chapters.1 Following this 
introduction, Chapter 2 first reviews the characteristics of an ecosystem, deriving six attributes that 
enable an evaluation of the suitability of different organisation theory approaches to organisational 
collectivities. I then review models of collectivities in organisation theory, evaluating the ecosystem 
construct against each model, concluding that the organisational field has most relevance. I argue that 
the organisational field construct has a number of facets distinguished by their recognised area of 
institutional life, and that the ecosystem can be usefully viewed as an organisational field where value 
co-creation is its recognised area of institutional life. 
Chapter 3 synthesises the literatures addressing organisational fields, institutional formation and 
change, dominant design, social movement theory, and institutional entrepreneurship and proposes four 
activities of ecosystem emergence. I identify resource and technological activities that occur at the level 
of the firm, such as resource acquisition and digital service design. I also identify institutional activities 
that occur at multiple levels of analysis, such as governance and identity construction. I also identify 
contextual activities that occur outside the ecosystem, such as actions of regulators and the media.  
Chapter 4 outlines the process methodology, where raw narrative data is reduced to sequences of 
objectively coded events that are then compared using phasic analysis. The chapter details the 
methodological basis of the process methodology and describes the techniques of sequence data 
generation and analysis, including data collection, event colligation, phasic analysis and statistical boot-
strapping. 
Chapter 5 reports the results of the comparison of the six empirical cases. The first comparison, 
of the complete event sequences of each of the six cases, finds that the sequences are significantly 
dissimilar to one another. The second comparison finds that there are three phases of ecosystem 
emergence. Phase I, or Initiation, consists of the initial idea and digital service development, resource 
gathering and early operation. In Phase II, or Momentum, the ecosystem begins to grow rapidly, driven 
by increasing numbers of participants (driven by positive network effects), aggressive marketing, much 
1 Parts of this chapter and the following chapters are included in two co-authored papers with Professor 
Erkko Autio which have been presented at a number of conferences. 
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press and societal interest, as well as competitor activity. In Phase III, or Control, the ecosystem is 
established as the undisputed leader and the focus of activity moves from expansion to control and value 
appropriation. The third comparison compares each phase across cases, finding that the first phase is 
similar across cases, but subsequently the similarities decrease from one phase to the next as the 
ecosystem evolves. To explain these findings I argue that the idiosyncratic logics of value co-creation 
of each case result in differing emergence sequences. More specifically, I argue that in the first phase, 
when the logics of value co-creation are nascent, there are similarities due to the common requirements 
of resource gathering and the development of the digital service. However, in the second phase the 
idiosyncratic and path dependent logics of value co-creation are embedded and extended, and in the 
third phase idiosyncratic value appropriation and control logics created, resulting in increasing 
dissimilarities in the event sequences of each case. 
Chapter 6 discusses the implications of both the theoretical and empirical contributions for 
ecosystem research, institutional theory and strategic management practice. Specifically considering 
the important role of the logic of value co-creation on ecosystem evolution, I discuss how the close 
relationship between value co-creation and appropriation in ecosystem contexts requires an ‘ecosystem 
model’ – the rationale of how an ecosystem co-creates, delivers and shares value. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, outlining the contributions to theory, method and practice, 
limitations, and directions for future research. 
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2 THE ECOSYSTEM AS AN ORGANISATIONAL FIELD 
This chapter reviews the characteristics of the ecosystem, deriving six attributes that enable an 
evaluation of differing models of organisational collectivities from within organisation theory. (For a 
full review and evaluation of the ecosystem literature, see Autio & Thomas, forthcoming.) I review 
conceptualisations of organisational collectivities in organisation theory, outlining relevant models 
from resource dependency theory, organisational ecology and institutional theory, and assessing their 
resonance with the ecosystem construct. Concluding with a discussion of the organisational field 
construct, which represents perhaps the dominant lens for the portrayal of organisations and their 
collectivities in organisation theory, I argue that institutional theory, and the organisational field 
construct in particular, has the strongest resonance with the ecosystem construct. 
I then argue the ecosystem should be considered a type of organisational field, in that it consists 
of those network and institutional elements that are both the defining characteristics of an organisational 
field. Noting that an ecosystem has an analytic focus on value co-creation, I review the differing analytic 
foci of the organisational field, arguing that the organisational field construct has four facets where each 
facet represents a different recognised area of institutional life. The dominant facet, as originally 
suggested by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), is represented by a common industry as the distinguishing 
area of institutional life. The second facet is represented by common technologies as the distinguishing 
area of institutional life (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002), and I also discuss the related notions of 
technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982) and dominant designs (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Anderson 
& Tushman, 1990). The third facet of organisational fields is represented by social issues as the 
distinguishing area of institutional life (Hoffman, 1999). Discussing this, I also introduce social 
movement theory into my analysis (McAdam & Scott, 2005; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000). The fourth 
facet is represented by the market as the distinguishing area of institutional life (Beckert, 2010). The 
chapter concludes by suggesting that ecosystems are distinguished – both as a category and as a 
theoretical concept – by a fifth facet, value co-creation, which acts as the fifth recognised area of 
institutional life (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b; Moore, 1993).  
2.1 Characteristics of an ecosystem 
In strategy research, the most common conceptualisation of the ecosystem was first proposed by 
Moore (1993), who used the term to describe the set of organisations and consumers that surround a 
focal organisation, and which contribute to its performance. Moore explicitly adopted a biological 
metaphor and viewed the company not as a member of a single industry but as part of a ‘business 
ecosystem’. For Moore, a business ecosystem is an economic community supported by a foundation of 
interacting organisations and individuals, and which includes suppliers, lead producers, competitors and 
other stakeholders (Moore, 1996). In their influential book, Iansiti and Levien (2004a) propose the 
ecosystem as loose networks of suppliers, distributors, outsourcing firms, makers of related products or 
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services, technology providers and others that both affect, and are affected by, the creation and delivery 
of a hub firm’s own offerings. Even more broadly, an ecosystem can be considered to include the 
community of organisations, institutions and individuals that impact the focal organisation, such as 
customers, competitors, complementors, suppliers, regulatory authorities, standard-setting bodies, the 
judiciary, and educational and research institutions (Teece, 2007).  
Research into ecosystem dynamics suggests three main characteristics that best describe 
ecosystems. These are discussed below, and a number of key attributes derived which can be used to 
evaluate of models of organisational collectivities that have been developed within organisation theory. 
2.1.1 Value-creating networks 
A defining characteristic of ecosystems is that they are dynamic and purposive value-creating 
networks in which the participants co-create value (Adner, 2006; Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Typified by 
a system-level goal of value co-creation (Gulati et al., 2012), an ecosystem explicitly and holistically 
considers the role of complementary asset providers in value creation and appropriation (Teece, 1986). 
Moving beyond the value chain to consider the wider network of value creating participants, ecosystems 
extend the concept of a value chain to that of a system, including any organisation that impacts the focal 
organisation in some manner (Iansiti & Levien, 2004b). By embedding themselves in a complex set of 
network relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati et al., 2000), ecosystem participants combine their 
individual offerings into a coherent, customer-facing solution, in the process co-creating value that 
would not be possible for a single participant alone (Adner, 2006; Adner & Kapoor, 2010). However, 
these are not the arms-length or hierarchical transactions of Williamson (1975), as the co-creation of 
value here relies on investments in relation-specific assets, substantial knowledge exchange, and non-
market governance mechanisms (Dyer & Singh, 1998). As a consequence, ecosystems have a logic of 
mutual exchange that operates differently from that of markets and hierarchies. 
In order to facilitate value co-creation, the relationships in an ecosystem efficiently move 
information, innovations and resources around the network (Adner, 2012; Iyer et al., 2006). The 
movement of information, innovations and resources is not constrained to a particular locality, with 
value co-creation independent of the physical locations of the ecosystem participants. Although not 
explicit in the extant ecosystem literature, location independence is implied through the empirical 
examples adopted in ecosystem research (see for instance Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Iansiti & Levien, 
2004a; Moore, 1993) as well as through theoretical development (see for instance Teece, 2007). A 
healthy ecosystem is productive in that it can consistently transform technology and other raw material 
of innovation into lower costs and new markets, as well as continuously adapting and evolving to 
changes inside and outside of it (Basole, 2009; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b). Due to their embeddedness in 
the network, each ecosystem participant is symbiotic to and co-evolves with other participants (Iansiti 
& Levien, 2004b; Li, 2009), driven by technological interdependence (Adner, 2012; Adner & Kapoor, 
2010). Symbiosis and co-evolution in ecosystem contexts means that each participant of the ecosystem 
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ultimately shares the fate of the network as a whole, regardless of that individual participant’s strength 
or power (Iansiti & Levien, 2004b).  
The dynamics of value co-creation mean that opportunities enabled by ecosystems are not 
necessarily equally distributed amongst participants (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Burt, 2004). There is a 
heterogeneous pattern of relationships, both of strength and number of direct and indirect ties (Adner 
& Kapoor, 2010; Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Li, 2009; Pierce, 2009). Often there is a hub firm within 
the network, providing a coordination role (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b; Li, 
2009; Pierce, 2009). These hub firms often are at the centre of multi-sided markets were value creation 
is driven by both direct and indirect positive network externalities underpinned by standards and lock-
in (Cusumano, 2010; Gawer, 2009; Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Thomas et al., forthcoming). Such hub 
firms are central to the health and stability of an ecosystem, as not only do they drive the collective 
performance of the network (Pierce, 2009), they also increase the ease with which nodes can connect 
to each other (Evans, Hagiu, & Schmalensee, 2006; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti & Levien, 
2004a). Hub firms naturally emerge in networks, regardless of the quality of the networked system, its 
participants, or the specific nature of their connections (Barabási, 2002; Barabási & Albert, 1999; 
Cohen, 2002b; Newman, 2001). For instance, in digital service ecosystems it was found that while the 
number of digital services grew in a linear fashion, the distribution of complementors to hub firms 
followed a power law, implying a small number of hub firms provided for a majority of complementors 
(Weiss & Gangadharan, 2010). A substantive subset of the literature identifies the ‘platform’ as the 
coordinating artefact that a hub firm uses, or the services, tools and technologies that other members of 
the ecosystem can use to enhance their own performance (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Iansiti & Levien, 
2004b; Li, 2009; Tiwana et al., 2010). 
Summarising, ecosystems are characterised by a value co-creating network that is not restricted 
to a locality, where there is symbiosis and co-evolution between participants, and where a hub firm 
provides a coordinating role. This characteristic suggests four attributes that are relevant to an 
evaluation of models of organisational collectivities and the subsequent selection of an appropriate 
organisational theory approach to ecosystems: 
• The model of the environment should conceptualise the relationships of the organisations 
within the collectivity as a network. Put differently, the unit of analysis should be the 
network. 
• The model of the organisational collectivity should be able to theoretically account for 
processes of value co-creation which characterise ecosystems.  
• The model of the organisational collectivity should not be constrained to a particular locality. 
• The model of the organisational collectivity should be able to theoretically account for a 
dominant central actor. 
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2.1.2 Governance system 
A second characteristic of the ecosystem is the governance system that coordinates the activities 
of the participants, introducing both regulatory and normative institutional elements into the analysis. 
All ecosystems have rules and standards that cover interactions between the participants, as these 
orchestration processes enable ecosystem functioning and survival (Adner, 2012; Gawer & Cusumano, 
2002; Iansiti & Levien, 2004a; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). For example, for ecosystems that have a 
central hub firm or platform such as Walmart or Microsoft, participants need to agree to a common 
contract which provides the regulations that govern collaboration and value co-creation. For more open 
ecosystems, such as open source projects, during the registration participants may also agree to a limited 
set of legal requirements. Indeed all functioning value creating collaborative networks require rules and 
standards (Evans & Wolf, 2005; Nathan & Mitroff, 1991), as ecosystem participants may be both 
simultaneously competing and cooperating, resulting in complex strategic games (Nalebuff & 
Brandenburger, 1996). As all ecosystem boundaries are permeable to some extent, a regulatory function 
is determining how open the ecosystem is to new members (Gulati et al., 2012). Nambisan and Sawhney 
(2011) have specifically identified processes relating to innovation leverage, innovation coherence, 
knowledge, membership, stability, and appropriability all of which require agreement on the rules of 
the game. 
However, although ecosystem participants are bound by complex relations that involve mutual 
interdependence, the degree of stratification between participants can vary (Gulati et al., 2012). 
Stratification can occur through ownership, such as through the provision of a stable and predictable set 
of common assets (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b), through being a fundamental 
technological element of the ecosystem (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008), or through leveraging a brand 
(Pierce, 2009). Stratification can be also be purposefully introduced into ecosystems, through tiering in 
task assignment or administration, which can complement other mechanisms of stratification. Gulati et 
al. (2012) note that in situations of higher stratification through design, a degree of hierarchical decision-
making is possible because of defined roles and normative expectations. In situations where 
stratification occurs through production assets, authority can also be exercised through technological 
means such as varying the modularity of the product and service (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2008; Weiss & Gangadharan, 2010), the standardisation of interfaces (Gawer & Cusumano, 
2008; Li, 2009; Tilson & Lyytinen, 2006; Weiss & Gangadharan, 2010) or restricting access (Gulati et 
al., 2012; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Although the authority that results is often 
limited in scope, especially in open-membership contexts, it can still create a social structure that can 
guide task identification and assignment, decision-making, and conflict resolution. 
In situations of low stratification, where the power afforded is limited, hierarchical decision-
making is often impossible. In these situations roles and normative expectations emerge around a peer-
based approach to coordination (Gulati et al., 2012). Self-enforcing governance (Dyer & Singh, 1998) 
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becomes salient, as goodwill, trust and reputation mechanisms being necessary for ecosystem 
coordination (Gulati, 1995; Larson, 1992; Powell, 1990). For instance, early on in ecosystem research, 
Iansiti and Levien (2004a: 208) underlined the importance of trust in relation to ecosystem operations, 
noting that “trust is fundamental … [as] … ultimately it decreases operating costs and risk exposure. A 
well-trusted marketplace will need to spend less in attracting customers and in managing their 
relationships.” Others have also acknowledged the importance of norms of openness, trust, tact and 
professionalism in ensuring ecosystem value co-creation, stability and maintenance (see for instance 
Agerfalk & Fitzgerald, 2008). These attributes also contribute to the participants’ belief that inclusion 
in the ecosystem will lead to value creation and value capture, as well believing the hub firm will behave 
in such a way as to maintain stability. In doing so they lead to further conformance to norms. 
Summarising, ecosystems are also characterised by a governance system that coordinates the 
activities of the participants, and which consists of both regulatory and normative elements. This 
characteristic suggests a further attribute that is relevant to an evaluation of models of organisational 
collectivities: 
• The model of the organisational collectivity should be able to theoretically account for a 
governance system that includes both regulative and normative elements. 
2.1.3 A shared logic 
A third characteristic of ecosystems is the importance of a shared logic that consists of cognitive 
elements such as legitimacy and meaning. Providing for a functioning and stable ecosystem, a shared 
logic enables differing participants to co-exist with minimal friction, as individual participants may 
have institutional logics that are specific to their particular industry organisational field (Adner, 2012; 
Iansiti & Levien, 2004a).  
Legitimacy here is socio-political, in that key stakeholders, opinion leaders and wider society 
accept and endorse the ecosystem and hub firm as appropriate, proper, and cognitive, reflecting a shared 
understanding of what the ecosystem is about and what it seeks to achieve (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). For 
instance, the concept of ‘platform leadership’ (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) implies cognitive elements 
through its focus on leadership – a hub firm cannot lead an ecosystem without being seen as legitimate 
by partners and other ecosystem participants (Olleros, 2008; Sivadas & Dwyer, 2000). To effectively 
facilitate ecosystems, therefore, hub firms need to gain social acceptability and legitimacy in order to 
gain a leadership position within the ecosystem (Adner & Snow, 2010; Gawer & Phillips, forthcoming). 
In particular, hub firms need to perform both practice and legitimacy work in order to ensure that they 
are accepted as a leader (Gawer & Phillips, forthcoming). Gulati et al. (2012) have indicated that 
legitimacy in ecosystems can be enhanced through the inclusion of high-status participants at an early 
stage. Moreover, research has indicated that participating firms are attracted to the dominant actor in an 
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ecosystem for reasons of legitimacy and stability (Oliver, 1990), which in itself leads to the creation of 
hub firms in an ecosystem (Barabási, 2002).  
Beyond legitimacy, ecosystems also have an shared logic through the mutual awareness of 
participants that are engaged in a common enterprise of system level value co-creation, with a shared 
understanding of goals and how they are to be pursued (Adner, 2012; Gulati et al., 2012). In ecosystems 
the conversation between organisations changes from a firm-centric to an ecosystem perspective, as 
participants discursively confront the challenges that lie beyond their own immediate responsibilities, 
consider how they want to organise and address the risks of organisation, and how to act proactively in 
the future (Adner, 2012). As a consequence, the mutual awareness of common enterprise is more than 
a simple awareness that each participant is collaborating with others. It extends not only to include 
norms of behaviour and the goals of collaboration, but also to a common understanding of the logic of 
value – what and how value is to be co-created and how it is shared. This common understanding of 
value co-creation results in a collective identity that is embedded in the shared logic, which can be 
actively supported by the actions of the hub firm (Gawer & Phillips, forthcoming). Moreover, being the 
centre of the common channels of dialogue and discussion around which issues of value co-creation 
and sharing arise and evolve (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Iansiti & Levien, 2004a), means that hub 
firms can guide ecosystems through, for example, influencing the on-going discourse and sense-making 
processes and through the subtle exercise of power (Weick, 1995). Hub firms also encourage the 
development of an shared logic through innovating new practices, enrolling ecosystem members to 
engage with these and managing the external tensions (Gawer & Phillips, forthcoming). 
Often this shared logic is established very early on, with membership criteria and welcome 
messages utilised to ensure an understanding of the goals of the ecosystem as well as the regulations, 
norms, beliefs and practices. For example, Wikipedia established a specialised group of users which 
engaged with new users to acculturate them into the prevailing norms and practices. The shared logic 
is also reflected in symbolic and discursive practices (Levy & Scully, 2007; Phillips, Lawrence, & 
Hardy, 2004). Stratification provides a useful symbolic tool to draw attention to which issues are 
important and which competencies and behaviours are valued (Gulati et al., 2012). The shared logic is 
also reflected within the construction of an ecosystem identity, where participants advertise their 
inclusion in the ecosystem as well as their level of participation through logos and other insignia. Some 
go as far as to reflect the ecosystem identity within their corporate brand and identity. Stratification-
related symbols and discursive practices can also create incentives for other organisations to join as 
they act as an advertisement of value creation and appropriation within the ecosystem. Many arrange 
conferences and seminars for ecosystem participants to gather together physically, share their 
experiences and to debate and agree practices, norms and meanings (Lampel & Meyer, 2008). Much 
effort is often expended in aligning the perspectives on the future success of the ecosystem, in the 
process constructing an ecosystem level frame in the same manner as a ‘field-level’ frame (Lounsbury, 
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Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003) and legitimating the collective identity (Gawer & Phillips, forthcoming). In 
doing so the identities and interactions of the ecosystem participants are defined and stabilised (Scott, 
2008).  
Summarising, ecosystems are also characterised through a shared logic that includes cognitive 
elements such as legitimacy and meaning. This characteristic suggests a sixth attribute that is relevant 
to an evaluation of models of organisational collectivities: 
• The model of the organisational collectivity should be able to theoretically account for a 
shared logic that includes cognitive elements such as legitimacy and meaning. 
2.2 Models of organisational collectivities in organisation theory 
Within organisation theory there is a rich history of the study of the collectivities in which 
organisations operate, and of the interdependencies between organisations within these collectivities. 
The models that consider organisational collectivities emerged from attempts to bridge the gap between 
the microscopic organisational unit of analysis and the macroscopic institutional unit of analysis. These 
models developed from an analytic consideration of how both the immediate and distal environment 
influences the structure of the organisation, and differing models consider a range of units of analysis, 
levels of analysis and types of interdependence.2 
Much of this research has considered the influence of the collectivity on the structure of an 
organisation. For instance, resource dependency theory examines power relations between an 
organisation and the providers of its resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978); organisational ecology 
explores how populations of organisations are transformed by the differential success of constituent 
members (Hannan & Freeman, 1977); and institutional theory explores how organisations conform to 
their institutional environments (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Similarly, transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1975) and network approaches (Granovetter, 1973; Kilduff & Tsai, 2003), although not 
strictly organisation theory, have also provided insight into organisational collectivities. Others have 
discriminated between technical and institutional environmental sources of interdependence within 
collectivities, suggesting that complex technologies, social environments and complex exchanges foster 
the development of rationalised organisational structures (Galbraith, 1973; Thompson, 1967), while 
highly institutionalised environments lead to the development organisational structures that conform to 
shared institutional rules (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1981; Scott, 1983). Technical 
interdependence models generally stress the incompleteness of the organisation primarily in terms of 
resource and information flows, while social/cultural interdependence models instead view 
 
2 For the sake of clarity, level of analysis points to the scale of the model and the more or less integrated 
set of relationships, while unit of analysis refers to the distinct unit which is considered by the model. 
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organisations as participating in larger systems of interorganisational relations as well as larger cultural 
systems (Scott, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1983). 
Resource dependency theory, which examines the power and dependency relations between 
organisations in a collectivity (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), adopts a number of models that vary by unit 
of analysis and interdependence type. While the organisational set (Evan, 1966) is applicable at the 
focal firm unit of analysis, the interorganisational field (Litwak & Hylton, 1962; Warren, 1967), 
interorganisational collectivity (Van De Ven et al., 1974), and interorganisational network (Benson, 
1975) each operate at the network level of analysis. These models also vary by interdependence type, 
with the organisational set, interorganisational field and interorganisational collectivity considering 
technical interdependence within the collectivity, while the interorganisational network considers 
social/cultural interdependence. In addition, the interorganisational field and interorganisational 
collectivity differ by level of analysis. Organisational ecology, in contrast, utilises both the 
organisational population (Astley, 1985; Carroll, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and the 
interorganisational community (Astley, 1985; Carroll, 1984) as models, both of which operate at 
differing levels of analysis.  Institutional theory, which considers how organisations conform to their 
regulatory, normative and cognitive environments (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), also utilises a number of 
models of organisational collectivities, including those of societal sector (Scott & Meyer, 1983), 
industry system (Hirsch, 1972, 1985), business system (Whitley, 1992a, b), interorganisational domain 
(Trist, 1983), and organisational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). See Table 1 above for an outline.  
The main models of organisational collectivities from organisation theory are discussed below in 
the context of their primary theories and their relevance to the ecosystem construct.3 Contingency theory 
and its later elaborations (Van De Ven, Ganco, & Hinings, 2013), such as the configuration (Meyer, 
Tsui, & Hinings, 1993), complementarity (Whittington, Pettigrew, Peck, Fenton, & Conyon, 1999), 
complexity (Anderson, 1999) and creative (Romme, 2003) perspectives are not reviewed, as here 
analytic attention is instead directed to attributes of the environment such as technology, size and 
uncertainty, rather than the collectivities in which an organisation resides. Transaction cost economics 
is also not explicitly reviewed, as this analytic approach generally conceives of organisational 
collectivities in a similar manner to resource dependence theory, with much of the focus on the 
organisation set (Davis & Powell, 1992; Evan, 1966). Similarly, network approaches (Granovetter, 
1973; Kilduff & Tsai, 2003) are not explicitly developed, as the research on interorganisational 
networks has also tended to follow the logic of resource dependence theory: networks of 
interorganisational resource exchanges confer power and dependence, which in turn motivate 
3 This is by no means the first review of this literature, in particular see Scott & Meyer (1991) and Davis 
& Powell (1992), although it is the first to evaluate the literature in the context of the ecosystem construct. 
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organisations to establish ties with others (Davis & Powell, 1992). Where relevant both transaction cost 
economics and network approaches are noted. 
2.2.1 Resource dependence theory models 
Resource dependency theory is based on the notion that an organisation’s pattern of dependence 
on environmental resources results in external constraints and control (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These 
are determined by the differential power of the heterogeneous organisations that have a relation with 
the focal organisation. A number of models of organisational collectivities have been adopted in 
resource dependency theory, each varying by type of interdependence, unit of analysis and level of 
analysis.  
At the focal firm level, and analogous to the earlier conception of the ‘role-set’ of Merton (1957), 
Evan (1966) suggested the organisation set as the network of organisations in the focal firm’s 
environment. In an organisation set the relations between the focal organisation and its organisation set 
are mediated by the role-sets of its boundary personnel, the flow of information, the flow of product or 
services, and the flow of personnel. Depending on the relative value and scarcity of critical resources 
that are provided within the organisation set, the resulting interorganisational system is a set of power 
and dependence relationships between firms. Compositionally, the organisation set consists of two 
components: the input organisation set consisting of those organisations that supply resources such as 
personnel, materials, capital, legality and legitimacy; while the output organisation set consists of those 
to which the focal organisation supplies a good or a service, such as a market, an audience or a client 
system. Conceptually, the organisation set is a weak model of organisational collectivities because it 
focuses attention on direct connections and flows, and views the environment from the vantage point 
of a single organisation (Scott, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1983).  
Moving beyond the focal firm to consider the network unit of analysis, other models focus instead 
on the relational elements between organisations either expressed as flows or linkages (Scott, 1983). 
For instance, the interorganisational field model focuses on the pattern of relations that link a collection 
of diverse organisations into a common network. This notion is based upon the observation that the 
interaction between any two organisations is affected, in part at least, by the nature of the organisational 
pattern or network in which they find themselves (Warren, 1967). Clark (1965) suggests that these 
interorganisational patterns are neither overtly bureaucratic nor political in nature, characterised instead 
by a less formal structure, looser accountability and shared responsibilities. As such, the patterns of 
interorganisational relations are characterised by social conflict and unstructured authority (Litwak & 
Hylton, 1962), particularly in the arenas of resource procurement and allocation, political advocacy and 
organisational legitimation (Galaskiewicz, 1985). Within these patterns systems of meaning develop, 
including the definition of collective goals and values, and the available methods to pursue objectives 
(Scott, 1983). Normative contexts also exist, varying from the competitive to the cooperative, with 
cooperation ranging from contingent on the demands of the collectivity to a more mandated cooperation 
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(Laumann, Galaskiewicz, & Marsden, 1978). This mandated cooperation has led others to suggest that 
due to the technical interdependence within these interorganisational patterns, coordinating agencies 
emerge to regulate behaviour by communicating pertinent information, adjudicating areas of dispute, 
providing standards of behaviour, and by promoting the common interest (Litwak & Hylton, 1962). 
However, despite the valuable focus on relations and cognitive and normative aspects, the 
interorganisational field model is limited in its usefulness through an analytic concentration on the 
horizontal linkages between organisations, and on connections between organisation within a restricted, 
usually local, geographical area (Scott & Meyer, 1983). 
The organisational collectivity of Van De Ven et al. (1974) also concentrates on horizontal 
linkages between organisations, but is not limited to a restricted geographical area. Viewing the 
environment as a social system, the unit of analysis here is the collectivity of primary productive 
organisations that are technically dependent upon one another. The collective’s orientation is towards 
the attainment of goals that are unattainable by the organisations independently, and require coordinated 
action by the member organisations in the collectivity. Introducing normative elements, they suggest 
that constituent organisations take on specialised roles and develop behavioural expectations of each 
other regarding the rights and obligations of membership within the collective.  
The interorganisational network of Benson (1975), also taking the unit of analysis as the 
network, moves beyond concerns of technical interdependence to consider social and cultural 
interdependence, and also begins to reflect network approaches (see for instance Laumann et al., 1978). 
In addition, it also explicitly includes both vertical and horizontal linkages outside of a limited 
geographic area. Benson conceptualises the interorganisational network as a political economy 
concerned with the distribution of the scarce resources of money and authority. These 
interorganisational networks are emergent and vary widely in structure, ranging from a series of 
organisations linked by multiple direct ties, or characterised by clustering or centred linkages on one or 
more mediating or controlling organisations. In the substructure of an interorganisational network, 
differentially powerful constituent organisations interact in pursuit of scarce resources. Power within 
this substructure derives from both the network structures and patterns of direct linkages, and through 
the patterns of linkage between organisations within the substructure and other organisations, officials 
and publics. The interorganisational superstructure, reflecting social/cultural interdependence 
considerations, consists of the sentiments and interactions of the participating organisations. It is 
characterised by domain consensus on the role and scope of the network, ideological consensus, 
agreement on the appropriate approaches to common or similar tasks, evaluation of quality of work, 
and the coordination of work through the conduct of joint, cooperative, or articulated activities and 
programs. 
Astley and Van De Ven (1983) take a collective action view of the interorganisational network, 
conceiving the collectivity as guided and constructed by collective purpose and choice (c.f. Emery & 
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Trist, 1965). Here the interorganisational network is “a social action system of symbiotically 
interdependent organisations that, over time, take specialised roles within a framework of normative 
expectations that define rights and conduct” (p. 251). These semi-autonomous organisations interact to 
modify their collective environment, working rules and options so as to create a protective social 
environment that displaces the natural environment as the critical influence. The cohesion in these 
networks derives from the functional interdependence, or symbiosis, that develops on the basis of 
complementary differences between the heterogeneous participants. Normative expectations develop 
through the construction of a social environment that permits the network to act as a unit and make 
decisions to attain the collective and individual interests of its member organisations. Power begins to 
play an explicit role as those units responsible for obtaining resources directly from the natural 
environment are able to regulate the conditions essential to the functioning of other units in the network 
that only have indirect relations with this environment. As such, although such resource flows may still 
be characterised as economic exchanges, powerful members of the network are able to define their own 
terms of exchange and impose these on others. They also note a growing dominance of big business at 
the core of interorganisational networks, where artificial social environments are created among a 
community of organisations to ensure immunity from the harsh realities of competition in the natural 
environment. Thus, similar to Litwak and Hylton (1962) and the organisational set model, they suggest 
that interorganisational networks develop mutually beneficial structures that support collective survival.  
Models of organisational collectivities from resource dependency have some resonance to the 
ecosystem construct (see Table 2 below). 
Table 2 – Organisational collectivities relevance to ecosystem construct 
CORE 
THEORY 
NETWORK 
PERSPECTIVE 
VALUE CO-
CREATION 
SUPPORT 
NON-
LOCALITY 
BASED  
POWERFUL 
CENTRAL 
ACTOR 
GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM 
SHARED 
LOGIC 
Resource 
dependence 
Yes Limited Yes Partial Yes Partial 
Organisational 
ecology 
No No Partial No No No 
Institutional Yes Yes Yes Partial Yes Yes 
As resource dependency theory increased in sophistication, it moved from a focus on a focal 
organisation to a focus on collections or networks of organisations, better aligning with the system 
perspective of ecosystems. The conception of interdependence in models of the environment also 
moved from an early focus on geographical proximity to one that was driven by functional concerns, 
further aligning with the non-geographic nature of ecosystems. Moreover, the primary understanding 
of the interdependence between organisations is technical, similar to the focus on technological 
interdependence in ecosystem research. This is complemented by a well-developed consideration of a 
governance system based upon regulative and normative elements, well as a partial recognition of a 
shared logic based upon cognitive aspects. However, models of organisational collectivities in resource 
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dependency theory only partially consider the role of powerful central actors in the collectivity (c.f. 
Astley & Van De Ven, 1983; Litwak & Hylton, 1962), one of the defining attributes of an ecosystem. 
Furthermore, resource dependency theory, with its focus on power relations, is limited in its ability to 
(although not unable to) address the dynamics of value co-creation that typify ecosystems, although 
Van De Ven et al. (1974) began to consider this through their notion of collective attainment of goals. 
These limitations restrict the application of models of organisational collectivities from resource 
dependency theory to develop an organisation theory approach to ecosystems. 
2.2.2 Organisational ecology models 
The organisational ecology approach to collectivities entails a shift in the unit of organisational 
analysis from the network to the population of organisations. Organisational ecology takes a natural 
selection approach (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Astley, 1985; Carroll, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 1977) 
and is primarily concerned with variation and selection processes where the environment selects optimal 
combinations of organisations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). As such the main thrust of the organisational 
ecology approach to the relationship between organisations in collectivities is on the structure and 
composition of the environment (Davis & Powell, 1992). The dominant model here is that of the 
organisational population, which considers aggregate collections of organisations similar in form and 
function (Astley, 1985; Carroll, 1984; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Taking a technical interdependence 
view, the adjustment of organisational forms to environmental conditions is presumed to occur 
primarily through selection rather than adaption processes (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977). As such population ecology models tend to assume that competitive forces dominate 
relations among the units comprising the population, giving little or no attention to cooperative and 
symbiotic relations developing among dissimilar organisations. More recently, given the focus on 
organisational change shaped by alterations in the environment, there has been a convergence of 
organisational ecology and institutional theory (Davis & Powell, 1992; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). In 
doing so the emphasis of technical interdependence has been complemented with a recognition of 
isomorphic institutional pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
In contrast the ‘community ecology’ approach, with the interorganisational community as its 
model of the organisational collectivity, incorporates both competitive and symbiotic (cooperative) 
connections between organisations in similar and diverse populations (Astley, 1985; Carroll, 1984). 
Still utilising variation and selection logic with technical interdependence, the community ecology 
approach considers the emergence of populations of particular organisational forms. Where functional 
ties fuse populations into functionally integrated organisational communities, symbiosis emerges based 
upon the interdependencies between the technologies of different populations (Astley, 1985). As these 
symbiotic interdependencies emerge between populations, new populations branch out from established 
ones to fulfil ancillary roles in which they become dependent on, but non-competitive with, their 
ancestors, and shift resource acquisition from the environment to the community. Thus, echoing 
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contingency and resource dependency theories, wider environmental conditions are seen as both 
constraining the community and shaping the community structure as well as placing internal constraints.  
Models of organisational collectivities from organisational ecology have only limited resonance 
to the ecosystem construct (see Table 2). Integration with the organisational population model is 
conceptually invalid, as the organisational population consists of organisations that are similar in form 
and function, counter to the notion of the ecosystem consisting of a network of heterogeneous 
organisations that co-create value. The analytic focus on variance, selection and retention mechanisms 
within the population also means that governance systems consisting of regulative and normative 
elements, as well as a shared logic, are not considered. Although an interorganisational community 
model of organisational collectivities holds more promise, considering heterogeneous populations and 
their interactions, its applicability is limited by a focus on geographically bounded collection of 
organisations (c.f. Hawley, 1950; Scott, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1983). Furthermore, with their focus on 
the population of organisations (or the community of populations for the interorganisational 
community), community ecology is not able to theoretically account for the existence of a powerful 
central actor or hub firm. As a consequence, organisational ecology models of organisational 
collectivities only have limited resonance with the ecosystem construct.  
2.2.3 Institutional models 
In contrast to previous theories, institutional theory emphasises cultural rather than technical and 
economic forces in organisational change. In particular, institutional theory posits that the institutional 
environment leads to the development of organisational structures that conform to institutional rules 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer et al., 1981; Scott, 1983). Organisational conformity is reflected in a 
consonance with relevant social and behavioural norms as well as established rules, laws, and 
regulations, so that there is a “generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, property or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions” (Scott, 2008; Suchman, 1995b: 574). Building on the more conventional idea of an industry, 
these models tended to focus on cultural elements comprising of both normative and cognitive belief 
systems relevant to the system of organisation, although they also include relational elements (Scott, 
1983). As such the models here tend to emphasise shared conceptions and information and compatible 
structures, and also explicitly emphasise the ‘totality of relevant actors’, including other organisations 
that critically influence performance, including exchange partners, competitors, funding sources and 
regulators (Scott, 2008). 
The industry system of Hirsch (1972, 1985) takes a holistic view of all parties engaged in the 
development, production, and distribution stages of any product or service, and considers the single, 
concrete, and stable network of identifiable and interacting components that constitute the system. In 
doing so the industry system is conceived as an input-output conversion system, and operationally 
entails taking some organisational resource (or set of resources) that enters the industry’s input 
38 
boundary – such as a new product idea – and following it through all the facets of the system until it is 
either discarded or reaches consumers. Structurally it includes production, innovation, investment, 
employment, consumer and regulatory organisations, and deliberately forces the specification of 
interconnections among the sets of institutional, organisational and individual-level variables. In doing 
so it has a focus more on network and relational dimensions (Scott, 1983). 
With a stronger emphasis on cultural elements, the societal sector proposed by Scott and Meyer 
(1983, 1991) consists of the collection of organisations operating in a domain, as identified by the 
similarity of their services, products or functions, and also those organisations that critically influence 
the performance of the focal organisations, such as major suppliers, major customers, owners, 
regulators, funding sources and competitors. The boundaries here are functional, not geographic, with 
the societal sector comprised of participants that are functionally interrelated. The structure and the 
behaviour of an organisation depends on the characteristics of the sector in which it operates, such as 
the dominance of technical or institutional processes, the structure of decision making, and the nature 
of the inter-level controls. 
The business system of Whitley (1992a, b) considers the social modelling of organisations and 
markets. Operating at the level of the nation-state, business systems are concerned with the nature of 
economic activities that are coordinated through managerial hierarchies and how these hierarchies 
organise their cooperative and competitive relations through markets. A business system is thus a 
collection of hierarchy-market relations that become institutionalised in different market economies in 
different ways through the varieties of dominant institutions. They reflect successful patterns of 
business behaviour and understandings of how to achieve economic success that are reproduced and 
reinforced by crucial institutions.  
The interorganisational domain of Trist (1983) is a functional social system that occupies a 
position in social space between society as a whole and the single organisation. It emerges when an 
organisational population engages with a common societal problem in order to insulate themselves from 
the environment turbulence this problem domain causes (Emery & Trist, 1965; Westley & Vredenburg, 
1991). The analytic focus is on collaboration rather than competition (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Trist, 
1977; Westley & Vredenburg, 1991), emphasising the cooperative relationships among organisations 
that rely on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms of control (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000). 
Underlying much of the work on interorganisational domains is negotiated order theory, which 
considers the processes whereby organisations jointly determine the terms of their future interactions 
with one another (Gray, 1989; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Nathan & Mitroff, 1991; Strauss, Schatzman, 
Bucher, Ehrlich, & Satshin, 1963). In an organisational domain a population of organisations agrees on 
the meaning and scope of the problem domain, and then uses various cooperative devices such as 
informal agreements, joint ventures, trade associations and collaboration as mechanisms to shape an 
internal structure that accommodates their partially conflicting interests while securing the common 
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ground of participants (Nathan & Mitroff, 1991; Trist, 1983). As such an interorganisational domain is 
a cognitive as well as an organisational structure. More recently, Hardy and Phillips (1998) have 
emphasised notions of power and legitimacy, noting that formal power, scarce or critical resources and 
discursive legitimacy all influence the dynamics of an interorganisational domain. These can be 
particularly relevant when a domain is under-organised due to a lack of convergence around key values 
or the exclusion of relevant stakeholders, or both (Hardy, 1994; Nathan & Mitroff, 1991). In such 
domains exist ‘referent organisations’, which enable purposeful action to be taken in the name of the 
domain through the provision of regulation, a long term view and supporting infrastructure (Trist, 
1983). A related concept is the ‘bridging organisation’ which spans the social gaps among organisations 
and constituencies to enable coordinated action (Westley & Vredenburg, 1991). The referent 
organisation must provide appropriate leadership, finding mechanisms to integrate organisations that 
are widely disparate in wealth, power, culture, language, values, interests and structural characteristics, 
without usurping the functions of the constituent organisations (Trist, 1983; Westley & Vredenburg, 
1991). Phillips et al. (2000) have explicitly linked the interorganisational domain with the organisational 
field, pointing out institutionalisation and collaboration are interdependent, as institutional fields 
provide the rules and resources upon which collaboration is constructed, while collaboration provides 
a context for the on-going processes of structuration that sustain the organisational fields of the 
participants. 
The most common model of an organisational collectivity in institutional theory, and perhaps 
organisation theory in general, is the organisational field of DiMaggio and Powell (1983).4 The 
organisational field builds upon both the ‘life space’ concept of Lewin (1951), emphasising the mutual 
interdependence of the elements and forces surrounding an individual, and the ‘field’ of Bourdieu 
(1977), which considers “both the totality of actors and organisations involved in an arena of social or 
cultural production and the dynamic relationships among them” (DiMaggio, 1979:p. 1463). In their 
seminal paper DiMaggio and Powell (1983) defined the organisational field as “those organisations 
that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organisations that produce the similar services or 
products” (p. 148). Thus the organisational field has much similarity with both the industry system, 
societal sector and interorganisational domain in terms of composition – it includes the totality of 
relevant actors, both those who compete for the same resources as well as those who interact with the 
producer organisations, such as exchange partners, customers, competitors, intermediary actors, 
regulators, funding agents (Scott, 2008). An organisational field is agnostic as to whether it is 
4 Although the term ‘institutional field’ has also been used in the past, it has been replaced by the term 
‘organisational field’ (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008); following Davis and Marquis (2005) I consider the two terms 
interchangeable. 
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constituted by organisations, individuals or other combinations of actors (Anand & Jones, 2008; Davis 
& Marquis, 2005). 
An organisational field consists of a relational space, a meaning system and a set of rules (Hardy 
& Maguire, 2010). Put differently, an organisational field has “two constitutive elements: a set of 
institutions, including practices, understandings, and rules; and, a network of organisations” (Lawrence 
& Phillips, 2004: 692). More generally, the institutional element can be considered having regulatory, 
normative and cognitive dimensions (Scott, 2008). The regulative and normative dimensions are 
reflected in a governance system that consists of the established rules, role and assumptions that govern 
the interaction among participants of the field (Garud et al., 2002; Scott, 2008). These governance 
systems are composed of a combination of public and private actors that coordinate the relations 
between actors (Scott, 2008). For the cognitive dimension, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) originally 
noted that within organisational fields there develops “a mutual awareness among participants in a set 
of organisations that they are involved in a common enterprise” (p. 148). This was elaborated by 
Friedland and Alford (1991) who, introducing the symbolic element to institutional theory, noted 
institutions have a central logic – a set of material practices and symbols – which constitutes its 
organising principles and which is available to organisations and individuals to elaborate. Institutional 
logics are hence the belief systems and associated practices that predominate in an organisational field 
(Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000). Put differently, an institutional logic is a field’s shared 
understanding of the goals to be pursued and how they are to be pursued (Battilana, Leca, & 
Boxenbaum, 2009). Closely related to discursive practices (Levy & Scully, 2007; Phillips et al., 2004), 
institutional logics are symbolically grounded, organisationally structured, politically defended, and 
technically and materially constrained (Friedland & Alford, 1991). As such they define and stabilise 
the identities and interactions of the institutional actors (Scott, 2008). Complementing this approach has 
been the application of the cultural frame, adopted from social movement theory (Benford & Snow, 
2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Thus Fligstein (2001) notes that an organisational 
field refers to situations where organised groups of actors gather and frame their actions with respect to 
each other, emphasising the linkage to social movements. Others have introduced the notion of ‘field-
level frames’ where networks of organisations collectively mobilise to create interweaving structures 
of meaning and resources into their wider cultural and political context (Lounsbury et al., 2003). Frames 
are thus closely related to the institutional logic of how things are interpreted and represented, and 
connects to considerations of how things are to be done (Scott, 2008).  
The second constitutive element of an organisational field is a network of organisations. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) emphasise that the relations between organisations in an organisational 
field reflect both direct and indirect ties, as well as positional similarity, leading to “interorganisational 
structures of dominance and patterns of coalition” (p. 148). These interorganisational structures 
influence the power of an organisation or set of organisations to capture or direct the actions of the 
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organisational field (Fligstein, 1991). Fields are therefore comprised of the specific structures of social 
networks that create power differences between firms and status hierarchies (Beckert, 2010). Taking 
the institutional and network elements together, organisational fields can be viewed as a network of 
actors within a contingently stable alignment of material, organisational and discursive forces (Levy & 
Scully, 2007).  
Institutional theory-based models of organisational collectivities, and the organisational field in 
particular, resonate with the ecosystem construct (see Table 2). Specifically, the organisational field 
considers the network of actors that are not geographically bounded, and also has a governance system 
consisting of regulative and normative elements, as well as a shared logic, that describes the interaction 
of the actors in the field. As an organisational field refers to situations where organised groups of actors 
gather and frame their actions with respect to each other (Fligstein, 2001), theoretically the 
organisational field is able to support notions of value co-creation. Institutional theory also 
acknowledges the role of powerful central actors in the field (see for instance Scott & Meyer, 1983; 
Trist, 1983), however the organisational field in general has tended to dwell on the relative power of 
different actors in a field as distinct to the dominant actors themselves (see for instance Beckert, 2010; 
Brint & Karabel, 1991; Fligstein, 1991; Hardy & Phillips, 1998). Thus, although dominant central actors 
are not central to theorising in the organisational field, this model of organisational collectivities has 
the potential to consider powerful central actors. 
Above I have reviewed the models of organisational collectivities in organisation theory in the 
context of the main theories of organisation, outlining how organisational ecology has a limited 
resonance with the ecosystem construct, resource dependency theory some resonance, and institutional 
theory the most resonance. As such, institutional theory, and the organisational field in particular, 
provides useful models of organisational collectivities and their interdependencies, which can be used 
to develop an organisation theory approach to ecosystems. 
2.3 The ecosystem as a fifth facet 
Moving beyond the identification of institutional models of organisational collectivities as the 
most applicable to the ecosystem construct, I now argue that an ecosystem is a type of organisational 
field as it also consists of those same network and institutional elements that are the defining 
characteristics of an organisational field (Lawrence & Phillips, 2004). By introducing institutional 
theory to our understanding of ecosystems, I am not arguing that an ecosystem should be considered an 
institution, although in some cases a hub firm has become institutionalised – consider the iconic status 
that Apple Inc has achieved.5 
5 Although even in this case one cannot be certain if it is Apple as a hub firm or its ecosystem that is the 
institution. 
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Emphasising the alignment between the organisation field and the ecosystem construct are the 
constituent participants, with both comprising of the ‘totality’ of actors, including suppliers, 
complementors, customers, competitors, universities, regulators, judiciary, and standard setting bodies 
(see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Iansiti & Levien, 2004a; Scott, 2008; Teece, 2007). Moreover, for both 
constructs these participants are viewed as being embedded in a network which influences the power of 
each participant to capture or direct the actions of the organisational field or ecosystem (see Adner & 
Kapoor, 2010; Beckert, 2010; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1991; Iansiti & Levien, 2004a). 
Similarly, both ecosystems and organisational fields have governance systems which consist of 
regulative and normative elements (see Adner, 2012; Garud et al., 2002; Gulati et al., 2012; Iansiti & 
Levien, 2004a; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Scott, 2008). Both the ecosystem construct and the 
organisational field construct also have a cognitive element  – a central logic which constitutes its 
organising principles and which is available to organisations and individuals to elaborate (see Friedland 
& Alford, 1991; Gulati et al., 2012; Scott et al., 2000). Put differently, both the ecosystem construct and 
the organisational field construct emphasise a shared understanding of the goals to be pursued and how 
they are to be pursued (see Adner, 2012; Battilana et al., 2009; Gulati et al., 2012). In summary, an 
ecosystem is a type of organisational field in that it has the same network, governance and institutional 
logics characteristics as an organisational field.  
An important point of differentiation is the analytic focus of the ecosystem construct, in that an 
ecosystem is a dynamic and purposive value-creating network in which the participants co-create value. 
In contrast, theorisations of the organisational field have not developed the notion of co-creation of 
value. Instead, in its initial formulation, the analytic focus of the organisational field construct (and also 
for the industry system and societal sector) has been on a common industry: ‘those organisations that 
in the aggregate … produce similar services or products’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: p. 148; emphasis 
added). As theorisations of the organisational field have developed (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008), this 
analytic focus has extended to include those organisations that share common technologies (Garud et 
al., 2002), social issues (Hoffman, 1999), and markets (Beckert, 2010).  
Importantly, this analytic focus underpins the recognised area of institutional life to which the 
organisational field relates, and which demarcates its boundary (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As an 
organisational field only exists to the extent that it is institutionally defined by its constituent members 
(Fligstein, 2001; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lounsbury et al., 2003; Scott, 2008), to be a recognised 
area of institutional life a domain must be acknowledged as such by the constituent actors. This 
acknowledgment is not an objective recognition by an impartial observer but instead a subjective 
recognition by the field participants. Consequently, the formulation of an institutional field does not 
exclude the possibility that other areas of institutional life can be considered organisational fields, so 
long as the constituent members recognise it as such. Each of the analytic foci identified above – 
common industry, common technologies, issues and markets – considers that organisational fields are 
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networks of organisations which share a set of institutions; however, for each the participants have 
differing subjective recognised areas of institutional life. Therefore, rather than consider these as 
different types of organisational fields, these extensions should be considered as different facets (or 
aspects), with each aspect addressing a different recognised area of institutional life. Put differently, an 
organisational field is a multi-faceted construct that applies to heterogeneous recognised areas of 
institutional life. Each facet is detailed below: 
• The first facet of the organisational field has a common industry as its recognised area of 
institutional life, and is perhaps the most common within institutional theory. This facet 
requires little elaboration as it is the founding conception of the organisation field, and 
encompasses the “key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and 
other organisations that produce the similar services or products” (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983:p. 148).  
• The second facet considers common technologies as its recognised area of institutional life 
(Garud et al., 2002; Garud & Karnoe, 2001). No technology exists in a vacuum; instead for 
successful adoption a technology requires a defined institutional space with rules that govern 
the production, distribution, and consumption of associated artefacts (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991; Dosi, 1982; Garud et al., 2002; Rosenberg, 1982; Van De Ven & Garud, 1994). The 
technological facet considers an organisational field to be the pattern between humans and 
technological artefacts related to a given product-market domain, and which provide the 
institutional environment for the production, use, and interaction among human and 
organisational agents and technological artefacts (Garud et al., 2002). In doing so this facet 
explicitly introduces the notions of the technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982) and dominant 
design (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Anderson & Tushman, 1990), where networks of 
organisations institutionalise design choices and standards of value (Kaplan & Murray, 2010; 
Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1994) which shape the broad direction of technological progress. 
• The third facet of the organisational field has social issues as its recognised area of 
institutional life. Hoffman (1999) introduced this facet in their study of environmentalism 
and the U.S. chemical industry, specifically noting that an organisational field is “the centre 
of common channels of dialogue and discussion” (p. 352), and more than just common 
industries or common technologies. More recently Glynn (2008) has argued that in Olympic 
host cities, given that the Olympics are an event that needs to be understood, managed, 
strategised, resolved and realised, institutionalised meanings can fortify and change the 
relationships within a field. With its focus on issues, this facet explicitly recognises the 
enabling and constraining attributes of the organisational field in social movement theory 
(McAdam & Scott, 2005; Rao et al., 2000), viewing the organisational field as an ‘arena of 
power relations’ (Brint & Karabel, 1991). In particular, Rao et al. (2000) point out that 
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organisational fields define the nature of the social contention. For instance, if a social 
movement arises in an interstice between two fields, movements are able to produce new 
organisational forms by bundling together particular sets of practices. If instead the social 
movement arises within a hierarchical field characterised by a distinct dominance order, the 
movement will generally assume a ‘conflict orientation’ as it is an organised attempt to 
modify the existing order. Finally, if a movement emerges within a fragmented field where 
the elites are disorganised and there is no centre of power, then it will meet with support 
rather than contention. 
• A fourth facet includes the market as its recognised area of institutional life (Anand & 
Peterson, 2000; Beckert, 2010). This facet considers that in competitive fields the market 
serves as a magnet around which groups of actors consolidate, and that cognition occurs 
through the creation, distribution, and interpretation of a web of information about the 
‘market’ (Anand & Peterson, 2000). As such markets are here understood as arenas of social 
interaction for the exchange of goods and services, comprising of specific social network 
structures that create power differences between firms and status hierarchies (Beckert, 2010). 
The network structure positions organisations and individual actors in a structural space, 
institutional rules anchor the relative force of actors supporting certain types of behaviour 
while discouraging others, and cognitive frames provide the mental organisation of the social 
environment and thereby contribute to the order of market fields.  
Recognising each of these four facets, I argue that the ecosystem should be considered a fifth 
facet of the organisational field construct, where value co-creation acts as the fifth recognised area of 
institutional life. As the review of the ecosystem literature above outlines (see Section 2.1), ecosystem 
participants explicitly recognise that they are members of an ecosystem. Furthermore, there is a 
distinctive institutional logic and collective identity based around value co-creation, meaning that an 
ecosystem can also be considered as having a discrete recognised area of institutional life – that of value 
co-creation. The emphasis on value co-creation and the recognition of all participants that together they 
are co-creating value means that the ecosystem area of institutional life differs from each of the four 
already identified facets. Although the ecosystem differs markedly from the third facet, a common 
social issue as the recognised area of institutional life, it has similarities for each of the others that 
require more explanation.  
The first facet encompasses the totality of participants that produce similar services or products 
(or a common industry). In contrast, an emphasis on value co-creation requires that an ecosystem 
encompass a cross-industry network of producers of many different types of goods and services that 
can be combined into different combinations. Furthermore, as multiple ecosystems can exist within the 
same industry (for example the Apple iOS, Blackberry OS, Google Android and Microsoft Windows 
Phone ecosystems), it does not include all the organisations that create the common good or service, 
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only those that are within a particular ecosystem. As such, the ecosystem has a recognised area of 
institutional life that is both narrower than the recognised area of institutional life of a common industry, 
as it may only contain a subset of the population of the organisations that make a particular good or 
service, yet simultaneously broader in that it contains organisations from the heterogeneous industries 
that create completely different goods and services that are required for value co-creation. Although the 
ecosystem could be considered as a subset of the first facet, the focus on value co-creation means that 
the ecosystem requires that it be considered a distinct area of institutional life – the participants 
recognise that they are partaking in a domain that is different to an industry – and consequently a new 
facet. 
The second facet has common technologies as its recognised area of institutional life, where there 
is an interdependency between participating organisations, technology and institutions (Garud et al., 
2002). An ecosystem also incorporates technological elements, as value co-creation requires 
complementarity and co-specialisation of the operating and technological assets of the participating 
organisations. In a similar fashion to a technological field, ecosystem participants are jointly 
interdependent on the underlying technology and institutions that coordinate their action. However, to 
consider the ecosystem as an exemplar of the technological facet would over-emphasise the 
technological aspects of the ecosystem, obscuring both the emphasis on value co-creation and the 
market dynamics. In contrast, by considering the ecosystem as a fifth facet, the emphasis on value co-
creation moves analytic attention from the relationship of the organisations to the technology to broader 
considerations of product and service co-delivery, and to customer and system level value co-creation.  
The fourth facet has a common market as the recognised are of institutional life, where there is 
an interdependency between social actors, institutions and market-specific cultural frames (Beckert, 
2010). In ecosystems the transactional relationships between participants are often undertaken through 
market transactions, with the ecosystem often consisting of a multi-sided market. However, although 
an ecosystem has market dynamics, the logic of mutual exchange operates differently from that of 
markets and hierarchies, as value co-creation is driven by collaboration (Phillips et al., 2000) where 
there are investments in relation-specific assets, substantial knowledge exchange, and non-market 
governance mechanisms (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Furthermore, to consider the ecosystem an exemplar of 
the market facet would obscure the dynamics of value co-creation and the technological 
interdependencies that characterise the ecosystem. By considering the ecosystem as a fifth facet, the 
emphasis on value co-creation moves analytic attention from the market relationships of the 
organisations to broader considerations of organisational interdependence. 
Summarising, the existence of a value-creating network, a governance system and a shared logic 
suggest that the ecosystem should be considered an organisational field. Furthermore, as participants of 
an ecosystem explicitly recognise that they are members of an ecosystem, where there is a distinctive 
institutional logic and collective identity based around value co-creation, an ecosystem can be 
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considered a fifth facet of the organisational field with a discrete and distinguishable recognised area of 
institutional life. The emphasis on value co-creation and the recognition of all participants that together 
they are co-creating value means that the ecosystem area of institutional life differs from each of the 
other four facets. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter first reviewed the characteristics of the ecosystem construct, deriving six attributes 
that are relevant to an evaluation of the models of organisational collectivities and the subsequent 
selection of an appropriate organisational theory approach to ecosystems. I reviewed models of 
organisational collectivities utilised within resource dependency theory, organisational ecology and 
institutional theory, and assessed their resonance with the ecosystem construct. Culminating in the 
review of the organisational field, I argued that models of organisational collectivities within 
institutional theory have the most relevance to the ecosystem construct. I then argued that an ecosystem 
can be considered an organisational field, as it consists of a network of organisations, a governance 
system and institutional logic. Considering the analytic focus of the organisational field construct, I 
identified four facets of the organisational field, where each facet is based upon a different recognised 
area of institutional life, and argued that the ecosystem is a fifth facet which has value co-creation as 
the recognised area of institutional life.  
The next chapter develops this theoretical perspective further, synthesising insights from 
dominant design, social movement and institutional entrepreneurship theories to derive four activities 
that drive ecosystem emergence.  
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3 ACTIVITIES OF ECOSYSTEM EMERGENCE 
This chapter synthesises the institutional formation and change literatures of dominant design 
theory, social movement theory, and institutional entrepreneurship theory to propose four activities of 
ecosystem emergence. I first review each of the three literatures, emphasising their relevance to the 
analysis of ecosystem emergence, and then detail the four activities – resource, technological, 
institutional and contextual. 
Very early on Meyer and Rowan (1977) defined ‘institutionalisation’ as the means by which 
social processes, obligations and actualities come to take on a rule-like status in social thought and 
action. More specifically related to organisational fields, institutionalisation can be understood as the 
process by which rules move from being abstractions to being constitutive of repeated patterns of 
interaction (Fligstein, 2001). These institutionalisation processes include the origins, reproduction and 
erosion of institutional practices and organisational forms (DiMaggio, 1988; Jepperson, 1991). It is 
arbitrary to distinguish between the processes that create institutions and those that change them, as 
institutions do not emerge from a vacuum but always challenge, replace or borrow from existing ones 
(Holm, 1995; Scott, 2008). The difference is in the focus – if attention is addressed to the formation of 
new rules, understandings and associated practices, then it is institutional formation (Scott, 2008). As 
this thesis investigates the emergence processes of ecosystems, the focus is upon institutional formation 
rather than change. 
There is remarkably little literature on organisational field formation and the mechanisms which 
bring together the actors and relationships (Anand & Jones, 2008; Powell, White, Koput, & Owen-
Smith, 2005). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have proposed a four step process that leads to the 
emergence of mutual awareness of participants, focusing on the emergence of a collective rationality. 
First there is an increase in the extent of interaction among organisations in the field, which is followed 
by the emergence of sharply defined interorganisational structures of domination and patterns of 
coalition. As a consequence, the third stage consists of an increase in the informational load with which 
organisations must contend, which then results in the fourth stage, the development of a mutual 
awareness among participants in a set of organisations that they are involved in a common enterprise. 
In contrast, Bourdieu (1993) focuses on conflict as the driving principle of emergence, where the 
competitive forces arise due to the resource limitations in any field (DiMaggio, 1979). Field participants 
are in a constant struggle to secure and improve upon their social position, through the acquisition of 
economic, cultural, social or symbolic capital to overcome the constraints of their social position 
(Anand & Jones, 2008; Battilana et al., 2009). Together these two approaches suggest that the processes 
of field formation involve increased interaction and communication, development of a sense of 
interested in common issues, facilitate systems of dominance, and allow for the acquisition of economic, 
cultural, social or symbolic capital of the participating actors (Anand & Jones, 2008). 
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Organisational field formation can either be naturalistic or agent-based (Scott, 2008). Naturalistic 
institutionalisation derives from the work of Berger and Luckmann (1966) who stressed the unconscious 
ways in which activities are habitualised and reciprocally interpreted, as a natural and undirected 
process. Examples of this naturalistic approach is organisational ecology, where increasing organisation 
density as a function of increasing legitimacy (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), and the studies of diffusion 
processes of institutional reforms (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). More recently, Dorado (2005) has proposed 
uncoordinated collective action as ‘institutional partaking’, where institutional change results as the 
autonomous actions of countless agents converging over time, where no single individual or 
organisation can be responsible for the change. 
In contrast, an agent-based view stresses the importance of particular actors or groups of actors 
as causal agents. Van De Ven and Hargrave (2004) differentiate between collective action (for groups 
of actors) and institutional design (for individual actors) in the emergence of an organisational field. 
Collective action, based on a dialectical motor and recently called ‘institutional conflict’ by Zietsma 
and Lawrence (2010), focuses on the social and political processes that facilitate and constrain the 
development of a technological innovation or social movement through the institutions that emerge. In 
contrast, institutional design is concerned with the actions that an individual actor can take to create or 
change institutional arrangements. Termed ‘institutional innovation’ by Zietsma and Lawrence (2010), 
institutional design views institutional formation as driven by a teleological motor. Here, the actors are 
generally called ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ (DiMaggio, 1988; Scott, 2008). 
One theory of collective action driven institutional formation and change is dominant design 
theory, which addresses the technological elements and stability of an ecosystem, vital to digital 
services. Dominant design theory provides a theoretical logic that argues that the characteristics of a 
dominant technical design are rarely determined on technological grounds alone but instead are socially 
and institutionally constructed (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Tushman & Murmann, 1998; Tushman & 
Rosenkopf, 1992; Van De Ven & Garud, 1993). A second theory of collective action driven institutional 
formation and change is social movement theory, which provides the means to understand how the 
actions of groups of individuals can create and change institutions (Davis & McAdam, 2000; McAdam 
& Scott, 2005). A third theoretical approach, instead focused on individual driven institutional 
formation and change is institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1988; Garud et al., 2002). 
Institutional entrepreneurship enables specific consideration of the actions of a particular agent, and 
provides insight into the discursive and legitimation processes that occur in institutional formation.  
Each of these theories is applicable to the entrepreneurial activities involved in ecosystem 
emergence. For instance, in dominant design theory a technological discontinuity is often triggered by 
new entrepreneurial organisations and associated with increased environmental turbulence (Henderson 
& Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). In addition, entrepreneurs in nascent industries and 
ecosystem emergence contexts need to gain cognitive and socio-political legitimacy (Rao, 1994), and 
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in attempting to obtain this, the interactions between firms take on a social movement-like character 
(Swaminathan & Wade, 2001). An entrepreneur can also act in the role of an institutional entrepreneur 
– i.e., as an agent who purposefully introduces changes into the institutional setup (Battilana et al., 
2009). Not all entrepreneurs take on this role, however, as entrepreneurs can either imitate existing 
business models or generate new ones (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). It is only when an entrepreneur introduces 
a new business model whose ‘institutional logic’ diverges from the existing institutional setup that he 
or she can be considered an institutional entrepreneur. In a similar vein, entrepreneurs can also act as 
institutional entrepreneurs when the commercialisation of a technology requires the introduction of new 
economic logics and institutional set-ups (Kaplan & Murray, 2010). Key here is not that parts of the 
technology itself are socially constructed (e.g., when it comes to defining the meanings and uses of the 
technology), but also, that many economic factors too are socially constructed, and consequently, 
entrepreneurs introducing novel business models also seek to instantiate novel institutional logics to the 
ecosystem.  
Given the applicability of each theory to discerning the activities that underpin ecosystem 
emergence, each is now reviewed below. 
3.1 Dominant design theory 
Dominant design theory is primarily concerned with industry and technological evolution and its 
effect on firm performance. There are two main questions that are considered generally in the literature: 
what are the factors that influence a dominant design? And, will a dominant design emerge? Originally 
discussing technological innovations (in particular product and process innovation), as dominant design 
theory has developed it has explicitly included economic, strategic and institutional determinants and 
causality in its explanations.  
The notion of the dominant design is well established in the literature, and is generally considered 
applicable to a wide range of technology, from non-assembled to simple assembled products, and closed 
and open assembled systems (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). Although 
others have limited the use of the dominant design concept to more complex production processes 
(Abernathy & Utterback, 1978), complex assembled products (Suarez & Utterback, 1995), and complex 
systemic technologies (Nelson, 1994), the concept is currently considered applicable to virtually any 
technology. The dominant design concept itself has been used at a variety of levels of analysis, such as 
product, component or subsystem (Murmann & Frenken, 2006; Tushman & Murmann, 1998). At the 
product level, dominant designs are ‘a single bundle package of innovations’ (Tushman & Murmann, 
1998), such as the DC-3 airplane (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978), container glass (Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986) and typewriters, calculators and TV sets (Suarez & Utterback, 1995). At the 
component level, dominant designs can be microprocessors (Anderson & Tushman, 1990), transistors 
(Suarez & Utterback, 1995) and hard drives (Christensen, Suarez, & Utterback, 1998). With increasing 
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interest in modularity and system architectures, the unit of analysis has also been sub-systems, linkages 
and design hierarchies (Baldwin & Clark, 1997; Clark, 1985; Henderson & Clark, 1990). Murmann and 
Frenken (2006) also identified some studies that span different levels of analysis, and others have 
identified multiple level dominant design strategies (Funk, 2003). To reconcile these multiple-levels of 
analysis, technology has been considered as a system with a nested hierarchy of technology cycles 
(Tushman & Murmann, 1998), incorporating both modularity and design hierarchies (Baldwin & Clark, 
1997; Clark, 1985). Emphasis has also shifted to a consideration of core and peripheral subsystems, 
where core components are those components that affect many functions by their changes (Murmann 
& Frenken, 2006; Tushman & Murmann, 1998). This consideration of core and peripheral subsystems 
reflects notions of platform-centric ecosystems, where the system is partitioned into low- and high-
variety components (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009).  
Dominant design emergence is an evolutionary process (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). Initiated 
by a technological discontinuity, there is an era of intense technical variation and selection culminating 
in a single dominant design, which is then followed by a period of incremental progress until the next 
technological discontinuity (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Dosi, 1982; 
Sahal, 1981; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). A technological discontinuity may either forward the 
performance frontier along the parameter of interest by a significant amount or change the product or 
process design rather than merely enlarging the scale of existing designs (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). 
Technological discontinuities are often based upon a different set of engineering and scientific 
principles, which lead to major product and process technological breakthroughs that open up an entire 
new market (Dess & Beard, 1984; Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Ettlie, Bridges, & O'Keefe, 1984; Henderson 
& Clark, 1990). Tushman and Anderson (1986) differentiate between technological discontinuities that 
are either competence-enhancing or competence-destroying. Competence-enhancing discontinuities are 
order-of-magnitude improvements that build upon existing know-how, and are generally initiated by 
existing firms. A competence-destroying discontinuity is fundamentally different to the existing 
technology so that the existing skills, production process and competences of the organisation are 
generally initiated by new firms. For instance, an architectural innovation destroys the usefulness of 
architectural knowledge, and since architectural knowledge tends to become embedded in the structure 
and information-processing procedures of firms, this destruction is difficult for existing firms to 
recognise and correct (Christensen et al., 1998; Henderson & Clark, 1990).  
With the arrival of a technological discontinuity, there is environmental turbulence and resource 
munificence (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 1986), leading to an era of variation, 
during which time there is uncoordinated process and product performance maximisation, reflected in 
multiple competing product designs, non-standardised manufacturing processes, and generalised 
production capital. Competition between firms at this point is between designs of the products. As the 
technology matures, product performance stabilises around a particular product design and process 
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innovation is at its greatest. The stabilisation around a particular product design is influenced by a wide 
range of institutional, technological and economic factors such as the rate of technological change (Lee, 
O'Neal, Pruett, & Thomas, 1995), nature of the technological field (Suarez, 2004), appropriability 
regime (Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991; Lee et al., 1995; Suarez, 2004), regulation (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Lee et al., 1995; Suarez, 2004; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992), product radicalness (Srinivasan, 
Lilien, & Rangaswamt, 2006), availability of complementary assets (Schilling, 2009; Teece, 1986), 
participation in coalitions (Cusumano, Mylonadis, & Rosenbloom, 1992; Smith, 1996; Soh, 2010), 
installed base and switching costs (Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991; Schilling, 2009; Suarez, 2004), 
economies of scale (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Christensen et al., 1998; Lee et al., 1995; Tushman 
& Anderson, 1986), network externalities (Lee et al., 1995; Murmann & Frenken, 2006; Suarez, 2004), 
firm resources (Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991; Schilling, 2009; Smith, 1996), firm capabilities (Lee et 
al., 1995; Schilling, 2009), and firm reputation and credibility (Cusumano et al., 1992; Hariharan & 
Prahalad, 1991; Khazam & Mowery, 1994; Suarez, 2004). Taken together, each of these factors has an 
influence on one design being selected over another.  
An aspect of design selection is the functional characteristics of the technology and how it meets 
the required dimensions of merit (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Christensen et al., 1998; Suarez & 
Utterback, 1995). This aspect considers how effective a particular design is as compared to others for a 
given parameter of interest. However, a product design that meets all the required dimensions of merit 
is generally a compromise, as a single technical design rarely dominates others on all dimensions of 
merit (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). As such the selection of the dominant design becomes a function 
of both the dimensions of merit of the technology, as well as a negotiated socio-political and institutional 
process, as competing technical communities debate between the feasible technical and economic 
options (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). This is particularly salient where 
the product is complex with many technological uncertainties (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992), or where 
there are network externalities at work (Wade, 1995).  
A synthesis of Rosenkopf & Tushman (1994) and Tushman & Murmann (1998) provides a non-
formal descriptive account of the social construction logic. The social construction of a dominant design 
begins when a technological discontinuity affects the dimensions of merit, as well as the mechanism 
for measuring these dimensions of merit. This dissolution of the dimension identification and 
measurement mechanism spurs the introduction of new firms, inter-organisational relationships, and 
affiliations that span industry boundaries. More specifically, the movement of new members enables 
the reformation of the old interorganisational networks. These organisational, inter-organisational and 
institutional activities hence create a context within which competing technologies are selected, such as 
developing the markets and matching technological variants to them. Thus, accompanying emergence 
of new technological variants and actors, is the development of a social system within which these 
actors interact. As technological variants compete, the social system evolves clusters around competing 
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variants, and this interorganisational action drives technological competition and eventually defines the 
selection event. This occurs through the determination of the appropriate dimensions of merit as well 
as the mechanism to measure the technological variants along these dimensions. This convergence on 
a set of technical attributes is matched by an interorganisational convergence of the technical 
community. Put differently, the selection of dominant design has not only technical level effects but 
also social system level effects: critical problems are defined, legitimate procedures are developed, 
technical puzzles are solved and social system norms and values emerge (Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998; 
Van De Ven & Garud, 1989).  
These technological communities adjudicate on the process of technological evolution by 
selecting the critical dimensions of merit, driving the standardisation of the design, and creating 
legitimacy and promoting stability through the consensus building (Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1994, 1998; 
Tushman & Murmann, 1998). During this adjudication process there is a reciprocal interaction between 
beliefs, the technological artefacts and evaluation routines of the individual participants and the group 
as the community alights upon the design (Garud & Rappa, 1994). This reciprocal interaction between 
the frame of reference and the collective frame influences the technological choices of the actors, such 
as user adoption, producer investment or institutional support (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). As such a 
dominant design emerges as part of a negotiated collective frame, where a negotiation process, 
consisting of the interactions of the interpretive processes of producers, users and institutions, shapes 
the emergence of a collective technological frame (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). Thus a dominant design 
reflects a set of technical, social and political constraints (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & 
Murmann, 1998). 
The selection and retention of a standard technical design is the ‘dominant design’ (Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978) or a ‘technological guidepost’ (Sahal, 1981). A key transition point between the era 
of ferment and the era of incremental change, once a dominant design emerges, the uncertainty 
associated with competing design approaches disappears and the subsequent technical progress 
elaborates on the selected design, shaping the broad general direction of technical advances. Processes 
become systemic, and production variety and costs are minimised through economies of scale. These, 
and any network externalities, mean that the design that initially acquires a lead in the market will 
emerge as a the dominant design through an inexorable economic logic (Klepper, 1997; Murmann & 
Frenken, 2006; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975; Wade, 1995). A similar notion of technological 
trajectories was introduced by Dosi (1982), which are broader in scale in that they represent the whole 
technology rather than a design, better echoing the broader scale of scientific paradigms introduced by 
Kuhn (1962). There is thus a cycle of variation, selection and retention, initiated by a technological 
discontinuity, where the dominant design selected provides the operational principles for a product or 
service (Murmann & Frenken, 2006). 
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Overall, the emergence of a dominant design represents a key transition point in the evolution of 
a technological field, where the industry moves from high variety in product designs to an industry that 
has coalesced around a particular architecture of a set of core components. In the process technical 
communities adjudicate on the dimensions of merit and collectively negotiate a standard technical 
design, legitimate processes and a cognitive frame for future incremental innovation. As ecosystems 
are complex value co-creation systems, characterised by technological interdependence, dominant 
design theory provides insight into the determinants and processes of the technological aspects of 
ecosystems. This approach is reinforced by the similar scope of the participants involved in dominant 
design emergence and ecosystems, including suppliers, complementors, distributors, users, government 
and educational bodies (Iansiti & Levien, 2004b; Teece, 2007; Tushman & Murmann, 1998). Moreover, 
the recognition of the reciprocal interplay between technology, frames and routines in the community 
that results in dominant design selection suggests a variety of technological, economic and social 
activities of ecosystem emergence. As such dominant design provides insight into the technological 
design, delivery and operation of value co-creation and the product(s) or service(s) around which the 
ecosystem is organised. 
3.2 Social movement theory 
Social movement theory is primarily concerned with understanding the origins and processes of 
collective action in society, and has a long tradition within sociology that focuses on social process 
(McAdam & Scott, 2005). In general social movement research has focused on two questions: what is 
the mix of factors that gives rise to a movement? And, what form will the movement take? Beginning 
from an early focus on the motivations of an individual participant, social movement theory has 
subsequently developed to include institutional, political, structural, organisational, and cognitive 
elements.  
As a sociological theory of institutional change, social movement theory has examined large, 
society-wide movements aimed at affecting politics, in particular those change efforts that require the 
conscious mobilisation of marginalised and disenfranchised constituents (McAdam & Scott, 2005). 
Social movements can be differentiated into identity and instrumental movements (Rao, Monin, & 
Durand, 2003). Instrumental movements seek to redress injustices, challenge economic and political 
structures, and strive for policy impact in the form of new laws or governance structures. By contrast, 
identity movements seek autonomy rather than justice, and arise in opposition to the dominant cultural 
codes. They consist of a ‘we-feeling’ sustained through interactions among participants, expressed 
through cultural materials such as names, narratives, symbols and rituals.  
Key factors considered within social movement theory include the source of political opportunity 
(Tilly, 1978), the mobilisation of people and resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), the construction and 
reconstruction of purposes and identities (Benford & Snow, 2000; Cohen, 1985), and the crafting of 
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ideologies and cultural frames to support and sustain collective action (Snow et al., 1986). These have 
been incorporated into three broad interrelated factors that make up social movements and collective 
action in general. These are known as political opportunity structure, mobilising structures, and framing 
processes.  
The political opportunity structure consists of the political opportunities and constraints facing 
the movement, which generally emerge through shifts in external political structure (Davis & McAdam, 
2000; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). For a political opportunity to be salient and provide a 
stimulus, people need at least to feel aggrieved and/or threatened by some aspect of their life, and at 
least minimally optimistic that acting collectively they can address the problem (McAdam et al., 1996). 
The political opportunity structure also constrains potential collective action, as it acts as a moderating 
factor of the success of the social movement by restricting the types of activities and actions that can be 
conducted (Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008). 
Mobilising structures are formal and informal structures available to the movement (Davis & 
McAdam, 2000; McAdam et al., 1996). Consisting of groups, formal organisations and/or information 
networks (McAdam et al., 1996; Tilly, 1978), these mobilising structures are considered to be the 
‘building blocks’ of social movements (McAdam & Scott, 2005), in that they provide the original social 
structures, social capital and context for the mobilising parties. In particular, mobilising structures 
provide the availability and deployment of tangible resources (Snow & Benford, 1988), such as 
volunteer labour, revenue and membership (McCarthy & Wolfson, 1996), as the resources controlled 
prior to mobilisation are key to movement mobilisation success (Jenkins, 1983).  
Framing processes are the collective processes of interpretation, attribution and social 
construction that mediate between the political opportunity and action (Davis & McAdam, 2000; 
McAdam et al., 1996). Originally proposed by Snow et al. (1986), who introduced the concept of frame 
alignment to provide the cognitive link between the individual and the social movement, over time 
framing processes have been deepened to encompass the link between the political opportunity structure 
and the mobilising structure. Frames themselves are a ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enables 
individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and in the world at 
large (Goffman, 1974). A collective action frame is the ideological tool that organises experience, by 
serving as an accenting device to either underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a 
social condition or redefine it as unjust and immoral; diagnosing problems; and prescribing solutions 
for the constituents of social movements (Babb, 1996; Snow & Benford, 1992). It is through collective 
action frames that a social movement socially constructs the contours of contention and protest 
(Klandermans, 1992). Collective action frames can have variable potency, influenced by such factors 
as the salience of its problem identification to the target audience, the level of flexibility the frame has 
to adjust to changing circumstances, and when it occurs within the protest cycle (Benford & Snow, 
2000). Also relevant to the potency of a collective action frames is its credibility, salience and alignment 
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to the master frame in which it is situated, as alignment with the master frame influences the resonance 
any particular frame will have (Benford & Snow, 2000). A master frame is a collective action frame 
that is sufficiently inclusive and flexible to encompass a whole ideological tradition (Benford & Snow, 
2000; Snow & Benford, 1992). 
The processes of framing include the generation and dissemination of the symbolic and discursive 
elements that mediate between the social movement and the social actors (Benford & Snow, 2000; 
Snow & McAdam, 2000). Framing activity is an active, processual phenomenon which is constantly 
ongoing as targeted audiences interact (Benford & Snow, 2000). Snow and Benford (1988) identify the 
three core framing tasks that lead to the construction of meaning and legitimacy. Participation in a social 
movement is contingent upon these three framing tasks which act as prods to action, which can 
additionally be enhanced with a range of incentives such as material, status, solitary and moral 
inducements. Diagnostic framing involves the identification of injustice or problems and the attribution 
of causality, blame and/or culpable agents. Prognosis framing involves the articulation of a proposed 
solution to the problem or a plan of attack, and the identification of the appropriate strategies, tactics 
and targets. Motivational framing is the elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action that goes 
beyond the diagnosis and prognosis, including the construction of appropriate vocabularies or motives. 
Gamson and Meyer (1996) point out that movements often exaggerate opportunities and underestimate 
constraints, and assess an opportunity with a systematically optimistic bias.  
Closely related to the framing process is a collective identity, which is constructed as part of the 
motivational framing (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). Participation in a social movement frequently involves 
an enlargement of personal identity for participants, as well as offering fulfilment and realisation of the 
self (Gamson, 1992). Taking the pre-existing collective beliefs and identities of individuals, framing 
processes result in a collective identity which defines the cognitive, moral and emotional connection of 
participants with a broader community, category, practice or institution (Klandermans, 1992; Polletta 
& Jasper, 2001). The development of a collective identity increases the ability of a movement to 
translate common interests into mobilisation towards a common objective (Davis & Thompson, 1995), 
and is often key to the success of a social movement (Polletta & Jasper, 2001).  
McAdam et al. (1996) suggest that a social movement generally begins with a political 
opportunity, followed by an organising structure, both of which are pulled together by framing 
processes. In contrast Davis and McAdam (2000) suggest that a social movement begins with a political 
opportunity, followed by framing processes which then lead to the adoption of an organisation structure, 
followed by more framing. Whatever the specific sequence, the creation of a political opportunity alone 
is not sufficient for collective action, nor is the availability of a structure with which to mobilise, and 
no matter how momentous a change appears in retrospect, it only becomes an opportunity when defined 
as such by a group of actors sufficiently well organised. Put differently, when the cognitive and affective 
by-products of these framing processes are combined with the political opportunity/threat and sufficient 
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organisational processes, chances are that collective action will develop (Davis & McAdam, 2000). The 
specific form of the movement is also an output of the interaction of the three factors. Although the 
nature of the political opportunity may dictate the broad category of movement, the formal and 
ideological properties of the movement are more directly influenced by the cognitive frames that were 
available at mobilisation, and these in turn are largely a product of the initial mobilising structures 
(McAdam et al., 1996). Thus the form of the movement is both a product of the interaction of framing 
with mobilising structures and the initiating political opportunity (Clemens, 1993; McAdam et al., 1996; 
McAdam & Scott, 2005).  
Social movements can lead to new forms of organisations and new markets (Rao et al., 2000; 
Schneiberg et al., 2008; Swaminathan & Wade, 2001), as the creation of new organisational forms is 
an institutionalisation project consisting of the active definition, justification and diffusion of the theory 
underpinning the new form (Clemens, 1993; DiMaggio, 1988). Here social movements play a double 
edged role as they both de-institutionalise existing beliefs, norms and values embodied in existing 
organisational forms, and they establish new forms that instantiate new beliefs, norms and values (Rao 
et al., 2000). The socio-political and constitutive legitimacy of the new organisational form are key to 
the success of the social movement, as the new organisational form must be validated if they are to get 
resources (Rao et al., 2000). Beyond organisational forms, social movements can also provide the social 
infrastructure necessary for new markets to be created (Fligstein, 1996; Schneiberg et al., 2008). By 
contesting existing arrangements and providing entrepreneurs with political support, field frames, 
standards and organising templates, social movements can carve out space for new markets, generate 
institutional support for industry development, and populate the market with new organisational forms 
(Schneiberg et al., 2008). In doing so social movements enable the construction and propagation of 
cognitive frameworks, norms, values, and regulatory structures (Sine & Lee, 2009). Moreover, as social 
infrastructures, social movements can help to institutionalise key forms and market supports, buffering 
them from adverse of short-term economic forces.  
Beyond providing insight into how social movements can create new organisational forms and 
markets, social movement theory can also be adopted as a theoretical framework within organisation 
theory. For instance, Davis and McAdam (2000) suggest that there is a strong analogy between 
processes of mobilisation for collective action in social movements and those for building momentum 
for contemporary business organisations, as the underlying assumptions are the same: boundaries 
around organisations are difficult to define, interests and grievances are socially constructed rather than 
transparent, and organisational structures are emergent and path dependent. More specifically, 
Swaminathan and Wade (2001) argue that interactions between firms in emerging markets take on a 
social-movement like character as firms attempt to obtain socio-political and cognitive legitimacy. They 
emphasise that, similar to social movements, new organisational forms need collective action to 
mobilise resources to survive and grow, to establish legitimacy, form a distinct and inimitable collective 
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identity, and to replace the dominant incumbent organisational form. Similarly, Campbell (2005) 
suggests that there is a strong similarity between processes of change and development between social 
movements and organisations. He links political opportunity structures with external environment 
mechanisms, mobilising structure with the organisation, and highlights that framing as a cognitive 
mechanism is congruent with the logic of appropriateness utilised in organisational structure and 
strategy. Furthermore, he emphasises common cognitive processes such as diffusion (the spread of 
practices through actors), translation (the process by which practices travel from site to site), and 
bricolage (the innovative recombination of elements).  
Social movement theory can also be adopted to understand market creation. Fligstein (1996) 
argues that in new markets, politics resembles social movements, as actors in different firms try to 
convince other firms to go along with their conception of the market. In addition to institutions, property 
rights, rules of exchange and governance structures, he introduces the notion of ‘conceptions of control’ 
that structure how a market works and that allow actors to interpret their world and act to control 
situations. A conception of control is similar to the collective frame, as it is simultaneously a worldview 
and also a reflection of how market is structured, consisting of the market specific agreements between 
firms on principles of internal organisation, the tactics for competition and cooperation, and the 
hierarchy and status of organisations. A conception of control is also a kind of collective identity to 
which many groups adopt to create successful market. Firms take advantage of a market opportunity in 
the same way organisations in social movements take advantage of political opportunity – they can 
invade a market and transform the conception of control – looking like a social movement in the sense 
that trying to establish a new conception of control and ally themselves with challengers and existing 
incumbents. 
Summarising, social movement theory considers the processes of collective action that result in 
institutional change, specifically identifying the political opportunity structure, mobilising structure and 
framing processes. As ecosystems consist of a heterogeneous collection of independent entities that 
interact to co-create value, social movement theory provides insight into the collective action processes 
and factors that drive institutional formation from the perspective of the ecosystem participants. Indeed 
one can argue that ecosystem creation is a process of institutional change driven by collective action. 
This approach is buttressed by the more recent work in social movement theory that explicitly adopts 
social movement theory in organisation theory, such as Fligstein (1996), Swaminathan and Wade 
(2001), and Campbell (2005). This has the benefit of not assuming that the participants of the ecosystem 
are a social movement, but instead that they have collective action processes that are theoretically 
analogous to those of social movements. As such, social movement theory provides insight into the 
collective actions of ecosystem participants and their effect on both ecosystem emergence and the 
environment in which the ecosystem resides.  
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3.3 Institutional entrepreneurship 
Institutional entrepreneurship literature considers how individuals change the institutional 
context in which they reside. Institutional change moments occur when groups of social actors confront 
one another in some set of social interactions that is contentious and inherently political, as those who 
benefit from the existing regime will almost invariably arise to defend existing beliefs and practices 
(DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Agent-driven institutional change generally takes place 
in the context of powerful actors attempting to produce roles of interaction to stabilise their situation 
vis-a-vis other powerful and less powerful actors (Fligstein, 2001). However, the underlying interest in 
institutional entrepreneurship is the ‘paradox of embedded agency’ (Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002): 
how actors can change institutions if their actions, intentions and rationality are all conditioned by the 
very institution they wish to change? As an attempt to address this paradox, institutional 
entrepreneurship literature generally considers the enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship 
and how divergent change is implemented (Battilana et al., 2009). In doing so, the concept of 
institutional entrepreneurship reintroduces agency, interests and power into institutional analyses of 
organisations (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007). 
Institutional entrepreneurship was introduced to institutional theory by DiMaggio (1988), who 
utilised an earlier conception of institutional entrepreneurship by Eisenstadt (1980). An institutional 
entrepreneur is an actor who leverages resources to create new institutions or transform existing 
institutions (DiMaggio, 1988; Garud et al., 2007; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004). The most 
comprehensive definition to date is that of Battilana et al. (2009): 
Institutional entrepreneurs, whether organisations or individuals, are agents who initiate, and 
actively participate in the implementation of, changes that diverge from existing institutions, 
independent of whether the initial intent was to change the institutional environment and whether 
the changes were successfully implemented. Such changes might be initiated within the 
boundaries of an organisation or within a broader institutional context, within which the actor 
is embedded. (p. 72) 
Institutional entrepreneurship can spring from either or both field and actor level sources. These 
field level sources enable institutional change by blocking the activation of reproductive procedures or 
by thwarting their successful completion (Jepperson, 1991). Field level sources include external jolts 
(Fligstein, 1997, 2001; Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Holm, 1995; Rao et al., 2000), the 
presence of multiple institutional orders (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Jepperson, 1991), degree of 
institutionalisation (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Phillips et al., 2000; Rao et al., 2000; Reay, 
Golden-Biddle, & Germann, 2006), and the presence of internal contradictions (Clemens & Cook, 1999; 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002). Actor level sources influence institutional change 
as an actor is required with the relevant skills and motivation to be able to execute the change (Zietsma 
& Lawrence, 2010). Actor level sources include the level of embeddedness of actors (Garud et al., 2002; 
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Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; Reay et al., 2006), the 
capabilities and characteristics of the individual actor (Fligstein, 1997), and network location, such as 
at the intersection of fields (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Phillips et al., 2000; Rao et al., 2000). 
Although these enabling conditions provide the impetus for institutional change, they do not lead 
deterministically to that change (Seo & Creed, 2002). Nor do all conditions necessarily need to be 
present, nor is one source necessarily sufficient on its own, nor is there indication that any of these 
sources are sufficient to predict when institutional entrepreneurship will occur (Battilana et al., 2009). 
To add complexity, these differing enabling conditions of institutional entrepreneurship also influence 
and mediate the actions of sources (Battilana et al., 2009; Clemens & Cook, 1999; Mutch, 2007). For 
institutional entrepreneurship to occur, these enabling conditions need to result in the creation of 
alternative practices, ideas and/or organisational forms that counter the existing practices (Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997; Hinings, Greenwood, Reay, & Suddaby, 2004; Leblebici et al., 1991). Practically 
speaking, these new practices, ideas or forms need to be in place before actors are able to begin to 
assemble resources and rationales (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). In addition, these practices, ideas and forms 
need to be recognised as anomalies in order to effect institutional change (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007). 
The widespread adoption of such innovations depends upon successfully presenting them to a 
wide range of potential adopters where they are seen as more compelling than existing practices 
(Maguire et al., 2004; Strang & Meyer, 1993). This is accomplished through theorisation – the 
development and specification of abstract categories and the elaboration of chains of cause and effect; 
that is, building both a model of how new practices and organisational forms work, and providing a 
justification for them in current and future contexts (Greenwood et al., 2002; Hinings et al., 2004; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Strang & Meyer, 1993). Theorisation informs wider audiences of the new 
localised practices (Hinings et al., 2004), specifies general organisational failings (Tolbert & Zucker, 
1996), and justifies abandoning old practices in favour of new ones (Hinings et al., 2004; Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1996). Theorisation essentially promotes the innovation that emerged in response to the 
enabling condition, and provides a general story about how they are relevant to, and appropriate for, 
wider audiences.  
A concomitant and interacting process is legitimation, the process of linking the alternative idea, 
practice or form to sets of values and logics that are held in esteem by field actors and by the surrounding 
societal context (Hinings et al., 2004). This is vital as the innovations need to been seen as plausible 
due to the absence of information and evidence regarding their activities (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
DiMaggio, 1988). At its most basic, an institutional entrepreneur can conform to a certain extent in a 
particular institutional environment to gain legitimacy, however more commonly the institutional 
entrepreneur will need to manipulate the institutional environment (Suchman, 1995b). Legitimation can 
occur through discursive actions (Battilana et al., 2009; Phillips et al., 2004) such as the use of rhetorical 
strategies (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), stories (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Zilber, 2007) and 
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analogies (Etzion & Ferraro, 2010). The construction of collective identities can also lead to 
legitimation (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002). In particular, building an identity is important for making 
the unfamiliar familiar, understandable, acceptable, and thus more legitimate (Lounsbury & Glynn, 
2001). More recently, Navis and Glynn (2011) have introduced the concept of the ‘entrepreneurial 
identity’ as the constellation of claims that gives meaning to the questions ‘who we are’ and ‘what we 
do’. More substantive actions include establishing a standard (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Garud et al., 2002; 
Kaplan & Murray, 2010; Lawrence, 1999), having a robust design (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001), 
performing symbolic actions (Zott & Huy, 2007) and proving the value of the innovation (Kaplan & 
Murray, 2010; Reay et al., 2006; Sine, David, & Mitsuhashi, 2007; Suchman, 1995b; Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983). Legitimation can also occur through the social position of the actor (Battilana et al., 2009; 
Maguire et al., 2004) and through the mobilisation of resources, both financial (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Hinings et al., 2004; Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008) and number of 
followers (DiMaggio, 1988; Hinings et al., 2004; Lawrence, 1999). Together these legitimating actions 
lead to cognitive, social and material endorsement and support that is integral for institutional change 
(Battilana et al., 2009; Dorado, 2005).  
Some have argued that the notion of ‘framing’ (Snow & Benford, 1992; Snow et al., 1986) from 
social movement theory provides insights into the processes of theorisation and legitimation (Battilana 
et al., 2009; Fligstein, 1997, 2001; Rao et al., 2000). Battilana et al. (2009) helpfully develop framing 
as part of the key process of ‘creating a vision’, or those activities undertaken to make the case for 
change. To develop a vision, the institutional entrepreneur locates the change project, first, in terms of 
the problem it helps to resolve, secondly, as preferred to existing arrangements, and thirdly, as motivated 
by compelling reasons (Battilana et al., 2009; Rao et al., 2000; Snow & Benford, 1992). As a frame 
begins to cohere to organise the field, actors then act to propagate that frame and the social order it 
implies (Fligstein, 1997). 
The processes of theorisation, legitimation and framing can be challenging. As the promoted 
changes will differ with those that are taken for granted by people in the field, the institutional 
entrepreneur needs to be aware of and sensitive to the discursive and cultural contexts in which they are 
embedded (Battilana et al., 2009; Fligstein, 1997). The processes of theorisation, legitimation and 
framing will also differ in substance depending on the characteristics of the field in which the change 
is occurring (Battilana et al., 2009). In fields with high levels of institutionalisation and which are quite 
homogenous, entrepreneurs need to frame discourses which resonate with the interests and values of 
members of the dominant coalition (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Greenwood et al., 2002). However 
when the field is institutionalised but fragmented, there are no dominant actors and the institutional 
entrepreneur must unite the divergent actors and find stable sets of agreements in ways that meet the 
interests of diverse stakeholders without access to the taken-for-granted symbolic and material 
resources and institutional channels of diffusion that are normally available (Fligstein, 1997; Fligstein 
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& Mara-Drita, 1996; Maguire et al., 2004). In less institutionalised fields, particularly those which are 
fragmented (often called emerging fields) little existing coordination exists between members, and there 
is less relevance of isomorphic pressures, no widely shared values, and diffuse power making coercion 
difficult (Lawrence & Phillips, 2004; Maguire et al., 2004). As such the institutional entrepreneur has 
considerable scope to be strategic and opportunistic, such as attaching new practices to existing routines, 
using discursive strategies, political tactics such as bargaining, negotiation and compromise, or by 
crafting an attractive social identity that appeals to potential field members (Battilana et al., 2009; 
Fligstein, 1997; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Maguire et al., 2004).  
Finally, the new institutional practices that have been theorised and legitimated also need to be 
diffused to other actors. This can occur through the processes of coercive, normative and mimetic 
isomorphism, particularly in more established fields (Hinings et al., 2004). However, Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996) suggest that in a less mature, less tightly coupled and more permeable field, more ideas 
can be theorised, and as a result dissemination will be more difficult because of the lack of enabling 
mechanisms (Hinings et al., 2004). Lawrence, Hardy, and Phillips (2002) have suggested ‘proto-
institutions’ as new practices, rules and technologies that are narrowly diffused and only weakly 
entrenched. Proto-institutions can become new institutions if they evolve from their particular 
collaborative context and diffuse sufficiently through social processes.  
Summarising, institutional entrepreneurship literature considers the enabling conditions and 
processes of agency in institutional contexts. As an ecosystem has been argued to represent one facet 
of an organisational field, institutional entrepreneurship provides insight into the processes and factors 
that drive institutional change from the perspective of the hub firm. In particular, the recognition of the 
resources, material and substantive strategies that need to be deployed for theorising, legitimation and 
framing provide insight into the key activities of ecosystem emergence.  
3.4 Four activities of ecosystem emergence 
From the above review, it is apparent that each is a theory of institutional change that considers 
institutional formation from a different vantage point. Dominant design literature considers the 
institutional formation from the context of technological standardisation, social movement theory 
considers institutional formation as the outcome of collective action, and institutional entrepreneurship 
literature considers institutional formation as driven by individual actors. Together, and broadly stated, 
dominant design theory considers the activities concerned with the technological development of the 
underlying technologies in an ecosystem; social movement theory considers the collective action 
activities of the ecosystem participants; and institutional entrepreneurship theory considers activities 
undertaken taken by the hub firm.  
There are areas of commonality between the three theories that provide the foundations for the 
identification of the four factors below. For instance, each theory highlights legitimising processes as 
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integral to the success of the institutional formation (DiMaggio, 1988; Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; 
Rao et al., 2000; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998; Suchman, 1995b; Swaminathan & Wade, 2001; Van 
De Ven & Garud, 1989). Legitimacy is the “generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, property or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995b: 574). In particular it is “possessed objectively, yet created 
subjectively” (p. 574). As such, legitimacy is a condition reflecting perceived consonance with relevant 
rules and laws, normative support, or alignment with cultural-cognitive frameworks, which are 
displayed in a way that is visible to outsiders (Scott, 2008). One source of legitimacy is socio-political, 
in that key stakeholders, the general public, key opinion leaders or government officials accept a venture 
as appropriate and right (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Sine et al., 2007). Legitimacy can be pragmatic, based 
upon audience self-interest, as well as moral, based upon positive normative approval (Suchman, 
1995b). Legitimacy can also be cognitive, based on comprehensibility and taken for grantedness, and 
where a status hierarchy is created along with reputations of organisations (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rao, 
1994; Suchman, 1995b). Ecosystems and the participating organisations require social acceptability, 
plausibility and credibility beyond their material resources, technical information and capabilities to 
survive (DiMaggio, 1988; Scott et al., 2000). In emergence contexts, the absence of information and 
evidence regarding their activities reinforces the importance of legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
Furthermore, gaining legitimacy for the new ways of organising, such as an ecosystem, will confer the 
authority for a hub firm to control existing and future processes (Hinings et al., 2004).  
For dominant design theory, the legitimacy of the sponsoring firm signals to other participants in 
the technological field that the firm and its technology is viable and worthwhile considering (Cusumano 
et al., 1992; Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991; Khazam & Mowery, 1994; Suarez, 2004). Relatedly, the 
reputation and credibility of an organisation provides an advantage over others when manoeuvring 
strategically (Cusumano et al., 1992; Khazam & Mowery, 1994; Klepper & Simons, 2000). For social 
movement theory, socio-political and cognitive legitimacy are key to the success of a social movement, 
as the movement must be validated if they are to get resources (Rao et al., 2000). As a social movement 
gains legitimacy, there is decreasing amounts of collective action as the goals of the movement become 
institutionalised (Davis & McAdam, 2000; McAdam et al., 1996; Swaminathan & Wade, 2001). For 
institutional entrepreneurship, claims to legitimacy are often made to a variety of audiences by linking 
changes to broader social values – in doing so the discourse of legitimacy aligns (or claims to align) the 
values and attributes of new ideas, forms, and practices to those held in society at large, that is to broader 
values beyond the particular organisational field (Battilana et al., 2009; Phillips et al., 2004). For 
instance, in technology contexts, it is not necessarily the nature of the technology that is important in 
determining how disruptive the technology will be, but the degree to which institutional entrepreneurs 
manage the meaning of the technology and its level of embeddedness in everyday lives for potential 
consumers (Munir & Phillips, 2005). 
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Another commonality is the role of collective action. Institutional entrepreneurship and dominant 
design theories both cover collective dimensions, each introducing collective action from social 
movement theory. This explicit recognition of collective action has occurred as scholars have begun to 
realise the importance of the mobilisation processes in order to gain legitimacy (Battilana et al., 2009). 
Institutional formation in dominant design contexts puts emphasis on the technological communities 
that collectively standardise the design through a process of compromise and accommodation (Tushman 
& Murmann, 1998). Here the collective action of the technological communities builds legitimacy for 
both themselves as the adjudicator within the emerging technological field, but also on their selection 
of the standards of merit and value that drive the measurement of technological performance (Kaplan 
& Murray, 2010; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). For institutional formation driven by institutional 
entrepreneurship there needs to be some type of multilateral or collective action that reconstructs both 
the existing social arrangements and the actors themselves (Seo & Creed, 2002). Others have introduced 
the concept of ‘collective institutional entrepreneurship’, defined as the process of overcoming 
collection inaction and achieving sustained collaboration among numerous dispersed actors to create 
new institutions or transform existing ones (Wijen & Ansari, 2007). Underscoring the importance of 
collective action in institutional formation and change, McAdam and Scott (2005) have proposed deeper 
integration between social movement theory and institutional theory with institutional actors and 
mobilising structures, governance structures with political opportunities, and institutional logics with 
framing processes.  
A further commonality is that all theories recognise the importance of cognitive processes and 
framing contests – the generation of shared meanings through framing processes (Hargrave & Van De 
Ven, 2006). Central to social moment theory, they have been explicitly integrated into institutional 
entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009; Fligstein, 1997, 2001; Rao et al., 2000) and are beginning to be 
considered within technology innovation management (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). As a consequence 
Hargrave and Van De Ven (2006) have explicitly linked social movement theory with dominant design. 
Similarly, collective action coordinated through social movements has been explicitly called out as 
institutional entrepreneurship (Fligstein & Mara-Drita, 1996; Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Rao, 
1998; Rao et al., 2003; Rao et al., 2000; Van De Ven & Hargrave, 2004).  
The commonalities between each of these theories in the context of institutional formation 
provide insight into the activities of ecosystem emergence (see Figure 1 below). Taken together, these 
three frameworks suggest that there are four types of activity of ecosystem emergence – resource 
activities, technological activities, institutional activities and contextual activities.  
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organisational form are an important early resource (Zald & Ash, 1966). For instance, social movement 
theory emphasises the importance of the mobilising structure that provide the initial social capital for 
movements (Tilly, 1978), as it constitutes the ‘building blocks’ of collective action (McAdam & Scott, 
2005). In addition, the likelihood of mobilisation is largely determined by the organisational vehicles 
utilised (Jenkins, 1983; Tilly, 1978). The form of the organisation can be informal or formal, and 
includes groups, formal organisations and information networks (Davis & McAdam, 2000; McAdam 
et al., 1996; Tilly, 1978). Different organisational forms are effective for different tasks (Zald & Ash, 
1966), and as a consequence the choice of organisational form influences the hub firm’s ability to 
respond to environmental stimuli (Davis & McAdam, 2000; Lounsbury et al., 2003; McAdam et al., 
1996). The organisational form also influences the range of frames and meanings that are available 
(Clemens, 1996). The organisational form can also influence the availability and deployment of tangible 
resources (Jenkins, 1983; Snow & Benford, 1988), such as financial resources, ability to enter into 
coalitions, and capability development through the professionalism of staff and membership (McCarthy 
& Wolfson, 1996; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The particular organisational form of the hub firm can 
either be created or adopted from one already existing. The acquisition of complementary asset 
providers can develop the ecosystem by appropriating existing organisational forms and restructuring 
them into something more appropriate (Davis & McAdam, 2000; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). 
Alternatively, through investment in an organisation others can be encouraged to participate (Garud et 
al., 2002) or encourage stakeholders to favour the ecosystem (Battilana et al., 2009).  
Another resource activity is the acquisition and management of financial resources, such as 
initial seed investments, venture capital investments, loans, initial public offerings (IPOs), and stock 
issuance. Financial resources are important as sufficient resources are required in order for an ecosystem 
to be created (DiMaggio, 1988; Schilling, 2009; Smith, 1996; Swaminathan & Wade, 2001). Financial 
resources can also act as a legitimating factor, as actors need sufficient resources in order to realise the 
opportunity that they can see (DiMaggio, 1988). In particular, developing an ecosystem and the 
resulting institutional change is likely to be costly (Misangyi et al., 2008), as incumbents may try and 
resist the change (Fligstein, 2001). For instance, financial assets can be used during the early stages to 
bypass sanctions likely to be imposed by opponents of the change (Greenwood et al., 2002), or ride out 
the negative costs of the transitional period during which the new digital service and related ideas are 
likely to be unknown (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Financial assets are also useful to bring others 
into the coalition, such as by providing a service or product for free as distinct to the charged offering 
of the incumbent (Garud et al., 2002). In addition financial resources can be used to get stakeholders to 
favour a project (Battilana et al., 2009). Thus institutional entrepreneurs can devise appropriate 
incentive structures (Wijen & Ansari, 2007) and create rule structures that also confer property rights 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
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A further resource activity is the establishment and maintenance of coalitions, such as joint 
ventures, strategic agreements, licensing, and marketing and technology agreements (Cusumano et al., 
1992; Khazam & Mowery, 1994; Smith, 1996; Soh, 2010; Suarez, 2004). Ecosystem success springs 
not just from technological superiority, but also from the level of organisational support from the 
surrounding technological community (Wade, 1995) and from alliances in the existing institutional 
apparatus (McAdam et al., 1996). These coalitions form a network of complementary players that 
collectively possess the skills and resources needed to achieve success (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006). 
As complementary assets underlie the ability of the hub firm to profit from the ecosystem (Lee et al., 
1995; Teece, 1986), once the ecosystem begins to take off, then access to and use of complementary 
assets become critical (Schilling, 2009; Teece, 1986). The linkages created through coalitions represent 
some of the interdependencies between the participants in the ecosystem (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; 
Iansiti & Levien, 2004a), and can be between individual actors, and at other times between multiple 
individual actors, such as consortia and trade associations (Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1994). These 
coalition building activities can mobilise elite allies (McAdam et al., 1996), legitimating the ecosystem 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood et al., 2002) and granting access to resources (Tilly, 
1978). This access and the strength and status of individual partners (Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991) 
generally creates a qualitative improvement in the returns to the ecosystem. Greater firm centrality 
within in the ecosystem leads to informational advantages due to improved knowledge acquisition and 
sharing (Funk, 2003) as well as enhanced embedding of texts in the wider discourse (Phillips et al., 
2004).  
Coalition building activities directly affect the number of participants in the ecosystem, which 
can have an influence on ecosystem emergence. For instance, the number of users of a technology is 
associated with higher rates of adoption for that technology, providing ‘extra’ momentum (Schilling, 
2009; Suarez, 2004). Relatedly the composition of the early members of the ecosystem can have an 
influence, as the more homogenous the interests and the more dense the social network, the greater the 
resource mobilisation for further growth (Davis & Thompson, 1995). The number of users in an 
ecosystem also enables the process of mimetic isomorphism to drive the legitimation of ecosystem wide 
value co-creation practices and structures (Hinings et al., 2004). Together these have a virtuous cycle 
effect, as a greater number of participants leads to more rapid adoption of the ecosystem by those 
participants, (both customers and both supplier and complementary asset providers), leading in turn to 
a greater number of participants.  
Another resource activity is the development of the appropriate skills and competences, as 
relevant capabilities, competences and skills are required to be able to execute the institutional 
formation project (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). For instance, strong organisational linking capabilities 
are required to develop partnerships and alliances (Tushman & Murmann, 1998), as some competences 
may come from suppliers external to the hub firm, such as advertising, while others will be within the 
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hub firm itself. Similarly, learning capabilities, both within and between organisations (Lee et al., 
1995), and of the market (Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991), are also vital, as learning-curve advantages 
can result in more efficient and effective technology that underpins the ecosystem (Schilling, 2009). 
Furthermore, both production capacities and marketing capabilities are vital resources that will 
influence the emergence of an ecosystem (Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991; Schilling, 2009; Smith, 1996). 
A hub firm should also have the production capabilities available to take advantage of the market 
opportunities (Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991). The capabilities and characteristics of specific individual 
actors may also influence the emergence of an ecosystem. For instance, Fligstein (1997) and Wijen 
and Ansari (2007) have identified a collection of social skills that the successful institutional 
entrepreneur requires. The quality of leadership is also particularly important, as the hub firm will only 
be as good as the leaders that guide it (Snow & Benford, 1988; Swaminathan and Wade (2001)). In 
particular, having prior experience and expertise can be a factor in success (Swaminathan & Wade, 
2001). The quality of the leadership can also influence other resource activities, such as financial 
resource acquisition, quality of the coalitions and membership.  
Intimately involved in the development of the relevant capabilities is the social position of the 
hub firm, including formal positions that that the firm may hold, as well as the available socially 
constructed and legitimated identities that enable influence (Dorado, 2005; Maguire et al., 2004; 
Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). Social position mediates the relationship between the hub firm and the 
environment in which they are embedded and hence their capability to act (Emirbayer & Mische, 
1998). It reflects the perceptions of that actor to the potential for ecosystem emergence (Bourdieu, 
1977) and provides ongoing differential access to resources (Lawrence, 1999). Alternatively, the social 
capital from a social position may provide legitimacy with respect to diverse stakeholders, as well as 
the ability to build bridges between then to access dispersed sets of resources (Maguire et al., 2004). 
It can also act as a source of legitimacy if it provides access to information and political support 
(Battilana et al., 2009). Social position can also enable the capability to influence tactics, set agenda, 
and to leverage power (Fligstein, 1997; Maguire et al., 2004). Social position may change over time, 
with social status accruing to some ecosystem participants more than others, and as a consequence 
ecosystem participants may differ in their ability to shape and influence ecosystem emergence (Lee et 
al., 1995; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1994). 
Summarising, the activities of resource acquisition, development and maintenance are salient in 
in ecosystem emergence contexts. In particular, the establishment (or adoption) and management of a 
corporate form, the acquisition of financial assets, the establishment and maintenance of agreements 
and strategic alliances with other participations, the development of relevant capabilities, and the hiring 
and development of personnel are key to providing the requisite resource endowments upon which to 
build an ecosystem. 
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3.4.2 Technological activities 
Technology activities are those related to the design and provision of the underlying technologies 
in the ecosystem that enable value co-creation. Salient technological activities include the design and 
delivery of the underlying technologies and the establishment and operation of supporting services for 
ecosystem participants.  
Activities concerning the design and functionality of the underlying technologies are important 
in ecosystem emergence contexts, as they can have economic, cognitive and social impacts. When a 
technology or offering is superior to competing technologies on the dimension of merit, ceteris paribus, 
it is more likely to be adopted over others (Suarez, 2004). As such technological design can often be 
the key factor in successful value co-creation and ecosystem emergence (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; 
Christensen et al., 1998; Murmann & Frenken, 2006; Suarez & Utterback, 1995), although others have 
noted that the characteristics of the technology only have an strong influence (Schilling, 2009). 
Similarly, Gawer and Cusumano (2002) noted that technological design has a strong influence on 
platform and ecosystem success. A technological design can provide a means through which people can 
understand, appreciate, interact and adopt an innovation (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001). The type of 
design that is required is 'robust', where its arrangement of concrete details are immediately effective in 
locating the novel product or process within the familiar world, by involving valued schemas and 
scripts, yet preserve the flexibility for future evolution, by not constraining the potential evolution of 
understanding and action that follows use. Related technological activities include those day-to-day 
routines that facilitate the operation of the service. For instance, the availability of a technology – 
whether the system is down or running slow – is vital to its success.  
The level of radicalness of the design and functionality can influence ecosystem emergence, as 
new technologies that offer significant advances in both technology and consumer benefits can often 
have low initial performance-to-price ratio and face limited market acceptance (Christensen, 1997; 
Srinivasan et al., 2006). The design and functionality of the underlying technology can also influence 
the relevant complementary assets that are required for value co-creation within the ecosystem. Access 
to and use of complementary assets is vital for building market momentum, and a better set of 
complementary assets will be associated with a higher likelihood of dominance, all other things being 
equal (Suarez, 2004). Although complementary assets do not loom large in early stages of ecosystem 
emergence when there is little to gain from specialised assets (Teece, 1986), once the ecosystem begins 
to gain momentum then access to and use of complementary assets become critical (Schilling, 2009; 
Teece, 1986). As complementary assets underlie the ability of a firm to profit from an innovation (Lee 
et al., 1995; Teece, 1986), the design of the technology can subsequently influence value sharing within 
the ecosystems. In addition, the design and functionality offered will be influenced by the overall rate 
of technological change, as it affects the number of service alternatives available, the nature of the 
dimensions of merit against which it will be measured, and likelihood of obsolescence (Lee et al., 1995). 
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The design and functionality of the technology, particularly the level of standardisation, can also 
have significant economic impacts on the emergence of the ecosystem. For instance, as the ability to 
scale up quickly is vital to ecosystem emergence, the standardisation of design and functionality can 
influence the availability and size of any economies of scale and scope (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; 
Christensen et al., 1998; Lee et al., 1995; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). The technological design can 
also impact network externalities, where the customer value of a product increases through its adoption 
by other customers (Lee et al., 1995; Murmann & Frenken, 2006; Suarez, 2004). Network externalities 
can be either direct or indirect, where a direct network externality relates to increased value from other 
customers, and an indirect network externality relates to increased value from complementary assets 
(Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1986). A network externality can act as a strong force in driving participant 
adoption to an ecosystem, as similar to that of economies of scale, so that a small lead (either random 
or through first mover advantage) will inexorably drive more users to the ecosystem through increasing 
returns (Murmann & Frenken, 2006). The design and functionality of the underlying technology can 
also impact switching costs, influencing the ability to attract customers and to build or maintain existing 
participants (Lee et al., 1995; Suarez, 2004). Although switching costs can increase the perceptions of 
riskiness of an ecosystem, through fear of lock-in (Lee et al., 1995), switching costs can also influence 
on network externalities by making existing participants more ‘loyal’ (Suarez, 2004). Technological 
functionalities, the level of openness of the technology, the installed base and the availability of 
complementary goods all interact to drive the emergence of an ecosystem (Schilling, 2009). 
A related technological activity to technological design and functionality are the supporting 
services that enable ecosystem participants to enhance their performance. These include technological 
features such as toolkits, as well as the technology specific support programs and training. The 
maintenance of group communications, the development of formal alliance programs, and the 
involvement of users in testing, and the development of linkages with educational curricula (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) serve as useful mobilisation mechanisms in ecosystem 
contexts. By easing the burden of joining the ecosystem, participants can be motivated and subsequently 
provide legitimacy through their provision of resources (DiMaggio, 1988).  
Summarising, technological activities that enhance the design and provision of the core services 
within the ecosystem can be important for ecosystem emergence and momentum building. In particular, 
the design and delivery of the core technological services and the provision of supporting services to 
assist ecosystem participants in their operations can influence ecosystem emergence. 
3.4.3 Institutional activities 
A third collection of activities are those related to the institutional structure and operation of the 
ecosystem, as distinct from the resource and technological activities. These factors are internal to the 
ecosystem and include actions by both the hub firm and ecosystem participants. Salient institutional 
activities include rule-making and enforcement, framing, discourse, and identity construction. 
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The first institutional activity relates to the establishment and application of rules, including 
those efforts to establish norms of behaviour and procedures within the ecosystem. These rules and 
norms govern action in the ecosystem and outline the ways of working together (Hargrave & Van De 
Ven, 2006; Lee et al., 1995; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998; Van De Ven & Garud, 1989). The rules of 
engagement, such as coordination, behaviour and operation, have implications for the ability of 
ecosystem participants to co-create value (Garud & Rappa, 1994; Suarez, 2004). Furthermore, the rules 
of engagement, such as information sharing practice, and structure of the value system, have 
implications for value co-creation (Garud & Rappa, 1994; Suarez, 2004). For instance, if ecosystem 
participants are in opposition (as contrary to their values) to the level of ‘openness’ in value co-creation 
activities, then value co-creation and subsequent ecosystem emergence will be restricted (Schilling, 
2009). Similarly, the norms of cooperation versus competition affect dynamics of value co-creation 
(Suarez, 2004). Relatedly, the rules and activities around governance are also a mechanism for 
manipulating ecosystem dynamics and the right of the hub firm to control existing and future processes 
(Hinings et al., 2004). A more tangible activity is the establishment of technical, legal or market 
standards that define ‘normal’ processes involved in the production of a good or a service (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994; Lawrence, 1999). These standardisation processes are inherently fragile, and social and 
political skills are required for their maintenance and legitimacy (Garud et al., 2002).  
As ecosystems encompass many members, activities around the establishment and maintenance 
of the rules and criteria for membership are important as they outline who can make rules, what 
attributes participants should possess and the degree of redundancy between them, and the degree of 
exclusivity and duration (Gulati et al., 2012). Membership strategies, such as those that involve the 
definition of the rules of membership and their meaning for an institutional community, can also drive 
legitimacy (Lawrence, 1999; McCarthy & Wolfson, 1996). Membership strategies also enable 
collaboration activities through providing the boundaries of the problem domain (Phillips et al., 2000), 
and in doing so indirectly affect the level of stability in the ecosystem (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). 
Membership strategies are often tied to appropriate incentive structures (Wijen & Ansari, 2007), such 
as conferring property rights (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), so as to encourage stakeholders to 
participate in the ecosystem (Battilana et al., 2009). Rule-setting activity can also include pricing, which 
can be varied in order to encourage adoption (Armstrong, 2006; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Murmann & 
Frenken, 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2006; Suarez, 2004).  
Central to processes of institutional formation is the generation of shared meanings through 
framing (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006). Implying reality construction (Snow & McAdam, 2000), 
framing is important in building legitimacy and the institutional logic of the value co-creation in the 
ecosystem. As ecosystem participants and the hub firm interact, frames are being constantly modified 
depending on the challenges that it faces (Benford & Snow, 2000). Benford and Snow (2000) identify 
three overlapping framing processes which enable the development, generation and elaboration of 
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meaning. Discursive processes consist of the talk, conversation and written material that occur in 
conjunction with ecosystem emergence. Strategic process are those deliberately utilitarian processes, 
often including collective identity construction (Polletta & Jasper, 2001), which connect frames to the 
ecosystem purpose and goals. Contested processes are those that contest the identity and discursive 
processes, underlining that collective action frames are contested processes. Within such framing 
process two institutional activities are salient to the creation of meaning and legitimacy in ecosystem 
emergence: discourse and identity construction. 
Discursive activity includes the talk, conversation and written material that occurs in conjunction 
with ecosystem emergence (Benford & Snow, 2000), as well as generation and dissemination of the 
symbolic elements that mediate between the participants and the ecosystems. Discursive activities are 
those activities and practices that motivate and convince others to accept and participate in the 
ecosystem, as well as building a shared understanding (Battilana et al., 2009; Benford & Snow, 2000; 
Phillips et al., 2004). Active, sometimes controversial, discourse is essential for the hub firm to validate 
their role in the centre of emerging ecosystem and to provide legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Munir 
& Phillips, 2005; Phillips et al., 2004; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). This discursive activity is 
complemented by intense sensemaking, experimentation and search for good practices as participants 
seek to adopt, adapt and utilise the new technologies in the emerging ecosystem (Garud & Rappa, 1994; 
Kaplan & Murray, 2010; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). The discursive 
activity often consists of shared narratives, rhetoric and analogies, through white papers, speeches, 
conferences and industry award ceremonies, that shape participants’ shared understanding of the 
ecosystem (Anand & Jones, 2008; Anand & Watson, 2004; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010; Garud, 2008; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Zilber, 2007), as do promotional and sales activities set expectations and 
encourage participation (Suarez, 2004). Actions that draw attention to the meaning of an object that 
goes beyond its functional use are also vital to drawing participants to the ecosystem (Zott & Huy, 
2007). Together these generate justified accounts – narratives that describe the way value co-creation 
in the field should be done – and persuade the ecosystem participants to adopt them (McInerney, 2008).  
A final institutional activity relates to the construction of a collective identity among the 
participants, as identity construction is an inherent feature of the framing process (Benford & Snow, 
2000; Klandermans, 1992; Snow & McAdam, 2000). At the early stages of ecosystem emergence a 
generally recognised mobilising identity can make the claims of the hub firm and ecosystem more 
salient (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). However, the construction of ecosystem-level collective identities – 
defined here as the participants’ cognitive, moral and emotional connection with the ecosystem (Polletta 
& Jasper, 2001) – can underpin the successful emergence of an ecosystem (Creed et al., 2002; Gawer 
& Phillips, forthcoming). The development of collective identities increases the ability of an ecosystem 
and the hub firm to translate common interests into mobilisation towards a co-creation (Davis & 
Thompson, 1995). Collective identities can emerge through differing narratives, such as those that 
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valorise or demonise particular actors or practices, others that idealise particular attributes or practices, 
those that authorise particular practices, and also some that problematise issues or actors (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2010). The formation of a distinct and inimitable collective identity also increases the 
legitimacy of the ecosystem, as legitimating accounts are often intertwined with the construction of 
social identities (Davis & Thompson, 1995; Gawer & Phillips, forthcoming; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; 
Swaminathan & Wade, 2001). In particular, a collective identity can be shaped so as to enhance the 
ecosystem’s interpretations of and claims to the logics in an attempt to create the conditions for the 
collective, on-going social construction of the institutional logic (Creed et al., 2002). This subsequently 
both legitimates participation and mobilises others and crucial audiences. This collective identity can 
be shaped through field-configuring events such as conference, award ceremonies and tradeshows 
(Anand & Jones, 2008; Garud, 2008; Lampel & Meyer, 2008), as well as through activities that develop 
endogenously amongst the participants, such as specific routines and practices. Together these embed 
the identity into the institutional logic (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Hinings et al., 2004; Polletta & Jasper, 
2001). 
Summarising, institutional activities shape the successful operation, perceived legitimacy, and 
sense of belonging of the participants in the ecosystem. In particular, rule-setting and enforcement, and 
framing activities, discursive activities and identity construction are all salient to the emergence of 
ecosystems. 
3.4.4 Contextual activities 
Contextual activities also drive the emergence of an ecosystem, as wider technological, political 
and economic environment changes can influence the conditions in which the ecosystem emerges 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; McAdam et al., 1996; Oliver, 1992; Rao et al., 2000). For instance, Rao 
et al. (2000) emphasise that the initiating context influences the level of competition initially faced by 
an ecosystem entrepreneur. If the ecosystem emerges within a fragmented context which is disorganised 
and where there is no pre-existing dominant competitor, it will generally be met with support; however 
if the ecosystem emerges in an interstice between two dominant competitors, or in a context 
characterised by a distinct dominance order, there will be resistance and competition from existing 
competitors. This restricts the likelihood of ecosystem emergence, and hub firm entrepreneurs often 
switch fields to take advantage of new emerging fields (Perkmann & Spicer, 2007), although early 
competition does not preclude ecosystem emergence (Barley, 1986; Beckert, 1999; Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Reay et al., 2006). 
External events are a common enabling condition for ecosystem emergence and which shape the 
activities required for ecosystem emergence. These external events disturb the existing socially 
constructed, field-level consensus and invite the introduction of new ideas (Fligstein, 1997, 2001; 
Greenwood et al., 2002; Holm, 1995; Jenkins, 1983; Rao et al., 2000; Reay et al., 2006). These external 
events can consist of social upheaval, technological disruption, resource disruption, competitive 
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discontinuity, and regulatory changes (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Battilana et al., 2009; Fligstein & 
Mara-Drita, 1996; Hinings et al., 2004; Jepperson, 1991; Thornton, 2002), and may happen gradually 
or abruptly (Gamson & Meyer, 1996). However they occur, they shape the strategic landscape which 
the hub firm and emerging ecosystem must navigate. Similarly, internal contradictions in existing 
markets, ecosystems or organisational fields (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Friedland & Alford, 1991; 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002) can also influence the initial conditions for 
emergence. For instance, the levels of inefficiency, lack of adaptability and levels of divergent interests 
can create the conditions for emergence (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Seo & Creed, 2002). Indeed 
these contradictions may provide the alternative logics of value co-creation, as well as the cognitive and 
physical resources to be mobilised, appropriated and transposed in the process of ecosystem emergence 
(Seo & Creed, 2002). As the hub firm and ecosystem also directly interact with the existing political, 
economic and institutional system, in doing so it can create opportunities (Ingram & Rao, 2004).  
 As the context can both provide the conditions for ecosystem emergence as well as shape the 
environment in which emergence occurs, a collection of activities that relate to the actors external to 
the ecosystem which have an impact on the emergence processes of the ecosystem is suggested. 
Activities here include the actions of regulators and government, discourse in the press and wider 
society, and the actions of competitors.  
Regulatory activities relate to those regulatory events that occur in the wider context, such as the 
passing of statutes that relate to the operation of the ecosystem and investigation by regulatory bodies. 
Governments may have a strong interest in the activities of the ecosystem and hence may regulate 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Lee et al., 1995; Suarez, 2004; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). By the act 
of regulating an activity, a government or regulator can not only (de)legitimate the ecosystem, it may 
also make the market much more (less) favourable (Sine et al., 2007). For instance the introduction of 
legislation can lead to altered alliances between participants, changing power relations, and hence 
threatening established resource flows in the ecosystem (Holm, 1995). In particular they can change the 
regime of appropriability that governs the ability to capture profits (Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991; Lee 
et al., 1995; Suarez, 2004; Teece, 1986). Appropriability is an influence on the ecosystem emergence, 
as a strong regime of appropriability will favour ecosystems and hub firms with superior technology 
(Suarez, 2004), or will give them time to improve their technology (Teece, 1986). An example is the 
selection of the GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) mobile phone standard in Europe. 
However, an adverse appropriability regime can be worked around by encouraging imitation and market 
acceptance of a particular design through an ‘open architecture’ (Schilling, 2009). Institutional 
intervention, such as government purchases of a product (Suarez, 2004) or through large and powerful 
users requesting a particular product design (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992) can also influence 
ecosystem emergence. In these circumstances the sheer volume of production required will be sufficient 
to ensure success through scale economies or through legitimacy signals. Similarly, private institutions 
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such as industry associations or standards making bodies can influence which technology can enter the 
market initially providing first mover advantages to particular hub firms and ecosystems (Suarez, 2004; 
Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1992). 
The second context activity relates to the discursive actions of the press, analysts and other actors 
in wider society. Here press activities include any written or spoken actions that discuss the ecosystem 
in a substantive manner (Phillips et al., 2004). Societal discursive activities are the dialogue that occurs 
in wider society, such as entering the general lexicon, referencing in art, winning awards, and the release 
books, magazines, academic or medical research that addresses the ecosystem. These activities have the 
effect of legitimating the ecosystem (Phillips et al., 2004), as can winning a certification competition 
which highlights the ‘best’ service or product (Rao, 1994). Signals of leadership are also important in 
the construction of markets and the shaping of boundaries (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009), as they build 
legitimacy both for ecosystem participants on the viability of value co-creation, as well as for the 
ecosystem within wider society. Discourse external to the ecosystem can also lead to fragmentation of 
views of the participants within an ecosystem, an imposition of values from outside the ecosystem, or 
changing opinions of participation about their involvement (Hinings et al., 2004). For instance, 
Haveman and Rao (1997) point how the changing nature of society led to changing concepts of the 
nature of thrift, and Greenwood et al. (2002) show how new external views of the monopoly position 
of professions altered the organisational field of accounting. In both these cases wider societal changes 
affected the institutional logics within the field. 
The activity of competitors within the ecosystem can also influence ecosystem emergence, as 
successful ecosystems and hub firms will generate spin-offs and motivate other organisations to 
compete for the same resources (Fligstein, 2001; Rao et al., 2000). Thus the entry of competitors as 
well as their actions are relevant to sales-take off, technological improvement and ecosystem emergence 
(Agarwal & Bayus, 2002). At times the contest between the ecosystem and competitors will focus on 
meaning construction (Benford & Snow, 2000; Ryan, 1991) and at other times related more directly to 
the core product or service, such as through price wars or functional improvements (Garud et al., 2002). 
A competitor can also generate conditions for wider institutional change, including acting in such a way 
that foster opportunities that other organisations can take advantage of (Battilana et al., 2009; Delbridge 
& Edwards, 2008). Moreover, a competitor, in its zeal for competitive success could deliberately 
compromise the boundaries of the ecosystem, disembedding some previously embedded participants, 
as well as exposing the ecosystem to new actors who have never been embedded (Zietsma & Lawrence, 
2010). 
Summarising, context activities are those external to the ecosystem that impact on the emergence 
of the ecosystem. In particular these activities include actions by regulators and government, discursive 
actions of the press, analysts and wider society, and the actions of competitors.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter has synthesised the institution formation and change literatures of 
dominant design theory, social movement theory, and institutional entrepreneurship theory to propose 
four activities of ecosystem emergence. Resource activities are those concerned with the procurement 
and management of resources by the hub firm in an ecosystem, including corporate activities, financial 
activities, coalition building activities and competence building activities. Technology activities are 
those related to the design and provision of the underlying technologies, including the design and 
delivery of the underlying technologies and the establishment and operation of supporting services for 
ecosystem participants. Institutional activities are those related to the institutional structure and 
operation of the ecosystem, including actions by both the hub firm and ecosystem participants. These 
include rule-making and enforcement, framing, discourse, and identity construction. Contextual factors 
that both provide the conditions for ecosystem emergence as well as shape the environment in which 
emergence occurs include the actions of regulators and government, discourse in the press and wider 
society, and the actions of competitors.  
The next chapter outlines the process methodology adopted to empirically investigate the 
emergence processes of ecosystems.  
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4 METHOD, DATA AND EMPIRICAL SETTING 
This chapter outlines the process methodology relevant to addressing the third research question: 
do ecosystem emergence processes exhibit similarities across cases? I first specify the key assumptions 
of the process methodology adopted: narrative explanation. I then detail the research design, the 
empirical setting, the empirical cases, as well as the methods employed for the generation and analysis 
of the sequence data, including data collection, event colligation, phasic analysis and statistical boot-
strapping. 
4.1 Narrative explanation 
The process methodology adopted employs narrative explanation, which takes the contribution 
that actions and events make to a particular outcome and then configures these contributions into a 
complete episode (Polkinghorne, 1988). Put differently, narrative explanation conceptualises 
development and change processes as a sequence of events which have unity and coherence over time. 
Outcomes are explained as the result of the order in which the events unfold and of particular 
conjunctions of events and contextual conditions. Ideally, narrative explanation provides an account of 
how and why a sequence of events unfolds that is sufficiently flexible to encompass a range of observed 
cases, yet sufficiently powerful to help researchers discern the operation of a generative mechanism in 
a collection of sequences (Poole et al., 2000). This generative mechanism is located in the particular 
progression of events and their conjunctions with other events and conditions, and is a sequence or 
cycle of prototypical events that enact the change path through space and time (Van De Ven & Poole, 
1995). 
That outcomes are explained as a result of the order in which they unfold indicates that the 
underlying assumptions of narrative explanation differ with respect to those methods based upon 
variance methodological approaches (Abbott, 1983, 1988, 1990a; Poole et al., 2000). The first 
assumption is that the entities that are the subject of interest may change over time (Abbott, 1988; Poole 
et al., 2000). No degree of similarity between earlier and later stages in development is required so long 
as this development is spatio-temporally continuous (Hull, 1975). This is in sharp distinction to 
methodologies based upon variance models, where the entity is assumed to be fixed with changing 
attributes (Abbott, 1988, 1992). As a consequence discerning a central subject and the types of events 
and characteristics that mark changes in the subject underpins the methodology. Central subjects are 
individual entities (groups, people, organisations, machines and other material artefacts) around which 
the narrative is woven. Also distinct from the variance approach, an entity, attribute, or event may 
change in causal meaning over time (Abbott, 1988, 1992; Poole et al., 2000). 
Because of the inherent complexity of developmental processes, narrative explanation explicitly 
focuses on events rather than variables which indicate attributes of the entity. Events naturally simplify 
the complex flow of incidents (Abbott, 1990b). As such, events are the natural unit of the process in 
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that they are what happens to the central subject or what the central subject does (Abbott, 1990b; Poole 
et al., 2000). In contrast to variance approaches where, for instance, a survey contains indicators of the 
underlying constructs, a narrative text contains the indicators for an underlying process theory 
(Pentland, 1999). Furthermore, the temporal sequence of events is critical (Pentland, 1999; Poole et al., 
2000). For variance theories there is an assumption of independence between entities, attributes and 
time periods, so that the order of things does not influence the way things turn out (Abbott, 1988, 1992). 
For narrative explanation, the order in which events occur determines when causality come into play, 
while the duration of events and the continuity across events determines how long these causes operate 
(Abbott, 1988; Poole et al., 2000). This means that unlike variance approaches, establishing the 
minimum time unit is relatively unimportant as process theories have to be able to expand and contract 
their windows for event recognition (Poole et al., 2000). 
Narrative explanation also incorporates multiple layers of explanation ranging from the 
immediate to the past (Poole et al., 2000). In distinction to variance theories which are ‘causally 
shallow’ where history is encapsulated in the immediate past state of the entity, process theories are 
‘causally deep’ as they explain the state of development at any point in terms of the prior history of 
events and associated causal influences (Abbott, 1988). The importance of considering both the 
immediate past and the distant past is underpinned by the fact that the history of an individual case can 
cause different paths with differing outcomes, and that events can have differing time horizons (Poole 
et al., 2000). 
Narrative explanation is also based upon a different logic of causality to variance approaches. 
Necessary causality requires that only the entire set of forces that influence the change process, in the 
particular order and combinations in which they occur, are necessary and sufficient to explain a 
narrative (Poole et al., 2000). This is in distinction from variance approaches which attempt to cut 
through a variety of variables to find the relevant few that are both necessary and sufficient (Mohr, 
1982; Poole et al., 2000). As causal influences come through one or more events, it is rare for a single 
cause to be sufficient in narrative explanation, and hence, unlike variance models, main effects are not 
more important than interaction effects (Abbott, 1988, 1992). Also in contrast to variance models, a 
given attribute can have more than one effect on another attribute within a given study (Abbott, 1988). 
This means that in process research although each causal event will impart a particular direction, the 
subsequent events, conjunction and confluences also influence the subject and alter the direction 
imparted by a previous event. Narrative explanation is also based upon final and formal causality, 
supplemented by efficient causality (Poole et al., 2000), which is the causality utilised within variance 
explanations, where a force acts upon the unit of analysis to make it what it is in terms of the outcome 
variable (Mohr, 1982). Efficient causality explains the influence imparted by particular events and 
explains the mechanics of transitions between events and more macro-level units, such as phases (Poole 
et al., 2000). Both final and formal causality, not viewed as valid generative mechanisms by variance 
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approaches, can also be used. Final causality considers explanations where an end or goal guides the 
unfolding of development and change, while formal causality considers explanation driven by a pattern 
that guides the change (Poole et al., 2000). 
Finally, the generality of narrative explanation depends upon its versatility (Poole et al., 2000). 
For variance theories generality is based upon the domain of cases and contexts in which the explanation 
operates uniformly and consistently (Abbott, 1988, 1990a). In narrative explanation generality stems 
from the degree to which it can encompass a broad domain of developmental patterns without 
modification of its essential character (Poole et al., 2000). Thus rather than categorise the cases that do 
not fit the explanation within the error term, the goal is to incorporate all cases into the explanation. In 
order to achieve this versatility, process researchers are required to pursue a strategy of simplification, 
where events and event sequences are categorised in such a way as to identify qualitatively similar 
events and sequences (Abbott, 1990a).  
Summarising, narrative explanation explains outcomes as a result of the order in which they 
unfold. To do so narrative explanation has a range of assumptions which differ from those of variance 
studies. In particular, narrative explanation allows the subject of interest to change over time, focuses 
on the temporal sequence of events, utilises various layers of explanation, has differing logics of 
causality, and aims to be generalisable through the versatility of its explanations.  
4.2 Research design 
Having noted that the overall empirical approach adopts narrative explanation, I now outline the 
research design, which is a logical plan for getting from the research question to the answers (Yin, 
1984). A research design needs to explicitly describe the key methodological decisions taken in order 
to answer the research question. Together these methodological decisions constitute the framework that 
is used to empirically investigate the research question. 
The first methodological decision was to adopt a case study based approach. Case studies are 
particularly useful when the research question focuses on an area that is currently understudied and 
where there is limited theory (Edmondson & McManus, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989; Siggelkow, 2007). 
Furthermore, case studies are generally preferred when the research question is focused on a 
contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context and where the researcher will have little control over 
the events being researched (Yin, 1984). For narrative explanation and process studies such as this, case 
studies provide rich detail (Langley, 1999; Van De Ven, 1992; Weick, 2007), capture multiple levels of 
context and recurrent patterns in process data (Pettigrew, 1992), and contain the same narratives that 
organisations use to plan, enact, interpret and evaluate their own actions and those of others (Pentland, 
1999). The narrative data that constitutes the source material for case study research can also be easily 
manipulated and codifiable using standard methodological techniques. 
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In seeking to understand if there is similarity in the processes of ecosystem emergence across 
cases, the unit of analysis here is the process of emergence. This is congruent with the synthetic 
approach to sensemaking of process data and theory development which takes the full process as the 
unit of analysis and attempts to construct global measures from the detailed event data to describe it 
(Langley, 1999).  
With the process as the unit of analysis, multiple case studies are required to generate enough 
processes for comparison. In this way the research takes the event sequences and conducts a type of 
variance analysis to determine similarities. Furthermore, the greater the number of cases utilised in the 
analysis the greater the potential generalisability of the results, as case studies are subject to limitations 
in generalisability and open to biases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984). The generalisability of narrative 
explanation also depends upon its versatility, as outlined above (Poole et al., 2000). Multiple case 
studies also typically enable the emergence of more robust and parsimonious theory than single case 
studies (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1984). Multiple cases also permit a replication logic in 
which each case is treated as an experiment, with each serving to confirm or disconfirm inferences 
drawn from the others (Yin, 1984). A further natural advantage that comparative case studies have over 
other comparative approaches is the opportunity to explore holistic explanations within and between 
cases (Pettigrew, 1992). 
A further methodological decision was to not only extract incidents from the raw case narratives, 
but also to construct events from the incidents. An incident differs from an event in that it is an empirical 
observation, while an event is not directly observed but is a construct that explains a pattern of incidents 
(Abbott, 1984). As events act as a simplifying tool for analysis of complex change processes, methods 
of incident extraction and event identification are vital to the construction of event sequences (Abbott, 
1990b; Pentland, 1999; Poole et al., 2000). Incident extraction uses standard methods of reviewing raw 
qualitative data and recording each incident. To construct events, the method of colligation is adopted, 
a procedure where any number of incidents are selected as indicators of an event (Abbott, 1984, 1990a; 
McCullagh, 1978; Walsh, 1958; Whewell, 1847). This creates a temporal sequence of events that 
explains an observed stream of incidents (Poole et al., 2000). This process of incident extraction and 
event colligation is in stark contrast to non-process oriented case study research which takes case data 
and applies qualitative methodologies such as grounded theory (for instance, Corbin & Strauss, 1990; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Having created event sequences for each case study, the next methodological decision was to 
code each event with the four activities of ecosystem emergence – resource, technological, institutional, 
and contextual – previously identified in Chapter 3. As these activities describe the underlying types of 
events that occur in ecosystem emergence contexts, the coding of each event sequence creates an 
activity sequence that captures a sample of activities that occurred in the emergence processes of each 
case. This also organises each event sequence into a format conducive for process analysis. A related 
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decision was to apply the codes multi-functionally, meaning that multiple codes are applied to a single 
event, aligning with the concept of processes as multiple, intertwining narratives (Abbott, 1990a).  
With the activity sequences for each case created, the penultimate methodological decision was 
to adopt phasic analysis as the tool to analyse the activity sequences. Phasic analysis attempts to capture 
the overall coherency of development and change at a higher level than fine-grained micro-level 
structure (Poole et al., 2000). Three different phasic analysis techniques were selected. Optimal 
matching compares whether any two sequences have similarities in their code patterns. Direct 
inspection, a qualitative technique, enables the determination of phases through interrogation of the 
case narratives and the manual discernment and sorting of pattern sequences into higher level sequences. 
Frequency analysis is the quantitative analysis of the occurrences of codes, such as code counts per 
period or within a moving window.  
The final methodological decision was to bootstrap statistical significance for the phasic 
analysis technique of optimal matching. Optimal matching is a technique that is not normally utilised 
alone, but is paired with cluster analysis so that groups of sequences could be identified (see for 
instance Biemann, Fasang, & Grunow, 2011; Huang, El-Khouri, Johansson, Lindroth, & Sverke, 2007; 
Joseph, Boh, Ang, & Slaughter, 2012; Saberwhal & Robey, 1993; Salvato, 2009; Shi & Prescott, 
2011). This is necessary because although a single distance provides a numerical value of the 
dissimilarity between any two sequences, the real meaning of this value is obscure (Poole et al., 2000). 
As a consequence optimal matching is usually only viable when there is a large enough sample of 
sequences that can provide statistically significant results from cluster analysis. As there are only a 
limited number of cases within this research, the optimal matching technique needs to be enhanced so 
as to provide meaningful statistical information. The details of the statistical bootstrapping technique 
to address this shortcoming of the optimal matching technique are discussed in more depth in Section 
4.11.1. 
Together, this framework provides the necessary methodological steps that are required to 
investigate whether there are similarities in the processes across differing cases of ecosystem 
emergence.  
4.3 Empirical setting 
The research setting is digital services. Broadly stated, a digital service is the electronic provision 
of a service that was previously delivered either as analogue service or as a physical product. From this 
perspective the introduction of accounting software, word processing and computerisation of production 
control equipment can be considered digital services. Although the emergence of such services is 
fundamental to understanding the emergence of the post-industrial economy (Castells, 2000), 
particularly in relation to productivity increases and the shift from manufacturing to services, digital 
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services relate to an upgrading of an information transfer activity that already existed in the industrial 
economy, and also to activities that are usually internal to an economic entity, such as an organisation. 
A more comprehensive approach to digital services is to focus on transfers of information that 
did not exist in the industrial economy, such as those that relate to the provision of data and information 
between economic entities beyond traditional telephony or paper. An early example of digital services 
is provision of digital data between parties, such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), and the early, 
non-interactive internet. A unique element of information technology is that in contrast to previous 
general purpose technologies, information technology can be used to improve itself (Castells, 2000). 
As a consequence, over time the resources made available as digital services have increasingly exposed 
the underlying technology which provides the information and data. Digital services have evolved from 
mere data and information interchange to the manipulation of it, such that the capabilities of software, 
previously hidden ‘behind’ the service, have become available as a service. As such digital services are 
defined as informational resources available for consumption where the consumers do not own the 
physical or informational infrastructure.  
Digital services are an attractive setting for studying the emergence of ecosystems as they are not 
necessary consumed directly or alone. Digital services are normally consumed by other services or 
jointly consumed in a network setting. This is due to the fact that many digital services are designed as 
incomplete systems (Garud et al., 2008), necessitating their inclusion in a network of other 
complementary services. As such they are designed with value co-creation in mind, and it is through 
the ecosystem that the combination of heterogeneous digital services provides utility to the ultimate 
economic entity that consumes the service. This is enabled by ‘loosely coupled’ integration 
methodologies, with ‘just-sufficient’ protocols of interoperability and extensibility, which are a good 
design for widely distributed systems and networks (Orton & Weick, 1990). Digital services also exhibit 
many of the characteristics of a high velocity environment, in that there are rapid changes in demand, 
competition, and technology (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988).  
In sum, digital services provide an ideal setting to observe ecosystem emergence processes. 
4.4 Empirical cases 
Six successful digital service ecosystem emergence processes are investigated – Amazon, eBay, 
Facebook, Google, Salesforce, Wikipedia. Each of these cases is a well-known digital service. See Table 
4 for an overview of each case. 
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These six cases are heterogeneous within the context of digital services. They illuminate the 
phenomenon of interest and cover a range of polar types (Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 1984). More 
specifically, each digital service case has a different logic of value co-creation, and the cases collectively 
exemplify the main logics of value co-creation in digital service contexts. Amazon is an online retailer, 
eBay an online auction service, Facebook a social networking service, Google a search engine, 
Salesforce an online customer relationship management service, and Wikipedia an open source 
encyclopaedia. A second source of heterogeneity are the participants in each ecosystem; Amazon is 
business to consumer service, while the services of eBay and Wikipedia link consumers. Facebook and 
Google link businesses to consumers through advertising (and Facebook consumers to consumers for 
socially motivated reasons) and Salesforce is a business to business service.  
Further sources of heterogeneity include the effect of the dot-com crash, major crisis events, 
founder backgrounds and motivations, and early stage funding activities. The dot-com crash had a major 
impact on the business of Amazon, leading to lay-offs and a reduction in scope of strategic ambition, 
and also caused severe cash flow difficulties at Salesforce. eBay had a slump in listings, but as the 
digital service had been profitable from the beginning, the dot-com crash had little effect on its 
operation. Google was at too nascent a stage to be affected by the dot-com crash; both Facebook and 
Wikipedia had not yet been founded. In terms of major crisis events, all cases experienced an event 
which shook their ecosystem’s confidence in the viability of the digital service and ecosystem, with 
corresponding widespread media coverage. Both Facebook and Google suffered significant issues with 
privacy, eBay and Salesforce issues with service availability, Amazon the dot-com crash, and Wikipedia 
the quality of the articles. 
The founders and their motivations in each of the cases also vary widely. Jeff Bezos, originally 
a hedge fund executive, founded Amazon with the explicit goal of commercial success. In contrast 
Pierre Omidyar was a software engineer who founded eBay with the idealistic goal of creating the 
perfect market after experiencing what he felt were unfair practices in the stock market. Facebook, 
Google, Salesforce, and Wikipedia all adopted founding ideals which reflected the altruistic and open 
nature of the internet. Mark Zuckerberg was an undergraduate student at the founding of Facebook, and 
founded the digital service with the goal of making the world more open through enabling easier 
connections and communication between people. Sergei Brin and Larry Page of Google were both 
doctoral students who founded the digital service to make the world’s information freely accessible and 
available. Marc Benioff was a senior software executive at Oracle, and founded Salesforce to free the 
business from the travails of enterprise software. Jimmy Wales, the founder of a moderately successful 
early web company that, among other things, sold access to soft-core porn, founded Wikipedia to enable 
free access to the world’s knowledge after being influenced by the open source movement. 
The early stage funding of these digital services is also heterogeneous. Prior to venture capital 
(VC) investment, all empirical cases were initially seeded by their founders, although Salesforce was 
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also seeded by some angel investors, and Amazon and Facebook acquired early capital from the families 
of the founders. eBay, uniquely, was profitable from the very beginning and only acquired VC funds as 
a means of signalling viability. In contrast to all the other cases, Wikipedia has always been supported 
by philanthropic means, either from Bomis which initially established the service, or through direct 
outreach to corporate and individual donors after their establishment as a foundation. 
Together, these six cases are heterogeneous along a number of different dimensions within the 
context of digital services. As well as illustrating the phenomenon of interest, this should potentially 
provide a level of generalisability beyond their context (Leonard-Barton, 1990). 
4.5 Data sources 
Narrative explanation is based upon stories, because they help explain the relationships between 
events in a process or narrative (Pentland, 1999). Narrative data can be collected from many sources, 
as most forms of data embody, to a greater or lesser extent, some aspect of narrative structure (Pentland, 
1999).  
Data was collected from a variety of archival sources, including critical histories authored by 
independent journalists, websites, press releases, Wikipedia, and news articles. Each data source 
presents its story, more or less, in the form of a narrative, and in doing so gives a surface view of the 
deep structure of the underlying process. Table 5 details the data sources for each case. 
Table 5 – Data sources utilised for each case 
 Book Corporate 
Milestones 
Press 
Releases 
Blog/ 
Newsletter 
Wikipedia 
Criticisms 
Other 
Amazon Brandt (2011) 
Spector (2000) 
Y Y N Y N 
eBay Cohen (2002a) 
Lewis (2008) 
Y Y N Y N 
Facebook Kirkpatrick (2010) Y Y Y Y N 
Google Vise (2005) Y Y Y Y N 
Salesforce Benioff and Adler (2009) Y Y N Y N 
Wikipedia Lih (2009) 
Sanger (2005) 
Y Y Y Y Trophies 
For each case, at least one book that covered the early period of operation was included. For 
Amazon and eBay two books were reviewed, and for Wikipedia a book chapter that specifically covered 
the early years was included. All of these books, with the exception of the one used for Salesforce, were 
authored from a critical perspective by independent journalists. A chapter authored by Larry Sanger on 
the early history of Wikipedia was also included. Corporate milestones and all press releases were 
available on the public websites for all cases. In addition, Facebook, Google and Wikipedia, due to their 
later founding, had a body conversational-style archival material, such as newsletters and blogs that 
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were available online. Given the potential for biased narrative to be generated from these hub firm-
centric archival materials, the criticisms or controversy page or section on Wikipedia was also included 
as a data source. Only data verified through a citation was extracted from such Wikipedia pages. In 
addition, the trophies page was included for Wikipedia, which lists the awards that the digital service 
received. 
Beyond the core archival texts listed above, to cross check data, such as dates, Dow Jones Factiva 
was consulted as required. This enabled a deeper triangulation logic between differing sources to ensure 
additional reliability (Jick, 1979; Yin, 1984). 
4.6 Central subject identification 
In narrative explanation, the identification of the central subject is vital as they are the entity 
around which the narrative is woven. A central subject can take many forms, including groups, people, 
organisations (such as social movements), machines, material artefacts, and genetic lineages (Hull, 
1975). The discernment of the events and characteristics that qualitatively change this unit of analysis 
provides the raw data for analysis. So long as the central subject can be described, and has spatio-
temporal unity and continuity over time, then it can be a central subject. In addition, because they are 
primary and give the narrative its basic unity and continuity, central subjects must be identified 
independent of the events in which they figure (Poole et al., 2000).  
Narratives with multiple central subjects are possible, however they may become quite tangled 
and complicated as multiple strands of narrative are tracked (Poole et al., 2000). Rather than consider 
multiple narratives, an approach similar to Garud and Van De Ven (1989) is taken, which looked at the 
development of cochlear implants. For them their central subject was the business unit within 3M which 
revolved around a technology based product. As the central subject and the technology were 
intertwined, anything that was relevant to either was included. In the case of the research here, the 
central subject is the ecosystem, as well as the digital service and hub organisation that lie at the centre 
of the ecosystem. As such, anything that is relevant to the organisation, digital service or ecosystem is 
considered. Similarly, following Garud and Van De Ven (1989), data concerning the wider contextual 
environment, such as competing digital services, regulators and press, were also considered relevant. 
The inclusion of this wider contextual environment is congruent with definitions of ecosystems which 
include regulators, competitors and educational bodies, such as Teece (2007). This wide range of levels 
of analysis overcomes issues with difficulty in isolating the central subject in an unambiguous way 
which naturally consist of multiple levels of analysis (Langley, 1999).  
4.7 Time frame 
In process research such as this establishing the time frame is also vital, as it sets a reference for 
what changes are seen and how the changes are explained (Pettigrew, 1990). Here the time frame ranged 
from the initial idea of the digital service, to the time when the success of the digital service and 
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ecosystem are commonly acknowledged. Thus data collection often began before the digital service or 
hub firm was launched, and finished a number of years later; for completeness an additional year was 
added after the commonly acknowledged (discussed more below) success date.  
Table 6 – Empirical cases key dates 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
First Idea 08/04/1994 20/05/1994 12/12/2003 10/12/1996 Approx. 1997 18/08/1999 
First (Beta) 
Availability 
04/04/1995 04/09/1995 04/02/2004 08/10/1997 06/04/1999 23/02/2000 
(Nupedia) 
Full (Open) 
Availability 
16/07/1995 04/09/1995 26/09/2006 03/02/1999 07/02/2000 15/01/2001 
First Paying 
Customer 
07/06/1995 05/02/1996 27/05/2004 17/03/1999 12/11/1999 Not 
Applicable 
First International-
isation 
15/10/1998 04/07/1999 07/02/2008 09/05/2000 09/04/2001 15/03/2001 
First Press Release 04/10/1995 20/01/1998 19/04/2006 18/08/2004 06/12/1999 25/02/2004 
First Investment 
(non-seed) 
13/12/1995 17/06/1997 24/08/2004 27/08/1998 06/12/1999 Not 
Applicable 
First VC Investment 07/06/1996 17/06/1997 06/04/2005 07/06/1999 08/05/2000 Not 
Applicable 
IPO 14/05/1997 24/09/1998 Not 
Applicable 
19/08/2004 23/06/2004 Not 
Applicable 
First Profit 2001 1995 2009 2000 2002 Not 
Applicable 
First Employee 
Hired 
17/10/1994 06/05/1996 06/03/2004 14/09/1998 14/11/1998 03/01/2000 
Table 6 above details the years of study for each case, as well as key dates. The years of study 
for Amazon range from 1994 to 2003; 2003 was selected because by this year Amazon had reached 
general profitability and was by far the dominant retailer on the internet. The years of study for eBay 
range from 1994 to 2001, as although eBay was the undoubted market leader by late 1999, given the 
effect of the dot-com crash it was considered prudent to include its effect in the years of study. For 
Facebook the range is from 2003 to 2009, as by 2009 Facebook was the undoubted market leader for 
personal social networking, having not only surpassed MySpace a couple of years earlier, but also 
surpassing Orkut and Friendster globally. The years of study for Google range from 1996 to 2005, as 
Google was not only the undoubted market leader by this year, but it also won a court case in 2005 that 
ensured its dominance in search driven advertising. The years of study for Salesforce are from 1996 to 
2006, as by 2006 its ecosystem was finally completely opened and monetised. Prior to this year, 
Salesforce only progressively opened its ecosystem because it was not fully developed. Finally, the 
years of study for Wikipedia range from 1999 to 2008, from the first idea of an online encyclopaedia 
(then called Nupedia) to when its philanthropic underpinnings achieved long term viability, both of the 
regularity and amount of donations as well as the operation and staffing of the Wikipedia Foundation. 
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4.8 Incident extraction 
In process research, it is important to distinguish between an incident as raw datum, and an event 
as a theoretical construct (Abbott, 1984). Whereas an incident is an empirical observation, an event is 
not directly observed; it is a construct in a model that explains a pattern of incidents. An incident is the 
basic element of information. As explicated by Poole et al. (2000), an incident is empirical qualitative 
datum consisting of these characterisitics: (1) a bracketed string of works capturing the basic elements 
of information, (2) about a discrete incident or occurrence, (3) that happened on a specific date, which 
is (4) entered as a unique record (or case) in a qualitative date file, and (5) is subsequently coded and 
classified as an indicator of a theoretical event. 
In order to identify incidents consistently across the differing empirical cases, explicit decision 
rules are required.6 The decision rule used here is based upon the definition of an ecosystem. Adapting 
Autio and Thomas (forthcoming), and also following Poole et al. (2000), a relevant incident is defined 
as a major recurrent activity or whenever changes were observed to occur in or to a network of 
production and use side participants as well as the hub firm or platform. In addition, incidents relating 
to the wider contextual environment were also considered as relevant to the emergence process.  
Following Garud and Van De Ven (1989), a discrete view of time was taken with the day as the 
temporal measurement unit. This means that events take place at a particular time and incidents are 
using the DD/MM/YYYY format. The decision rules listed in Table 7 were applied to the application 
of the unit of time. 
Table 7 – Unit of time decision rules 
• Unclear exact date – When exact dates cannot be ascertained, they were estimated based upon the information obtained, 
entered in the incident date field, and flagged as ‘approximate’. 
• Unknown date – Where the specific day, month or year of an incident was not known, this was flagged as an ‘unknown’ 
and the date left empty. 
• Short incidents – Where incidents were less than one unit of measurement, they were specified at the level of the unit 
of measurement. 
• Long incidents – Where an incident took longer than one unit of measurement, it was said to have duration. In this case 
the dates and incidents that started and concluded the event were specified, as well as flagged as having duration. 
• Quantity incidents – Where an incident refers to a quantity (such as revenue or number of users) that was gathered over 
a defined time duration (such as ‘over January’ or ‘through Q1’), the date is specified as the final day of the duration 
and the marked as ‘final date’. 
Due to the nature of the source material, and the fact that the raw data has been gathered from a 
number of sources, not all incidents extracted from the raw narratives are relevant to the case of study. 
6 It is also necessary to ensure the validity of the bracketing procedures (Poole et al, 2000), something that 
has not been carried out in this research. This requires testing of whether the list of incidents is consistent with the 
common perceptions of the phenomenon investigated. There are two main techniques here: the first is to use a 
second researcher to ensure that the decision rules are consistently interpreted; the second is to have the resulting 
list of incidents reviewed by key informants. 
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In order to identify incidents consistently across the differing empirical cases, explicit decision rules 
ensure that only incidents relevant to the creation process were included. Table 8 below outlines the 
incident relevance decision rules. 
Table 8 – Incident relevance decision rules 
• Solely quantitative – An incident is coded as quantitative when it is not a press release or other promotional activity, 
and only details purely numeric achievements, such as revenue, number of users, or size of database.  
• Subjective observations – An incident is coded as an observation when judgements or interpretative statements are 
made by stakeholders about events. Coding incidents as observations requires a referencing of the event (by number) 
on which interpretive statements are made, the stakeholders making the observation, and what the statement is about 
(that is, about the ecosystem core concepts). 
• Out of date range – An incident is coded as out of range when it occurs prior to either the establishment of the initial 
organisational form or the initial idea for the digital service, or occurs after the range of interest. The range of interest 
is determined as when an ecosystem is considered fully created. 
Each incident was incorporated into a Microsoft Access database with core metadata associated 
for identification, management and manipulation. These metadata were applied univocally, in that an 
only single item for each metadata category was applied to each incident (Poole et al., 2000). See Table 
9 for the core incident metadata.  
Table 9 – Core incident metadata 
Metadata Description 
ID A unique ID to identify the incident. 
Incident date The starting date of the incident. If the incident occurred over a period of time then the finish 
date can be added and the incident_range field selected.  
Date approximate Denotes if the exact date is used, or an approximation. 
Incident title A short sentence that pithily describes the incident 
Incident description The long form text which describes the incident in more depth 
Source The source from which the incident was extracted. 
Source reference The reference from within the source, such as a page number. 
For data sources that came from electronic sources (such as press releases, newsletters and 
corporate milestones), these were directly imported into the Microsoft Access database and the core 
metadata automatically associated with each incident. For data sources that required manual extraction 
of data, such as books, any action or incident that occurs was manually entered into the database.  
Table 10 below details incident counts for each case by each data source. As can be observed, 
the volumes of incidents from each data source vary, as does the overall count for each case. This 
variability is to be expected given the range of data sources. In addition, as emphasised by Poole et al. 
(2000), it is important to recognise that the resulting list of incidents is only a sample. Put differently, 
the list of incidents for each case represents a sample of indicators of events.  
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Table 10 – Case incident count 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Books Brandt - 261 
Spector - 449  
Cohen - 476 
Lewis - 87 
Kirkpatrick - 601 Vise - 318 Benioff - 259 Lih – 179 
Sanger - 80 
Press 
Releases 
440 205 64 16 635 47 
Corporate 
Milestones 
80 25 54 102 47 143 
Blog / 
Newsletter 
- - 114 466 - 450 
Wikipedia 
Criticisms 
16 3 55 16 - 78 
Other - - - - - 28 
Total 1246 796 888 918 941 1005 
Note: N/A signifies no incidents available or relevant for extraction from data source. 
At this stage a case narrative and timeline are also completed for each case in order to gain a 
holistic overview of its emergence process.  
4.9 Event colligation 
The next step is to identify theoretically meaningful events from the incident data. There is a 
particular kind of relationship between incidents and events. As noted above, incidents are descriptions 
of happenings, documentary records of occurrences, and are raw data. In contrast, an event is a 
theoretical construct (Abbott, 1984), built upon a systematic interpretation of what is relevant to the 
process. As such the stream of incidents, a first order construction, needs to be translated into a sequence 
of events, a second-order construction (Poole et al., 2000).  
However, events may vary in several respects, as they may differ in temporal duration, may 
overlap or nest, and may also differ in spatial extension (Poole et al., 2000). That events may differ in 
temporal and spatial scope suggests that incidents may well indicate more than one overlapping event. 
Events may be embedded within other different types of events of larger scope. Here both event levels 
may be important for understanding the change process, because interleaving narratives may clarify the 
emergence process better than either narrative could on its own. Another complication is that the event-
incident relationship may change over time (Abbott, 1984). Just as the significance of events may 
change as a process unfolds, so can the relationship between an incident and event change. As a 
consequence, incident indicators can correspond to a theoretical construct in a variety of ways: some 
are better representatives than others, and some are easier to measure or detect (Poole et al., 2000).  
To identify events from a collection of incidents requires colligation, which can be formally 
defined as the combination of incidents into an emergent whole (Abbott, 1984; McCullagh, 1978; 
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Walsh, 1958; Whewell, 1847). The task of colligation involves three essential parts (Abbott, 1984, 
1990b).7 
The first part of colligation involves identifying the levels of analysis within which a coherent 
story can be told. Each level of analysis is a social level-of-action on which the story events for that 
level occur (Abbott, 1990b). These levels of analysis are also those where one can conceive of coherent 
cases for the stories (Abbott, 1984). Based upon our identification above of the central subject, relevant 
levels of analysis include the ecosystem, the digital service, the organisation that provides that service, 
and the wider contextual environment, such as competitors and wider societal institutional events. The 
level of incident was applied univocally; for an incident to act as an indicator of an event requires the 
incident to be applicable at a single level (Abbott, 1984). The decision rules for the classification of an 
incident into a level are detailed in Table 11 on the following page. 
The second part of colligation is substantive colligation, or deciding the substantive story at each 
of those levels (Abbott, 1984). This consists of assembling the narrative by deciding its essential events 
at each of those levels and ensuring the same event granularity at each level (Abbott, 1984, 1990a). 
There are a number of approaches to formally map indicators to events, including giving all indicators 
an equal weight, considering each indicator on a case-by-case basis, or using some measure of central 
tendency (Abbott, 1984). Following Poole et al. (2000) the first and third strategies were adopted for 
initial classification, and the second strategy then used to adjust the initial classification to one that was 
meaningful within the context of the case. This means that conceptual and practical reasoning are used 
to correct the bluntness of the objective rules.  
In order to construct an event from a set of incidents, clear and rigorous decision rules are required 
to so that high construct validity can be achieved. Table 12, also on the following page, details the 
decision rules that govern the indication of an event. These rules utilise a triangulation logic between 
differing indicators to ensure additional reliability (Jick, 1979; Yin, 1984). 
7 The reliability of the colligation process should also be tested (Poole et al, 2000), something that has not 
been carried out in this research. This requires testing the unitising reliability, or the consistency in dividing the 
stream of activity into units. The main technique is to use a second researcher to ensure that decision rules are 
consistently interpreted. 
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Table 11 – Decision rules for levels of incidents 
Level Organisation Service Ecosystem Context 
Definition An incident that relates to 
the organisation that 
controls the digital service 
An incident that relates to 
the digital service 
An incident that relates to 
the participants that interact 
with both the digital service 
and company both on the 
production and use side 
An incident that occurs in 
the wider environment in 
which the case study is 
occurring 
Examples • Promotion and 
marketing related to 
company and unrelated 
products and services 
(such as email blasts, 
holiday related press 
releases, competitions, 
sponsorships, etc.) 
• Philanthropic activities 
(such as scholarships, 
charitable giving, 
charitable assistance, 
etc.) 
• Acquisitions of other 
organisations 
• Patents and trademarks 
awarded 
• Office openings, moves 
and refurbishments 
• Firm founding, bank 
account opening, bank 
loans, etc. 
• IPO and related activity 
• Election of personnel to 
operating committees 
and board 
• Hiring (and departures) 
of personnel 
• Decisions, realisations 
and other actions of 
managers 
• Staff training 
• Restructuring 
• Performance (such as 
revenue, profits, number 
of employees, etc.) 
• Release of new features 
(including related 
hardware elements) 
• Changes to existing 
features 
• Change of name, visual 
layout, design and logos 
• Release of supporting 
programs and sites 
• Standard setting 
• Rule and policy setting 
• Price setting (including 
making something free 
of charge) 
• Sales activities 
• Promotion and marketing 
activities related to 
digital service (such as 
advertising, email blasts, 
holiday related press 
releases, competitions, 
sponsorships, charitable 
auctions, etc.) 
• Outgoing 
communications 
specifically relating to 
digital service 
• Initial ideas and R&D 
• Technology selection and 
deployment 
• System performance 
issues or system down 
• Performance (for 
example, number of 
entities that the service 
delivers, such as 
searches, items listed, 
articles; or number of 
languages supported) 
• Partnership agreements 
and alliances 
• Licensing agreements 
• Integration of the service 
into other services and 
products 
• Entry and/or exit of 
participants 
• Participant activity, such 
as word of mouth 
marketing, promotions, 
projects, polls, surveys, 
competitions, etc. that 
support the service 
• Participant responses to 
service changes, new 
features, or 
organisational actions 
• Emergence of related 
industry in which 
ecosystem participants 
partake 
• Attendance at 
conferences 
• Investor and funding 
activity (including actual 
investment, offers and 
fundraising) 
• Investment in and 
funding of participants 
• Performance (such as 
numbers of users, number 
of partners/affiliates, 
number of apps, number 
of edits, etc.) 
• Activities of competitors 
• Acquisition activity (from 
non-ecosystem members) 
• Press and news articles, 
including participation in 
interviews 
• Market and industry 
analyst reports 
• Actions of regulators and 
government 
• Actions of NGOs and 
other pressure groups 
• Honours and prizes 
awarded 
• Enters society discourse 
(books written, service 
name becomes a verb, 
etc.) 
• Court cases brought 
(when the organisation is 
sued) 
• Court case resolutions 
(for both when sued and 
suing) 
• Visit of dignitary to 
company 
• Participation in high 
profile non ecosystem 
event (such as attendance 
at Davos, or meeting 
President) 
• Performance (such as 
surpassing a rival or 
Alexa rankings) 
Table 12 – Event colligation indication decision rules 
• When an incident was deemed worthy of a press release, newsletter or some other public broadcast or publication by 
the hub firm, then there is an indicator of an event. 
• When an incident is named as critical by an ecosystem participant, then there is an indicator of an event. 
• When an incident is named as a ‘milestone’ by a participant, then there is an indicator of an event. 
• Where there is a change in the functionality of the digital service, the capability of the hub firm or the environment in 
which the ecosystem resides, then there is an indicator of an event. 
• When an incident is mentioned more than once from differing data sources, then there is an indicator of an event. 
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As the goal is to create a series of events which all have the same approximate granularity, 
additional decision rules are required when there are multiple indicators that occur on a given day. The 
following rules described in Table 13 below apply in the decision to construct an event from a single 
incident or multiple incidents. 
Table 13 – Event colligation multiple indicator decision rules 
• When multiple indicators occur on the same day, if these are the same incident then they are joined together into the 
same event. 
• When multiple indicators occur on the same day which are not exactly the same but are closely related, where logical, 
these should be joined together into the same event. For instance, if three new technical features are released on the 
same day, then these can be colligated into the same event. However, if there is a technical feature and a new pricing 
policy on the same day, then these should be considered separate events. 
• When there is a series of indicators over differing dates that can be better considered as a single event, then these should 
also be joined into a single event. Here the decision rule is “do these indicators together cover a single event in relation 
to ecosystem emergence?” In general these incidents should not run over a long time period, say 4 months, but should 
be clustered around a number of closely spaced days. The date assigned should correspond to the emphasis of the event. 
For instance, a series of articles in the press over a couple of days can be reduced to a single press event. Here the date 
of the event would the publication of the first article. Similarly a series of meetings and activities which result in a 
failed or successful funding or acquisition can be considered the one event, however here the date should be that which 
concludes the incident as all other lead to that date. 
The third part of colligation concerns the analysis of the formal qualities of each event (Abbott, 
1984). The first formal quality is duration, which has been discussed earlier, and is obviously an issue 
when there are events occurring at differing levels. The second formal quality is dispersion, where an 
event propagates from one level of analysis to another, and need to be carefully noted. However this is 
done, Abbott (1984) points out that the final colligation should be coherent in both its limitation to the 
level of analysis and by extension to the participants in the event, and the pattern of links between events 
must be closed, although external antecedent events may be allowed. Here event duration was noted on 
each event.  
Table 14 below details the number of events colligated for each case. 
Table 14 – Event and incident counts 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Incidents 1246 796 888 918 941 1005 
Events 674 483 520 568 721 710 
As can be observed, the dispersion between the numbers of events for each case has decreased 
as compared to the dispersion for incidents. Again, it is important to emphasise that the list of events is 
only a sample of the events that can be identified. 
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4.10 Event coding 
To organise these event sequences into a format conducive for process analysis, they need to be 
categorised to describe the emergence process.8 These category systems provide the ‘measurement’ 
necessary to construct theoretical models of change with empirical events (Abbott, 1984). Classifying 
an event or a sequence into a type is fundamentally different from measuring its variable attributes, as 
the change processes being classified are too complex to decompose into variables (Poole et al., 2000). 
The coding scheme consists of the four conceptual categories derived in the theoretical 
development – resource, technological, institutional, and contextual. To recap, resource activities are 
those concerned with the procurement and management of resources by the hub firm in an ecosystem, 
including corporate activities, financial activities, coalition building activities and competence building 
activities. Technology activities are those related to the design and provision of the underlying 
technologies, including the design and delivery of the underlying technologies and the establishment 
and operation of supporting services for ecosystem participants. Institutional activities are those related 
to the institutional structure and operation of the ecosystem, including actions by both the hub firm and 
ecosystem participants. Salient institutional activities include rule-making and enforcement, framing, 
discourse, and identity construction. Contextual factors that both provide the conditions for ecosystem 
emergence as well as shape the environment in which emergence occurs include the actions of 
regulators and government, discourse in the press and wider society, and the actions of competitors.  
Coding was conducted with a focus on pragmatism and utility, where rules and codes were 
devised in order for the coder to recognise and distinguish the categories. These rules were made easier 
by the archival data sources used, as by definition these were observer privileged and had little-to-no 
subjective influence. For each code a number of sub-categories emerged which aided application of the 
higher codes, enabling a more granular and accurate application of the codes. These sub-categories were 
developed retroductively, combining both inductive and deductive approaches (Poole et al., 2000). 
Taking the top level categories derived within Chapter 3, each the sub-categorisation was developed 
and then adjusted in view of what is workable and informative after trying out on the data. This is 
consistent with the observation of Poole et al. (2000) that when the study of organisational change 
process is at an embryonic stage, initial categories emerge as ‘sensitising constructs’ for conducting 
exploratory research. Appendix A outlines the codes, sub-categories and examples utilised. 
 The codes were applied multi-functionally, meaning that multiple codes were applied to a single 
event, aligning with the concept of processes as multiple, intertwining narratives (Abbott, 1990a). For 
instance, a strategic partnership between a hub firm and a complementary asset provider which also 
8 For coding, both reliability and validity need to be tested (Poole et al, 2000), but this has not been 
performed here. Here classificatory reliability, referring to the consistency in assigning units to classification, and 
interpretive validity, the accuracy of interpretation, are salient. The main technique is to use a second researcher 
to ensure that there is consistency of interpretation about the decision rules. 
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involved a functional improvement to the digital service would be coded two times: once for the 
resource acquisition and once for the technological improvement.  
The following Table 15 presents some descriptive statistics of the code frequency. The total code 
counts differ to the total event count due to the multifunctional coding. 
Table 15 – Case descriptive statistics for activity codes 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Resource 27.55% 
(197) 
25.25% 
(126) 
18.29% 
(182) 
22.45% 
(134) 
15.18% 
(114) 
7.05% 
(52) 
Technological 25.03% 
(179) 
18.31% 
(91) 
34.67% 
(182) 
33.33% 
(199) 
11.98% 
(90) 
29.54% 
(218) 
Institutional 30.77% 
(220) 
43.06% 
(214) 
23.62% 
(124) 
22.61% 
(135) 
52.60% 
(395) 
40.51% 
(299) 
Contextual 16.64% 
(119) 
13.28% 
(66) 
23.43% 
(123) 
21.61% 
(129) 
20.24% 
(152) 
22.90% 
(169) 
Total 100.00% 
(715) 
100.00% 
(497) 
100.00% 
(525) 
100.00% 
(597) 
100.00% 
(751) 
100.00% 
(738) 
Note: The number in parentheses represents actual code count. 
Following the application of codes to the events, the data consists of six sequences of activity 
codes. For example, a subset of the code sequence could appear as follows, R-T-C-T-R-I-C, with ‘R’ 
signifying a resource activity, ‘T’ a technology activity, ‘I’ an institutional activity and ‘C’ a context 
activity. From this basis analysis can proceed.  
4.11 Phasic Analysis 
Phasic analysis attempts to capture the overall coherence of development and change at a higher 
level than fine-grained micro-level structure (Poole et al., 2000). The fundamental assumption of phasic 
analysis is that the overall process can be described in units larger than the underlying events. A number 
of phasic analysis techniques were applied to these coded sequences: optimal matching, direct 
inspection and frequency analysis. Analysis was conducted using the R open source statistical software 
(R Core Team, 2012) with the TraMineR package for optimal matching (Gabadinho, Ritschard, Muller, 
& Studer, 2011). 
4.11.1 Optimal matching 
Optimal matching is a technique that compares whether two sequences have similarities in the 
pattern of the codes, and requires that each sequence is represented by well-defined elements drawn 
from an alphabet of relatively small set of (repeating) event types (Abbott, 1990b; Poole et al., 2000). 
Optimal matching produces an index of the relative ‘distance’ between any two sequences, and can be 
utilised on sequences of differing lengths. This index, known as the Levenshtein distance, is the smallest 
possible cost of insertion, substitution and deletion operations required to align the two sequences. Put 
differently, this index represents the effort required to transform one sequence into another. As an 
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example below demonstrates,9 the Levenshtein distance between “R-T-R-T-C-R” and “T-T-R-T-I-R-
C” is 3, since the following edits change one into the other, and there is no way of doing it in less than 
three edits.  
1. Substitution of “T” for “R” in position 1: “R-T-R-T-C-R”  “T-T-R-T-C-R” 
2. Substitution of “I” for “C” in position 5: “T-T-R-T-C-R”  “T-T-R-T-I-R” 
3. Insertion of “C” at end:   “T-T-R-T-I-R”  “T-T-R-T-I-R-C” 
A cost matrix determines the effort required for each insertion, substitution or deletion of a 
sequence element. In the example above, the cost of each insertion, substitution or deletion is costed at 
a value of 1, in what is called a constant cost matrix. As such the higher number returned in the distance, 
the more different the sequences. Where sequences have varying lengths, this distance can be 
normalised to a number between zero and one – where zero represents perfect similarity.  
I use a constant cost matrix within this thesis; there is a value of one to each insertion, substitution 
and deletion. An alternative costing method, called TRATE, is based upon the probabilities of the 
transition of one code to another calculated from an analysis of the two sequences. This approach was 
not adopted as it results in differing costs of each insertion, substitution and deletion for each sequence 
comparison, making comparisons across differing sequence-pairs difficult to interpret.  
The optimal matching algorithm always computes a distance measure for any pair of event 
sequences. However, because real-life event sequences are influenced by random events, it is very rare 
for any two event sequences to be perfectly matched. The challenge therefore remains to determine the 
meaning of the distance measure. For example, if the optimal matching algorithm indicates a distance 
of 0.459 for two sequences, a procedure is required to determine whether this is indicative of meaningful 
difference or similarity between the two sequences. This is further complicated by the varying number 
of events within each case. For instance, the distance between Amazon-eBay is between 715 and 497 
events, Amazon-Facebook is between 715 and 525 events, and eBay-Facebook is between 497 and 525 
events. Given the influence of the number of insertions required to calculate the distance between each 
case-pair, the distances of each case-pair are not directly comparable. To explore the meaning of 
distance measures calculated from a dataset, clustering procedures are often used with optimal matching 
(Abbott, 1990b; Poole et al., 2000). Clustering procedures help identify clusters where event sequences 
share a higher similarity with one another than with event sequences from other clusters (see for instance 
Biemann et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2007; Joseph et al., 2012; Saberwhal & Robey, 1993; Salvato, 2009; 
Shi & Prescott, 2011). Clustering allows the identification of a ‘most typical’ sequence by finding the 
sequence that minimises some (possibly weighted) function of the distances to all other sequences 
9 Example adapted from “Levenshtein distance”, Wikipedia (retrieved on 20/07/2013). 
96 
                                                     
(Abbott, 1990b). However, a clustering procedure is not possible here, as there are only six cases, and 
hence fifteen event sequence pairs in the dataset. 
For this reason, I developed a randomisation procedure to establish statistical benchmarks that 
could be used to compare the distance measures against. 
1. For each case I first create an event set that was of equal length and contained the same 
frequency of codes as the actual event sequence (to use Amazon as an example, this would 
consist of a length of 715, of which 197 are resource codes, 179 technological codes, 220 
institutional codes and 119 contextual codes). See Table 14 above for total length and code 
frequencies for each case. This is repeated for each case. 
2. Using the ‘SAMPLE’ randomisation algorithm in R and the respective event sets as a basis, 
I create 10,000 event sequences for each case where the ordering of events is randomised but 
the frequencies of the codes remain the same. In practice, this simply means that there was a 
different order in which the underlying activities occurred. This creates a sample of the 
population of the code ordering permutations that could exist for each case. 
3. For each case-pair comparison, I compute the distance of the 10,000 randomised event 
sequences of the first case to 10,000 randomised event sequences of the second. This 
procedure creates a database of 10,000 distance measures where 10,000 randomised event 
sequences of the first case sequence length and code frequency are compared against 10,000 
randomised event sequences of the second case event sequence and code frequency. These 
10,000 distances are a sample of the population of distances that would be created by 
calculating the distance between the populations of the code ordering permutations of each 
case-pair. 
4. I then compare the actual distance measure computed for the actual sequences of the case-
pair against the distance measure database. This enabled me to establish how the actual case-
pair distance measured compared against the frequency distribution in the distance measure 
database. For example, if the mean distance was 0.5, and 95% of the random distances were 
within the range from 0.4 to 0.6 and the actual distance computed for the pair was 0.61, then 
this distance was equal to or greater than 95% of all distances in the database. Thus, the 
statistical significance of 0.11* indicates that the case-pair event sequences are statistically 
dissimilar with 95% confidence level (p < 0.05).  
5. The meaning of this difference can be interpreted as indicating that the first case event 
sequence is substantially different to the second case event sequence. A distance measure of 
0.39, where 0.39 is smaller than 95% of the values in the database would have indicated that 
the event sequence of the first case is statistically distinguishable and substantially similar to 
the second case.  
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Summarising, optimal matching enables the comparison of two sequences to determine the 
distance (or the amount of similarity) between the two sequences. I have complemented this method 
through ‘statistical bootstrapping’, a technique that enables the comparison of limited numbers of 
sequences. 
4.11.2 Direct inspection 
A second technique utilised is direct inspection to determine if phases are suggested in the activity 
sequences. Direct inspection, a qualitative technique, enables the determination of phases through 
interrogation of the case narratives and the manual discernment and sorting of pattern sequences into 
higher level sequences. In doing so direct inspection capitalises on the background knowledge of the 
researcher and allows the modelling of sequence phases in a more discerning fashion than is possible 
by using algorithmic techniques (Poole et al., 2000). It is particularly useful when there are not many 
phases in the change sequence (Poole et al., 2000), something that the process models from ecosystems 
(see for instance, Moore, 1993), dominant design (see for instance, Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; 
Suarez, 2004), social movement theory (see for instance, Davis & McAdam, 2000) and institutional 
entrepreneurship (see for instance, Greenwood et al., 2002; Hinings et al., 2004) literatures suggest. The 
results from direct inspection are investigated further through frequency analysis and validated through 
optimal matching. 
4.11.3 Frequency analysis 
The third technique utilised is frequency analysis of the activity codes. In addition to standard 
frequency techniques such as code counts per period, two original techniques have been developed. 
One frequency measure is the count of the occurrence of codes over a moving window (of a size of a 
set number of events, say 25) that progresses along the sequence. As a code occurs within the window 
the code count increases by one, and as the moving window moves past the code, the count decreases 
by one. Differing smoothing techniques were also applied, including symmetrical smoothing where the 
smoothed value includes values on both sides of the value and lagging value. This technique provides 
a visual aid that provides the relative frequency of codes at any point within the sequence and also 
implies rates of change.  
A second frequency measure examines the variance of code frequencies within a phase from a 
mean. This approach bootstraps statistical significance into the code frequency analysis. To produce a 
random mean for each code in a phase, 10,000 random sequences are generated for each case 
maintaining the same frequency of codes as the actual sequence (in the same manner as the statistical 
bootstrapping technique described above in Section 4.11.1 for optimal matching). Phase markers are 
then added at the same location in the random sequence as they occur in the actual sequence. The phase 
marker location is calculated by counting of the number of events in each phase (from the actual event 
sequence) as the phase duration. For instance, for a particular case, if a complete event sequence consists 
of 650 events, with the first phase consisting of 100 events, the second of 400 events and the third of 
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150 events, then for each randomised sequence for that case the first 100 events in the sequence is 
removed to form Phase I, the next 400 removed to form Phase II, and the remainder (150 events) forms 
Phase III. This is repeated to all 10,000 random event sequences for that case, as well as for the other 
case with their specific phase durations. This splits each randomised sequence into its constituent 
phases.  
The code frequency in each phase of the randomised sequence is then calculated, resulting in 
10,000 different frequencies for each phase. The mean frequency and standard deviation for each code 
can then be calculated for each phase. This mean frequency is identical (if not very close) to the code 
frequency for that phase if it had been calculated directly from the code counts on the actual event 
sequences. When comparing with the actual code occurrence for a phase of a case, a positive variance 
signifies a greater occurrence of that code than would occur by random, given the overall code 
frequency in the sequence. Similarly, a negative variance signifies a lesser occurrence of that code than 
would occur by random, given the overall code frequency in the sequence. 
4.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the process methodology relevant to addressing the third research 
question: do ecosystem emergence processes exhibit similarities across cases? The chapter has 
specified the key assumptions of the process methodology, the research design, empirical setting, as 
well as detailing the methods employed for the generation and analysis of the sequence data, such as 
data collection, event colligation, phasic analysis and statistical boot-strapping. It has expounded in 
more detail the three phasic techniques applied: optimal matching, direction inspection and frequency 
analysis. The following chapter reports the results of the case comparisons using phasic analysis.  
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randomisations is a different sequence of events in the complete event sequence – in practice, simply a 
different order in which the underlying activities occurred. This resulted in 60,000 random event 
sequences in total – 10,000 for each case. The optimal matching procedure was then run for each random 
event sequence for each case-pair, so that a database of 150,000 distances was created – 10,000 for each 
case-pair. As there was a range of distances for each case-pair, the mean and standard deviation were 
calculated. Following this procedure there were 15 mean distances and 15 standard deviations – one 
each for each case-pair. The mean distance for each case-pair (hereafter called the ‘random mean’) 
represents the average distance of 10,000 pairwise distances calculated.  
The random mean for a particular case-pair thus provides a measure against which the actual 
event sequence for a case-pair can be compared. By subtracting the random mean from the actual 
distance, a measure of the variance from the random mean can be calculated. Thus, a positive variance 
represents an increased distance and a negative variance represents a lesser distance of the actual 
distance to the random mean of 10,000 pair-wise random sequences calculated from the same code 
frequency. These results are detailed in Table 16 below. The mean distance and standard deviations for 
each case-pair are in Appendix B.  
Table 16 – Complete sequence optimal matching cross-case comparison 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay 0.019 + 
(0.643) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook 0.029 ** 
(0.691) 
0.013 
(0.789) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google 0.044 *** 
(0.719) 
0.037 ** 
(0.760) 
0.036 ** 
(0.700) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce 0.008 
(0.767) 
0.043 *** 
(0.676) 
0.022 * 
(0.778) 
0.030 ** 
(0.815) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia 0.108 *** 
(0.855) 
0.051 *** 
(0.717) 
0.074 *** 
(0.738) 
0.082 *** 
(0.785) 
0.069 *** 
(0.768) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; numbers in parentheses are actual distances. 
The results indicate that the majority of the case-pairs are significantly different to each other, 
although with differing levels of significance. Amazon-Google,10 eBay-Salesforce, Amazon-
Wikipedia, eBay-Wikipedia, Facebook-Wikipedia, Google-Wikipedia and Salesforce-Wikipedia are 
the most significantly different to each other (p<0.001). This means that the distance of the actual event 
sequences in each case-pair is greater than 99.9% of the 10,000 pairwise distances calculated from their 
randomly generated sequences. Amazon-Facebook, eBay-Google, eBay-Facebook, Facebook-Google 
and Google-Salesforce are also significantly different (p<0.01). This means that the distance of the 
10 For clarity and consistency, all case comparisons have the following format vertical case name hyphen 
horizontal case name. For example, the comparison between Salesforce and Wikipedia will be denoted Salesforce-
Wikipedia. 
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actual event sequences in each case-pair is greater than 99% of the 10,000 pairwise distances calculated 
from their randomly generated sequences. Facebook-Salesforce is also almost significantly different, 
although less so than the others (p<0.05), with Amazon-eBay less so (p<0.1). This means that the 
distance of the actual event sequences between Salesforce and Google is greater than 95%, and Amazon 
and eBay greater than 90%, of the 10,000 pairwise distances calculated from their randomly generated 
sequences. The remaining case-pairs, eBay-Facebook and Amazon-Salesforce are not significantly 
different to each other. This means that their distances are similar to their respective random means. As 
the differences are positive, positive this suggests that the event sequence of each case-pair tends 
towards being different to each other.  
These results overwhelmingly suggest that the emergence sequences of the six cases are not 
similar to one another. In fact they are significantly dissimilar to each other. This is an interesting 
finding. Put another way, a significant positive variance from a random mean indicates that each case 
in a comparison has a sequence of events that, when compared, are more different than a comparison 
of 10,000 pair-wise iterations of the same code frequency. This implies that each case has a pattern of 
events that is non-random in comparison to the pattern of events of the other cases. For those distances 
which are not significant, this implies that the pattern of events for each case in a comparison is no 
different than any two random sequences of the same code frequency. As a whole, these results suggest 
that there are no commonalities in the emergence sequences of the six cases.  
The finding that the emergence process of each ecosystem is dissimilar has support within the 
institutional formation literature. For instance, theorists have noted that the institutional logics and 
power relationships within a field are unique and that they emerge uniquely (Fligstein, 2001; Scott, 
2008). Schilling (2009) suggests that there are multiple pathways to the emergence of a dominant design 
when the firm is able to adjust the level of ‘openness’ of the technological design. Others have noted 
that firm level capabilities, such as financial resource acquisition, alliance formation, personnel 
recruitment, and product design, emerge in different ways although appear similar once created 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  
Potentially some of the differences in emergence sequences may be explained through the unique 
history of each case. For instance, the significant difference between the emergence sequences of 
Salesforce and eBay could be explained through their very different histories, with eBay launching over 
a weekend and growing organically, while Salesforce was extensively planned and grew after launch 
through active and aggressive marketing. More granularly, the non-significant variances of eBay-
Facebook and Amazon-Salesforce pairs may reflect some of the similar challenges that these 
ecosystems faced, and hence some internal patterns of events that are more similar. For example, both 
Facebook and eBay experienced conflict within their ecosystem over policy changes, and Salesforce 
and Amazon both undertook extensive marketing and societal outreach in order legitimise their 
respective ecosystems. 
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However, more likely, the dissimilarity of each event sequence can be explained through a 
consideration of the characteristics of each case. For instance, it is not surprising that Wikipedia is 
significantly different to the other cases, given its non-profit ethos that differed from the other, for-
profit ecosystems. The governance of Wikipedia was handed over to ecosystem participants from the 
beginning, and it relied on donations for its income rather than sales. This would lead one to reasonably 
expect that Wikipedia’s event sequence would be significantly different from that of the other cases due 
to its distinctive value logic. This heterogeneity in the logics of value co-creation was already embedded 
in the research design: Amazon is an online retailer, eBay an online auction service, Facebook a social 
networking service, Google a search engine, Salesforce an online customer relationship management 
service, and Wikipedia an open source encyclopaedia. Together these ecosystems collectively 
exemplify the main logics of value co-creation in digital service contexts and are hoped to support a 
degree of generalisability in my analysis results. 
The model of value creation in e-business by Amit and Zott (2001) has the potential to illuminate 
the level of heterogeneity across the logics of value co-creation of each case in my dataset. Although 
Amit and Zott (2001) consider value creation at the firm level, they note that their four factor model of 
value creation – efficiency, complementarity, lock-in and efficiency – applies to the total value created 
in e-business “regardless of whether it is the firm, the customer, or any other participant in the 
transaction who appropriates that value” (p. 503). In their model efficiency refers to the cost reductions 
obtained through digital provision of a service, complementarity refers to the revenue increase through 
the alignment of ecosystem participants, lock-in refers to the propensity of ecosystem participants to 
remain in the ecosystem, and novelty refers to the development of a new way of doing business. Table 
17 below details how each case differs across these four factors, with an additional factor of mode of 
value appropriation of the hub-firm. 
There is a range of differing efficiency benefits that each ecosystem delivers. Both Amazon and 
eBay offer similar transaction efficiency benefits through the reduction of search costs and having a 
wide selection range; however each varies on how they appropriate value – Amazon makes a margin 
on the sale and shipping of physical products and eBay a commission through brokerage. In contrast, 
Facebook, Google and Wikipedia, in addition to reducing search costs, also reduce information 
asymmetry, albeit through different mechanisms. Whereas Facebook and Google appropriate value 
through advertising, Wikipedia offers their service for free. In a further contrast, Salesforce creates 
transaction efficiency benefits through simplicity and speed, appropriating value through a subscription 
model. Each case also has differing complementary asset providers beyond the common complementary 
assets required for a digital business (servers, software, backup systems, engineers and internet 
connections).  
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Table 17 – Case logics of value co-creation heterogeneity 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Efficiency • Search cost 
reductions 
• Wide selection 
range 
• Scale economies 
• Search cost 
reductions 
• Wide selection 
range 
• Search cost 
reductions 
• Reduced 
information 
asymmetry 
• Search cost 
reductions 
• Reduced 
information 
asymmetry 
• Simplicity 
• Speed 
• Scale economies 
• Search cost 
reductions 
• Reduced 
information 
asymmetry 
Comple-
mentarity 
• Book (and 
music) 
wholesales 
• Shippers 
• Complementary 
software 
provision 
• User base 
• Advertisers 
• Complementary 
software 
provision 
• User base 
• Advertisers 
• User base 
• Complementary 
software 
provision 
• Complementary 
software 
provision 
• User base 
Lock-in • Switching costs, 
such as loyalty 
and 
customisation 
• Network effects 
• Trust 
• Network effects • Network effects • Switching costs, 
such as 
customisation 
and trust 
• Loyalty 
Novelty • Online retailing • Online 
brokerage 
• Social network 
supported 
advertising 
• Search 
supported 
advertising 
• Software as a 
Service (now 
known as 
‘cloud’) 
• Open and free 
group authoring  
Appro-
priation 
• Margin • Commission • Pay-per-click 
• Cost-per-
impression 
• Pay-per-click 
• Cost-per-
impression 
• Subscription • None 
Amazon relied upon book (and later music) wholesalers and shippers, eBay and Wikipedia relied upon 
their user base and providers of complementary software, Facebook and Google upon advertisers and 
users, and Salesforce upon software developers who provided extensions. Similarly, each case exhibits 
different lock-in mechanisms, with eBay, Facebook, and Google relying on positive network effects 
and Amazon and Salesforce relying on high switching costs created through customisation, particularly 
by a personalisation engine and customer history and operational and technological dependencies, 
respectively. In contrast, Wikipedia employs few lock-in mechanisms beyond user loyalty. 
Together, the heterogeneity in these logics of value co-creation suggests differing processes of 
value co-creation. For instance, the processes involved in online brokerage are different to those of 
subscription and those that are offered for free. Similarly, the processes involved in the management of 
complementary asset providers such as shippers is different to managing advertisers, which is different 
again to managing ecosystem participants who are deeply involved in the governance of the service. 
More specifically, a logic of value co-creation that has open ecosystem governance is more likely to 
have a higher frequency dialectical processes of conflict and resolution as rules are debated and agreed 
(such as Wikipedia and to a lesser extent eBay), than a logic of value co-creation that has a command 
and control process of governance (such as Google and Salesforce). This is not to say that dialectical 
processes would not occur in the latter examples – the imposition of rules that participants do not agree 
with will also result in conflict and resolution – however these processes are likely to be less frequent.  
By extension, this implies that the emergence processes of each ecosystem would also be 
different as these value co-creation processes are established. For instance, the emergence processes 
required to achieve critical mass for positive network effects to create lock-in, are different to those 
required to create lock-in through switching costs based on customisation or loyalty. Similarly the 
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emergence processes required to co-opt software developers into an ecosystem are different to those 
required to ensure supply of physical goods. 
Summarising, the optimal matching analysis of the complete emergence sequences of the six 
cases suggests that the emergence sequence of each ecosystem are dissimilar. This finding has support 
within the institutional formation literature, and can potentially be explained through idiosyncratic 
logics of value co-creation of each case, as well as through the unique challenges each experienced 
during emergence. 
5.2 Analysis II: Three phases of emergence 
This second analysis considers whether there are sub-sequences (here called ‘phases’) within 
each case. Although the complete sequence analysis above indicates that the complete event sequences 
of each case are significantly different, sub-sequences within each complete event sequences are 
possible, as each case may have experienced the same sub-sequences, just in different ways. 
To investigate whether there are sub-sequences within the complete event sequences, three phasic 
analyses are applied. The first, direct inspection, is retroductive, combining both inductive and 
deductive approaches (Poole et al., 2000). Insights and models from existing theories of ecosystem and 
organisational field emergence are applied to the case narratives and then adjusted in view of what is 
workable and informative. The analysis of each case narrative is enhanced through descriptive statistics, 
including a moving average frequency analysis and code frequencies for each case. (See Appendix C 
for the individual case narratives, and Appendix D for the results of the moving average frequency 
analysis.) This retroductive approach provides a theoretical basis for the identification of phases and is 
consistent with the observation of Poole et al. (2000) that initial theoretical models can be used as 
‘sensitising constructs’ for conducting exploratory research when the study of change processes are at 
an embryonic stage.  
The second analysis, code frequency variance analysis, is a statistical technique that provides a 
measure of whether a particular code is more or less prevalent in a phase than the overall occurrence of 
that code in the complete event sequence. The goal of this analysis is to statistically validate the 
existence of each phase. Substantial variance of code frequencies within the overall event sequence 
would be indicative of the existence of distinct phases within the sequence. Taking the phases identified 
by direct inspection, the variance of each code in a phase is compared to their overall frequency in the 
event sequence. A positive variance implies that a code is more frequent, and a negative variance that 
a code is less frequent, than their occurrence in the complete event sequence. A first code frequency 
analysis considers the code variances within a phase, bootstrapping statistical significance so as to 
determine the significance of the amount of a variance. The intuition here is that similarities of variances 
of code frequencies within a phase across cases provides statistical support for the phases. A second 
code frequency analysis analyses the changes in these variances across phases. The intuition here is that 
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similarities in changes of code variances across phases provides statistical support for the existence of 
the three phases. 
The third analysis compares the (dis)similarity of a phase with other phases within a case, 
utilising optimal matching to determine the pairwise ‘distance’ between each phase, as determined by 
the similarity of the event sequence within each phase. This analysis provides a validity check on the 
phase identification by determining if the phases in each case are different or similar to each other.  
First presented below are the results of the direct inspection analysis. Three phases are proposed. 
Theoretically, these three phases are derived through a synthesis of the ecosystem, dominant design, 
social movement theory and institutional entrepreneurship literatures. For instance, Moore (1993) has 
proposed a four stage model of the ecosystem lifecycle – birth, expansion, leadership and renewal – of 
which the first three are relevant when considering the emergence of an ecosystem. Suarez (2004) has 
suggested a five phase model of dominance design emergence - R&D build-up, technical feasibility, 
creating the market, decisive battle and post dominance – all of which are salient to understanding the 
emergence of an ecosystem. Hargrave and Van De Ven (2006) have suggested three phases of 
institutional technological innovation – emergence, development and implementation – as well as 
identifying the underlying process motors in each. Within social movement theory, Davis and McAdam 
(2000) have proposed a linear model which emphasises the identification of an opportunity, the 
gathering of resources to enable change, followed by collective action. From the institutional 
entrepreneurship literature, Greenwood et al. (2002) have proposed a six stage model – precipitating 
jolts, deinstitutionalisation, pre-institutionalisation, theorisation, diffusion and re-institutionalisation – 
which is similar to the five stage model of Hinings et al. (2004).  
A synthesis of these emergence models suggests a first phase where there is the early 
technological development (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Moore, 1993; Suarez, 2004) as well as 
activities, such as sense-making and rule-making, that establish of the viability of the ecosystem and 
digital service (Greenwood et al., 2002; Suarez, 2004). There is also resource gathering, including the 
establishment of an organisation structure for the personnel involved (Davis & McAdam, 2000) and the 
co-option of complementary asset providers and suppliers (Davis & McAdam, 2000; Moore, 1993; 
Suarez, 2004). As the ecosystem is nascent there is little competitor activity or wider interest from 
society (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Moore, 1993; Suarez, 2004). This phase corresponds to the 
initial slow growth found by Agarwal and Bayus (2002) in the early stages of market evolution and 
sales take-off for new products.  
A second phase is also suggested through the synthesis of these models. In this phase the 
ecosystem begins to grow rapidly (Agarwal & Bayus, 2002; Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Moore, 
1993; Suarez, 2004), as an installed base is created and network effects drive ecosystem growth (Suarez, 
2004). Strategic manoevuring such as marketing and alliancing activity is undertakn to drive adoption, 
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as well as to provide the resources to scale up the ecosystem (Moore, 1993; Suarez, 2004). Increasing 
participant adoption, and marketing and discourse in wider society begins to legitimate the ecosystem 
and hub firm, complemented by processes of theorisation and dissemination (Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006). Competitive activity is at its greatest here, as challengers also attempt 
to seize the opportunity (Agarwal & Bayus, 2002; Davis & McAdam, 2000; Hargrave & Van De Ven, 
2006; Moore, 1993; Suarez, 2004).  
A further phase is also suggested, where the ecosystem is now dominant and the competitive 
battles have been won (Greenwood et al., 2002; Moore, 1993; Suarez, 2004). Secure in the power 
structure it has created (Hinings et al., 2004) and its install base (Suarez, 2004), the ecosystem and hub 
firm have gained socio-political and cognitive legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2002; Hinings et al., 2004). 
The focus of activity moves from growth to control as activities move to interest satisfaction and value 
appropriation (Hinings et al., 2004; Moore, 1993; Suarez, 2004).  
Taken together, these models of ecosystem, organisational field and institutional formation and 
change suggest that there are three phases of emergence. Phase I consists of the initial idea and digital 
service development, resource gathering and early operation. In Phase II the ecosystem begins to grow 
rapidly, characterised by increasing numbers of participants (driven by positive network effects), 
aggressive marketing, much press and societal interest, as well as competitor activity. In Phase III the 
focus of activity moves from expansion to control and value appropriation.  
The characteristics of each phase are now discussed in three subsequent sub-sections in the 
context of existing ecosystem and institutional formation theories, including dominant design, social 
movement theory and institutional entrepreneurship, as well as the case narratives. Appendix F provides 
an overview of each phase in context with the cases. This emphasises the theoretical support for the 
identification of each phase. For Phase II and Phase III, the key transition events for each case are also 
provided, providing further evidence of the existence of each phase.  
The direct inspection analysis is followed by the code frequency variance analysis, providing 
statistical support for the existence of each phase. The existence of each phase within each case is then 
validated through optimal matching analysis. 
5.2.1 Phase I - Initiation 
Pre-existing environmental conditions meant that the emergence of an ecosystem was possible 
in each of the six cases (c.f. Hoffman, 1999). For Amazon, eBay, Salesforce and Wikipedia, the internet, 
specifically technology and increasing broadband provision, provided the ‘jolt’ that enabled the 
founders to successfully launch an ecosystem (Battilana et al., 2009 ; Greenwood et al., 2002; Hinings 
et al., 2004). For Facebook and Google, the poor performance of existing services (Friendster and 
Yahoo! respectively) led to efficiency mismatches that enabled the conditions for both services to 
launch (Seo & Creed, 2002). Attributes of the founders of each ecosystem, such as their network 
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location and embeddedness, also suggested readiness for emergence (Battilana et al., 2009; Greenwood 
& Suddaby, 2006). For each case the founders were technically minded and cognisant of the 
opportunities that the internet provided. These conditions enabled the founders to identify new 
opportunities, gather resources, and introduce technically viable innovations (Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Hinings et al., 2004).  
In this stage the early ecosystem participants cooperatively work together to co-opt key customers 
and partners, and define the value logic (Davis & McAdam, 2000; Moore, 1993; Suarez, 2004). The 
cooperation of key customers and partners was more important for some cases than others. For example, 
Google’s strong relationship with Search Engine Watch and their constant attention to the maintenance 
of that relationship ensured a source of legitimacy. Similarly Amazon’s good relationship with the 
major book wholesalers ensured the success of the nascent digital service. 
Each case cooperatively developed their respective logics of value co-creation with their nascent 
ecosystems. Each digital service was first developed in isolation, and access (and by implication 
membership) was then progressively released to beta testers (normally family and friends) until the 
digital service was released to general access. An exception here is eBay which opened up immediately 
to general access. However, uniquely among the other cases where there was significant activity within 
the ecosystem from the beginning, eBay was seeded and tested by the founder himself before activity 
started in earnest within the ecosystem. In all cases, once there were a small number of active 
participants within an ecosystem, the rich interaction between beta testers and the hub firm resulted in 
the co-production of the functionality of the digital service, and the definition of the logics that drove 
co-creation of value. This intense interaction addressed the technical potentialities for each ecosystem, 
as the feasibility of the digital service was de facto tested by early participants (Suarez, 2004). For those 
cases that faced (some little) competition during this phase, such as eBay, Facebook and Wikipedia, 
each competitor proposed a differing service and ecosystem design, leading to design competition 
(Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991). In parallel with this, a set of regulative mechanisms was being created 
that enabled ecosystem emergence (Hoffman, 1999). For instance, very early on in their operation 
Amazon posted a ‘Bill of Rights’ for shoppers, and eBay published its ‘Ethical Guidelines’. Similarly, 
Wikipedia participants were releasing a series of policies that enabled the heterogeneous users to be 
able to create an encyclopaedia. These regulations led to increasing returns so that participation in the 
ecosystem became viable, highlighting the role of incentives as a motivating force in ecosystem 
emergence (Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 2008).  
Very early on in some ecosystems these early regulative institutions were complemented by the 
emergence of a normative institution (as first noted by Hoffman, 1999). As examples, on both eBay and 
Wikipedia, which had handed over much governance to ecosystem participants, particular behaviours 
of ecosystem participants were soon viewed as either constructive or to be discouraged. In the case of 
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Wikipedia for instance, the behaviour of ‘trolls’11 was actively discouraged. On Facebook ecosystem 
participants very quickly developed idiosyncratic behaviours that gained normative significance. These 
were often beyond the regulative (and technical) control of the service, such as ‘friending competitions’ 
and the use of a photo to broadcast political affiliation. For those ecosystems which launched early in 
the history of the Internet, such as Amazon and eBay, much of this sense-making was as much cognitive 
as technical, as the potential of the internet, and hence the potential capabilities of the service, was not 
well understood at this time.  
Summarising, based upon the insights gained from theory and complemented through the 
particular histories of each case, Phase I consists of the initial idea and digital service development, 
resource gathering and early operation. With pre-existing conditions providing a fertile setting for the 
digital services to emerge, and following the progressive opening of the service to wider groups of 
participants, intense sense-making resulted in a set of technological attributes for the digital service and 
agreed-upon regulative, normative, and cognitive structures. Together these shaped the subsequent 
ecosystem emergence and created the necessary conditions for collective action (Hensmans, 2003; 
Hoffman, 1999). 
5.2.2 Phase II - Momentum 
In Phase II the ecosystem begins to grow rapidly, due the improving quality of the digital service 
and competitors’ entry (Agarwal & Bayus, 2002). Understanding of the ecosystem spreads rapidly as 
there is diffusion and dissemination of the value logic to potential participants (Greenwood et al., 2002; 
Hinings et al., 2004; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). The accumulation of ecosystem participants generates a 
momentum that harnesses their distributed inputs that drives further adoption ecosystem through the 
ongoing regulation, evaluation, design, production and use of the digital service (Garud & Karnoe, 
2003).  
The case narratives (see Appendix C) provide insight into the key transition events that initiated 
this phase. For Amazon, Phase II commenced in late 1995 with the founder raising approximately $1 
million from local Seattle investors. Following the investment round, the strategy became ‘Get Big 
Fast’,12 an explicit change from incremental organic growth to market domination, and business 
development staff were hired, an advertising agency brought on board, and an aggressive advertising 
campaign launched. For eBay, Phase II commenced at the beginning of 1997 with increasing numbers 
of participants, with over 330,000 completed auctions in the first quarter alone, giving rise to the 
moniker ‘the Great eBay Flood’.13 As a result, the service was unable to scale to meet demand and was 
continually crashing; despite this the number of participants continued to pour in. For Facebook, Phase 
11 A person who sows discord on the Internet by starting arguments or upsetting people (Wikipedia, 
retrieved on 20/07/2013). 
12 Brandt (2011), p. 95. 
13 Cohen (2002), p. 55. 
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II started with rapid growth in users after the summer 2004 college recess, aided by an automated 
process to add universities, as well as a VC investment round. To outflank emerging competitors, a 
‘surround’ strategy was introduced, consisting of opening up access to the service to students at all the 
local universities where another social network had begun to take root. For Google, Phase II began with 
VC funding in June 1999, which resulted in extensive news coverage. This fuelled user adoption as the 
‘Google’ brand became familiar to a wider audience beyond the core group of devotees. For Salesforce, 
Phase II commenced in February 2000 with high profile guerrilla marketing at the main competitor’s 
annual conference, as well as their own uniquely branded launch party. Together these led to a large 
influx of customer interest and a media firestorm, further inflamed when Siebel responded publically. 
For Wikipedia, Phase II commenced with escalating main stream media attention (such as the New 
York Times), rapidly increasing the number of contributors and the arrival of specialised tools and 
services to assist in editing. 
During this stage the ecosystem opens up a large market by scaling up with both suppliers and 
partners to achieve maximum market coverage (Moore, 1993). Put differently, the nascent market that 
was created in the first phase is rapidly expanded in this phase through coalitions and outreach such as 
marketing (Suarez, 2004). In each case during this phase increasing network effects drove market size, 
to such an extent that eBay, Salesforce and Wikipedia experienced serious technological failures due to 
the overloading of their service. In these three cases the service outage and the resulting furore within 
the ecosystem almost destroyed confidence in (and the legitimacy of) the emerging ecosystem. 
Although Amazon, Facebook and Google also experienced service failures due to the explosive growth 
each was experiencing, in these cases they did not have the same effect on the legitimacy of the 
ecosystem. Of particular note here is Facebook which had an explicit policy of slowing growth through 
the limited opening of the service to new ecosystem participants to ensure service stability.  
In all cases there was ongoing technical development of the service. However, the main 
functional dimensions of the service had already been agreed by this time and were being implemented. 
Instead, as suggested by social movement theory and institutional entrepreneurship theory, there was 
increasing introduction of regulative mechanisms to coordinate activity, as well as rising participant 
commitments as normative aspects developed (Hoffman, 1999; Scott, 2008). In addition, cognitive 
mechanisms of coordination also began to emerge, through discourse between participants and the hub 
firm, receipt of awards from commentators, as well as high levels of press and societal interest that 
established the ecosystem and digital service in society. These provided validation and objectification 
of the ecosystem and service not only to the participants, but also for wider society (Lampel & Meyer, 
2008; Rao, 1994; Scott, 2008). Processes of theorisation, legitimation and dissemination led to the 
commitment of the participants, as well as to the establishment of a power structure (Greenwood et al., 
2002; Hinings et al., 2004). However these processes were contested (c.f. Benford & Snow, 2000). For 
eBay and Wikipedia, where the governance of the ecosystem had been handed over to participants, any 
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change in regulative or normative structures was often met with a large push back from the ecosystem 
participants. For those cases where governance remained more under the control of the hub firm, the 
nature of the contestation varied. For instance, often the digital service’s own tools were used against it 
when ecosystem participants protested. In the case of Facebook, technological design changes to the 
service sometimes led to protests which were collectively organised through service functionality, such 
as groups. For those cases that remained tightly controlled, such as Google and Salesforce, the 
contestation often originated outside the ecosystem, but implicitly supported by ecosystem participants. 
This process of socio-cognitive construction was aided by the aggressive use of marketing and 
public relations, and technical tools which further raised the profile of the ecosystems. In particular, as 
each ecosystem was finding themselves in a favourable position with respect to the emerging systemic 
power relations, they acted to mobilise a bias in their favour to conquer the field (Hensmans, 2003). 
Much of this framing activity (Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow & McAdam, 2000) was undertaken with 
the goal of actor mobilisation and collective action (Battilana et al., 2009; Seo & Creed, 2002). For 
instance, both Amazon and eBay, with their more consumer oriented ecosystems, focused marketing 
attention on advertising that corresponded to festive dates within the consumer calendar (such as 
Fathers’ Day and the December holiday season). Google celebrated festive dates through its Doodles. 
In doing so they were framing themselves as part of the wider US institutional and societal environment. 
Amazon and Google enabled their service to be deployed onto third party websites, thus not only driving 
more traffic to their ecosystems, but also advertising the service that they were offering to potential 
participants who had not yet discovered their service. In this manner they emphasised their technical 
efficiency aspects. Salesforce, with its business to business orientation, undertook aggressive guerrilla 
marketing against the market dominant players, such as Seibel, emphasising its ‘otherness’ (Snow & 
Benford, 1988; Snow et al., 1986). For Facebook, Google and Wikipedia, marketing and public relations 
activity focused not so much on driving participants to the site but mitigating scandals, such as privacy 
concerns, that periodically erupted (Rao et al., 2000). 
This phase is also characterised by the main competitive battles as the ecosystem strives to 
dominate its challengers (Davis & McAdam, 2000; Moore, 1993; Suarez, 2004). Although much of the 
dominant design literature emphasises that this competitive battle is for ownership of the technological 
standards that underpin a service (Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991), in the example of the cases at hand this 
was not such a concern as the main internet standards had been established. Instead, the main 
competitive thrust was to drive participant adoption so as to reach a tipping point and allow network 
effects to largely guarantee dominance; this was particularly so for those cases – eBay, Facebook, 
Google and Wikipedia – that relied on network effects for their lock-in. Thus much of the framing and 
market outreach activities were directed towards participant adoption. In addition to the actions of the 
hub firm, collectively the ecosystem participants also began to contest the domain vis-à-vis the 
competition (Davis & McAdam, 2000). For example, when Amazon received a poor review for the 
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service that it offered, the offending media outlet was bombarded with complaints, and a wider 
recognition of the value of the digital service emerged from the independent (un-orchestrated) actions 
of the ecosystem participants. Similarly in the case of eBay, when a competitor placed a stooge onto 
the eBay boards to promote a competitive digital auction service, ecosystem members responded 
aggressively to remove it. For Salesforce, the success of their roadshows generated such high levels of 
goodwill towards the digital service and ecosystem that individual participants, alone or collectively, 
would evangelise the ecosystem independently of any guidance from Salesforce themselves. Indeed 
this activity was so prevalent that marketing activities were established to help support it. Similarly for 
Wikipedia, individuals and groups of individuals would collectively act to maintain the coherence and 
stability of the service during large influxes of new ecosystem participants. 
Summarising, based upon the insights gained from theory and complemented through the 
particular histories of each case, in Phase II the ecosystem begins to grow rapidly, driven by increasing 
numbers of participants (drive by positive network effects), aggressive marketing, much press and 
societal interest, as well as competitor activity. The market takes-off, and understanding of the 
ecosystem spreads rapidly as there is diffusion and dissemination of its value logic. 
5.2.3 Phase III - Control 
In Phase III, the ecosystem has now emerged and has socio-political and cognitive legitimacy 
(Greenwood et al., 2002; Hinings et al., 2004). Power relations stabilise and become more or less taken 
for granted and the hub firm is freer to act (Hensmans, 2003). Throughout this period regulative, 
normative and cognitive structures continue to develop, although these tend to become self-reinforcing, 
enhancing the dominant position of the hub firm in the ecosystem and the ecosystem itself (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Hoffman, 1999). This powerful position is reinforced through the installed base and 
network effects working to their advantage, assuring market dominance (Suarez, 2004). With the hub 
firm in such a powerful position, the nature of competition shifts from market momentum to competition 
for profits (Hariharan & Prahalad, 1991). This reflects the reality that value appropriation processes 
would not be able to occur unless the hub firm was in a powerful position vis-à-vis the other ecosystem 
participants. With the ecosystem established as the undisputed leader focus now shifts to closer control 
of the activities of ecosystem participants and value appropriation. 
The case narratives (see Appendix C) provide insight into the transition events that initiated this 
phase, and which further support the identification of this phase. For Amazon, already the undoubted 
market leader, Phase III began in early 2000 with an explicit shift to profitability and value 
appropriation. Staff were made redundant, unprofitable lines of business closed down, and functions 
and programs of the digital service changed to drive profitability. For eBay, Phase III was ushered in 
mid-2000 with the resolution of the Million Auction March, a (successful) participant protest to move 
one million transactions to competing auction services. Resolution meant that ecosystem participants 
now recognised eBay’s tensions to operate as a listed company, so conflict between the ecosystem and 
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hub firm declined. As a consequence, the functionality of the digital service was enhanced with the goal 
to increase revenues, such as the introduction of ‘Buy-It-Now’. In addition, wider society and the press 
now viewed eBay as a neutral venue. For Facebook, Phase III began in 2009 as control was finally 
consolidated over the apps available through the platform, as well as formal acknowledgement of the 
wide ranging privacy concerns. A particular action here was opening up the terms of use to a vote for 
the users. In addition, internally operations had coalesced around a particular logic of value co-creation, 
and advertising and other value extraction techniques were now mature and continually tweaked to 
enhance revenue. For Google, Phase III began in 2004 as the service became the undisputed leader and 
the remaining competition (such as Microsoft and Yahoo!) were unable to maintain parity. Socially the 
service was now embedded in society, although there was an increasing wariness as to privacy. The 
shift to value appropriation was underlined with the winning of a court case which allowed trademarked 
terms to be used as keywords and a subsequent change in advertising policies further entrenched the 
focus on value appropriation. For Salesforce, Phase III began in 2006 with the rectification of the 
technical issues that had caused serious service delivery, and launch of trust.salesforce.com, a service 
that publically detailed the status of the service delivery. Press interest began to wane as the software 
as a service model was accepted as viable. In addition, there was a shift to value appropriation with the 
hiring of staff to focus on revenue collection, and release of monetisation strategy documents. For 
Wikipedia, Phase III commenced at the end of 2005 with the media crisis of the Seigenthaler incident, 
who wrote an op-ed piece in USA Today, entitled ‘A False Wikipedia Biography’. This crisis led to an 
imposition of tighter editorial control, which in contrast to previous attempts, was welcomed by the 
ecosystem tired of the previous scandals and edit wars. In addition the Wikipedia Foundation formalised 
its fundraising process and technologically the service was stabilised. 
As well as the importance of maintaining strong bargaining power in relation to other participants 
in the ecosystem, the hub firm needs to provide a compelling vision for the future (Moore, 1993). In 
this manner the hub firm in this phase corresponds to the ‘platform leader’ of Gawer and Cusumano 
(2002) and the ‘keystone’ of Iansiti and Levien (2004a). For instance, Gawer and Henderson (2007) 
and Gawer and Phillips (forthcoming) emphasise that a hub firm must use a number of mechanisms at 
a either firm level or ecosystem level in order to ensure ecosystem dominance. At the firm level, such 
mechanisms include organisational structure and processes that signal that the future viability of the 
ecosystem and the intention of the hub firm. As examples, Amazon underwent a wide ranging 
restructure to enable profitability; eBay instigated specialist teams to signal its intentions to collaborate 
with the ecosystem; and Google appointed senior executives to global communications and outreach 
roles. Other mechanisms involve discourse, such as explicitly framing a strategy for the future. As 
examples, eBay publically defended its actions regarding antiques auctions in the face of criticism and 
outlined its future strategy for the first time, Salesforce publically announced its monetisation strategy, 
and Wikipedia issued a series of press releases detailing how the service was to be run into the future. 
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Taken together, these strategies highlight how a dominant hub firm in an ecosystem can maintain its 
position within the ecosystem, and also signal its viability and success beyond the ecosystem. 
Summarising, based upon the insights gained from theory and complemented through the 
particular histories of each case, in Phase III, the focus of activity moves from expansion to control and 
value appropriation. Power relations stabilise and become more or less taken for granted, technological 
change is driven by maintenance and value extraction reasons. Regulative, normative and cognitive 
structures continue to develop, becoming self-reinforcing, enhancing the dominant position of the hub 
firm in the ecosystem and the ecosystem itself, and the ability of the hub firm to control and extract 
value. 
5.2.4 Code frequency variance analysis  
Above three phases have been proposed from a synthesis of the ecosystem, dominant design, 
social movement and institutional entrepreneurship literatures, and retroductively analysed in the 
context of the case narratives. The goal of this section is to statistically confirm the existence of the 
three phases. To do so, this section presents the results of the code frequency variance analysis, where 
the occurrences of different types of event codes (resource, technological, institutional and contextual) 
are analysed in the context of these three phases.  
There are two types of code variance analysis within this section. Both analyses consider the 
variance of a code in each phase as compared to the overall frequency of that code in the entire event 
sequence for that case. For example, for a particular case, if the overall occurrence of technological 
events is 25% and the frequency of technological events is 30% in a phase, then the 5% positive variance 
suggests that technological events are more prevalent in that phase. This approach is applied to the 
frequency of codes in all three phases. Caution should be exercised in attempting to extract too much 
insight from the frequency analysis results for Phase III. The results in Phase III are right censored in 
the sense that there are continuing to control and appropriation activities past the end date which are 
not included in the analysis.  
The first code frequency variance analysis compares the code variance of each case within each 
phase, and considers the particular example mentioned above. However, rather than calculate this 
frequency direct from the data, this analysis bootstraps statistical significance into the code variances 
(see Section 4.11.3 in Chapter 4 for a more detailed overview of this technique). To do so, the complete 
event sequence for each case is randomised 10,000 times, resulting in 60,000 random complete event 
sequences. For each random sequence in each case, the three phases are extracted. This results in 
180,000 phase event sequences, 10,000 for each phase (3), for each case (6). The code frequency is then 
calculated for each event sequence, resulting in 720,000 code frequencies, 10,000 for each code (4), for 
each phase (3), for each case (6). As there is a range of frequencies for each code, the mean frequency 
and standard deviation are calculated for each code for each case. This mean frequency is identical (if 
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not very close) to the code frequency for that phase if it had been calculated directly from the code 
counts on the actual event sequences (Appendix E outlines the code frequencies calculated from actual 
code counts as a comparison). The randomly generated mean code frequency is then subtracted from 
the actual code frequency to provide a variance; the standard deviation enables a calculation of the 
significance of the variance. A positive or a negative variance signifies a greater or lesser occurrence of 
a code in that particular phase. 
Table 18 below presents the frequency analysis of Phase I, detailing the variance of each code 
frequency from the randomly generated mean code frequency for each of the six cases. Appendix B 
contains the means and standard deviations of the randomly generated code frequencies. 
Table 18 – Phase I cross case comparison code frequency variance analysis 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Resource 2.158 
(29.76%) 
-7.823 
(17.54%) 
5.749 
(24.10%) 
1.275 
(23.75%) 
24.728 *** 
(40.00%) 
-1.402 
(5.62%) 
Technology 14.286 ** 
(39.29%) 
8.069 + 
(26.32%) 
0.334 
(34.94%) 
7.946 
(41.25%) 
6.384 
(18.33%) 
0.749 
(30.34%) 
Institutional -8.094 + 
(22.62%) 
9.582 
(52.63%) 
2.956 
(26.51%) 
-8.894 * 
(13.75%) 
-15.925 * 
(36.67%) 
14.562 ** 
(55.06%) 
Context -8.350 * 
(8.33%) 
-9.828 * 
(3.51%) 
-9.039 * 
(14.46%) 
-0.326 
(21.25%) 
-15.188 ** 
(5.00%) 
-13.909 *** 
(8.99%) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Numbers in parentheses are actual frequency; these may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
Phase I code frequency variance analysis indicates that there are similarities in the frequencies of 
the technology and context codes for each case in this phase. In particular, there is a decreased 
occurrence of context events and increased frequency of technological events. The increased occurrence 
of resource events and decreased occurrence of context events is emphasised by the significant variance 
from the mean frequency for some cases. For instance, both Salesforce and Wikipedia have frequencies 
of context events that are significantly lower than the overall frequency (p<0.01). This means that the 
frequency of their context events is lower than 99% of the context frequencies calculated from the 
10,000 random event sequences for this phase for each case. Similarly, Amazon, eBay, and Facebook 
also have frequencies of context events that are significantly lower than the overall frequency (p<0.05). 
The increased occurrence of technology events is also emphasised through significant variance from 
the mean frequency, with both Amazon and eBay have significantly higher occurrences (p<0.01 and 
p<0.1 respectively).  
There are higher frequencies of resource events compared to the overall frequency of resource 
event for all cases except for eBay and Wikipedia. All early stage businesses need to acquire resources 
(Gilbert, McDougall, & Audretsch, 2006), emphasised through the significantly higher level of resource 
events (p<0.001) of Salesforce which, operating as a business-to-business service, was resourced as a 
major enterprise from the very beginning. In contrast eBay and Wikipedia both have lower frequencies 
of resource events than their overall frequency of resource events respectively. These lower frequencies 
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can be explained through their particular histories, as both services started through being supported by 
an existing resource base. eBay operated within the existing digital and physical infrastructure of 
Omidyar, the founder, while Wikipedia was operating as a subsidiary of Bomis Inc. In addition, both 
had handed over much of the governance and maintenance of their respective services to ecosystem 
participants. Together these reduced the requirement for substantial resource acquisition in this phase.  
The frequency of institutional events is higher for ecosystems that have substantial social 
interaction in the service involvement, in particular, eBay, Facebook and Wikipedia. For eBay and 
Wikipedia, who opened up governance and maintenance to ecosystem participants early in their 
emergence, there were many regulative parameters to be established in order to structure the relations 
between the participants (Battilana et al., 2009; McAdam et al., 1996; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Scott, 
2008). There was also normative development in those ecosystems that allowed intense interaction 
between participants, reflected in the increased frequency of institutional events for Facebook. The 
effect of the regulative and normative development is most apparent in Wikipedia, which had the most 
open and dynamic levels of ecosystem participant activity, where its variance of institutional events 
from their overall frequency is significantly high (p<0.01). In contrast, cases that maintained tighter 
control over the participation of ecosystems in governance and maintenance, Amazon (p<0.1), Google 
(p<0.05) and Salesforce (p<0.05). Interestingly, cases that have a high frequency of institutional events 
also have resource event frequencies that are lower, reflecting the transfer of governance to the 
ecosystem and a reduced requirement for firm level resources.  
Together, these code frequency variance analysis results provide statistical support for the 
existence of the retroductively derived Phase I. These results illustrate that in the early stages of 
ecosystem emergence, when the hub firm is setting up and the digital service is being originally 
designed, there are similarities in the types of underlying activities of ecosystem emergence. The 
decreased occurrence of context events reflects the nascent markets in which each ecosystem was 
emerging, and hence low competitive and media interest (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009). The increased frequency of technological events reflects the early development of 
the underlying service (Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Suarez, 2004). And the increased frequency of 
resource events reflects the importance of the founders in acquiring resources to enable the launch of 
their digital service (Gilbert et al., 2006; Greenwood et al., 2002; Hinings et al., 2004). However for 
ecosystems that opened up governance and maintenance to ecosystem participants early on, there was 
instead decreased frequency of resource events counterbalanced with an increased frequency of 
institutional events. 
Table 19 below presents the frequency analysis of Phase II, detailing the variance of each code 
frequency from the randomly generated mean code frequency for each of the six cases. Appendix B 
contains the means and standard deviations of the randomly generated code frequencies. 
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Table 19 – Phase II code frequency cross case comparison with bootstrapped significance 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Resource -0.005 
(27.57%) 
-0.116 
(25.23%) 
2.086 
(20.37%) 
1.853 
(24.30%) 
-0.431 
(14.75%) 
-2.733 *** 
(4.31%) 
Technology -5.283 *** 
(19.73%) 
-1.196 
(17.12%) 
-1.971 
(32.72%) 
-5.704 *** 
(27.62%) 
-0.153 
(11.84%) 
7.732 *** 
(37.28%) 
Institutional -2.674 
(28.11%) 
-2.522 
(40.54%) 
-1.098 
(22.53%) 
2.451 * 
(25.06%) 
-2.165 * 
(50.43%) 
0.217 
(40.73%) 
Context 7.961 *** 
(24.59%) 
3.834 *** 
(17.12%) 
0.983 
(24.38%) 
1.400 
(23.02%) 
2.749 *** 
(22.98%) 
-5.216 
(17.67%) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Numbers in parentheses are actual frequency; these may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
The Phase II code frequency variance analysis indicates that, similar to Phase I, there are 
similarities in the variances of technological and context events. However in contrast to Phase I, there 
is instead an increased occurrence of context activities and a decreased occurrence of technological 
activities. The increased frequency of context events and decreased frequency of technological events 
in this phase is further accentuated by the significance of the variances. For instance, Amazon, eBay, 
and Salesforce all have significantly higher frequency of context events than occurs within their 
respective complete events (p<0.001). Similarly, there is a significant decrease in the frequency of 
technological events for Amazon and Google (p<0.01). 
There is also a weak similarity in the frequency of institutional events for Amazon, eBay, 
Facebook and Salesforce, which have a lower frequency of events than the overall frequency for each 
case. In contrast Google and Wikipedia have a higher frequency of events, explained by their particular 
histories. The positive variance of Google is significant (p<0.01), emphasising the scale of the 
marketing, media engagement and ecosystem development that occurred in this case during this phase. 
The slightly higher frequency of institutional events for Wikipedia in this phase is explained through 
the intense ongoing involvement of ecosystem participants in the governance and maintenance of the 
ecosystem. 
However there are no similarities in the variances of resource events, with Facebook and Google 
having a higher variance of resource events and Amazon, eBay, Salesforce and Wikipedia having a 
lower variance of resource events. This variance is only significant for Wikipedia (p<0.001), and the 
absolute amount of variance is also low for the other five cases (generally less than 2% on frequencies 
of approximately 25%). This suggests that although there is heterogeneity in the frequency of resource 
events, the overall levels of resource frequency are approximately the average of the resource events 
for each case. During this phase, with the exception of Wikipedia, all hub firms undertook extensive 
coalition building activity as well as hiring staff. In addition Amazon, Facebook and Google continued 
to seek and obtain funding from VC and other investors. In contrast Wikipedia continued to rely 
extensively on the actions of ecosystem participants for its maintenance and governance, and, apart 
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from leaving Bomis to become a philanthropic foundation, did not undertake much resource acquisition 
activity. This is reflected in its positive variance of institutional events. 
Together, these results support the existence of Phase II, and imply that during the momentum 
phase when ecosystem adoption is rapidly expanding, there is a reduced focus on technological events 
and a significant increase in societal interest, regulation and competition. The decreased frequency of 
technological events reflects the emergent consensus on the form, structure and operation of the digital 
service (Garud & Karnoe, 2003; Suarez, 2004). The increased frequency of contextual events reflects 
the increasing reach of each case into wider society as it is legitimated as well as from competition 
(Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Moore, 1993; Rao et al., 2000; Scott, 2008; Suarez, 2004). The average 
occurrence of resource events reflects the ongoing requirement for resources during this phase, but 
which is overshadowed by other activities. 
Table 20 below presents the frequency analysis of Phase III, detailing the variance of each code 
frequency from the randomly generated mean code frequency for each of the six cases. Appendix B 
contains the means and standard deviations of the randomly generated code frequencies. To reiterate 
the earlier warning, caution should be exercised in attempting to extract too much insight from these 
frequency analysis results during to right censoring of data.  
Table 20 – Phase III code frequency cross-case comparison with bootstrapped significance 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Resource -0.688 
(26.82%) 
4.528 
(29.91%) 
-9.772 ** 
(8.47%) 
-6.558 * 
(15.87%) 
-11.409 *** 
(3.70%) 
7.53 *** 
(14.59%) 
Technology 2.891 
(27.97%) 
-0.577 
(17.76%) 
5.177 
(39.83%) 
12.656 *** 
(46.03%) 
-2.720 
(9.26%) 
-19.754 *** 
(9.73%) 
Institutional 6.395 ** 
(37.16%) 
2.746 
(45.79%) 
0.937 
(24.58%) 
-1.959 
(20.63%) 
20.532 *** 
(73.15%) 
-7.549 * 
(32.97%) 
Context -8.598 *** 
(8.05%) 
-6.697 * 
(6.54%) 
3.658 
(27.12%) 
-4.138 
(17.46%) 
-6.403 + 
(13.89%) 
19.773 *** 
(42.70%) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Numbers in parentheses are actual frequency; these may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
In contrast to the two previous phases where there were similarities across cases in the variance 
of frequencies of technological and context events, in Phase III there are few similarities between the 
cases. There are no similarities of code frequency variances across all cases that are found in the earlier 
two phases. Instead there are positive and negative variances of code frequency across the cases. For 
instance, half of the cases experience a relative decline and the other half a relative increase in 
technological events, while the other codes have either four and two cases with either higher or lower 
frequencies of codes.  
The frequency of resource events is lower than the overall frequency for four cases, Amazon, 
Facebook, Google and Salesforce. In particular, the frequencies for Facebook, Google and Salesforce 
are significantly lower (p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.001 respectively). This provides evidence of the 
successful emergence of each ecosystem, as a shift to value appropriation would result in additional 
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value within the firm and less need for resource acquisition. In contrast eBay and Wikipedia have higher 
frequencies of resource codes, Wikipedia significantly so (p<0.001). Given that both eBay and 
Wikipedia were the most socially open of the cases, allowing participation in the governance and 
maintenance of the ecosystem from early on, the increased frequencies of resource codes here perhaps 
represents the gathering of resources now required as the hub firm assumes more responsibility. As 
Wikipedia was the most open, this explanation accords for the high significance of their code variance. 
The frequency of contextual events is also lower than the overall frequency for four cases, 
Amazon, eBay, Google, and Salesforce, significantly so for Amazon, eBay and Salesforce (p<0.001, 
p<0.05 and p<0.1 respectively). This supports the notion of decreased media and societal interest as the 
digital service and ecosystem are accepted and become taken for granted, as well as reduced competitive 
activity as the ecosystem comes to dominate its market. In contrast, there is an increased frequency of 
contextual events for Facebook and Wikipedia, significantly so for Wikipedia (p<0.001). For Facebook, 
although the digital service and ecosystem were generally taken for granted by the end of 2009, there 
was at the time increased media speculation as to whether there would be an IPO. For Wikipedia, 
following the establishment of tighter editorial control that commenced Phase III, adoption and 
engagement in wider society began to increase as the perceived reliability of Wikipedia increased.  
The frequency of institutional events is higher than the overall frequency for four cases – 
Amazon, eBay, Facebook and Salesforce – significantly for Amazon (p<0.01) and Salesforce 
(p<0.001). This reflects their focus on marketing and societal outreach, as well as the establishment of 
new ecosystem regulations, to their value appropriation activities. This is particularly so for Amazon 
and Salesforce who undertook significant marketing campaigns once market dominance and long term 
viability was attained, explaining their significance. In contrast, the frequency of institutional events is 
lower for Google and Wikipedia, significantly for Wikipedia (p<0.05). For Google, although marketing 
activity and ecosystem maintenance continued, this was not the main focus of their strategy in this phase 
(which instead was focused on technological development). For Wikipedia, the establishment of 
editorial control at the beginning of this phase soon reduced the quantity of regulatory, normative and 
cognitive development within the ecosystem, reflected in the reduced frequency of the codes. As such, 
in the case of Wikipedia, the imposition of editorial control results in a lower frequency of institutional 
events. 
The variance of the frequency of technological events is equally shared across the cases, with 
Amazon, Facebook and Google all having a higher frequency of technological events, Google 
significantly so (p<0.001). In each case, following (or as part of) the attainment of market dominance, 
each hub firm adopted a policy of extensive technological development, much of which was focused 
on enhancing value appropriation from the ecosystem. This policy of significant technological 
development was particularly apparent in Google, explaining the high significance of the variance. In 
contrast, eBay, Salesforce and Wikipedia all have a lower frequency of technological events in this 
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phase, Wikipedia significantly so (p<0.001). For Wikipedia, although maintenance of the service 
continued, following the imposition of editorial control and the service gaining operational stability, 
less effort was placed on the addition of new features and functions for the service. In fact, although 
there have been some service stability improvements, the Wikipedia service today looks very similar to 
when the data collection ceased. In the case of eBay and Salesforce, value appropriation and control 
was not addressed through technological means but instead was driven through increased levels of 
marketing and through changes in the rules that governed the ecosystem. This has resulted in lower 
frequencies of technological events in this phase. 
Together, these results tend to support the existence of Phase III. The general decrease of context 
events supports the notion that the ecosystem has been established in society and dominance over 
competitors. Furthermore the increased occurrences of institutional events and decreased occurrence of 
resource events tends to suggest value appropriation as ecosystem rules are tweaked, marketing 
initiatives are undertaken, and a reduced requirement for resources due to increased incoming value. 
However these specific frequencies of these contextual, institutional and resource events that support 
the existence of Phase III are not distributed evenly across the cases. Thus although there is evidence 
of value appropriation and control in these code frequencies, there is heterogeneity in the results. This 
heterogeneity of code frequencies could be a product of the right censoring of the data. Alternatively, 
as suggested in Analysis I, the complete sequence optimal matching analysis, this could be the result of 
different processes related to the idiosyncratic logics of value co-creation and appropriation of each 
ecosystem.  
The second code frequency analysis considers the change in the variances of each code across 
phases. The intuition here is that similarities in changes of code variance across cases provide statistical 
support for each of the three phases. This analysis supports the previous code frequency variance 
analysis through a different focus, in this case how the code variance changes across phases. These 
results are presented as four graphs, one for each code, with the three phases on the x-axis, and the 
variance of the code frequency from the overall code frequency for that case on the y-axis. Thus on 
each graph there are six lines, one for each case, showing the changes in variance of the code for that 
case. Appendix E provides tables of the results of this analysis. Figure 3 on the next page details the 
change in variance of resource codes across the three phases for each case.  
This figure indicates that the frequency of resource events for Amazon, Facebook, Google and 
Salesforce decreases with each progressive phase. This supports the notion that resource activities 
become less important as the ecosystem emerges. In Phase I, there is increased frequency of resource 
events reflecting the resource gathering required for the development of the underlying corporate form 
and the digital service is developed and the ecosystem is launched. The frequency of resource events in 
Phase II remain either slightly above or at the overall occurrence of resource codes, supporting the 
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explained through their specific characteristics. For Facebook, although the digital service and 
ecosystem were generally taken for granted by the end of 2009, there was at the time increased media 
speculation as to whether there would be an IPO. For Wikipedia, following the establishment of tighter 
editorial control that commenced Phase III, adoption in wider society began to increase as the perceived 
reliability of Wikipedia increased. 
As a whole, the changing frequencies of the types of events – resource, technological, 
institutional and contextual – support the identification of the three phases. In general there is a U-
shaped frequency of technology events and an inverted-U shaped frequency of contextual events. This 
supports the notion of initial idea and digital service development with low societal interest in Phase I, 
intense media, societal and competitive interest in Phase II, and control and value appropriation in Phase 
III. In general, resource events decrease as the phases increase, supporting the notion that there is intense 
resource gathering in the first phase, ongoing resource gathering the second, and a decreased 
requirement for resource gathering in the third. The differing profiles of socially oriented cases (eBay, 
Facebook and Wikipedia) compared to those that remained more closed (Amazon, Google and 
Salesforce) explain the differing frequency variances of resource and institutional events. 
5.2.5 Optimal matching analysis 
Above, three phases have been identified through direct inspection, and each phase has been 
statistically verified through two differing applications of code frequency variance analysis. The goal 
of this section is to prove that each phase within each case is dissimilar to the others, thus validating the 
existence of each phase. To do so the event sequences of each phase are compared through optimal 
matching to determine a pairwise ‘distance’ between each phase within a case, as determined by the 
(dis)similarity of their phase sub-sequences.  
In this analysis the phase event sequences for each case are compared with the other phase event 
sequences within that case. Eighteen phase-pair distances are calculated: for Amazon, one for Phase I-
II, one for Phase II-III, and one for Phase I-III;14 for eBay, one for Phase I-II, one for Phase II-III, and 
one for Phase I-III; and so on. To create a comparison distance, the three phase sub-sequences for each 
case were randomised 10,000 times using their same respective frequency of codes (see Section 4.11.1 
in Chapter 4 for rationale and details of the following technique). This resulted in 180,000 random event 
sequences – 10,000 for each phase (3) of each case (6). The optimal matching procedure was then run 
for each random event sequence for each phase-pair, so that 180,000 distances were created – 10,000 
for each phase-pair (3) for each case (6). As there was a range of distances for each phase-pair, the mean 
distance and standard deviation was calculated. Thus following this procedure there were 18 mean 
distances and 18 standard deviations – one each for each phase-pair (3) of each case (6). Each phase-
14 For clarity and consistency, all phase comparisons have the following format vertical phase number 
name hyphen horizontal phase number. For example, the comparison of Phase II and Phase III will be denoted 
Phase II-III. 
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pair mean distance (hereafter called the ‘random mean’) represents the average distance of 10,000 
pairwise distances calculated. 
The random mean for a particular phase-pair thus provides a measure from which the actual 
distance for that phase-pair can be compared. By subtracting the random mean from the actual distance, 
a measure of the variance from the random mean can be calculated. Thus, a positive sign represents an 
increased distance and a negative sign represents a lesser distance of the actual distance to the mean of 
10,000 random iterations of phase sequences of the same code frequency.  
These results are detailed in Table 21 below. Tables of the random means and standard deviations 
for each phase-pair are in Appendix B.  
Table 21 – Optimal matching within case cross phase comparison 
Amazon  eBay 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III   Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
   Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Phase II -0.001 
(0.773) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  Phase II 0.000 
(0.829) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Phase III 0.011 
(0.716) 
0.039 * 
(0.678) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 Phase III -0.027 
(0.617) 
0.013 
(0.715) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Facebook  Google 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III   Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
   Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Phase II 0.007 
(0.756) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  Phase II 0.000 
(0.795) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Phase III 0.075 * 
(0.737) 
0.009 
(0.691) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 Phase III 0.087 ** 
(0.746) 
0.016 * 
(0.719) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Salesforce  Wikipedia 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III   Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
   Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Phase II 0.000 
(0.897) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  Phase II 0.000 
(0.808) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Phase III 0.269 *** 
(0.889) 
0.000 
(0.815) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 Phase III 0.062 ** 
(0.692) 
0.110 *** 
(0.761) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; numbers in parentheses are actual distances. 
 
For all phases in all cases except Amazon and eBay, the sign of the variance is positive for all 
phase comparisons, providing evidence that each of the phases is not similar to the others within a case. 
For Amazon, Facebook, Google, Salesforce and Wikipedia, some phases are significantly different. 
Phase I-III of Salesforce and Phase II-III of Wikipedia are the most significantly different (p<0.001). 
This means that the distance between the phase-pairs is greater than 99.9% of the 10,000 random phase-
pairs with the same code frequency. Similarly Phase I-III of Google and Phase I-III of Wikipedia are 
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also significantly different (p< 0.01). This means that the distance between the two phases is greater 
than 99% of the 10,000 random phase-pairs with the same code frequency. Phase II-III of Amazon, 
Phase I-III of Facebook and Phase II-III of Google are also significantly different (p<0.05). This means 
that the distance between the phase-pairs is greater than 95% of the 10,000 random phase-pairs with the 
same code frequency. The remainder of the phase-pairs are not significantly different or similar, further 
indicating that within each case there is no similarity between the phases. eBay has positive variances 
from random mean for Phase I-II and Phase II-III, however the variance from the random mean for 
Phase I-III is negative but not significant. As the distance from Phase I to Phase II is positive, and Phase 
II to Phase III is positive, these results still suggest that the sequences within each of the three phases 
differ and hence validate the phase identification. Amazon also has a non-significant negative variance 
for Phase I-II, however the size of the variance is small (0.001). This suggests that Amazon may have 
begun Phase II earlier than their explicit strategy of “Get Big Fast” would suggest; perhaps network 
effects had already begun to drive the momentum phase. 
These results overwhelmingly suggest that the phases within each case are not similar to one 
another. In fact they are dissimilar to each other. In part the sequence differences between each phase 
can be explained by recourse to the three phase model of institutional technological innovation of 
Hargrave and Van De Ven (2006). Hargrave and Van de Ven argue that in each phase there are three 
different underlying process engines, dialectical, collective action and evolutionary processes 
respectively. This supplies a useful rationale for understanding the differences between each phase 
independent of the other. However it does not explain the finding of overall dissimilarity of each case. 
Nor is it clear whether there are similarities across cases. 
Summarising, this optimal matching analysis has confirmed that there are no similarities between 
phases within a case. This provides further statistical evidence of the existence of the three phases of 
ecosystem emergence. 
5.3 Analysis III: Phase sequence comparison 
Analysis II above has suggested that there are three phases of ecosystem emergence that occur 
during the development of an ecosystem. The purpose of this section is to apply optimal matching to 
determine how similar or different each phase is across cases.  
In this analysis the event sequences of a phase are compared between the six cases. Forty five 
phase-case-pair distances are calculated: fifteen for Phase I, fifteen for Phase II and fifteen for Phase 
III. Alternatively expressed, three pairwise distances are calculated for Amazon-eBay (one for each 
phase), three for Amazon-Facebook, and so on. To create the mean distance for each phase-case-pair to 
which the actual case-pair distance could be compared (see Section 4.11.1 in Chapter 4 for rationale 
and details of the following technique), 10,000 random event sequences for each case were created, 
using the same frequency of codes as in the actual event sequence. This resulted in 180,000 random 
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event sequences in total – 10,000 for each phase (3) for each case-pair (6). The optimal matching 
procedure was then applied to the random event sequences for each phase-case-pair, so that 450,000 
distances were created – 10,000 for each phase (3) of each case-pair (15). As there was a range of 
distances for each phase-case-pair, the mean distance and standard deviation was calculated. Hence 
following this procedure there were 45 mean distances and 45 standard deviations – one for each phase 
of each case-pair. Each phase-case-pair mean distance (hereafter called the ‘random mean’) represents 
the average distance of 10,000 pairwise distances calculated. 
The random mean for a particular phase-case-pair provides a measure from which the actual 
distance for that phase-case-pair can be compared. By subtracting the random mean from the actual 
distance, a measure of the variance from the random mean can be calculated. Thus, a positive variance 
represents an increased distance and a negative variance represents a lesser distance from the random 
mean. The results for Phase I are presented in Table 22 below. The mean distance and standard 
deviations for each case-pair are in Appendix B.  
Table 22 – Phase I optimal matching cross case comparison 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay 0.081 + 
(0.750) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook -0.009 
(0.774) 
-0.061 
(0.675) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google -0.141 ** 
(0.619) 
0.102 + 
(0.838) 
-0.005 
(0.735) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce -0.069 
(0.643) 
-0.074 
(0.650) 
-0.068 
(0.711) 
0.003 
(0.800) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia -0.012 
(0.775) 
-0.074 
(0.629) 
0.050 
(0.809) 
0.095 + 
(0.865) 
0.142 ** 
(0.798) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; numbers in parentheses are actual distances. 
The results indicate that, in contrast to the complete sequence comparison of Analysis I, a large 
majority of the phase-case-pairs are no different to the random mean and the significant differences 
between event sequences have disappeared. This indicates that the difference between each phase-case-
pair is no different than the average of 10,000 phase-case-pairs calculated from random sequences with 
the same code frequency. Furthermore, the majority of these phase-case-pair comparisons now have a 
negative variance from their random mean. This implies that each phase-case-pair is tending towards a 
similar event sequence. This finding is emphasised through the significant similarity of the Amazon-
Google event sequences for this phase (p<0.01), where the distance of the event sequences for the phase-
case-pair, relative to one another, is less than 90% of the 10,000 pairwise distances calculated from the 
randomly generated sequences. In contrast, the phase-case-pair of Salesforce-Wikipedia is significantly 
different (p<0.01), where the distances of the event sequences for the phase-case-pair, relative to one 
another, is higher than 95% of the 10,000 pairwise distances calculated from the randomly generated 
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sequences. Similarity the phase-case-pairs of Amazon-eBay, eBay-Google and Google-Wikipedia are 
significantly positive, but only at a low level of significance (p<0.1).  
In general, the disappearance of the significant differences between each case-pair, and the 
negative variance from the random mean, suggest there is some similarity between the phases across 
the cases. Driving this similarity of event sub-sequences are the increased levels of technology and 
resource events and decreased levels of context events in this phase (see Section 5.2.4 and Table 18 
above), as well as the patterns of interaction of these types of events. Put differently, the likelihood of 
similarity of sequence is higher if there are similar frequencies of event types. Thus the similar 
significant frequencies of resource, technology, and context events for both Google and Amazon 
provides an explanation for the significant negative variance from the random mean of the Amazon-
Google phase-case-pair (p<0.01). Similarly, the significant positive variance from the random mean of 
Salesforce-Wikipedia, and more at a more minor level, Amazon-eBay, eBay-Google and Google-
Wikipedia, is a result of the interaction of different frequencies of event types. While Wikipedia has 
significantly more institutional codes than the random mean, Salesforce instead has significantly more 
resource and significantly less institutional codes. As a whole, these results illustrate that in the early 
stages of ecosystem emergence, when the hub firm is setting up and the digital service is being designed 
and developed, there are similarities in the processes of ecosystem emergence when compared to the 
overall sequence comparison. 
The results for Phase II are presented in Table 23 below. The mean distance and standard 
deviations for each case-pair are in Appendix B.  
Table 23 – Phase II optimal matching cross case comparison 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay -0.008 
(0.673) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook 0.009 
(0.714) 
0.008 
(0.802) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google 0.050 ** 
(0.765) 
0.012 
(0.747) 
0.056 ** 
(0.714) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce 0.005 
(0.708) 
0.023 + 
(0.666) 
0.011 
(0.750) 
-0.014 
(0.744) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia 0.110 *** 
(0.823) 
0.074 *** 
(0.748) 
0.073 *** 
(0.741) 
0.075 *** 
(0.791) 
0.065 *** 
(0.732) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; numbers in parentheses are actual distances. 
Here the similarity that was observed in Phase I has mostly disappeared and instead there is now 
predominantly dissimilarity between the phase-case-pairs. The variances for all the phase-case-pairs, 
except Amazon-eBay and Google-Salesforce, are positive from their respective random means with 
eight significant, suggesting that these phase-case-pairs are either dissimilar or tending towards being 
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dissimilar. Amazon-Google and Facebook-Google are significantly different (p<0.01) with eBay-
Salesforce less so (p<0.1). Strikingly all phase-case-pair comparisons with Wikipedia are highly 
significantly different (p<0.001). This means that the distance of the event sequences for each phase-
case-pair, relative to one another, are higher than 99.9% of the 10,000 pairwise distances in the 
randomly generated sequences. The negative variances of Amazon-eBay and Google-Salesforce are 
insignificantly negative. These results suggest that there are no longer any similarities in the underlying 
processes during emergence, and that, at best, any two ecosystem emergence process is no more similar 
that any two random sequences. 
The finding of dissimilarity here is interesting as the analysis of code frequencies in Analysis II 
(see Section 5.2.4 and Table 19 above), suggests that there are commonalities in the frequencies of 
technological and contextual events. In contrast to Phase I where commonalities in code frequencies 
was complemented with similarity in the interactions of those codes, in this phase there are 
commonalities in the code frequencies but little similarity in the interactions of those codes. This implies 
that the emergence sequences in this phase are unique to each ecosystem. The exception of Wikipedia, 
which has significantly higher frequency of technological events and lower frequencies for context 
events than the other cases, explains its significant differences in phase sequence to the other five cases. 
Overall, there has been a transition from similarity of emergence processes in Phase I to dissimilarity 
of emergence processes in Phase II. 
The results for Phase III are presented in Table 24 below. The mean distance and standard 
deviations for each case-pair are in Appendix B. As above, caution should be exercised in attempting 
to extract too much insight as the results are right censored due to continuing control activities past the 
end date that are not included in the analysis. Phase III appears to maintain the dissimilarities between 
the sequences for all cases. In particular, the variance from the respective random mean for the vast 
majority of phase-case-pairs is positive, with nine significant. This suggests that the sub-sequence for 
each phase-case-pair is either dissimilar or tending towards being dissimilar. In contrast to the previous 
phase, where there was strong significant differences for all phase-case-pairs with Wikipedia and 
weaker significant differences between the other phase-case-pairs, the levels of significance are much 
reduced for Wikipedia although it remains significantly different to all other cases in this phase. For 
instance, Amazon-Wikipedia and Google-Wikipedia are now the only phase-case-pairs that are highly 
significantly different (p<0.001). Facebook-Wikipedia and Salesforce-Wikipedia remain significantly 
different although less so (p<0.05). Google-Salesforce now exhibits a high significant difference 
(p<0.001), followed by Amazon-Facebook (p<0.01), Facebook-Salesforce (p<0.05) and eBay-
Salesforce (p<0.1). The exceptions are Amazon-eBay and Amazon-Salesforce which has a non-
significant negative variance from its random mean, suggesting that the respective sub-sequences within 
this phase tend to similarity. These results suggest that significant differences remain between each of 
the sub-sequences, but with reduced levels of significance. 
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Table 24 – Phase III optimal matching cross case comparison 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay -0.001 
(0.659) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook 0.046 * 
(0.716) 
0.064 
(0.856) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google 0.009 
(0.670) 
0.058 
(0.817) 
0.000 
(0.714) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce -0.021 
(0.648) 
0.095 + 
(0.806) 
0.126 * 
(0.966) 
0.225 *** 
(1.048) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia 0.167 *** 
(0.843) 
0.049 
(0.735) 
0.072 * 
(0.751) 
0.165 *** 
(0.859) 
0.064 * 
(0.697) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; numbers in parentheses are actual distances. 
The finding of continuing dissimilarity, although of a lower significance, aligns with the analysis 
of code frequencies in Analysis II (see Section 5.2.4 and Table 20 above). This code variance frequency 
analysis suggested that in this phase there are few commonalities in the frequencies of all types of 
events. Although the general decrease in occurrences of context events supports notions of competitive 
dominance and taken-for-grantedness, and the increased occurrences of institutional events and 
decreased occurrence of resource events tends to suggest value appropriation as governance is tweaked, 
marketing initiatives are undertaken, and a reduced requirement for resources due to increased incoming 
value, these specific code frequencies are not distributed evenly across the cases. This distribution of 
code frequencies may have influenced the levels of difference between each case. For instance, the non-
significant negative variance from the random mean for Amazon-Salesforce could be a product of the 
intense marketing that each case undertook in this phase, resulting in significantly higher occurrences 
of institutional events that Amazon. Similarly the similarities in Amazon-eBay could be the effect of 
the implementation of services on the eBay service such as “Buy-It-Now” which had the characteristics 
of retailing. The significant marketing effort of Salesforce in this phase, in comparison to the significant 
technical effort of Google, may have resulted in the significant differences in their event sequences 
(p<0.001). Similarly the significant difference of Amazon-Facebook (p<0.01) could be a result of 
ongoing media interest (and hence higher frequency of contextual events) in Facebook and the 
significantly reduced number of contextual events for Amazon. These results suggest that the ecosystem 
control and appropriation processes are heterogeneous across the cases and are unique to each 
ecosystem.  
Taking the three phases together, this analysis suggests that ecosystems begin with fairly similar 
processes of resource acquisition and technological development (Phase I) which then have unique 
momentum processes of ecosystem growth, competition, and press and societal interest (Phase II). In 
Phase III each case settles into their own unique processes of value appropriation and ecosystem control. 
Figure 7 below plots the variance of the distance of each phase-case-pair from their random means 
130 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ????? ???? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ?????????????? ??? ????? ???????????????? ????? ??? ???????????? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??? ????? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????????????? ??????????????????? ???? ?????????? ???? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
???? ??????? ????? ???? ?????? ??? ???????? ???????????? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ?????? ????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ???? ?? ?????? ??? ?????????? ?????????????? ?????????????????? ???? ???????? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ?????? ???????????? ???? ????????? ????????????????? ????????????? ??? ?????? ?????????????? ???? ????????
??????????? ???????? ??? ???????????????????? ??? ???? ?????? ?????????????????????????????????? ??? ??????
????
mechanisms necessarily are extensions of the established logic of value co-creation, and hence 
introduce additional differences into the emergence sequences. 
A consequence of this analysis is that it provides evidence counter to what would be suggested 
by institutional theory. Given that in this phase the ecosystems are now moving towards control, value 
appropriation and optimisation, it would be reasonable to consider that wider institutional concerns, 
particularly regulatory pressures, could also exert a homogenising influence on activities in later phases 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For instance, as the majority of cases experienced an IPO (Facebook and 
Wikipedia excepted), the resource activities required for the preparation and execution of the IPO, and 
particular the subsequent requirements for reporting, could impact both the frequency and pattern of 
resource, institutional and contextual events. Similarly, case responses to societal concerns such as 
privacy (Facebook and Google), viability (Amazon and Salesforce) and trust and fraud (eBay and 
Wikipedia), as well as engagement with regulators and other institutions, could also influence the both 
the frequency and patterns of institutional and contextual events. However, Figure 7 above demonstrates 
that there is no homogenising effect and instead value appropriation and control activities tend to further 
differentiate the underlying ecosystem event sequences.  
An alternative explanation for the increasing dissimilarity across phases between the emergence 
sequences of ecosystems is imprinting and path dependence. Path dependence occurs when the end state 
depends on the particular sequence of unfolding events (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985; Garud & Karnoe, 
2001). Organisations are imprinted by the forces present at the time of their creation, leading to them 
to assume specific characteristics that tend to be carried forward (Stinchcombe, 1965). For instance, 
dominant design theorists have outlined the formative influence that pre-existing technologies have on 
the emergence of a new design (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Murmann & Frenken, 2006). 
Furthermore, differences in technologies, beliefs and other founding conditions can lead to differing 
attributes of an ecosystem (Scott, 1983). Social movement theorists have also emphasised that the form 
of a social movement bears the imprint of the specific opportunity that gives it life (McAdam et al., 
1996). For example, each of the founders came from different backgrounds which shaped the 
subsequent processes of emergence. Bezos and Benioff (Amazon and Salesforce) both came from 
corporate backgrounds, and Page and Brin and Zuckerberg (Google and Facebook) were students, and 
these different starting positions influenced the service development process and resource acquisition 
of the respective ecosystems. Similarly the developer background of Omidyar and Wales (eBay and 
Wikipedia) meant that the hacker ethos and ideas of open participation were integral to the early 
development of eBay and Wikipedia. As a consequence, the conditions in which each ecosystem began 
influenced the constituent events and dynamics that drove the emergence of the ecosystem. 
The decisions which are taken throughout the emergence of an ecosystem also shape its final 
state, as each provides the raw material that subsequent decisions are made (David, 1985). In particular, 
the early decisions of founders, as well as the early influence of customers and other stakeholders, can 
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have a strong influence on the structure and dynamics of an ecosystem due to the amplification effect 
of structuration processes (Lawrence & Phillips, 2004). Similarly, processes such as breakthrough, 
translation and bricolage that shape the ecosystem mean that an emergence sequence will be 
idiosyncratic to the decisions made (Campbell, 2005; Garud & Karnoe, 2003). For instance, each case 
faced challenges – technological failure (eBay and Salesforce), internal conflict within the ecosystem 
(eBay, Facebook and Wikipedia), and intense societal pressure (Google and Facebook) – each of which 
was addressed uniquely according to the demands and interests of the service, ecosystem and founders. 
How each case addressed these challenges influenced the subsequent actions that were taken. For 
instance, Facebook’s habit of initially ignoring the demands or concerns of ecosystem participants, 
responding arrogantly, and then eventually backing down, led to feature retractions, ongoing conflict 
with both ecosystem participants and society, and a subsequent requirement for specialised resources 
and technologies that was not shared with other cases. Thus the decisions taken both enable and 
constrain the activities of the ecosystem, as it became embedded in paths that it tried to shape and which 
in turn shaped it (Garud & Karnoe, 2003). As a consequence the relationship between a hub firm, the 
ecosystem and society is the product its own distinct history, reflecting the assimilation of values and 
demands over time and the residues of past processes (Astley & Van De Ven, 1983; Scott, 1983). 
Path dependency complements the logic of value co-creation explanation by suggesting that 
beyond the differences for each logic of value co-creation, each process is unique due to the influence 
of initiating conditions and decisions made during the ecosystem emergence (Arthur, 1989; David, 
1985; Garud & Karnoe, 2001). More specifically, it is path dependence that drives the emergence of 
each logic of value co-creation and hence the increasing dissimilarity across each phase. In the first 
phase, the environment conditions and early decisions of the founders resulted in the nascent logics of 
value for each particular ecosystem case. For example, developer background and hacker ethos of 
Omidyar and Wales (eBay and Wikipedia) led to their early decisions to open up governance of the 
ecosystem to participants at an early stage. This meant that as the logic of value co-creation emerged in 
each ecosystem, it necessarily reflected and incorporated the ongoing governance activities of 
ecosystem participants into its nature. In contrast the more closed governance models of Amazon, 
Facebook, Google and Salesforce did not need to take into account the opinions of participants as much 
and did not integrate the ecosystem participants in the same way into the regulative aspects of the logic. 
As an ecosystem takes off (Phase II), path dependency enables both an extension of the value co-
creation logics from the earlier phase by building on what was already present, as well as constraining 
the application of other logics of value co-creation through the structure of what was already present. 
This further differentiated the underlying event sequences in this phase. For instance, the outright 
rebellion of Wikipedia ecosystem participants to the suggestion of advertising meant that Wikipedia 
became a philanthropic-based ecosystem, counter to the original aspirations of Wales. Similarly the 
revelation that a publishers’ placement feature (paying for higher listings on a page) had been 
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implemented on Amazon resulted in a furious ecosystem backlash requiring the retraction of the 
monetisation feature. The influence of path dependency continues into Phase III, as the logic of value 
co-creation that was established in the earlier phase both enables idiosyncratic value appropriation and 
control mechanisms, as well as restricting the availability of other mechanisms of value appropriation 
and control. In doing so this further differentiates the emergence sequences of each ecosystem. Taken 
together, path dependence provides the link between each of the three phases, driving the establishment 
of a particular logic of value co-creation in an ecosystem.  
Summarising, this section has compared the event sequences of each phase across-cases, and 
found similarities in the first phase, with increasing differences in the second and third phases. The 
increasing differences between the event sequences in each phase are proposed to be result of the 
establishment of idiosyncratic logics of value co-creation and the influence of path dependency. 
Specifically, path dependence drives the establishment of an idiosyncratic logic of value co-creation, in 
the process differentiating the event sequence of each case. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has reported the results of the phasic analysis of the six empirical cases. The first 
analysis, comparing the complete sequences of each of the six cases, found that each sequence is 
significantly different to the others. The second analysis found that there are three phases of ecosystem 
emergence. Phase I, or Initiation, consists of the initial idea and digital service development, resource 
gathering and early operation. In Phase II, or Momentum, the ecosystem begins to grow rapidly, 
characterised by increasing numbers of participants (drive by positive network effects), aggressive 
marketing, much press and societal interest, as well as competitor activity. In Phase III, or Control, the 
ecosystem is established as the undisputed leader and the focus of activity moves from expansion to 
control and value appropriation. The third analysis compared each of the individual phases, finding that 
the event sequences of the first phase are similar, and that these similarities decrease from one phase to 
the next as the ecosystem emerges.  
This chapter has proposed that the idiosyncratic logics of value co-creation of each case explain 
the differences in their emergence sequences. In particular, the types of transaction efficiencies, 
complementary assets and ecosystem participants, and lock-in that characterise a logic of value co-
creation vary for each case resulting in idiosyncratic value processes. Path dependency is also 
demonstrated, where the starting conditions and early decisions of the founders result in particular 
characteristics of value co-creation, which is subsequently embedded and further distinguished through 
idiosyncratic responses to circumstances that were unique to each ecosystem. Together the influence of 
the logics of value co-creation and path dependency drive the increasing dissimilarity in the emergence 
sequence of each case. 
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The following chapter discusses the implications of the above, as well as outlining theoretical 
implications of earlier chapters. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the theoretical arguments and empirical findings that answer the three 
research questions posed by this thesis. To address these questions, I have developed an institutional 
approach to ecosystems, proposing that ecosystems represent a distinct subset of organisational fields, 
distinguished by the importance of value co-creation as a recognised area of institutional life (Chapter 
2). In doing so I have argued that there are a number of distinct areas of institutional life, integrating 
the concept of value co-creation with the existing literature on common industries, common 
technologies, social issues and markets. Furthermore, I have synthesised the dominant design, social 
movement and institutional entrepreneurship theories to highlight four activities – resource, 
technological, institutional and contextual – that drive ecosystem emergence (Chapter 3), thereby 
contributing to our understanding of the mechanisms of organisational field formation. The 
identification of these four activities provides a theoretical basis for understanding the processes which 
underpin ecosystem emergence. Through an empirical comparison of the emergence sequences of six 
digital service ecosystems, I have also contributed by developing an ecosystem perspective that 
explicitly integrates value co-creation processes as an important regulator of the evolution of 
ecosystems (Chapter 5). I have also shown that ecosystem emergence exhibits three distinct phases that 
link to form a coherent whole when considered from the perspective of value co-creation (Chapter 5). 
More specifically, in the first phase the processes of ecosystem emergence are similar across cases, 
however with subsequent phases these processes become increasingly dissimilar. 
A number of implications arise from these contributions that require further elaboration. A first 
set of implications concerns the impact of the empirical findings and the development of an institutional 
approach to ecosystem research. The empirical findings provide empirical validation of existing 
theories of ecosystem emergence, as well as extend our understanding of the processes that underlie 
ecosystem emergence. These empirical findings also suggest that the emergence sequence of each case 
should be considered equifinal, as although each case emerged along its own path with its own distinct 
processes, each case also resulted in a functioning ecosystem consisting of a value-creating network, 
governance system and institutional logic. Furthermore, the finding of the importance of value co-
creation highlights that value captured first needs to be co-created, and that value co-creation and value 
appropriation need to be considered holistically. Theoretically, institutional theory, and the 
organisational field construct, brings additional insight that enhances our understanding of ecosystem 
dynamics and boundaries. 
A second collection of implications considers the impact of the empirical findings and the 
development of an institutional research on institutional theory, and theorisations of the organisational 
field in particular. The empirical findings provide empirical validation of a number of models of 
institutional formation, as well as directing analytical attention towards the processes that drive 
institutional formation, as distinct to the extant focus on the sources of institutional change. Moreover, 
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the identification of four activities that drive ecosystem emergence influences our understanding of the 
mechanisms of organisational field formation, potentially providing a novel analytic lens. Theoretically, 
the development of an institutional approach to ecosystems also provides the opportunity for particular 
aspects of ecosystems to develop our understanding of organisational fields, including powerful central 
organisations and technological interdependence. 
A final implication, and by extension an additional contribution of this thesis, relates to strategic 
management practice. The contributions and implications listed above suggest a range of practitioner 
guidance that should assist managers who seek to gain strategic edge over rivals through the promotion 
and facilitation of their ecosystems.  
6.1 Implications for ecosystem research 
Thus far, ecosystem research has focused on the dynamics of existing ecosystems, with only 
limited research into the emergence processes of ecosystems. For instance, research attention has 
focused on issues relating to the technological interdependences and their relationship to value co-
creation and value appropriation (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Jacobides et al., 2006; Pierce, 2009), network 
structure (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2009; Jacobides et al., 2006; Luo et al., 2012), platform leadership 
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Schilling, 2009), governance (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Tiwana et al., 
2010) and the economics of multisided markets (Eisenmann et al., 2009; Evans, 2009). Although this 
research has provided insight into the dynamics of existing ecosystems, it has not really developed our 
understanding of how ecosystems emerge. 
Consequently, the empirical findings and development of an institutional approach to ecosystem 
research provide scholars with new ways of thinking about ecosystem emergence. Specifically, the 
empirical findings enhance current theorisations of ecosystem emergence, both validating extant theory 
as well as deepening our understanding of the processes that underpin ecosystem emergence. 
Furthermore, the finding of dissimilarities in the emergence sequence of each case, explained through 
idiosyncratic logics of value co-creation and appropriation, suggests that ecosystem emergence should 
be considered equifinal as each case “reach[ed] the same final state from differing initial conditions and 
by a variety of paths” (Katz & Kahn, 1978:p. 30). The finding of the importance of value co-creation 
also highlights that value captured first needs to be co-created, and that value co-creation and value 
appropriation need to be considered holistically. Building upon this insight the notion of an ‘ecosystem 
model’, the rationale through which an ecosystem co-creates, delivers and shares value, is powerful as 
it provides a useful tool with which to consider ecosystem value logics. Furthermore, the additional 
insight that institutional theory, and the concept of organisational fields in particular, brings to our 
understanding of dynamics and boundaries, means that their application to ecosystem contexts offers 
potential to advance ecosystem research. 
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6.1.1 Models of ecosystem emergence 
To date, the only substantive model of ecosystem system emergence is that of Moore (1993), 
although others have considered ecosystem emergence from the perspective of platforms (such as 
Gawer, 2009; Thomas et al., forthcoming). As such the empirical findings of three phases of emergence, 
and the increasing dissimilarity in the emergence processes across the phases, extend our understanding 
of ecosystem emergence. 
To begin, these empirical findings provide perhaps the first empirical validation of the four stage 
model of an ecosystem lifecycle of Moore (1993). Moore proposes four evolutionary stages of a 
business ecosystem lifecycle – birth, expansion, leadership and self-renewal – of which the first three 
align to the Initiation, Momentum and Control phases identified in the empirical findings. Although this 
validation should be expected given the retroductive approach to phase identification (see Section 5.2), 
this finding is still worth noting as there has only been limited empirical work on ecosystem emergence 
that addresses this model. In addition, Moore, as a strategy practitioner, is more concerned with 
ecosystem creation – the deliberate acts of the hub firm to create the ecosystem. Thus the findings of 
three phases can be applied to both ecosystem emergence – the subject of study here – as well as to the 
processes of ecosystem creation.  
A closer reading of Moore’s model also indicates a number of key processes that typify each 
stage, that are also generally supported by the results. For instance, each of Moore’s birth stage 
processes – developing the seed innovation, discovering the right customer value proposition, and 
designing the business to serve the potential market – are indirectly empirically supported through the 
frequency analysis results of increased levels of resource and technological activities. Specifically, these 
types of processes internal to the firm and will involve the technological development of the product or 
service that underpins the offering. Similarly, Moore’s processes in the expansion stage – competition 
against other ecosystems, stimulation of demand, and ensuring that demand is met – and the leadership 
stage – guidance of ecosystem direction, maintaining a robust community, and the maintenance of 
bargaining power – are also supported by the frequency analysis. In particular, in the expansion stage, 
the findings of increased context activities supports the notions of ecosystem competition, ongoing 
resource and institutional activities implies both demand maintenance and satisfaction. Similarly, in the 
leadership stage, the increased frequency of institutional and resource activities supports the existence 
of ecosystem guidance, the maintenance of hub firm bargaining power and the community. Taken 
together then, the empirical findings also provide support for the existence of typical processes in each 
phase. 
More importantly, however, is the finding that there are process similarities across cases in the 
first phase which then become increasing dissimilarities in the later phases. This suggests that the typical 
processes suggested by Moore also start similarly then begin to become dissimilar in comparisons 
across cases. Accordingly the typical processes of the Initiation phase – the development of a seed 
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innovation, value proposition and business design – can be understood to be similar across different 
ecosystems. This also means that the processes of ecosystem competition, demand stimulation and 
meeting demand in the Momentum phase, and the processes of ecosystem guidance, community 
maintenance and power maintenance in the Control phase, differ according to the specific ecosystem. 
Thus although Moore has identified the processes that typify a phase, these empirical results suggest 
that how these processes actually unfold within an ecosystem are specific to that ecosystem.  
Taking the analysis further, these findings suggest that the typical processes of ecosystem 
competition, demand stimulation, meeting demand, ecosystem guidance, community maintenance and 
power maintenance, are specific to the idiosyncratic logic of value co-creation. Correspondingly, the 
instantiations of the typical processes of development of the seed innovation, value proposition and 
business design are not idiosyncratic to the logic of value co-creation. This implies that the ecosystem 
emergence processes should be distinguished from those processes that are of a more general 
entrepreneurial nature. As a consequence, ecosystem research that seeks to understand commonalities 
in the underlying processes (for instance, as suggested by Van De Ven & Poole, 1995) should be of 
ecosystems with similar logics of value co-creation, as ecosystem comparisons may be more 
heterogeneous than researchers realise. As value co-creation is non-linear (Moore, 1996; Nalebuff & 
Brandenburger, 1996; Normann & Ramirez, 1994), this also indicates that notions of equilibrium and 
linearity are not suitable for analyses of ecosystem emergence, or indeed, ecosystem processes in 
general. Instead, ideas such as complex adaptive systems, self-organising networks and autocatalytic 
feedback may be preferable to understanding the emergence and dynamics of ecosystems (Anderson, 
1999; Meyer, Gaba, & Colwell, 2005). 
These empirical results also speak to other models of emergence that do not consider ecosystems 
directly but instead consider platforms. For instance, Gawer (2009) has suggested an evolutionary 
typology of platform leadership which results in the emergence of an ecosystem. Gawer focuses on the 
architectural openness of the platform; in her model, the supply side components are first outsourced 
from external suppliers, leading the internal platform to evolve into a supply chain platform. As the 
outsourced subsystems take on a life of their own and horizontal links develop, an ecosystem emerges 
as the supply chain platform evolves into an industry platform. More recently, Thomas et al. 
(forthcoming) have extended this evolutionary model to suggest another mechanism that drives 
ecosystem evolution. Drawing on their identification of the three logics of leverage that drive value 
creation in platform systems (economies of production, innovation and transaction), they suggest that 
shifts in the type of leverage that a platform utilises, along with shifts in the level of architectural 
openness, together drive the evolution of a platform-centric ecosystem. They argue an evolutionary 
progression occurs as leverage logics change or platform opening allow others to participate. Eventually 
a platform-centric ecosystem emerges which represents a combination of three leverage logics, 
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coordinated and orchestrated through the platform architecture. Thus the emergence of a platform-
centric ecosystem requires the integration of three leverage logics within an open system environment. 
As differing leverage logics would have different underlying processes – for instance, the 
processes which drive a leverage logic based on economies of innovation would differ those processes 
that drive a leverage logic that is based on economies of transaction – the empirical finding of increasing 
dissimilarities in emergence sequences suggests that the interplay between these logics as the ecosystem 
emerges is idiosyncratic to each ecosystem. For instance, at the early stage of ecosystem emergence, 
there are similarities in the processes of different ecosystems as the three types of leverage logics have 
not yet begun to combine, nor has the progressive opening of the platform begun to occur. However, as 
the ecosystem emerges and the leverage logics adjust and platform opening occurs, then the processes 
of architectural opening and the dominant leverage logic begin to intertwine leading to differences in 
the emergence processes of ecosystems. Given that the dissimilarities in ecosystem emergence 
processes continue to increase as the ecosystem emergence continues, these results suggest that there is 
not one evolutionary route of platform-centric ecosystem emergence. Providing empirical justification 
for the claims of Thomas et al. (forthcoming), there is perhaps no common evolutionary route to 
platform-centric ecosystem emergence, but instead exists a variety of unique paths to emergence. 
Summarising, the empirical findings of the three phases of emergence and the increasing 
dissimilarity in the emergence processes across the phases, both validate current models of ecosystem 
emergence, as well as provide insight into the nature of the processes which underpin ecosystem 
emergence. 
6.1.2 Equifinal emergence 
The empirical findings of significant dissimilarities between each emergence sequence, the 
increasing differences in the emergence processes of each case, and the influence of the idiosyncratic 
logics of value, suggest that it is possible to argue that each ecosystem case is not comparable. Put 
differently, this view privileges ecosystem processes over ecosystem structures, arguing that different 
ecosystem processes mean that comparisons between ecosystems are not valid. Taking the view of Amit 
and Zott (2001), this implies that the heterogeneity in each of the four factors in their models of value 
co-creation – efficiency, complementarity, lock-in and novelty – results in processes than mean that 
ecosystem structures, dynamics and boundaries that are not comparable. It surfaces a tension between 
the structural characteristics of an ecosystems – the network of organisations, governance structure and 
institutional logic – and the dissimilar processes that have been empirically identified here. 
To claim such non-comparability would unnecessarily restrict the wider application of the term 
‘ecosystem’ and to do so would merely make the term a loose label for heterogeneous incompatible 
phenomena. If the ‘ecosystem’ as a term is to be used in any meaningful way in management research, 
it must be one that covers a range of different empirical examples. It must be broad enough to encompass 
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multiple instances of a phenomena, yet narrow enough to be meaningful. Theoretically, an ecosystem 
has a range of attributes that enable it to be applied to a range of different empirical examples (c.f. 
Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Chapter 2; Iansiti & Levien, 2004a). For instance, Chapter 2 argues that 
ecosystems consist of a value-creating network of organisations, governance system and institutional 
logic. Similarly, the whole thrust of the Autio and Thomas (forthcoming) definition – a network of 
interconnected organisations, connected to a focal firm or a platform, that incorporates both production 
and use side participants and that co-creates and appropriate value – is to be wide enough to encompass 
a range of empirical examples as well as defined enough to remain useful as a model. Specifically, the 
prerequisite that an ecosystem is a network of interconnected organisations connected to a focal firm or 
platform opens up a large conceptual space, however this space is limited through the further 
stipulations that the network must incorporate both production and use side participants and that 
together they co-create and appropriate value. For the six cases in this research, by the end of the period 
under investigation, each case certainly consisted of a network of interconnected organisations 
connected to a platform, incorporating both production and use side participants engaged in the co-
creation and appropriation of value. Put differently, by the end of the period of investigation, each case 
consisted of a value-creating network, governance system and institutional logic. Furthermore, the 
empirical findings of similiarity in the first phase also suggest that differing cases can be compared. 
If each of the six cases are comparable, then to resolve the tension between the process 
dissimilarities found empirically and the similar structural characteristics of ecosystems, it is productive 
to consider these emergence processes to be equifinal, in the sense that each case became a similar state, 
a functioning ecosystem, through dissimilar paths and processes. This provides both relevance to the 
term ‘ecosystem’, as well as to the generalisability of the results. In this sense, the processes of 
emergence are equifinal as each case “reach[ed] the same final state from differing initial conditions 
and by a variety of paths” (Katz & Kahn, 1978:p. 30). However to claim equifinality requires an 
understanding of what a ‘same final state’ is in the context of ecosystem emergence.  
Originally Bertalanffy (1968), with his focus on open systems, considered the ‘same final state’ 
to be the broad notion of a ‘steady state’. From this perspective, each case can be considered in a steady 
state – indeed the successful emergence to undoubted market leader of each case drove the scope of 
data provision. Data collection ceased when a case was considered to have stabilised and be in a steady 
state. However the notion of a ‘steady state’ is not conducive to operationalisation for empirical 
research, and as such organisation theory and strategy scholars, in their adoption of the notion of 
equifinality, have operationalised the ‘same final state’ in terms of organisational performance. 
Organisation theory and strategy have considered the ‘same final state’ from a variety of different 
perspectives. Within structural contingency theory and configurational theory, equifinality has 
generally been invoked when there are different paths to similar organisational performance, such as 
survival or effectiveness. Introducing equifinality to structural contingency theory, Van De Ven and 
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Drazin (1985) relaxed the assumption that there are unique, best structured solutions for a given level 
of context. Instead they recognised that there are multiple, equally effective alternatives of ‘fit’ to any 
context. Analytically, the basic hypothesis of equifinality in structural contingency theory is that some 
measure of organisational performance is a function of organisational context and structure. The 
influential approach to equifinality of Gresov and Drazin (1997) adopted the concept of functional 
equivalence of Giddens (1979). For Gresov and Drazin (1997), equifinality occurs when there are 
different structural alternatives that yield the same functional effect. Equifinality is also explicitly 
invoked in configurational theory, acknowledging that there is more than one way to success in a given 
setting (Doty, Glick, & Huber, 1993; Meyer et al., 1993). Here equifinality exists where there is a 
feasible set of equally effective, internally consistent patterns of strategy and structure for a given 
context (Jennings & Seaman, 1994). Analytically, the basic hypothesis of equifinality in configurational 
theory is that some measure of organisational performance is a function of organisational context, 
structure, and an appropriate pattern of coherent organisational processes.  
Equifinality has also been adopted within strategy literature, where the ‘same final state’ is 
competitive advantage. In the resource-based view, for instance, differing bundles of resources and 
capabilities have been shown to lead to competitive advantage (Gruber, Heinemann, Brettel, & 
Hungeling, 2010), or different combinations of business strategies and resource acquisition strategies 
can lead to competitive advantage (Zaefarian, Henneberg, & Naude, 2011). Perhaps counter intuitively, 
‘strategic equifinality’ occurs when strategic substitutes exist. Specifically, if a resource is valuable, 
rare and costly to imitate but has strategically equivalent substitutes that are themselves not rare or not 
costly to imitate, then that resource cannot be a source of competitive advantage (Barney, 2001). The 
two resources are strategically equifinal with respect to the end state of competitive advantage. 
Analytically, the basis hypothesis of equifinality in the strategy literature is that competitive advantage 
is a function of the underlying resources, strategies or both. As a contrast, within the behavioural 
strategy literature, the ‘same final state’ has been ‘tie formation efficiency’ – the avoidance of lengthy 
and high-effort searches, failed attempts, and undesirable partners (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012).  
Taken together, the organisation theory and strategy literatures have operationalised the ‘same 
final state’ as a measure of organisational performance, such as suvival, efficiency or competitive 
advantage. Each of the six cases meets these three measures, although at a different level of analysis. 
By definition each case and its ecosystem has survived. Similarly each case has demonstrated efficiency 
through their profitability (in the case of Wikipedia gaining donations), and in the emergence and 
maintenance of their network of ecosystem participants. Arguably each also has competitive advantage, 
as they successfully saw off rivals to become the dominant ecosystem for their particular logic of value 
co-creation. However in contrast to the original formulations in organisation theory and strategy, each 
of these objective measures is applied at the network level rather than at the level of the organisation. 
This is in the spirit of the original formulation of equifinality of Bertalanffy (1968) which looked to 
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open systems. As an ecosystem is an open system, there is little doubt that such an extension to the 
network level is feasible, if not desirable. 
The application of equifinality in the dynamic capabilities literature is illustrative of, and provides 
further support for, the claim of equifinality in ecosystem emergence. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), in 
their analysis of dynamic capabilities, noted that there are significant commonalities in product 
development, strategic decision-making and alliancing across firms (so called ‘best practices’). As a 
consequence, they argue that dynamic capabilities emerge equifinally within an organisation, noting 
that although dynamic capabilities are similar in terms of key attributes (‘best practices’), the specifics 
of any given dynamic capability are idiosyncratic to an organisation (for example, exact composition 
of a cross-functional product development team). By the same logic, equifinality can be claimed for the 
emergence of ecosystems. Each ecosystem meets the measures of performance that are commonly 
invoked, specifically survival, efficiency and competitive advantage. Each ecosystem is functionally 
equivalent (Gresov & Drazin, 1997), in that it is a successful network of interconnected organisations 
that are co-creating value. And each ecosystem is similar in terms of its key attributes – namely that it 
has a network of interconnected organisations, connected to a focal firm or a platform, incorporating 
both production and use side participants and co-creating value, and which has a governance system 
and an institutional logic – but where the specifics of each of these attributes are idiosyncratic. In this 
case, the underlying processes and logics of value of co-creation are idiosyncratic – but this does not 
deny a claim of equifinality. 
Summarising, this section has argued that to resolve a tension between the similar structural 
characteristics of an ecosystem and the empirical finding of dissimilar processes in each case, the 
emergence processes of the six cases should be considered equifinal, in the sense that they reached the 
same final state from differing initial conditions and by a variety of paths and processes. Despite the 
influence of the idiosyncratic logic of value co-creation of each case on the emergence processes, the 
end state of each is similar in terms of its key attributes, and as such specific examples of ecosystems 
are able to be compared meaningfully. To consider the emergence processes of ecosystems as equifinal 
is in the spirit of the original formulation of equifinality of Bertalanffy (1968), extending the application 
of equifinality in the management discipline from the organisational level to the network level.  
6.1.3 The ecosystem model 
These empirical findings, particularly the importance of the logic of value co-creation and 
appropriation in ecosystems, also highlights the close relationship between value co-creation and value 
appropriation. In ecosystem contexts, value co-creation and value capture are intrinsically intertwined: 
without value synergies, ecosystems would have little reason to exist, and value appropriated must first 
be co-created. Empirically, this interlinking is demonstrated by the increase in dissimilarity in the 
Control phase, when the imposition of value appropriation and control further differentiated the logic 
of value co-creation, and hence the emergence sequences of each case. As fair distribution of value 
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underpins the long term viability, success and health of an ecosystem, each participant must capture a 
sufficient portion of the overall value to justify its participation (Iansiti & Levien, 2004b; Lin, Wang, 
& Yu, 2010). If there is not fair value appropriation, powerful firms can drain value from the ecosystem 
and eventually destroy them by leaving too little value to support it (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Iansiti 
& Levien, 2004a, b). As a consequence, any discussion of the logic of value co-creation in ecosystem 
contexts must also include how that value is shared.  
However, in ecosystems, value co-creation and value appropriation operate at fundamentally 
different levels of analysis. The synergies required for value co-creation are enabled and facilitated at 
the level of the ecosystem: it is the ecosystem structure, participant composition, governance system 
institutional logic, and resulting value and participant synergies, and compatibilities between 
complementary offerings that underpin the synergistic value processes (Adner, 2012; Adner & Kapoor, 
2010). On the other hand, value appropriation always occurs at the level of participants and shows up 
in their balance sheets (Teece, 1986). Thus the model of value creation in e-business of Amit and Zott 
(2001), which has been useful demonstrating the heterogeneity of the logics of value co-creation, is not 
sufficient as it is predominantly focused at the level of the hub-firm. Moreover, it does not consider 
value appropriation extensively and is restricted in application to e-business, reducing generalisability. 
Similarly, the vibrant and growing business models literature, which is framed in the context of value 
creation, delivery and capture, could also hold promise were it not for its firm-level of analysis (c.f. 
Afuah, 2003; Chesbrough, 2007; George & Bock, 2011; Magretta, 2002; Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010; 
Zott & Amit, 2009). 
The few models of value creation and appropriation in the ecosystem literature hold promise. 
Adner and Kapoor (2010) consider value creation through the lens of technological interdependencies; 
however they do not consider in depth value appropriation nor the influence of institutional processes 
in value co-creation. Jacobides et al. (2006) have outlined how organisations can create an ‘architectural 
advantage’ in terms of high levels of value appropriation through the enhancement of both 
complementarity and mobility in parts of the value system where they are not active. However they do 
not consider value co-creation in any substantive way. Thomas, Autio, and Gann (2012) have proposed 
three structural characteristics that regulate the ability of an ecosystem to support value co-creation. A 
technology architecture represents the set of design choices relating to modularity, standardisation, 
connectivity and complementarity. An activity architecture operationalises the technological 
architecture as a series of specialised artefacts and organisational structures that coordinate to provide 
the technological artefacts. Together these two architectures influence a value architecture by 
determining the salience of different value creation mechanisms – economies of production, innovation 
and transactions (Thomas et al., forthcoming). Combined, the technological, activity and value 
architectures drive the logic of value co-creation in an ecosystem. With the Thomas et al. (2012) model 
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of value co-creation, each ecosystem participant develops firm-specific control mechanisms that enable 
them to appropriate their share of the overall value co-created.  
Synthesising these differing perspectives on value creation and appropriation in ecosystem 
contexts, as well as the business model literature, an ‘ecosystem model’ provides a useful lens to 
consider the ecosystem as a whole. An ecosystem model is analogous to a business model; however the 
difference is that while the business model applies at the level of the focal firm, the ecosystem model 
applies at the level of the network. The ecosystem model has been anticipated by the earliest of 
ecosystem thinkers, Moore (1996), who argued that for a hub firm to perform best within the ecosystem 
it was important for them to think about the ‘business model’ of the ecosystem (p. 57). Similarly, the 
network management literature has also anticipated this type of idea. Möller, Rajala, & Svahn (2005) 
have suggested that it is important to manage the network as a whole. Ritter, Wilkinson, & Johnston 
(2004) have distinguished between the ‘managing in’ of relationships such as the coping within a certain 
network situation, versus the ‘managing of’ relationships such as leading, determining, and organising.  
 An ecosystem model is formally defined as the stable configuration of attributes that jointly 
define how an ecosystem supports value co-creation by its participants and the distribution of this value 
among its participants. This suggests that value, technological, participant, and institutional attributes 
jointly define how an ecosystem supports value co-creation and the distribution of this value. Put 
differently, in the spirit of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), the ecosystem model can be considered ‘the 
rationale of how an ecosystem creates, delivers and shares value’. 
The concept of an ecosystem model complements the concept of a business model. Each 
participant within an ecosystem has its own business model, which determines how they individually 
will create, deliver and capture value; simultaneously each participant will also be part of the ecosystem 
model, which determines how collectively they co-create, deliver and share value. As a consequence 
the ecosystem model is constituted of the business models of its participants, but due to network level 
attributes, it is more than the sum of the underlying individual business models. This implies that those 
firms that have power with an ecosystem, such as a hub firm, have a tension between the ecosystem 
model and their business model. On the one hand, the hub firm needs to ensure that there is value co-
creation, delivery and fair distribution at the network level – it needs to manage the ecosystem model 
(perhaps collectively so with ecosystem participants). On the other hand, the hub firm needs to ensure 
that it creates, delivers and captures value for itself. Hub firms that balance this tension have been called 
‘keystones’ by Iansiti and Levien (2004a) and ‘platform leaders’ by Gawer and Cusumano (2002). 
Iansiti and Levien (2004a) eloquently describe how those firms that do not successfully balance the 
tension between the ecosystem model and their business model, so called ‘landlords’ and ‘dominators’, 
destroy or drain ecosystems, using Enron as an example. 
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Summarising, given the importance of value co-creation as a regulator of ecosystem evolution, a 
holistic understanding both value co-creation and value capture is necessary due to their intrinsic 
intertwining in ecosystems contexts and their fundamentally different levels of analysis. I have proposed 
the ecosystem model as the rationale of how an ecosystem creates, delivers and shares value. 
6.1.4 Ecosystem dynamics 
Theoretically, the development of an institutional approach provides insight into the dynamics of 
ecosystems. Theorisations of how dominant organisational arrangements reproduce themselves due to 
the distribution of rules and resources, and the ability of skilled actors to use these to reproduce their 
power (Fligstein, 2001), assist the scholar in appreciating similar dynamics in ecosystem contexts. 
Furthermore, theorising into organisational fields offers a sophisticated understanding of how these 
structures are created, sustained and transformed, which external forces are at work, and the conditions 
for change (Fligstein, 2001). 
The attention to legitimacy and the institutional logic in theorisation of organisational fields are 
also relevant to understanding the dynamics of ecosystems. Theorisations of the sources of legitimacy 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Suchman, 1995b), legitimation processes 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Greenwood et al., 2002), as well as the consequences of legitimacy 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), offer the potential to advance research into 
ecosystem dynamics. Some ecosystem scholars are already adopting such approaches. For instance, 
analysing the emergence of Cisco as a platform leader, Gawer and Phillips (forthcoming) expound upon 
the differing legitimacy and practice work a hub firm undertakes in order to become and remain a 
platform leader in an ecosystem. Sharapov, Thomas, and Autio (2013) illustrate how the development 
of cognitive legitimacy for the hub firm enables socio-political legitimacy for both the ecosystem and 
its participants. The analytic tools in institutional theory to understand cognition, such as framing, are 
a potent lens through which to understand legitimacy and institutional logic in ecosystem contexts. The 
three overlapping framing processes of Benford and Snow (2000) – discursive, strategic (including 
collective identity construction) and contested – provide a powerful framework to understand the 
development of legitimacy and the institutional logic within an ecosystem. The multi-level cognitive 
technological frame model of Kaplan and Tripsas (2008), where there is a reciprocal relationship 
between the individual participant frame and the negotiated collective frame, also offers a powerful tool 
to understand the evolution of the institutional logic in ecosystem contexts. The Kaplan model outlines 
the process by which the emergence of an institutional logic involves the sociological resolution of both 
competing frames and competing technologies. Specifically, congruent with the approach taken in this 
thesis, the collective frame for the ecosystem emerges through the interaction of the interpretive 
processes of the hub firm, complementors and other participants in the ecosystem, as well as the wider 
social, political and technological context. Their technological frame model also provides insight into 
the individual actions of participants involving adoption, investment and institutional support decisions, 
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illuminating a direct mechanism for how technology and technological interdependence evolves in an 
ecosystem.  
Existing research into collaboration also holds promise of theorising ecosystem dynamics. As 
organisational fields act as sources of rules and resources for collaboration, often collaborating parties 
draw from their ‘home’ organisational field in order to agree the terms of the partnership (Phillips et 
al., 2000), underscoring the potential of collaboration research. One potential approach is negotiated 
order theory, which holds that organisations can collaborate in constructing their organisational field 
by agreeing on the ‘rules of the game’ for their interactions with one another (Day & Day, 1977; Gray, 
1989; Nathan & Mitroff, 1991; Strauss et al., 1963). Older conceptions of the organisational field in 
institutional theory may also be pertinent. For instance, Scott and Meyer (1983) outlined how decision 
making power can be centralised on three differing axes: programmatic, the right to determine the 
purposes or goals towards which sector activities are to be directed; instrumental, the right to determine 
the means or procedures to be employed in pursuing sector objectives; and funding, the right to 
determine what level of funds are to be expended and/or to be allocated. These axes may assist in 
considering how the collaborative actions of ecosystem participants are shaped by the distribution of 
power within an ecosystem. Hardy and Phillips (1998) differentiate differing types of conflict and 
cooperation that occur within organisational fields. Cooperation can be distinguished between 
reciprocal collaboration where there is a probably change to the ecosystem, and compliance typified by 
high dependency on, and regulation by, a central authority which results in a reduced likelihood of 
change within the ecosystem. Conflict can morph into contention where there is a significant likelihood 
of change within the ecosystem and contestation where there is only limited possibility of change. Taken 
together these theorisations of collaboration suggest a more nuanced understanding of how ecosystem 
participants interact.  
Dominant design theory is particularly relevant to understanding ecosystem dynamics when it 
has a coordinating platform, considered a slowly changing collection of reusable assets (Baldwin & 
Woodard, 2009), structurally very similar to the nested model of dominant design of Murmann and 
Frenken (2006). This nested understanding of technological design could advance ecosystem research 
through theorisations of the technological trajectories that underpin value co-creation within the 
ecosystem. For example, the experience of Salesforce with the gradual opening of the underlying 
technological base to customisation at the request of participants, and then the wider release of sForce 
and AppExchange, could be analysed in more depth. How this progressive opening of a particular 
technological design, and the interplay with ecosystem participants who shaped the technological 
direction, is of particular interest in light of the later technological crisis that Salesforce experienced. 
Social movement theory also has potential to advance research into ecosystem dynamics, particularly 
where the ecosystem participants have a large role in the ongoing governance of the ecosystem, such as 
typified by Wikipedia and the early period of eBay. An understanding of the triggering events, 
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mobilising structures and framing that are used by participants in ecosystem contexts are valuable in 
understanding its dynamics. The institutional entrepreneurship literature offers theorisations of how the 
actions of participants in an existing ecosystem can alter it for their own benefit. In ecosystem contexts 
occasionally a participant has the ability to build their own ecosystem within the existing ecosystem 
(Iansiti & Levien, 2004a), or a dominant participant in one ecosystem challenges the hub firm in another 
(Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011). Given the emphasis on regulatory, normative and cognitive 
processes, as well as the contestation processes of incumbents, in theorisations of institutional change, 
their application to ecosystem competition may lead to a fuller understanding of such dynamics. 
Summarising, theorisations of the organisational field, as well as of collaboration, dominant 
design, social movement and institutional entrepreneurship, together offer the potential to advance 
ecosystem research. More specifically, they offer insight into the sources and processes of legitimacy 
and institutional logic, collaboration and conflict, the technological trajectories that underpin value co-
creation, and how participants can alter the ecosystem for their own benefit. 
6.1.5 Ecosystem boundaries 
Theorisations of the organisational fields provide also useful insight into the boundaries of 
ecosystems, as the variety of ecosystem participants gives rise to difficulty in defining the boundaries 
of ecosystems. Ecosystem boundary definition is complex, as the boundaries are usually considered to 
be fairly open and permeable (Gulati et al., 2012; Iansiti & Levien, 2004a). This difficulty is reflected 
in the different attempts to operationalise ecosystem boundaries. As an example, in their value-based 
model, Adner and Kapoor (2010) operationalised an ecosystem as consisting of those participants 
(suppliers, complementors, customers) that are only one network link away from the focal firm or 
customer. In contrast, other boundary definitions are not as clear. Iansiti and Levien (2004b) emphasise 
participant identification with ecosystem membership and argue that ecosystem boundaries are hub firm 
specific, drawn through the identification of ecosystem participants with the hub firm. Santos and 
Eisenhardt (2005) point out that ecosystems have broader boundaries than those implied by market 
efficiency. They specifically highlight power and the specialisation of organisational competencies as 
defining features of ecosystem boundaries. Although different boundary definitions may be applicable 
to different purposes and perspectives, it is clear that ecosystem boundaries are difficult to define.  
Boundary definition has been directly faced by institutional theorists when considering theorising 
the organisational field. Specifically, the boundaries of an organisational field are defined through the 
dominant institutional logics (Scott, 2008; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) and shared cultural-cognitive, 
normative or regulatory frameworks (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). Boundaries have also 
been defined through the extent of the adoption of institutional practices (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). 
The boundaries of an organisational field have also been seen as truce-making in a process of 
contestation, in that they only become established only when the ecosystem participants coalesce around 
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a frame that organises activities (Rao et al., 2000). Taken as whole, the boundaries of organisational 
fields are defined institutionally. 
By extension, the boundaries of an ecosystem can be defined through the adoption of institutional 
theorisations. To theorise the boundaries of the ecosystem in such a way aligns with the approach of 
Iansiti and Levien (2004b) who emphasise participant identification with the ecosystem membership. 
However, Iansiti and Levien (2004b) also consider the ecosystem boundaries to be hub firm specific, 
as the ecosystem participants impliedly define the boundaries through their identification with the hub 
firm. In contrast, institutional theorisations, such as the extent of the institutional logics and the shared 
regulatory, normative and cognitive frameworks, enable ecosystem boundaries to be drawn with 
reference to the participants of the ecosystem. This is a potentially more powerful approach as it moves 
the referent by which a boundary is defined from an ecosystem participant (the hub firm), to the 
ecosystem as a whole. 
Summarising, the boundaries of ecosystems are difficult to define, as boundaries are fairly open 
and permeable. Theorisations of the organisational field, which define boundaries institutionally (such 
as through the institutional logics or regulative, normative, and cognitive structures), have the potential 
to advance ecosystem research as they move the referents of definition from the hub firm to the level 
of the ecosystem. 
6.2 Implications for institutional theory  
The empirical findings and the development of an institutional approach to ecosystems also have 
implications for institutional theory, and theorisations of the organisational field in particular. 
Institutional theory has a long tradition of research into organisational fields, which has made great 
contributions to our understanding of how networks of organisations interact within a framework of 
regulative, normative and cognitive elements (Garud et al., 2002; Lawrence & Phillips, 2004; Scott, 
2008). These contributions have been enhanced through insights into institutional logics (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991), discourse (Phillips et al., 2004), identity (Polletta & Jasper, 2001) and framing processes 
(Benford & Snow, 2000; Fligstein, 2001; Snow et al., 1986). Indeed the focus on organisational fields 
as an object of study is viewed by institutional scholars as an important device to help transition this 
research domain from a paradigm-driven mode to a problem-driven mode (Davis & Marquis, 2005; 
Wooten & Hoffman, 2008).  
The empirical findings of this thesis provide some empirical validation of a number of models of 
institutional formation, as well as directing analytical focus towards the processes of formation, as 
distinct to an earlier focus on the enabling sources of change. In doing so it extends our understanding 
of the formation processes of organisational fields. Furthermore, the identification of four activities that 
drive ecosystem emergence offers the promise of extending our understanding of the mechanisms of 
organisational field formation. Building upon existing theories of institutional work (Jepperson, 1991; 
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Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) and field-configuring events (Lampel & Meyer, 2008; Meyer et al., 2005), 
these four activities potentially provide a novel analytic lens to assist our understanding of the 
mechanisms of organisational field formation. Theoretically, the development of an institutional 
approach to ecosystems also provides the opportunity for particular aspects of ecosystems to develop 
our understanding of organisational fields. Beyond consisting of a value-creating network of 
organisations, a shared governance system and a shared institutional logic, ecosystems also exhibit 
powerful central organisations and various degrees of technological interdependence among ecosystem 
participants. These latter attributes have not received much attention within the organisational field 
literature and as a consequence their theoretical integration has the potential to enrich the theorisation 
of organisational fields.  
6.2.1 Models of organisational field formation 
Only recently have scholars began to consider in detail the processes of organisational field 
formation (Anand & Jones, 2008; Powell et al., 2005). Early on DiMaggio and Powell (1983) proposed 
a four step process that leads to the emergence of mutual awareness of participants, focusing on the 
emergence of a collective rationality. In contrast Bourdieu (1993) focused on conflict as the driving 
principle of emergence, where the competitive forces arise due to the resource limitations in any field 
(DiMaggio, 1979). More recent theorisations of organisational field formation have primarily drawn 
from institutional entrepreneurship theory, which considers the question of how actors can change 
institutions if their actions, intentions and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they 
wish to change (Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002). Taken together, the majority of institutional, and 
more specifically organisational field, formation research addresses broad processes such as discourse, 
theorisation, contestation, legitimation and diffusion (Ferguson, 1998; Greenwood et al., 2002; Hinings 
et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 2004; Strang & Soule, 1998). Only recently have more specific 
considerations of the mechanisms of organisational field formation been proposed, such as ‘institutional 
work’ (Jepperson, 1991; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006) and ‘field-configuring events’ (Lampel & Meyer, 
2008; Meyer et al., 2005). 
As understanding of organisational fields and institutions has developed, a number of models of 
organisational field formation have been proposed. Not surprisingly, given the analytic focus on the 
sources of institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana et al., 2009), these models primarily consider 
enabling conditions that give rise to field formation. For instance, Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) focus 
on the interaction of practices and boundaries, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) consider when 
embedded elites are enabled and motivated to act as institutional entrepreneurs, and Seo and Creed 
(2002) focus how institutional contradictions arise and lead to change. Although these models do 
include some elements of the subsequent formation processes see for instance Seo and Creed (2002), 
these are not developed in any depth. There are a number of models that integrate the enabling sources 
of institutional change with broader emergence processes. The models of Suchman (1995a) and Tolbert 
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and Zucker (1996) both consider in detail the processes of problem generation, cognition and response, 
as well as broader processes of theorisation, objectification, contestation and diffusion. A more complex 
model is that of Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) who provide a detailed understanding of the processes, 
such as theorisation, contestation and boundary definition, which lead to the emergence of a new 
practice field. However these models do not establish any distinct stages or temporality, instead 
outlining the relationships between each type of process. 
There are a number of models of organisational field formation that include, either implicitly or 
explicitly, discrete formation stages as distinct to the sources of the change. The early model of Tolbert 
and Zucker (1983) suggested an adoption stage underpinned by the recognition of performance gaps, 
followed by a second stage of mimetic isomorphism driven by legitimation and theorisation. However 
this model is more focused on the processes of isomorphism at the organisational level and does not 
consider the organisational field in any substantive manner. A more recent high level model is that of 
Battilana et al. (2009), who identify the creation of a vision for divergent change and the mobilisation 
of allies behind the vision as two processes that drive institutional change. Although not named as 
separate stages, these two stages are presented as such, and roughly correspond to the empirical findings 
of the Initiation and Momentum phases. In contrast, Hinings et al. (2004), who incorporate and extend 
the earlier model of Greenwood et al. (2002), explicitly propose distinct stages of organisational field 
formation. However, unlike the Moore (1993) model of ecosystem emergence, the correspondence of 
their stages to the three empirically identified phases is not as clear cut. For instance, both the Hinings 
et al. (2004) and Greenwood et al. (2002) models, similar to other models of organisational field 
formation, also include the enabling conditions along with the subsequent broad emergence processes 
of theorisation, legitimation, objectification and diffusion. These models have six stages, with the 
Hinings et al. (2004) model specifically proposing: pressures for change (functional, political and 
social), sources of new practice (including institutional entrepreneurs), processes of de- and re-
institutionalisation (theorisation, legitimation and dissemination), dynamics of de- and re-
institutionalisation (value commitment, interest satisfaction, power structure and capability) and re-
institutionalisation. As such the first stage, consisting of precipitating jolts and deinstitutionalisation, 
occurs prior to the Initiation phase and represents the enabling conditions for organisational field 
formation. The following stage – sources of new practice, typified by institutional entrepreneurship – 
most closely relates to the Initiation phase in that there is independent innovation and activities to prove 
technological viability. The processes of de- and re-institutionalisation stage – theorisation, legitimation 
and dissemination – and the dynamics of de- and re-institutionalisation stage – value commitment, 
interest satisfaction, power structure and capability development – correspond to the Momentum phase, 
in that socio-political legitimacy and a power structure emerges, as well as societal and ecosystem 
outreach activities occur that justify participation in the ecosystem. The final stage – re-
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institutionalisation – corresponds to the Control phase, reflecting the emergence of cognitive legitimacy 
and the establishment of the hub firm as a powerful field level actor.  
Other institutionally-related theorisations of organisational field formation are also salient, 
including models from social movement theory and dominant design theory. These theories generally 
do not include the enabling conditions for change, and instead focus on the field formation processes 
themselves. From social movement theory, Davis and McAdam (2000) have proposed a linear model 
which emphasises the identification of an opportunity, the gathering of resources to enable change, 
followed by collective action. Although this model does not specifically identify stages and is more 
concerned with the interplay between the challenger and incumbents, the processes are presented as 
being in a temporal order, with one following the other. The first two processes – identification of 
opportunity and the gathering of resources – roughly correspond to the Initiation phase, and the 
collective action process to the Momentum phase. As Davis and McAdam (2000) do not propose any 
subsequent activities, instead suggesting that contention between the incumbent and challenger 
continues, the empirical identification of the Control phase directs attention to the processes that occur 
subsequent to successful collective action. In particular it highlights that there are additional processes 
of a dominant social actor consolidating its position, and control processes imposed on the new 
institutional settlement.  
From dominant design theory Suarez (2004) has suggested a model with five distinct phases of 
dominance design emergence – R&D build-up, technical feasibility, creating the market, decisive battle 
and post dominance. Here the first two stages correspond to the Initiation phase, focusing on resource 
gathering and technological activities with a focus on gathering complementary assets and development 
technological superiority. The next two stages correspond to the Momentum phase, typified by market 
outreach and competition, and as network effects, the installed base, and strategic manoeuvring become 
critical. Finally the last stage corresponds to Control phase, as the winning design becomes dominant 
and activities shift to incremental value improvements. Relatedly, Hargrave and Van De Ven (2006) 
have suggested three stages of institutional technological innovation – emergence, development and 
implementation – where each stage corresponds to each of the three phases found empirically. 
Specifically, the emergence stage correspond to the Initiation phase, as in this phase the hub firm begins 
to develop a new innovation and organise to launch. Their development stage corresponds to the 
Momentum phase, where collective action processes become more evident and networks of actors 
develop and compete for dominance. Their third stage, implementation, corresponds to the Control 
phase, as the particular innovation has achieved dominance and becomes legitimated and ratified. 
As a whole then, the correspondence of the existing models of organisational field formation with 
the empirical findings of three phase model provides some empirical validation of the existing 
institutional models. Although some validation should be anticipated given the retroductive approach 
to phase identification (see Section 5.2), this finding is still worth noting as there has only been limited 
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empirical work on these models to date. Furthermore, the three phases direct analytic focus to the later 
formation processes of the organisational field as distinct to the enabling conditions for emergence. In 
doing so the three phase model proposed within this thesis joins only a small number of extant models 
that have explicitly considered these processes of organisational field formation. Moreover, driven by 
the retroductive approach undertaken to empirically develop the three phases, these findings further 
integrate the institutionally-related theorisations of organisational field formation and change of social 
movement theory and dominant design theory with mainstream institutional theory. 
This analytic focus on the processes of formation is further enhanced through the related findings 
of differing event frequencies within each phase. In particular, the U-shaped frequency of technology 
events, an inverted-U shaped frequency of contextual events, the decreasing frequency of resource 
events, and the dependency of the institutional event frequency on the type of governance, provide a 
level of insight into the types of activities within each phase that has not been present in existing 
theorisations. At a broad level, these findings clarify the types of activities which constitute the broader 
processes of theorisation, legitimation and diffusion, and may be able to provide empirical insight into 
the underlying process motors (Van De Ven & Poole, 1995) which drive the formation. Moreover, these 
findings extend our understanding of theorisations of organisational field formation by providing 
additional justification for the integration of social movement theory into institutional theory more 
generally (see for instance Lounsbury et al., 2003; Rao et al., 2000). For instance, the Initiation phase, 
with its emphasis on resource gathering and the development of the business and technological artefacts, 
provides additional justification for the integration of social movement theory as it echoes the notion of 
the mobilising structure (Tilly, 1978). Similarly, in the Momentum phase, the increase in context 
activities and ongoing institutional activities underlines the importance of the discursive, strategic and 
contested framing processes of Snow and Benford (1988).  
The finding of increasing dissimilarity in the emergence processes in each case as an ecosystem 
emerges also has implications for theorisations of organisational field formation. In particular, these 
findings suggest that scholars should be aware of the nature of the change they are studying, and not 
assume that processes identified in one case are generalisable across all cases of organisational field 
formation. In particular, these findings suggest that these processes may be idiosyncratic to their 
context. From the point of view of institutional entrepreneurship, these findings suggest that although 
the processes may be similar across cases at the earlier stages of organisational field formation, such as 
reactions to social, technological or regulatory change (Hinings et al., 2004), or independently 
innovating and testing the technical viability of their innovation (Greenwood et al., 2002), the later 
processes of institutional entrepreneurship are specific to their context. For instance, the processes of 
theorisation and framing, such as the specification of the general failings and justification of the possible 
solution, as well as the processes of diffusion, with the concomitant increasing objectification, vary 
depending on the specific context. Similarly for social movement theory, these empirical findings 
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suggest that the early stages of social movement activity are characterised by similarity in these 
processes, such as reacting and mobilising to the political opportunity. However, the processes of 
collective action, particularly framing and identity construction, may be idiosyncratic to the social 
movement. For dominant design theory a similar logic applies, with suggestions that there are 
similarities in the processes of R&D build-up and technical feasibility across cases, but that the 
processes of market creation and competitive battles are idiosyncratic to the particular dominant design. 
As all theorisations of organisational field formation have legitimation as an important process in 
enablement, these findings also suggest that the processes of legitimation are similarly idiosyncratic to 
their context. 
The idiosyncratic nature of the processes that drive the formation of organisational fields may be 
reflected in extant empirical studies. To date, there has only been a small number of studies which 
specifically consider the emergence processes of organisational fields. Interestingly, these studies have 
focused on specific contexts, such as US art museums (DiMaggio, 1991), environmentalism (Hoffman, 
1999), and gastronomy in nineteenth-century France (Ferguson, 1998), rather than consider 
organisational field emergence as a general process. Given that the later processes of organisational 
field formation may be idiosyncratic to its context, this implies that scholars may be only able to identify 
the broad processes of organisational field formation. Put differently, these studies perhaps reflect the 
fact that granular process theories to explain organisational field formation may not be possible, and 
that the models discussed above are already at the best level of granularity that can be achieved. Instead, 
research and analytic focus may need to concentrate on those specific mechanisms of organisational 
field formation that are similar, and hence generalisable, across cases. (This insight is developed in 
more detail in Section 6.2.2 below.) 
Summarising, the empirical findings of the three stages and the increasing dissimilarity of the 
processes within each phase when compared across stages provide welcome empirical validation and 
direct analytic attention towards the processes of organisational field formation as distinct to the 
enabling conditions. The empirical findings also suggest complementary insights that extend our 
understanding of a number of models of organisational field formation. Furthermore, the finding of 
increasing dissimilarity in the emergence processes of the six cases suggests that granular process 
theories to explain organisational field formation may not be possible. 
6.2.2 Mechanisms of organisational field formation 
Building upon the empirical findings, and resultant suggestion that research focus may need to 
be on generalisable mechanisms of organisational field formation, the theoretical identification of the 
four activities that drive ecosystem emergence hold the promise of a novel analytic lens. 
As noted above, only recently have researchers begun to theorise the mechanisms of 
organisational field formation. One line of research has been ‘institutional work’, which focuses 
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attention on human action in institutional change (Jepperson, 1991; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). 
Institutional work considers the “purposive action of individuals and organisations aimed at creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 215), in doing so reintroducing 
notions of practice into institutional change. For the creation of an institution, Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006) from their review of the literature, propose such actions as: advocacy (the mobilisation of 
political and regulatory support); defining (the construction of rule systems); vesting (the creation of 
rule structures that confer property rights); constructing identities; changing normative associations; 
constructing normative networks; mimicry (associating new practices with existing sets of taken-for-
granted practices, technologies and rules); theorising; and educating. More recently Gawer and Phillips 
(forthcoming) have identified external practice work, internal practice work, legitimacy work and 
identity work as salient in ecosystem emergence contexts. Another recent line of research has been in 
‘field-configuring events’ (Lampel & Meyer, 2008; Meyer et al., 2005). Field-configuring events are 
mechanisms that occur at specific temporal moments in the evolution of an organisational field, where 
a structuring moment has a role in shaping technological artefacts, market boundaries and regulatory 
frameworks (Lampel & Meyer, 2008; Oliver & Montgomery, 2008). Field-configuring events include 
competitions (Rao, 1994), conferences (Garud, 2008), and ceremonies (Anand & Jones, 2008; Anand 
& Watson, 2004).  
Together both institution work and field-configuring events link field evolution at the macro level 
with individual action at the micro level (Lampel & Meyer, 2008; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Meyer 
et al., 2005). Similarly, the four underlying activities theoretically derived from dominant design theory, 
social movement theory and institutional theory also link macro level change with individual action. 
However in contrast to an analytic focus on a particular actor or organisation, or on specific events that 
shape organisational field emergence, these four activities analytically focus on the ongoing actions of 
multiple actors. Thus resource activities are those concerned with the procurement and management of 
resources by the hub firm in an ecosystem. Technology activities are those related to the design and 
provision of the underlying technologies, not necessarily but often undertaken by the hub firm. 
Institutional activities are those related to the institutional structure and operation of the ecosystem, 
undertaken by both ecosystem participants and the hub firm. And contextual activities provide the 
conditions for ecosystem emergence as well as shape the environment in which emergence occurs, 
undertaken by actors such as regulators, the press and competitors. As a whole, the interaction of these 
four types of activities and their actors builds legitimacy, and shapes the technological design, 
ecosystem boundaries and regulatory frameworks. As a consequence, these four types of activities cover 
the totality of actors, including the institutional entrepreneurs, who interact to create institutions. 
Furthermore these ongoing activities encompass field-configuring events, where resource, 
technological, institutional and contextual activities come together in a single, field-configuring event.  
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The analytical lens provided by these four activities complements research into institutional work 
and institutional change. Recent research has suggested that uncoordinated collective action can result 
in institutional change (see for instance Dorado, 2005; Wijen & Ansari, 2007). Rather than focus on the 
actions of an institutional entrepreneur, this suggests that institutional work – those actions aimed at 
“creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 215) – could also be 
undertaken by actors other than the institutional entrepreneur. However, to do so removes the 
requirement for the work to be ‘purposive’ for institutional change, and allows for work undertaken for 
other purposes to have institutional consequences. This is congruent with Dorado’s (2005) notion of 
‘institutional partaking’, where institutional change results from the autonomous actions of countless 
agents converging over time, so that no single individual or organisation can be responsible for the 
changes. The attribution of institutional work to a wider collection of actors implies that it could occur 
within any of the four types of activities. For example, contextual activities, such as those of the media 
or regulators, could be considered to have similar effects on institutional change such as advocacy or 
vesting respectively. Similarly, as rules are often embedded into features of a technology such as 
modularity (Baldwin & Clark, 2000), technological design activities could have the same effect as 
institutional work like rule systems that confer status or identity, define boundaries of membership or 
create status hierarchies (c.f. Gawer & Phillips, forthcoming).  
That institutional work may occur purposively or incidentally in any of the four activities by any 
actor is enhanced through an appreciation of the sub-categories for each category. Building upon the 
original four categories, each sub-categorisation (detailed in Appendix A) iteratively emerged from an 
analysis of the empirical data using the original theoretical constructs (Poole et al., 2000). Thus resource 
activities include corporate, financial, competence, appropriation, coalition, and operational 
infrastructure sub-activities; technological activities include design, delivery and internationalisation 
sub-activities; institutional activities include rule-making, discourse, identity, support programs, 
pricing, membership and promotional sub-activities; and contextual activities include regulatory, 
competitive, accolades and the discourse of the press and wider society sub activities. By partially 
operationalising the four activities framework with examples of each sub-activity, specific types of 
actions are identified which can be associated with institutional work. In doing so each of these sub-
activities enables an appreciation of the different types of institutional work undertaken by different 
actors. 
The analytical lens provided by the four activities also complements the recent interest in field-
configuring events, as they focus attention on the ongoing incremental activities of organisational field 
formation that surround an event, as well as provide the constituent elements of a field-configuring 
event. As a consequence, the four activities permit an examination of the interactions prior and post a 
field-configuring event to provide insight into the overall dynamics of organisational field formation. 
For instance, the activities prior to a field-configuring event, such as increased contextual or resource 
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activity, have the potential to influence both the likelihood of a field-configuring event, and what impact 
the event itself would have in the overall emergence of an organisational field. The activities post the 
field-configuring event would provide evidence of the impact of the event. The interplay of resource, 
technological, institutional and contextual activities could also provide insight into the dynamics within 
a field-configuring event. As well as occurring prior to a field-configuring event, the four activities will 
continue within it. As such events have a range discursive spaces (Hardy & Maguire, 2010) and rarely 
occur at a single specific moment in time – conferences normally occur over a series of days (c.f. Garud, 
2008) and award giving ceremonies unfold over longer periods (c.f. Anand & Jones, 2008) – the four 
activities potentially provide a lens to tease apart the microprocesses within a particular field-
configuring event. 
The analytic lens provided by the four activities should also enable deeper insight into 
theorisation, legitimation and diffusion processes involved in organisational field formation. For 
instance, as a technological design can also be a cognitive aid that assists ecosystem participant 
understanding and adoption of a technology (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001), understanding the impact of 
a technological design event on theorisation and legitimation processes holds promise. Similarly, as 
financial assets can act as a legitimating factor (DiMaggio, 1988) and can be used to attract others into 
the coalition (Battilana et al., 2009; Garud et al., 2002), understanding the interaction of investment 
events on legitimation, and diffusion processes also holds promse. Furthermore, by widening attention 
from the focal actor to the totality of actors who influence the emergence of a fields, the inclusion of 
resource, technological and contextual activities should enable a more detailed understanding of field 
structuration processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Giddens, 1979; Scott et al., 2000).  
Summarising, the identification of the four activities that drive ecosystem emergence offers 
promise as an analytic lens that assists in research on the mechanisms of organisational field formation. 
Complementing the institutional work conducted by institutional entrepreneurs and field-configuring 
event mechanisms of organisational field formation, the four activities extend analysis to include the 
totality of actors involved in organisational field formation as well as the incremental activities that 
occur around field-configuring events. Furthermore, they hold promise in enabling a deeper 
understanding of the processes of legitimation, theorisation and diffusion involved in organisational 
field formation. 
6.2.3 Powerful central organisations 
The notion of a powerful central organisation represents an attribute of the ecosystem construct 
that is unfamiliar to received theorisations in the organisational field literature. From the beginning of 
managerial and academic interest in ecosystems, a central organising firm has been treated as essential 
to this concept (Autio & Thomas, forthcoming). For instance, although a such an organisation was not 
explicitly highlighted by Moore (1993), his ecosystem nevertheless existed around a powerful focal 
firm as demonstrated by his examples of Ford, GM and Wal-Mart. Iansiti and Levien (2004a, b) 
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explicitly included ‘keystone’ organisations in their conception of ecosystems, and Cusumano and 
Gawer (2002), in their study of platform leadership, also have a powerful organisation at the centre of 
the ecosystem.  
Although institutional theory acknowledges the role of powerful central actors in the field (see 
for instance Scott & Meyer, 1983), in general theorisations of the organisational field have tended to 
eschew close inspection and associated theoretical development of the notion of a powerful central 
organisation. Instead, organisational field research has tended to dwell on the relative power of different 
actors in a field (see for instance Beckert, 2010; Fligstein, 1991; Hardy & Phillips, 1998). More broadly 
within institutional theory, Scott and Meyer (1983), in their notion of ‘societal sector’ consider the level 
of centralisation of the decision making powers as a determinant in the organisation of a societal sector.  
The notion of a powerful central organisation is not new to organisation theory, and many of the 
previous theoretical conceptualisations of central actors are congruent with the notion of a hub firm in 
an ecosystem, and hence have the potential to enrich research and theorising on organisational fields. 
Very early on, Litwak and Hylton (1962) suggested ‘coordinating agencies’ as organisations that 
facilitate the interaction between two or more interdependent formal organisations. Similar to the hub 
firm in an ecosystem, a coordinating agency manages behaviour between participating organisations 
through the communication of pertinent information, adjudicates areas of dispute, provides standards 
of behaviour, and promotes the common interest. Resource dependency theorists also explicitly 
consider the role of a powerful central organisation. For instance, Benson (1975) noted that an 
interorganisational network can consist of a clustering or centring of linkages around one or a few 
mediating or controlling organisations. This central organisation gains its authority from the centrality 
of its functions and critically to the resource acquisition of the other organisations. Echoing notions of 
platforms in ecosystems, he suggests that these controlling organisations derive their power from 
network structures, where, for example, they provide a service that is vital to all or a large number of 
organisations in the network. Astley and Van De Ven (1983) observed that there is a growing dominance 
of big business at the core of interorganisational networks who attempt to construct an artificial social 
environment to ensure immunity from the harsh realities of competition in the natural environment. 
Similar to hub firms in ecosystems, those powerful central organisations exercised their power by 
determining membership access and dictating the terms of exchange (Astley & Van De Ven, 1983; 
Benson, 1975).  
From a collaboration perspective, Trist (1983) introduced the ‘referent organisation’ as one that 
is essential to establishing cooperative links between organisations in turbulent environments (Emery 
& Trist, 1965). A referent organisation regulates the cooperation organisations, setting the ground rules, 
determining the criteria for membership, maintaining the values from which goals and objectives are 
derived, undertaking conflict resolution, and sanctioning activities. In addition the referent organisation 
provides long term direction, as well as infrastructure support such as mobilising resources, sharing 
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information, and developing a network of external relations. Similarly the ‘bridging organisation’ of 
Westley and Vredenburg (1991) is essential to establishing cooperative links between organisations. In 
contrast to the referent organisation, a bridging organisation acts as both broker and agent, entering 
collaborative negotiations to forward their own ends as well as to serve as links (brokers) among domain 
stakeholders. Also from the perspective of collaboration, more recently Phillips et al. (2000) have noted 
that the social processes that constitute a collaboration – the negotiation of membership, definition of 
issues, and standardisation of practices – are enacted in terms and concepts drawn from the institutional 
fields in which the members are located. In doing so the rules may be structured for the continued 
dominance of the originating members as the rules and resources that are most influential in the 
structuring of a collaboration are those drawn from the institutional fields of the dominant members.  
Taken as a whole, these conceptions of central actors in earlier models of the environment in 
organisation theory offer useful theoretical approaches for the inclusion of a powerful central 
organisation in research and theorising on organisational fields. In common across these differing 
conceptions of a powerful central organisation is control over the shared governance system. This 
particularly relates to the power to set the rules of membership (Astley & Van De Ven, 1983; Benson, 
1975; Phillips et al., 2000; Trist, 1983), as well as to dictate the terms of engagement – either though 
control of scarce resources (Astley & Van De Ven, 1983; Benson, 1975), through standardisation of 
activities (Phillips et al., 2000; Trist, 1983), or through conflict resolution and sanctioning activities 
(Trist, 1983). The approaches to a powerful central firm based around collaboration possibly holds the 
most promise given their already explicit acknowledgement of the organisational field and 
consideration of normative and cognitive elements (Phillips et al., 2000). These approaches also align 
with theoretical considerations of ecosystem governance which include the rules and standards that 
cover interactions between the participants, as well as the rules of membership (Adner, 2012; Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2002; Gulati et al., 2012; Iansiti & Levien, 2004a; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011) 
Taken as a whole, these existing approaches to a powerful central organisation provide a useful 
starting point to theoretically develop the notion of a powerful central organisation in research on 
organisational fields. Although more theoretical and empirical development is required, the discussion 
above provides some first steps. 
6.2.4 Technological interdependence 
Institutional theory, and the organisational field construct, has tended to focus on social and 
cultural interdependence, specifically considering cultural elements comprising of both normative and 
cognitive belief systems relevant to the system of organisation (Battilana et al., 2009; Friedland & 
Alford, 1991; Scott, 1983; Scott et al., 2000; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). In contrast, ecosystem research 
has generally focused on the role of technological interdependence, looking to the effects of such 
interdependence on value co-creation (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Iansiti & Levien, 2004a) or the survival 
of niche firms in the ecosystem (Pierce, 2009). However, ecosystem research has also acknowledged 
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that there is social and cultural interdependence, such as involvement in a common enterprise (Adner, 
2012) and the need to gain social acceptability and legitimacy (Adner & Snow, 2010; Gawer & Phillips, 
forthcoming). 
Technological interdependence between participants is not new to organisation theory, and many 
of the previous models of the environment including contingency theory, resource dependency theory 
and organisation ecology have explained the relationships between organisations in terms of 
technological interdependence (see Chapter 2). For instance, both resource dependency theory and 
community ecology argue that symbiosis and co-evolution are driven by the technological 
interdependence of each of the heterogeneous but complementary participants, fusing them into a 
functionally integrated network (Astley & Van De Ven, 1983) or community of populations (Astley, 
1985).  
However, models of the environment from institutional theory other than the organisational field 
hold promise for the introduction of technological interdependence into the organisational field 
construct. For instance, the ‘societal sector’ of Scott and Meyer (1991) specifically differentiates 
between technical and institutional sectors, suggesting that although there is considerable variation 
within each, and that they tend to be negatively correlated to each other, “they are apparently not 
strongly so, so that varying combinations may be observed” (p. 140). However Scott and Meyer’s focus 
is on the effect of these combinations of technological and institutional interdependencies on 
organisational forms. More promisingly, the ‘business system’ of Whitley (1992a, b), does not draw a 
distinction between technological and institutional interdependencies. Instead it focuses on the ways 
that different institutional environments generate different kinds of technical efficiencies but which 
have equally effective value co-creation dynamics.  
Adopting the same approach as Whitley (1992a, b), this suggests that technological 
interdependence can be reintroduced to theorisations of the organisational field. Specifically, an 
organisation field could be characterised by both the production and exchange of goods and services, 
where organisations are rewarded for effective and efficient control of their production systems, and 
also by the elaboration of rules and normative requirements to which individual organisations must 
conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy. This aligns with the notion of an ecosystem 
consisting both of a value-creating network (the production and exchange of goods and services 
characteristic) and a governance system (rules and normative requirements).  
Further theoretical and empirical effort is required to develop technological interdependence 
alongside institutional interdependence in the theorising of the organisational field. However the first 
tentative steps have been sketched out here. 
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6.3 Implications for strategic management practice 
A final implication concerns contributions for strategic management practice. As the locus of 
competition shifts from the firm to the network, the ecosystem is becoming a new referent for 
competitive strategy (Doz & Kosonen, 2008; Gulati et al., 2000; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b; Iyer et al., 
2006; Moore, 1993; Normann & Ramirez, 1993), and, as a consequence, managers are seeking to gain 
strategic edge over rivals through the promotion and facilitation of their ecosystems. As I have shown 
that there exist three phases of emergence, and that ecosystem emergence processes exhibit unique, 
distinct idiosyncrasies depending on their evolving logic of value co-creation and appropriation, a 
number of areas of managerial guidance suggest themselves.  
For industry practitioners, a core insight is that by understanding emergent value processes, it 
may be possible to understand, perhaps even anticipate, phases and challenges in ecosystem emergence. 
Much prescriptive writing tends to focus on providing generalised models, often called ‘best practices’, 
which industry practitioners can adopt and adapt to their specific organisational context. However the 
importance of the evolving logic of value in ecosystem contexts suggests that following generalised 
best practices blindly may not be advisable. My results suggest that understanding the particular logic 
of value co-creation in the ecosystem may assist industry practitioners in understanding, if not 
anticipating, some of the challenges they may have. For instance, the experience of eBay and Wikipedia 
where the some (or all) governance process was opened up to ecosystem participants, suggests that 
those practitioners who do the same should anticipate high levels of contestation between the hub firm 
and the participants. Furthermore, although this research has not compared the emergence sequence of 
ecosystems that have similar logics of value co-creation, these results suggest to managers that perhaps 
they should first look to ecosystems with similar logics of value co-creation for guidance.  
It is also important for industry practitioners to recognise that successful ecosystem evolution 
processes exhibit distinct phases, each characterised by distinct challenges and arenas of activity. This 
suggests that managers need to be flexible and prepared to shift their focus according to the migrating 
foci of activity during ecosystem evolution. The original four stage model of Moore (1993) suggested 
a collection of cooperative and competitive challenges in each stage that a hub firm in an ecosystem 
needs to address. The current findings extend this by suggesting particular combinations of activities a 
manager needs to consider alongside these challenges. For instance, in the Initiation phase, as well as 
emphasising the activities to provide the technology that underpins value co-creation, these results 
suggest that institutional activities, such as the establishment of rules of engagement and membership, 
need to commence almost immediately if there is to be participant involvement in the management of 
the ecosystem. Similarly, for the Momentum phase, these results suggest to managers that they should 
pay greater attention to those contextual activities that enable socio-political and cognitive legitimacy 
both within the ecosystem and wider society to ensure their dominance.  
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A tool that could be of significant use to industry practitioners is the ‘ecosystem model’. Given 
that value co-creation and value appropriation occur at fundamentally different levels of analysis, the 
ecosystem model complements the insight gained through the use of the business model. A business 
model is a tool by which a manager can determine how they will create, deliver and capture value at 
their firm level (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010). In contrast, the ecosystem model gives managers a tool 
through which they can understand the dynamics of the wider ecosystem in which they reside. It should 
provide managers within insight into the overall value co-created, their contribution to that value co-
creation, and how the value is being shared. Furthermore, it should permit managers to identify and 
manage tensions between their business model and the ecosystem model. In a nutshell, the ecosystem 
model enables both sensemaking and strategic planning within the ecosystem where their organisation 
operates. 
A final insight for industry practitioners is the salience of the cognitive and normative structures, 
in addition to regulatory structures, that both shape an emerging ecosystem and which characterise an 
existing ecosystem. Contrasting with the current prescriptive ecosystem literature that has focused on 
technological interdependence (Adner, 2006) or the steps for getting the different sides of a multi-sided 
market on-board (Hagiu & Eisenmann, 2007), these results suggest that managers should also pay 
attention to how potential and existing ecosystem participants think about their ecosystem. Specifically, 
this thesis suggests that managers should focus on building a common identity for ecosystem 
participants, as well as encourage the development of reinforcing normative behaviours, in order to 
shape the emergence of the ecosystem in their favour.  
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the implications of the theoretical arguments and empirical findings 
from earlier chapters. One set of implications concerns the impact of the empirical findings and the 
development of an institutional approach to ecosystem research. These include the empirical validation 
of existing theories of ecosystem emergence, an extension of our understanding of ecosystem 
emergence processes, the consideration that ecosystem emergence should be considered equifinal, the 
development of the ‘ecosystem model’, and additional insight of ecosystem dynamics and boundaries. 
A second collection of implications considers the impact of the empirical findings and the development 
of an institutional research on institutional theory, and theorisations of the organisational field in 
particular. These include empirical validation of a number of models of institutional formation, the 
direction of analytical attention towards the processes that drive institutional formation, the 
development of a novel analytic lens for the mechanisms of organisational field formation, and the 
theoretical development of powerful central organisations and technological interdependence as new 
aspects of organisational fields. A final implication, and by extension an additional contribution of this 
thesis, relates to strategic management practice.  
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The following chapter concludes the thesis, outlining contributions, limitations and future 
directions. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
This thesis has addressed the processes of ecosystem emergence, an area of ecosystem research 
that has not been well investigated. To do so, I have investigated ecosystem emergence both 
theoretically and empirically in the context of six digital service ecosystems. Theoretically, I have 
developed an institutional approach to ecosystems, arguing in Chapter 2 that an ecosystem is an 
organisational field, distinguished from other organisational fields through its analytic focus on value 
co-creation. In Chapter 3, synthesising dominant design theory, social movement theory and 
institutional entrepreneurship theory, I have proposed four activities – organisational, technological, 
institutional and contextual – that drive ecosystem emergence. Chapter 4 expounded the process 
methodology, detailing the data collection, event colligation, optimal matching, direct inspection, 
frequency analysis and statistical boot-strapping techniques. Empirically, Chapter 5 revealed that the 
emergence sequence of an ecosystem is unique to the ecosystem and that there are three phases of 
emergence – Initiation, Momentum, Control. The first of these phases is similar across cases, however 
subsequent phases then exhibit increasing differences as the ecosystem emerges. To explain these 
findings I argued that idiosyncratic logics of value co-creation and path dependency result in dissimilar 
emergence sequences. Chapter 6 discusses the implications of both the theoretical and empirical 
contributions on ecosystem research, institutional theory, and strategic management practice. 
Specifically considering the important role of the logic of value co-creation on ecosystem evolution, I 
discuss how the close relationship between value co-creation and appropriation in ecosystem contexts 
requires an ‘ecosystem model’ – the rationale of how an ecosystem co-creates, delivers and shares value. 
7.1 Contributions 
The primary contribution of this thesis is the development of an ecosystem perspective that 
explicitly integrates value co-creation processes as an important regulator of the evolution of 
ecosystems. Emerging from the unexpected finding of significant differences between the emergence 
sequences of each case – the success bias in the case selection and the restricted context of digital 
services would suggest that there would be similarities – the emphasis on the logic of value co-creation 
extends our understanding of factors that influence ecosystem processes. In particular, by demonstrating 
that differing logics of value co-creation result in differing processes, differences in ecosystem 
evolution can be explained by reference to their idiosyncratic logics of value co-creation. This moves 
the locus of discussion of value co-creation in ecosystem contexts from interdependencies between 
participants (c.f. Adner, 2012; Adner & Kapoor, 2010) to value co-creation itself, introducing 
institutional factors such as the regulative, normative and cognitive structures in ecosystems. Moreover, 
the importance of the logics of value co-creation highlights that value appropriated must first be co-
created in ecosystem contexts. Demonstrated empirically through the increase in dissimilarity in Phase 
III as value appropriation and control is applied, this suggests that value creation and value 
appropriation need to be considered holistically in ecosystem contexts. Extending the value co-creation 
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oriented ecosystem perspective, I proposed the ‘ecosystem model’ as an analytic tool to better 
conceptualise value co-creation and appropriation in ecosystems. Defined as the stable configuration of 
value, technological, participant and institutional attributes that jointly define ecosystem value co-
creation and distribution, an ecosystem model is the rationale of how an ecosystem creates, delivers and 
shares value. The ecosystem model promises more systematic future research into ecosystem dynamics. 
The importance of value co-creation processes for ecosystem evolution is further emphasised by 
the finding that ecosystem emergence exhibits distinct phases that link to form a coherent whole when 
considered from the perspective of value co-creation. The finding of three phases of ecosystem 
emergence itself contributes through supporting and extending existing ecosystem emergence and 
institutional formation models, providing a useful empirical verification of process models that to date 
have not been extensively validated. In particular, the three phases of emergence are congruent with the 
ecosystem emergence model of Moore (1993), and process models from dominant design (for instance 
Suarez, 2004), social movement theory for instance Davis and McAdam (2000) and institutional 
entrepreneurship (for instance Greenwood et al., 2002; Hinings et al., 2004). In doing so it focuses 
analytic attention on the emergence processes as distinct to the conditions that lead to ecosystem 
emergence. Combined with path dependency, the logic of value co-creation links these phases together 
by explaining the increasing dissimilarity between cases from one phase to the next. Specifically, in the 
first phase, when the logics of value co-creation are nascent, there are similarities due to the common 
requirements of resource gathering and the technological development of the digital service. However, 
driven by path dependence, in the second phase the idiosyncratic logics of value co-creation are 
extended and embedded, and in the third phase idiosyncratic value appropriation and control imposed, 
resulting in increasing dissimilarities in the event sequences of each case. As a consequence, an 
ecosystem perspective that focuses on value co-creation processes has the potential to shed further light 
on ecosystem evolution. 
The importance of value co-creation processes in ecosystem evolution also suggests that 
comparisons of ecosystems that seek to understand commonalities in the underlying process motors 
(Van De Ven & Poole, 1995) should be of ecosystems with similar logics of value co-creation, not of 
collections of ecosystems that utilise the same type of technology. Underlining the role of information 
and communication technologies as general purpose technologies, this implies that ecosystem studies 
which use samples selected for their adoption and utilisation of such technologies (such as ‘digital 
services’) may be more heterogeneous than researchers realise. Methodologically, this also indicates 
that notions of equilibrium and linearity are not suitable for the investigation of the dynamics of 
ecosystems, as value co-creation is non-linear (Moore, 1996; Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996; 
Normann & Ramirez, 1994). Instead, ideas such as complex adaptive systems, self-organising networks 
and autocatalytic feedback may be preferable to understanding the emergence and dynamics of 
ecosystems (Anderson, 1999; Meyer et al., 2005).  
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The development of an institutional approach to ecosystems contributes to ecosystem research. 
Further underlining the importance of value co-creation in ecosystem contexts, I have argued that an 
ecosystem has value co-creation as its recognised area of institutional life, differentiating it from other 
facets of the organisational field which have either a common industry, technology, issue or market as 
their recognised area of institutional life. Although not the first study to take an institutional approach 
(see for instance Gawer & Phillips, forthcoming; Meyer et al., 2005; Muegge & Grant, 2013), this is 
the first to theoretically link the ecosystem construct with theorisations of the organisational field. By 
taking an institutional approach, focus is directed to the processes of legitimacy building, identity 
construction and the structuring of institutional logic within the ecosystem. More specifically, an 
institutional approach directs attention towards the regulatory, normative and cognitive elements of 
ecosystems, as well as the dynamics of power, contestation and accommodation (Scott, 2008). This 
institutional approach is in sharp distinction to existing approaches to ecosystems which have emanated 
primarily from the strategy literature. Although researchers have started to consider legitimacy aspects 
(see for instance Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; Gawer & Phillips, forthcoming; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b), 
ecosystem research generally has taken theoretical perspectives that emphasise technologically 
interdependent networked organisations, such as value co-creation, network embeddedness and 
network management (Autio & Thomas, forthcoming). 
The synthesis of dominant design, social movement and institutional entrepreneurship theories 
to derive four activities that drive ecosystem emergence – resource, technology, institutional and 
contextual activities – contributes to our understanding of the mechanisms of organisational field 
formation as they address multiple levels of analysis and multiple actors. This is in contrast to existing 
concepts such as that of institutional work, which focuses attention on the human action in institutional 
change (Jepperson, 1991; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), and field-configuring events, which are specific 
mechanisms that bring together actors and relationships to configure organisational fields at particular 
points in time (Anand & Jones, 2008; Lampel & Meyer, 2008; Meyer et al., 2005). Although similar to 
both institutional work and field-configuring events, in that they link organisational field evolution at 
the macro level with individual action at the micro level (Lampel & Meyer, 2008; Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006; Meyer et al., 2005), these four activities widen the analytic focus to encompass the activities of 
the totality of institutional actors, including institutional entrepreneurs, as well as to ongoing 
incremental activities that shape organisational field formation, including field-configuring events. The 
analytic lens afforded by these four activities should permit deeper insight into theorisation, legitimation 
and diffusion processes, as well as a more detailed understanding of organisational field structuration 
processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Giddens, 1979; Scott et al., 2000). 
The innovative use of optimal matching contributes methodologically. In management research, 
although optimal matching has been proposed at various times as a useful method for process research 
(see for instance, Abbott, 1990b; Langley, 1999; Poole et al., 2000), it has not been widely adopted. 
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Where it has been adopted it has tended to follow similar applications to sociology, such as to the 
analysis of career paths (see for instance Biemann et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2007; Joseph et al., 2012). 
Other applications of the technique have tended to focus on organisational processes, such as 
information system implementation (Saberwhal & Robey, 1993), product development (Salvato, 2009), 
and acquisition and alliance behaviours (Shi & Prescott, 2011). Therefore, a minor methodological 
contribution is successfully demonstrating the application of optimal matching to sequences of events 
at the interorganisational level of analysis. The more significant contribution however, is the 
development of the statistical bootstrapping technique that enables a limited number of sequences to be 
compared in a statistically meaningful way. Prior to this research, optimal matching as a technique was 
not utilised alone, but was paired with cluster analysis so that groups of sequences could be identified 
(see for instance Biemann et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2007; Joseph et al., 2012; Saberwhal & Robey, 
1993; Salvato, 2009; Shi & Prescott, 2011). This was necessary because although a single distance 
provides a numerical value of the dissimilarity between any two sequences, the real meaning of this 
value has remained obscure (Poole et al., 2000). As a consequence optimal matching was only viable 
when there was a large enough sample of sequences that could provide statistically significant results 
from cluster analysis. This has meant that optimal matching has not been available for comparisons of 
a limited number of sequences, except where there is a model or ideal sequence, perhaps from prior 
research or theory, to which each sequence can be compared to gauge their relative fit (Poole et al., 
2000). The bootstrapping method of randomising each sequence 10,000 times while maintaining the 
same code frequency, calculating the distance for each random sequence, and determining the mean 
and standard deviation of these 10,000 distances, provides a method for meaningful comparisons 
between limited numbers of sequences. This methodological innovation should permit the wider 
application of a promising sequence analysis technique. 
A final contribution is to strategic management practice. With the locus of competition shifting 
from the firm to the network, the ecosystem is becoming a new referent for competitive strategy (Doz 
& Kosonen, 2008; Gulati et al., 2000; Iansiti & Levien, 2004b; Iyer et al., 2006; Moore, 1993; Normann 
& Ramirez, 1993), and, as a consequence, managers are seeking to gain strategic edge over rivals 
through the promotion and facilitation of their ecosystems. For industry practitioners, a core insight is 
that by understanding emergent value processes, it may be possible to understand, perhaps even 
anticipate, phases and challenges in ecosystem emergence. These results also recognise that successful 
ecosystem emergence processes exhibit distinct phases, each characterised by distinct challenges and 
arenas of activity. This suggests that industry practitioners need to be flexible and prepared to shift their 
focus according to the migrating foci of activity during ecosystem evolution. A tool that could be of 
significant use to industry practitioners is the ‘ecosystem model’. Given that value co-creation and value 
appropriation occur on fundamentally different levels of analysis, but that they need to be considered 
holistically, the ecosystem model complements the insight gained through the use of the business model. 
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A final insight for industry practitioners is the salience of the cognitive and normative structures, in 
addition to regulatory structures, that shape an emerging ecosystem and which characterise an 
ecosystem.  
7.2 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations of this empirical research. To begin, it considers ecosystems in 
digital service contexts and as a consequence these results may not be generalisable beyond internet-
based businesses. However within digital service contexts these results are salient, as they encompass 
a heterogeneous sample of digital service ecosystems. Further, with the continuous diffusion of ICT 
across industry sectors and the associated spread in the use of platform strategies, it is feasible that 
generalisability may increase.  
Another limitation is that the success bias in the cases may have painted a subjective picture of 
ecosystem emergence. Success bias is particularly difficult to avoid in these situations, as in most cases 
ecosystem (and related digital service) failure events are not well documented to enable archival 
research. Indeed, to gather enough empirical detail to include an ecosystem failure the researcher must 
be lucky enough to be following the ecosystem emergence in real time. It is not anticipated that the 
success bias in the cases has resulted in a biased picture of the results. For instance, the claim of 
equifinality runs counter to the sort of bias which would be expected, namely the recognition of similar 
processes across the cases. Instead the results seem to indicate that emergence processes are more path 
dependent and uniquely evolutionary. 
There are also a number of methodological limitations. First, data collection techniques mean 
that only a sample of the possible events was identified; as such the analysed sequences are incomplete. 
Furthermore, each sample gathered was not random as the majority of the data sources considered the 
context of the hub firm and not the ecosystem. This may have potentially biased the results towards 
the digital service and hub firm in terms of the quantity of incidents and events that have been recorded 
and collected. As such the sequence data may represent the ecosystem emergence as seen from the 
perspective of the hub firm. This is not considered to be an issue as the possible bias applies to all 
cases and any cross-case comparison would still be valid. 
A further methodological technique relates to incident extraction, event colligation and event 
coding. The reduction of narrative to sequences which are then coded means that all other elements of 
narrative structure are systematically removed. Although this enhances generalisation, it excludes 
those other features that are required to create rich narrative explanations (Pentland, 1999). A related 
limitation concerns the fact that each event is treated equally in importance, meaning that minor events 
have the same effect on the sequence as one which was game-changing. Thus the impact of potential 
field-configuring events has been removed from the data. These methodological techniques are 
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necessary to apply optimal matching and frequency analysis, but can be addressed through the 
application of other process techniques, some of which are detailed below. 
7.3 Future research 
A number of areas warrant further research, both theoretical and empirical. Despite the 
importance of value co-creation as the recognised area of institutional life, and the importance of the 
logic of value co-creation in ecosystem emergence, forcefully illustrated by the empirical results here, 
the majority of research literature to date has not directly considered value co-creation and 
appropriation, or the more nuanced perspective of fair value appropriation. Adner and Kapoor (2010) 
have explicitly and empirically linked value creation and value capture within ecosystem contexts, 
although they are perhaps the only to have done so to date. In this thesis, I have begun to develop a 
more holistic and rigorous consideration of value co-creation, delivery and capture with the suggestion 
of the ecosystem model. Given the importance of the co-creation and the fair appropriation of value in 
ecosystem contexts, further development of the ecosystem model, and a more coherent and detailed 
formulation of value creation logics in the same style as Doz and Hamel (1998) for alliance contexts, 
would aid both academic and practitioner understanding.  
The adoption of other organisation theory approaches to understand ecosystems also holds 
promise for future research. Indeed, as many approaches that have been labelled institutional have 
implicitly been organisational ecology and resource dependency arguments clothed in the language of 
institutionalism (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008), an analysis of ecosystems using these arguments may 
indeed be fruitful. For instance, the focus on technological interdependence in ecosystem contexts 
underscores the salience of resource dependency theory logics to ecosystem research (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). In ecosystems all participants, including the hub firm, are dependent on each other for 
the co-creation of value, and also jointly dependent on the environment external to the ecosystem. 
Although the types of control strategies that are used in ecosystems are being systematically analysed 
in the strategy (see for instance Gulati et al., 2012; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011) and industrial 
economics literature (see for instance Boudreau & Hagiu, 2009), a resource dependency view which 
incorporates the influences of multiple dependencies on an ecosystem participant could shed light on 
these interdependencies. Similarly, given the importance of participant diversity in ecosystem contexts 
(Iansiti & Levien, 2004a), an organisational ecology approach (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) could 
provide a useful lens to study homogeneity and heterogeneity in ecosystems contexts. For example, the 
application of a variation and selection logic driven by technical interdependence has the potential to 
shed light on participant heterogeneity. Furthermore, this approach could enable an analysis of the 
dynamics of participant symbiosis, providing a framework to consider the process of how new 
populations branch out from established ones to take advantage of new ecosystem niches. An 
investigation of ecosystem participant and hub firm ‘fit’ in an ecosystem holds intriguing possibilities. 
For example, Pierce (2009) has outlined how the decisions of a hub firm can have varied repercussions 
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on the organisations that participate in the niches. Taking the perspective of the niche firm, the insights 
from contingency and configurational theories may be able to provide an understanding of the 
challenges that such niche organisations face. Are there particular strategies or structures a niche firm 
should adopt in ecosystem contexts? Are there ideal configurations for a niche firm? How do these vary 
across different ecosystem models? 
Empirically, research into the processes of ecosystem creation, as distinct to emergence, also 
holds promise. Rather than considering how complex systems arise out of a set of relatively simple 
interactions, research into ecosystem creation considers the actions and strategies through which a hub 
firm constructs an ecosystem. A fruitful approach is to re-code the event data of each case identifying 
the primary actor of each event. For instance, the release of a new feature on the digital service would 
be coded as a hub firm event, while a critical article in the media would be coded as a broader 
environment event. This coding is applied multifunctionally, such that an alliance would be coded 
twice; once for the hub firm and a second time for the other actor in the broader environment. Both 
optimal matching and frequency analysis can then be applied to determine if there are similarities or 
dissimilarities between the emergence sequences of each case. Appendix G presents the early results of 
the optimal matching analysis. These results provide further support for the findings of this thesis, 
finding dissimilarities in the majority of the case-pairs in the comparison of the complete sequences, as 
well as validation of the phase identification. Furthermore, these early results also support the finding 
of similarities in the emergence sequences in the Initiation phase, which then become dissimilar in the 
Momentum phase and which become even more dissimilar in the Control phase. However there are 
some interesting differences between this analysis and the one within this thesis – such as an overall 
increased level of similarity and significances which do not occur in the original analyses – that require 
further research. Appendix H, presenting the early results of the moving average frequency analysis, an 
offers an intriguing insight into the dynamics of interaction between the hub firm and its broader 
environment. This analysis suggests that there is a cycle of heightened activity by the hub firm and 
followed by heightened activity in the broader environment. More research is required to further 
investigate these emerging findings. 
Other narrative explanation process methodologies could also provide insight into the emergence 
processes of the six cases. Beyond phasic analysis, other techniques include Markov analyses and, given 
the findings of equifinality and the influence of the logic of value co-creation, time series non-linear 
analysis (Anderson, 1999). Markov analyses, if analytically possible, would enable the investigation of 
particular patterns of activities to infer differing underlying process motors within each phase, such as 
teleological, lifecycle, evolutionary or dialectic mechanisms (Van De Ven & Poole, 1995). If the event 
sequence pattern appears random, then non-linear time series analysis could enable greater insight into 
the emergence sequence both at the level of the full sequence and within each phase, identifying periodic 
(stable equilibria), chaotic (strange attractors), white noise (truly random) or coloured noise (plotted as 
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a negative power law characteristic of a punctuated equilibrium process) dynamic patterns (Dooley & 
Van De Ven, 1999). In the event there is a non-linear change pattern, such as chaotic or pink noise, 
there is also the possibility of modelling the underlying process using an NK(C) approach (Kauffman, 
1993). A more detailed approach could utilise the sub-categories of each of the four activity types (see 
Appendix A). Phasic analyses and the process methodologies mentioned above could be reapplied at 
this more granular level of coding to provide further insight. Overall, future process research should be 
able to provide a finer grained understanding of the dynamics within each phase, such as theoretically 
suggested by Suarez (2004) and Hinings et al. (2004). 
Research into the ecosystem failure cases could also provide further insight into the processes of 
ecosystem emergence. Although the gathering of data can be difficult for failure cases, in the event that 
data became available, a comparative analysis of failure cases with the six cases analysed in this thesis 
has the potential to validate and extend the findings of this thesis. For instance, an analysis of the code 
frequency in each phase could provide insight into the salience of particular activities at particular 
phases of ecosystem emergence, and whether the lack, or too much, of certain activities influenced the 
success or failure of a case. Moreover, an analysis of the emergence and embedding (or lack of) of the 
logics of value co-creation of the failure case and comparison with those of a successful ecosystem has 
the potential to shed light on how the logic of value co-creation evolves in an ecosystem. Furthermore, 
direct inspection of failure cases could provide the means to identify and analyse the key decisions that 
differentiated between success and failure. 
The adoption of a discursive approach to understanding ecosystem evolution would also be 
rewarding. Discourse analysis provides an alternative coherent framework for the analysis of the 
processes of institutional and field formation, investigating the relationships among texts, discourse, 
institutions and action (Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Phillips et al., 2004). Discourse analysis is particularly 
salient in ecosystem contexts as it is not necessarily the nature of the technology that is important, but 
instead the degree of meaning the technology has and its level of embeddedness in the regular routines 
of participants (Munir & Phillips, 2005). For instance, the continued commercial success of Google is 
driven by cognitive adoption, so that there is confidence in, and the embeddedness of, the search service 
into consumers’ daily habits, and not just the quality of the technology and search results. Given the 
quantity of texts available, the accessibility of digital discourse, and the transparency of institutions and 
actions in the post-industrial economy, a discursive approach could be a rewarding methodological 
approach to further insight into the emergence processes of ecosystems. 
A further avenue of future research is analysing the emergence of ecosystems through the lens of 
field-configuring events (Lampel & Meyer, 2008). All cases examined in this thesis had conference 
events (Garud, 2008), award ceremony events (Anand & Jones, 2008; Anand & Watson, 2004), or both. 
The limitations of the research design meant that these events were treated as having an equal impact 
as any other. Given that the literature on field-configuring events suggests that these events should be 
171 
given a special emphasis, a potentially fertile avenue would be to single out specific events as field-
configuring, and analyse the dynamics on either side of them. A comparative analysis of the sequence 
patterns on either side of a number of field-configuring events may provide sufficient empirical data to 
enable searching for other field-configuring events that are either unknown or were not recognised as 
such. Alternatively this type of analysis may enable an appreciation of the field dynamics that lead to 
the field-configuring event, a more nuanced understanding of the activities within the field-configuring 
event, and more detailed insight into how it changed the emergence dynamics of the ecosystem. 
Further operationalisation of the ecosystem as an organisational field would also be useful. To 
begin, the four activities of ecosystem emergence have been operationalised to some extent, both 
through the retroductive derivation of the sub-activities and the empirical identification of specific 
examples of each (see Appendix A). However the activities have been operationalised for a process 
methodology based on narrative explanation, and it is possible that this operationalisation would not be 
viable for a variance approach. Moreover, these activities have been synthesised for the purpose of 
ecosystem emergence, and there is no certainty that they would constitute all the dimensions for an 
analysis of existing ecosystem change, maintenance or decline. As such, further operationalisation 
would be useful for additional fruitful empirical research.  
Given that an ecosystem is a network of organisations, research into the network itself could also 
be a productive approach (see for instance, Ginsberg et al., 2010). One approach would be to analyse 
the tangible pattern of organisational ties, an approach which has generally considered first order ties 
to a focal firm (see for instance, Adner & Kapoor, 2010). This approach has potential issues as it is 
difficult to move beyond first order ties in ecosystem contexts given the scope and porous nature of 
ecosystem boundaries (Gulati et al., 2012). However, through the consideration of an ecosystem as an 
organisational field, a more rewarding approach may be that of Hoffman (1999), who suggests that 
organisational field structures can be analytically detected through observing an increase in 
organisational interaction, an increase in the shared information load they share and the development 
of mutual awareness that they are involved in a common dialogue. 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, this thesis has investigated the emergence of ecosystems, a topic within ecosystem 
research that has not been well examined to date. Theoretically, I have developed an institutional 
approach to ecosystems, arguing that an ecosystem is an organisational field, and theorised four 
activities that drive ecosystem emergence. Empirically I have found that emergence sequences of 
ecosystems are significantly dissimilar, but that there are three phases of emergence. I also found that 
the sequences are similar in the first phase, but then there is increasing dissimilarity as each phase 
unfolds. I have emphasised the importance of the logic of value co-creation in ecosystem contexts, and 
proposed the ‘ecosystem model’ as the rationale of how an ecosystem creates, delivers and shares value. 
172 
Theoretically and empirically this research contributes to our understanding of ecosystems, 
organisational fields and process methodologies. It also provides practitioner guidance. I hope that these 
findings will inspire fellow researchers to further investigate why and how ecosystems emerge. 
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9 APPENDICES 
9.1 Appendix A – Event coding categories 
 
Activity Type Sub-Activity Example activities 
Resource Corporate • Formation activities 
• Governance activities, such as board elections, committee elections, Annual 
General Meetings, Publication of annual reports and account balances 
• Ownership activities, such as equity distribution, shareholder agreements, 
share splits 
 Financial • Incoming funding activities, such as angel investors, VCs, IPO, donations, in 
kind and in cash 
• Debt related activities, such as guarantees, loans, debt issuance 
 Competence • Personnel activities, such as hiring / firing, promotions, leadership changes, 
training and development and certification of competence  
• Capability development or enhancement activities, such as hiring of specialist 
supplier firms, such as advertising or law firms, outsourcing of a function to a 
specialist provider, creation of a new team within the hub firm, restructuring of 
teams within the hub firm 
 Appropriation • Acquisitions 
• Divestments 
• Investments 
 Coalition • Activities relating to alliance and partnerships, such as establishment, 
extension, re-affirmation, negotiation, failure 
• Activities relating to the licensing of core technologies 
 Infrastructure • Technological infrastructure activities, such as data centres, hardware, such as 
servers, load balancing and failsafe software 
• Software selection, such as database or coding technology 
• Internet provision 
 Litigation • Legal activities by courts, such as injunctions, countersuits, settlements  
Technological Design • Research and development activities, such as researching similar services, 
writing the code, testing 
• Technological feature activities, such as new and changed features, API 
release, toolkits, customisation suites, wireless access, offline access 
• Graphic design activities, such as fonts, logos, naming, site layout, (e.g., new 
sections, stores, etc.) 
 Delivery • Technological performance activities, such as system launch, system down, 
limited functionality, hacks and security breaches, bugs and issues, malicious 
and troublesome activity, such as vandalism 
• Day-to-day service delivery activities, such as data acquisition, (e.g., creation, 
crawling, access, preparation, loading, indexing), data provision, (e.g., 
performance metrics, data dumps, CDs and DVDs), inflow of merchandise 
(stock and goods), outflow of merchandise stock and goods , e.g., packing and 
delivery 
• Customer and technical support activities, such as fraud monitoring and 
control, product returns 
 International • Internationalisation activities, such as translations to other languages, launch in 
non-US country domains (e.g., .co.uk, .co.jp, .de, etc.), support of non-US 
currencies (e.g., Yen, Sterling, Euro, etc.) 
Institutional Rules • Rules and policies of use, such as of coordination, behaviour, operation, 
contracts 
• Standard setting activities, such as joining boards or committees 
• Ecosystem governance activities, such as committees, elections, voting and 
polls, surveys, ratification, sanctions 
 Support • Support program activities, such as mailing lists support, alliance and 
partnership programs, loyalty programs, support websites and services, peered 
data centre provision, incubators, grant programs 
Activity Type Sub-Activity Example activities 
• Educational activities, such as seminar and lectures, ‘University’ like 
operations, guidelines, manuals and cheat-sheets, publication of ‘How-to’ 
books 
 Pricing • Pricing activities, such as establishment of pricing, making free, pricing 
changes, discounting activities, commissions and bonuses 
 Membership • Limited access such as beta, previews, locations 
• General availability of the service 
• Opening up to new markets 
 Promotional • Marketing and PR activities, such a press releases that promote the service or 
ecosystem, promotional linking between sites 
• Launch of marketing only website, branded items (e.g., t-shirts, pens, pagers, 
credit cards, etc.), attendance at 3rd party conferences 
• Sales activities, such as strategies, pitches, commissions 
• Indexing by search engines 
 Discourse • Outreach activities with ecosystem members, such as conferences, feature 
proposals, focus groups, product reviews, user testing  
• Dialogue with Competitors 
• Word of mouth marketing and testimonials 
• Response to changes in ecosystem parameters 
• Dialogue between members of ecosystem 
 Identity • Cognitive activities, such as trust and credibility, sense of ownership, 
emotional connection, ecosystem and service positioning, sense of 
appreciation, emergence of ‘cult’ artefacts 
• Participation activities, such as contests and competitions, education, 
conferences, unique traditions (ceremonies and practices), advisory and 
governance boards, administration and feedback, calls to action and action 
requests, naming and issuing of awards 
Contextual Discourse (Press) • Press 
• Blogs 
• Television and radio 
• Financial analysts 
• Other commentators 
 Discourse 
(Society) 
• Entering the general lexicon 
• Becoming more generally ‘known’ 
• Release of books and magazines 
• Academic research 
• Medical diagnosis 
• Referencing in Art  
 Accolades • Industry awards, such as certification from a market participant, industry 
awards, individuals awarded accolades  
• High profile adoption, such as by prestigious stakeholders, invitation to Davos 
or other high profile conferences 
• Demonstrations of achievement and value, such as Longevity and/or scale 
(including surpassing competitors), tangible public demand for the services 
(e.g., access sold on eBay), proficiency with ecosystem services recognised as 
a skill 
 Regulatory • Activities of government, regulators and powerful actors, such as rules or 
legislation (proposal, enactment or retraction), official investigations, offers of 
collaboration by regulators, blocking of access 
• Activities by courts, such as favourable or unfavourable decisions 
 Competition • Service design and delivery 
• Resource acquisition 
• Acquisition activities 
• Litigation activities 
 
 
  
191 
9.2 Appendix B – Means and standard deviations 
 
Table 25 – Complete sequence optimal matching comparison mean and standard deviation 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay 0.625 
(0.011) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook 0.662 
(0.011) 
0.775 
(0.013) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google 0.675 
(0.011) 
0.723 
(0.012) 
0.664 
(0.013) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce 0.759 
(0.010) 
0.633 
(0.009) 
0.756 
(0.009) 
0.785 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia 0.747 
(0.011) 
0.666 
(0.009) 
0.664 
(0.010) 
0.703 
(0.010) 
0.699 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: The top number is the mean and the number in parentheses is the standard deviation. 
 
Table 26 – Within case cross phase comparison mean and standard deviation 
Amazon  eBay 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III   Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
   Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Phase II 0.774 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  Phase II 0.829 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Phase III 0.706 
(0.011) 
0.639 
(0.017) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 Phase III 0.644 
(0.035) 
0.702 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Facebook  Google 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III   Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
   Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Phase II 0.749 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  Phase II 0.796 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Phase III 0.663 
(0.036) 
0.682 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 Phase III 0.659 
(0.033) 
0.702 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Salesforce  Wikipedia 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III   Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
   Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Phase II 0.897 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  Phase II 0.808 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Phase III 0.620 
(0.038) 
0.815 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 Phase III 0.630 
(0.023) 
0.651 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: The top number is the mean and the number in parentheses is the standard deviation. 
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Table 27 – Phase I optimal matching case comparison mean and standard deviation 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay 0.669 
(0.048) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook 0.783 
(0.056) 
0.736 
(0.057) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google 0.760 
(0.053) 
0.736 
(0.059) 
0.739 
(0.050) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce 0.712 
(0.060) 
0.724 
(0.072) 
0.778 
(0.067) 
0.797 
(0.069) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia 0.787 
(0.057) 
 
0.703 
(0.053) 
0.759 
(0.055) 
0.770 
(0.057) 
0.655 
(0.049) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: The top number is the mean and the number in parentheses is the standard deviation. 
Table 28 – Phase II optimal matching case comparison mean and standard deviation 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay 0.681 
(0.020) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook 0.705 
(0.020) 
0.794 
(0.024) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google 0.715 
(0.019) 
0.735 
(0.020) 
0.658 
(0.017) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce 0.703 
(0.016) 
0.642 
(0.013) 
0.738 
(0.015) 
0.758 
(0.016) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia 0.713 
(0.018) 
0.673 
(0.016) 
0.668 
(0.016) 
0.716 
(0.018) 
0.668 
(0.016) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: The top number is the mean and the number in parentheses is the standard deviation. 
Table 29 – Phase III optimal matching case comparison mean and standard deviation 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay 0.660 
(0.015) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook 0.671 
(0.018) 
0.792 
(0.051) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google 0.662 
(0.019) 
0.760 
(0.047) 
0.714 
(0.038) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce 0.668 
(0.017) 
0.711 
(0.049) 
0.840 
(0.057) 
0.822 
(0.055) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia 0.676 
(0.024) 
0.687 
(0.033) 
0.679 
(0.031) 
0.704 
(0.033) 
0.634 
(0.028) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: The top number is the mean and the number in parentheses is the standard deviation. 
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Table 30 – Phase I code frequency comparison mean and standard deviation 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Resource 27.60% 
(4.611) 
25.37% 
(5.537) 
18.35% 
(3.900) 
22.48% 
(4.325) 
15.27% 
(4.457) 
7.02% 
(2.532) 
Technology 25.00% 
(4.490) 
18.25% 
(4.790) 
34.61% 
(4.788) 
33.30% 
(4.957) 
11.95% 
(4.073) 
29.59% 
(4.586) 
Institutional 30.71% 
(4.725) 
43.05% 
(6.190) 
23.55% 
(4.274) 
22.64% 
(4.386) 
52.59% 
(6.191) 
40.49% 
(4.928) 
Context 16.68% 
(3.842) 
13.34% 
(4.264) 
23.50% 
(4.226) 
21.58% 
(4.292) 
20.19% 
(5.038) 
22.90% 
(4.163) 
Note: The number is parentheses is the standard deviation; this may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
Table 31 – Phase II code frequency comparison mean and standard deviation 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Resource 27.57% 
(1.594) 
25.34% 
(1.371) 
18.28% 
(1.325) 
22.44% 
(1.251) 
15.18% 
(0.711) 
7.04% 
(0.728) 
Technology 25.01% 
(1.560) 
18.31% 
(1.200) 
34.69% 
(1.643) 
33.33% 
(1.431) 
11.99% 
(0.637) 
29.55% 
(1.304) 
Institutional 30.78% 
(1.659) 
43.06% 
(1.549) 
23.63% 
(1.470) 
22.61% 
(1.248) 
52.59% 
(0.979) 
40.52% 
(1.391) 
Context 16.63% 
(1.363) 
13.28% 
(1.077) 
23.40% 
(1.449) 
21.62% 
(1.219) 
20.24% 
(0.788) 
22.89% 
(1.199) 
Note: The number is parentheses is the standard deviation; this may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
Table 32 – Phase III code frequency comparison mean and standard deviation 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Resource 27.51% 
(2.220) 
25.38% 
(3.716) 
18.25% 
(3.150) 
22.43% 
(3.341) 
15.11% 
(3.221) 
7.06% 
(1.633) 
Technology 25.08% 
(2.138) 
18.33% 
(3.292) 
34.65% 
(3.865) 
33.38% 
(3.781) 
11.98% 
(2.829) 
29.47% 
(2.909) 
Institutional 30.77% 
(2.272) 
43.05% 
(4.217) 
23.64% 
(3.451) 
22.59% 
(3.348) 
52.62% 
(4.439) 
40.52% 
(3.138) 
Context 16.64% 
(1.840) 
13.24% 
(2.915) 
23.46% 
(3.435) 
21.60% 
(3.278) 
20.29% 
(3.559) 
22.93% 
(2.682) 
Note: The number is parentheses is the standard deviation; this may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
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9.3 Appendix C – Case narratives 
This Appendix contains the case narratives for each case. Each phase is illustrated through these. 
9.3.1 Amazon 
For Amazon, Phase I commenced with Jeff Bezos’ decision to create an online bookshop to take 
commercial advantage of the emerging internet. After a report he authored for his then employer D.E. 
Shaw argued for investment in online bookselling was rejected, Bezos resigned and moved to Seattle, 
rented a house with a garage and began researching bookselling and the potential competitors. 
Originally called Cadabra, the company was founded en route to Seattle by Bezos with $10,000, and 
later supported by a number of loans from Bezos. He also personally guaranteed the obligations of the 
company, such as credit cards and other facilities. A little later also Bezos raised some more money 
from his father and from a trust where his mother was a beneficiary. 
Within a couple of weeks of founding the company, Bezos had hired a couple of programmers 
from UC Washington and began to develop the service. He also renamed the company to Amazon after 
comments and advice from friends and colleagues. Initially they planned to provide both email and 
online trading capabilities, however by the time of the launch due to the development of the internet 
only the web-store was launched. In addition specialist systems were developed for handling credit 
cards and ordering. The service was optimised for all types of browsers because at this stage of the 
internet a dominant browser had not yet emerged. The company operated very frugally, with an informal 
atmosphere, with all hands helping in packing and shipping, meetings held in local bookshops and desks 
made out of doors. The company philosophy was that the customer was always right, and to under-
promise and over-deliver.  
In April 1994 the service was launched in Beta to several hundred friends to test and pretend to 
buy books. By June live purchases were possible, and word of mouth marketing began to drive users to 
the service, quickly making the service number one book-related service on the internet. In July 1995 
the service was officially launched, with over 1 million titles in its database and the claim that it was 
the ‘world’s biggest bookstore’. In fact Amazon carried only about 2,000 titles in stock in its Seattle 
warehouse, and most orders were placed directly through wholesalers and publishers, and then shipped 
to the customer. The service was designed to be as user-friendly as possible, with 10-30% discounts on 
most titles, powerful search capabilities, topic areas to browse, a recommendation centre, book reviews 
in its ‘Spotlight’ section and a gift wrapping service. 
Very soon after launch, Amazon developed an excellent reputation and became a very popular 
service; within a month they filled orders from all 50 states in the US and 45 other countries. Customers 
rallied around the service as features such as customer reviews and personalised services made it into 
an early social network for book fans. Very soon a sense of community developed around the service. 
These feelings of goodwill and trust were further encouraged by such actions as posting the ‘Amazon 
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Bill of Rights’ and ‘Shipping Policy’ documents on the service. They were also recognised by web 
commentators, and almost immediately placed on Yahoo's ‘what's cool list’ and Netscape's ‘what's new 
list’. As the year wore on they continued to add new features, fine tune the operation of service and hire 
more staff. 
For Amazon, Phase II commenced in late 1995 with Bezos raising approximately $1 million from 
local Seattle investors. Following the investment round, the strategy became ‘get big fast’, an explicit 
change in ecosystem strategy from incremental organic growth to market domination. Very quickly 
business development staff were hired, their first advertising agency brought on board, and an 
aggressive advertising campaign launched, featuring in major mainstream publications, general interest 
media, and banner ads on other services. With increasing customers and growing sales driven by 
glowing lead story in the Wall Street Journal in May, there was a deluge of calls from VCs who wanted 
to invest, and by June 1996 Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Buyers invested $8 million, valuing the 
company at $60 million. This lead to a much higher profile for the digital service, further enhanced 
when Al Gore dropped by for a photo opportunity, Bezos appearing on a PBS news show in late 1996 
and Time magazine voting the service one of the ‘10 Best Webservices of 1996’.  
New features were continually added to the service, such as automated recommendations based 
on past buying habits. An out-of-print department was created, a new look web service launched and 
many internal functions formalised with experienced managers brought in and professional systems put 
in pace. In addition, better relationships with distributors were established and formalised. Following 
an email from a customer asking to be allowed put a link to books on their service, the ‘Associates’ 
program was launched in July 1996, an explicit ecosystem building mechanism. This innovative 
program created a network of individual web services with Amazon ads for them, with visitors able to 
purchase those books. Order fulfilment was done through Amazon, and associates were sent reports on 
their sales and made a 3 to 8 percent commission from books sold on their services. This program 
rapidly became popular and gained a reputation where one could find any book on any topic. The 
participants continued to support the service, and independently acted to defend the service from bad 
press, such as when Slate magazine ran an online ordering test and found that the local store could 
deliver faster.  
However competition was beginning to stir, with Borders Group announcing it was going to 
launch a service, and books.com promoting themselves more aggressively. In addition Barnes & Noble 
entered an agreement to be an exclusive bookseller on AOL. Analysts and press began to argue that 
Amazon did not have sustainable competitive advantage and that the big book retailers would eventually 
dominate. In late 1996 and early 1997, Barnes & Noble expressed an interest in acquisition, launched 
their own bookstore, and eventually sued regarding the use of the phrase the ‘Earth’s Biggest 
Bookstore’. This case was settled in late 1997. 
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In May 1997, after less than two years of operation and in a poor IPO market, Amazon listed and 
became a public company, despite claims of overvaluation. The IPO was for three million shares of 
common stock on the NASDAQ exchange, valuing the company at $419 million. This investment drove 
further development of the service, such as the addition of One-Click, increased discounting, and 
advertising. At the same time distributors began to renegotiate access (to charge higher prices) and in 
response Amazon began to reduce their reliance on them. To counter the emerging competition 
adjustments to the Associate program promoted offered greater commissions and more exclusive 
agreements. By mid-1997 Amazon formed marketing partnerships with Yahoo! and AOL, giving broad 
promotional capabilities on two of the most visited services on the internet, as well as with many others, 
including Prodigy, Netscape, GeoCities, Excite, and AltaVista. By the end of 1997, to help broaden the 
company's distribution capabilities, and to ease the strain on the existing distribution centre they 
expanded the company's Seattle centre and opened an East Coast distribution centre in New Castle, 
Delaware. With customers in all 50 US states and over 160 countries worldwide, and with $147.8 
million in yearly sales, Bezos announced in October that Amazon would be the first Internet retailer to 
reach one million customers. To help achieve this goal in late 1997 the company secured a $75 million 
credit facility. 
In 1998 the company continued to grow and Amazon was soon the third largest bookseller in the 
United States. By February, the Associates program had reached 30,000 members, and four months 
later, this had doubled to 60,000. The company's customer database continued to grow with cumulative 
customer accounts reaching 2.26 million in March. Amazon continued to develop its services, with new 
features and more than 2.5 million titles. In February Amazon Advantage was launched, a program to 
help the sales of independent authors and publishers, and in March, Amazon Kids, with over 100,000 
titles for younger children and teenagers. In early 1998 Amazon also expanded into Germany and the 
UK through the acquisitions of Telebook and Bookpages respectively, relaunched as Amazon.de and 
Amazon.co.uk later in the year. Around this time Amazon also acquired the Internet Movie Database 
(IMD) to support plans for a move into online video sales, which began advertising for Amazon by the 
end of the year. In order to continue their growth in early May Amazon issued $326 million of debt. 
Later in the year more acquisitions continued with the purchase of Junglee and PlanetAll, price 
comparison and contact management services respectively; Junglee was re-launched as a ‘Shop the 
Web’ feature on the service. 
In mid-1998, after seeking feedback from bookstore customers and members of the music 
profession on the design the new web service, a music store was added, with over 125,000 music titles 
available. The new service had the same services as the book side including the ability to listen to music 
before a purchase; this began operations at the same time that Amazon debuted a redesigned book 
service. Over time accolades built up, despite some mixed reviews on the ability of the service to expand 
beyond books. Amazon also extended the titles available, such as classical music, and launched an 
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Advantage program for Music in November 1998. By the end of the year both video and DVD stores 
were launched, continuing the move away from books. 
Marketing and advertising continued on both online and offline, and there was huge brand 
recognition amongst consumers with many customers still arriving through word of mouth. By the end 
of the year the word ‘Amazon’ was part of the business lexicon. The launch of a book ranking feature 
also gained much press. In June Amazon was honoured by the Smithsonian Institute for business and 
related services and, in July 1998, Bezos was on the cover of Forbes as one of the ‘Masters of the New 
Universe’. In September Amazon extended its promotional partnership with Yahoo across their world 
services, including Asia, UK and Ireland, France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, Japan and Korea. However growth was not without criticism, with some 
commentators arguing that the growth could not continue, and was much overvalued and part of a 
bubble. 
Despite continued investment in the technology that underpinned the service, in October 1998 
the service went down for 10 hours during a problem with routine maintenance. In keeping with the 
corporate philosophy all customers on the service were offered a $5 gift voucher and communication 
was transparent and prompt. In addition, the hiring of a number of executives from Wal-Mart earlier in 
the year caused Wal-Mart to sue in October, which was later settled in Mach 1999. However, other 
events also assisted in their growth. The passing of the Internet Tax Freedom Act meant that internet 
sales were now protected from multiple taxes, and Barnes & Noble, in their failed attempt to acquire 
Ingram, the main book wholesaler, garnered an FTC anti-trust action and later threats of Congressional 
investigation. Bertelsmann, after a failed JV attempt with Amazon, invested in the Barnes & Noble web 
service. 
By the end of the year Amazon was flying high, with over three million customers and an 
exceptionally busy Christmas. Amazon’s focus on growth continued, with the successful issuance of 
the largest convertible debt auction in history, of $1.25 billion. In addition it received a patent for its 
‘One-Click’ technology. Acquisitions and investments continued in such organisations as 
Drugstore.com, Pets.com, LiveBid, Alexa Internet, Accept.com, Exchange.com, HomeGrocer.com, 
Gear.com, Della & James, Convergence Corporation, Toolcrib of the North, Back to Basics Toys, and 
Ashford.com. In early 1999 it opened fulfilment and distribution centres in Nevada, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Georgia, Washington, and North Dakota. During1999 Amazon quadrupled its hardware, and continued 
the development of new features, such as Cross Links, Amazon Payments, zBubbles, Amazon 
Anywhere and Overnight delivery. In a further explicit ecosystem growth measure, the launch of zShops 
enabled anyone to offer merchandise for sale through Amazon, be they micro- or major manufacturers, 
small businesses or global corporations, specialised retailers or ‘mega-conglomerates’. One new 
feature, Purchase Circles, which pointed out the most popular products in particular regions, garnered 
many negative reviews due to the implications on privacy, forcing Amazon to issue specific policies 
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for the service. In March 1999, the service was extended with an online auction service entitled Amazon 
Auctions, positioned as a place to buy anything one needed. This was later extended with a partnership 
with Sotheby’s in June and a joint auction service in November. Amazon also began offering toys and 
games in and electronics mid-1999, and then later divided its product offerings into individual stores 
on its service to make it easier for customers to shop for certain items.  
Amazon remained in the press spotlight, with Bezos featuring on Sixty Minutes in February 1999, 
profiled by New York Times magazine in March; the cover story of Fortune in December, and named 
the Times ‘Person of the Year’. Amazon itself was also labelled the ‘poster child of the internet’ by 
NYT Magazine in October and was the case of a Jeopardy question in July. However the press was not 
all positive; there was much derision in relation to the awarding of the ‘One Click’ patent, as well as 
the discovery of paid product placement, causing much shock and a special policy to denote it. 
Similarly, the aggressive litigation tactics used in their suit with the Amazon Bookshop company did 
not reflect well on the company, Amazon also sued Barnes & Noble over its infraction of ‘One Click’ 
technology, winning an injunction in December 2000. 
For Amazon, Phase III began in early 2000 with an explicit shift to profitability and value 
appropriation. Despite continued accolades, stellar end of year sales, and being the most widely 
recognised e-commerce brand, by early 2000 sales began to slow and Amazon began to focus on cutting 
costs and becoming profitable. In spite of issuing 690 million Euros of debt, Amazon made 2% of its 
staff redundant, wrote off more than $39 million of merchandise, and internally restructured and 
refocused employees on profitability. Cost reduction was added to the business strategy, which had 
traditionally been centred on vast selection and convenience.  
Despite the cost reductions, the functionality of the service continued to be expanded, with new 
stores added, including lawn and patio furniture, health and beauty, kitchen wares, photos and cameras, 
and computer and video games. In November 2000, expanding the ecosystem further, Amazon launched 
Marketplace, which complemented zShops in that second-hand goods could now be offered alongside 
new goods. It also continued its expansion, with a new service in West Virginian, French and Japanese 
services, and with investment or acquisitions in Greenlight.com, Audible Inc, Greg Manning Auctions, 
Basis Technology, Kozmo.com, Eziba.com, and Wineshopper.com. However the company continued 
to post net losses. The market share focus over profits was making Wall Street analysts speculate on 
whether the company would ever be able to turn a profit. In addition the company was sued over the 
privacy implications of its Alexa subsidiary, while it sued Barnes & Noble to protect its ‘One Click’ 
patent 
After another strong Christmas, however, in January 2001 Amazon made redundant over 1,300 
employees and closed a distribution centre in an effort to be profitable. Amazon also moved into third-
party deals with such well-known retailers as Target Corporation and AOL, as well as Waterstones in 
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the UK, Toysrus.com, Circuit City Stores, and the Borders Group. The service continued to be enhanced 
with Amazon Honour System, Software downloads, eDocuments, Computers and a ‘Look Inside the 
Book’ launched in October 2001. By the end of 2001, sales grew to $3.12 billion and secured a net 
profit of $5 million for the final quarter. Then Amazon was the undisputed leader in online retailing. 
Following the announcement of profitability, in 2002 and 2003 Amazon worked to move to outright 
profitability, with another small profit at the end of 2002. To do so they continued to promote and 
enhance the service. As well as launching an apparel store, which included clothing from retailers The 
Gap and Lands' End, it launched a Sports and Outdoor store, and launched discounted shipping rates. 
In addition Amazon Web Services were launched in July 2002 and ‘Search Inside the Book’ in 2003. 
By the end of 2003 Amazon was solidly profitable. 
9.3.2 eBay 
For eBay, Phase I commenced in September 1995 with the decision of Pierre Omidyar, a Paris-
born programmer who lived in Silicon Valley, to create the perfect market. Omidyar wrote the service 
over a long weekend, calling it AuctionWeb, and added it to his home page, which already hosted a 
number of other services. After posting a broken laser pointer on the service and watching it sell, 
Omidyar realised that the service may have potential. With little marketing, the ecosystem began to 
grow through word of mouth, and a commission based on a percentage value of the final sale was 
established after a couple of weeks of operation when the internet service provider dramatically 
increased their prices due to escalating web traffic (the ecosystem was profitable from the start).  
Very early on Omidyar outlined the ethical guidelines that he wanted the participants to follow 
(essentially ‘do unto others as they would do unto you’). To reduce Omidyar’s in-person involvement 
in mediating disputes between buyers and sellers, the administration of the ecosystem was handed over 
to participants through the establishment of bulletin boards and many of the early policies and service 
policing was done through participants. During this time a strong sense of community developed, 
typified by high trust and strong sense of identity, where it was not uncommon for goods to ship before 
payment arrived and payments by post. By the end of 1995 there were thousands of auctions, with 
operations based in Omidyar’s house. 
In early 1996 functionality continued to be developed, with the addition of premium fees, such 
as Featured Auction Fees, and by May 1996, revenues had risen to $5000 a month prompting Omidyar 
to give up his day job. In mid-1996 another fee was added to list an item so as to ‘remove a lot of the 
junk’, resulting in the first large pushback from participants, leading to a graduated approach for the 
listing fee. At this stage the fee that eBay was charging was still based on an honesty system, where the 
seller would send a cheque, money order or cash once they had received payment. By summer 1996 
AuctionWeb took over the whole ebay.com homepage, with the other services taken away, and the 
service itself had been split into 30 categories under three headings. Also around this time Jeff Skoll 
joined as President to develop the business so that Omidyar could focus on technology and the 
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ecosystem participants. Towards the end of the year PR management arrived and to alleviate poor 
customer support two ecosystem members were hired. Operations were frugal, with the guiding 
principle of to ‘spend the money like it was your own’.15 
The number of participants continued to grow, with vibrant debates concerning many issues of 
functionality, purpose and naming of features. Late in the year, Bulletin Board was split into two, with 
the Q&A Board and the eBay Café launched. These had a convivial feel, and developed a form of 
neighbourhood watch, and became a mechanism for participant oversight of duplicitous dealings. A 
proposal for feedback ‘stars’ for participants getting high feedback scores, resulted in a strong pushback 
as participants wanted to be involved in all stages of the process. eBay quickly apologised and launched 
a consultation regarding feedback stars. Also by the end of 1996 the first complementary services were 
arriving, such as an image rendering and hosting service.  
For eBay, Phase II commenced at the beginning of 1997 as ecosystem participants began to pour 
in, with over 330,000 completed auctions and the total transaction value of more than $10.25 million in 
the first quarter alone. The nature of the users also began to change, moving from computer related 
items to collectibles, and by March 1997 the service was the largest distributor of Beanie Babies in the 
US. As a result it was unable to scale to meet demand and continually crashing, giving rise to the 
moniker ‘the Great eBay Flood’. Additional technical staff were hired to build a new infrastructure that 
was able to scale. In the meantime Skoll and Omidyar attempted to reduce the load on the service by 
manipulating the behaviour of ecosystem participants, resulting in successive backlashes until a 
satisfactory solution was found. Paradoxically this manipulation resulted in enhanced bonding as 
participants collectively responded to unwelcome rules of use, and as they waited to be able to use the 
service. Staff also became intimately involved in discussions on the boards, deepening the feeling of 
community. As the participants became more intimately involved with the service, any changes to the 
service resulted in large backlashes, and a process for participants to input and revise potential changes. 
Following the efforts to deal with the ‘Great eBay Flood’, a new service was launched in 
September 1997, with new branding, a new design, and a new, scalable infrastructure, and a rebranding 
from AuctionWeb to eBay. However competition also began to emerge, such as OnSale (launched in 
May 1997) and AuctionUniverse. eBay responded with a more aggressive growth strategy, including 
the hiring of business development staff, engagement of an advertising agency, marketing partnerships 
with other internet companies, such as AOL, and marketing campaigns taking advantage of societal 
trends. eBay was having difficulty getting traction with the mainstream media, and it was only with the 
invention of the PEZ myth (eBay was started by Omidyar so that his fiancé could find PEZ dispensers) 
in late 1997 that the media began to respond to their press releases. To combat rising occurrences of 
fraud, an anti-fraud policy was established, and a legal capability hired to build relationships with all 
15 Cohen (2002), p. 49. 
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the relevant authorities. This also laid the legal groundwork asserting that eBay was a neutral venue, 
and hence had no legal duty to look for fraud on the service. Supporting this policy the Legal Buddy 
system was set up where eBay’s customer services would assist brand holders in removing offending 
auctions. Also during mid-1997, Omidyar and Skoll decided that the company needed venture capital 
and a more experienced management team, and in mid-1997 Benchmark Capital, a venture capital firm 
in Menlo Park, California, put $5 million into the company to acquire a 22 percent stake.  
In 1998, with the new infrastructure in place and the AOL partnership, eBay was truly able to 
grow, recording gross merchandise sales of $100 million, revenues of $6 million in the first quarter and 
950,000 registered users. The service began to garner awards and plaudits from commentators. Early in 
the year Meg Whitman joined as CEO, introducing formal organisation to the company for the first 
time and deepening the management capabilities with more experienced personnel. Within two weeks 
the service went down for eight hours, and Whitman invested heavily in new technology and replaced 
the technical leadership. Marketing was considerably extended with a $12 million deal with AOL, and 
also refocused on vertical publications, as well as maintaining more generalised marketing based around 
social and cultural events. To combat the emerging competitors, in early 1998, eBay continued to 
encourage users on the service, positioning itself as a ‘personal trading community for individuals’, and 
launching a category management process with specialised sub-services, a Powersellers program for 
heavy users, and a ‘Safe Habor’ programme to combat fraud. Up4Sale, a competing advertising 
trading/auction service, was acquired, rapidly absorbed and closed down. New features enabled greater 
user interaction with the service, such as PowerChat, the ‘My eBay’ personalisation tool and an ‘About 
Me’ feature. Supporting services, such as sniping, and other complementary assets also started to appear 
in the ecosystem, driving yet more volume to the service. A number of third party oriented services also 
appeared as responses to the draining conversation on the eBay boards.  
In September 1998, eBay was taken public, with the stock price tripling within a few days. 
Initially the goal was to include participants in the IPO, however legally this proved difficult and despite 
a letter from Omidyar explain the situation, the IPO caused outrage amongst many participants. 
Following the IPO, marketing capabilities were expanded and a national marketing campaign launched. 
However some high profile pranks, including a charity auction where all top bids were fake, and 
fraudulent activity garnered much press coverage and increased interest in online trading by regulators. 
By the end of 1998 eBay hosted nearly 1.8 million auctions and were one of the few digital services 
returning solid profits. Despite Yahoo! announcing a partnership with OnSale just prior to the IPO, by 
the end of the 1998 eBay was the undoubted, but not yet undisputed, leader. 
In 1999 eBay continued its rapid growth, publically announcing that it was sticking to its ‘core’ 
business, and drove traffic through strategic relations with supporting firms and complementary service 
providers such as shipping and wireless services. International expansion began with the purchase of 
Alando.de in Germany, a launch in the UK, and joint venture in Australia. The types of users began to 
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evolve, with government start selling through the service. Some academic research supported some of 
the service principles, ‘eBay addiction’ was identified as a psychological disorder, and the service also 
became the case of conceptual art. Accolades continued to be won, with the service ranking the second 
most popular service on the internet, and media interest was driven by listings for virginity, drugs and 
body organs. Overall, the media interest had the effect of promoting eBay as fun place to be. However 
facing increasing criticism from the press, eBay launched a high profile anti-fraud initiative, VERO, to 
reassure both users and regulators alike. New competition also arrived, with Half.com launching, and 
Amazon firstly hosting its own daily auctions then signing an agreement with Sotheby’s for an online 
auction house. eBay responded through acquiring Butterfield and Butterfield and launching Great 
Collections (later renamed eBay Premier) by the end of the year, with partnering auction houses, 
galleries, and dealers having their own branded areas. It also acquired Kruse International to launch an 
automotive section in the service, and after unsuccessfully trying to partner with some financial 
institutions to create a pay service, acquired BillPoint to provide payment services. 
Participant identity continued to evolve with the development of idiosyncratic rituals and 
behaviours, such as Friday Night Sing-alongs and birthday celebrations becoming common. eBay 
encouraged some of this behaviour with entertainment oriented activities such as the ‘eBay Addicts’ 
contest where users boasted of their most compulsive behaviour. The ‘Official eBay Magazine’ and 
eBay for Dummies book were also launched that assisted in identity development. Around this time the 
live support bulletin boards were closed, reducing some of the contact between the participants and the 
organisation. However, relations between the ecosystem and eBay were volatile in1999. By mid-year 
the VERO was causing problems with ecosystem participants over the enforcement of the protection. 
A ban on selling guns and ammunition triggered a phenomenal pushback and a poor response by eBay 
lead to a clear statement of free speech within the ecosystem. Although rules of conduct remained, such 
as prohibiting threats and hate speech, following this incident, participants were a lot freer to speak. To 
maintain ecosystem relations the Voices Program was introduced to discuss ecosystem issues, which 
enabled it to successfully ban the sale of alcohol and tobacco products. However, functional and pricing 
changes to the service also generated participant responses, such as the introduction of a listing fee and 
some extended system down time over the summer.  
By the beginning of 2000, eBay was now the Internet's top auction service with ten million 
registered users, selling around $10 million of merchandise a day. The ecosystem continued to grow, 
with many successful businesses now based on distribution through eBay. Shrugging off a Yahoo! 
acquisition attempt, it continued its strategy of partnering with firms to extend its marketing reach, as 
well as the provision of complementary services, such as the eBay University. Promotions continued to 
focus on the auction side of the business, and to maintain its lead Half.com was acquired - an auction 
service specialising in used goods for fixed prices. International expansion continued, launching in 
Taiwan, Canada, and Austria, and specialised extensions of the service were also released, such as a 
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business-to-business marketplace called BusinessExchange, a program for antique malls, and real estate 
through a partnership. As a consequence of the leadership changes from the previous year, by the 
summer development had sped up by more than four times, and functional improvements continued on 
the service such as the launch of eBay Anywhere, eBay Payments (although millions of users were 
already using PayPal), a Live Auction facility for Great Collections, and the ‘Buy it Now’ functionality. 
In March 2000 a major change to the feedback system, transactional feedback, was introduced with the 
vast majority of the ecosystem supporting the change. However relations with the ecosystem remained 
strained, with an open rebellion over the banning of advertising and the lack of consultation over the 
launch of the phenomenally successful eBay Motors. 
For eBay, Phase III was ushered in June 2000 with a massive protest called the ‘Million Auction 
March’, triggered by previous missteps with the participants and an increasing dissatisfaction with the 
direction of the service and the plight of small sellers. Whitman defused the situation over the summer, 
however one side effect of the march was that it demonstrated to participants how good the eBay 
ecosystem was, despite moving more than a million listings to competitor services. The resolution of 
this crisis meant that the ecosystem participants now recognised eBay’s tensions to operate as a listed 
company, and ecosystem conflict with the participants declined. However these lessons were not well 
learnt, as eBay triggered another enormous backlash when they launched a co-branded service with 
Disney later in the year, which heavily favoured the items from Disney. To rectify the situation 
Whitman announced an explicit statement of a level playing field for all participants, large or small, 
and internally the firm recognised that there had been a loss in capability in ecosystem management. In 
terms of functionality, the service continued to be enhanced, with the introduction of services to increase 
revenues, such as the introduction of ‘Buy it Now’. eBay also continued to develop the complementary 
service elements of the ecosystem, making officially available an API and launching a Developers 
Programme. As well as actively and fully complying with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act eBay 
won some a key court case ensuring that it was considered a neutral vendor and was not liable for the 
goods sold through the service. In addition, media coverage now considered eBay a neutral vendor, and 
instead focused on the users doing the buying and selling.  
In 2001, eBay continued its phenomenal growth, with the dotcom crash having little effect on its 
operations. It launched native services in Italy, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland and Singapore, and 
expanded into South America, South Korea, and France. They continued to build alliances for 
marketing and complementary service provision, notably with Microsoft and IBM, as well as user 
education through the continued development of the eBay University. Service functionality was 
extended, with the launch of eBay Stores and eBay Classified, the relaunch of Great Collections as eBay 
Premier, and the acquisition of HomesDirect. Wider society and the press now viewed eBay as a neutral 
venue, which was further legally established through a number of court victories.  
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9.3.3 Facebook 
For Facebook, Phase I began in mid-December 2003 when Mark Zuckerberg addressed an issue 
of concern to Harvard students, the fact that that their ‘Facebooks’ were not online. This dissatisfaction 
had been exacerbated by Harvard’s announcement that it was going to create a centralised repository 
without any subsequent action. Zuckerberg developed the service known as the ‘thefacebook’ over a 
couple of days in early January 2004, and mobilising his dorm-mates to support, launched the social 
network internally at Harvard on the 4th February 2003. Ownership of the service at this early stage was 
split between himself, Eduardo Saverin and Dustin Moskovitz, his dorm roommates. As more users 
came on board it became popular for setting up study groups, and soon the Harvard Crimson had run a 
couple of articles about the service, where Zuckerberg had clearly outlined the operating principles of 
the service (‘to be fun’). Participants began to exhibit idiosyncratic practices, such as broadcasting 
political views by changing photos and competing through friending competitions. Poking was also 
very popular, and much of the interaction had a strong sexual overtone. With no promotion, the service 
was a huge success, and very soon students at other universities began asking for access.  
At the end of February the service was opened to Stanford, Columbia and Yale, and in early 
March to Dartmouth, Cornell, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton, MIT, Brown, and Boston U. As 
well as continually re-architecting the service to enable it to scale as all the new users came on board, 
an improvement in mid-March was to introduce cross-campus linking; before this time users could only 
see those in their own university. To maintain growth, Zuckerberg and Saverin invested another $10,000 
each at the end of March, and the operation was later formalised as an LLC in Florida. Advertising 
functionality was included in mid-April, and very soon they began to sell some advertisements. Despite 
the benefits of this cash-flow, Zuckerberg maintained strict controls on the positioning and size of the 
advertisements. However a number of competitors were launching, notably ConnectU who claimed that 
Zuckerberg misappropriated their earlier work.  
In mid-June operations moved from the Harvard dorm rooms to Palo-Alto, California, installing 
the servers close by in Santa-Clara. Soon after arriving in Palo-Alto they met up with Sean Parker (who 
Zuckerberg had already met earlier in the year in New York) who became the front man for Facebook. 
Around this time, Saverin, who remained behind on the East Coast to find advertising revenues, cut off 
money from the LLC’s account, resulting in Zuckerberg and family funding the company out of their 
own pocket. As it was unclear what the LLC actually owned at this time, Parker incorporated the 
company in Delaware with a new company structure and ownership distribution. In order to maintain 
performance, they implemented a policy that every server upgrade should be able to handle ten times 
more users than they had at the time of the upgrade. In addition they continued to strengthen the service 
for the anticipated high load when users came back from holidays. Over the summer break usage and 
number of users continued to grow. However this preparation did not prevent a small number of outages 
and slow down, so by the end of summer they were adding servers almost daily. Users were looking at 
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100s and 1000s of profiles a day, and the movie quotes that Zuckerberg had added in the service 
achieved cult status.  
By the summer the first proper investment offers arrived, with Benchmark Capital unsuccessful 
in investing and an unsuccessful acquisition attempt by Google. At the end of August 2004, Peter Thiel 
(along with a couple of other angel investors) made a $500,000 angel investment for 10.2 percent of the 
company and joined Facebook's board. A couple of months later they struck an agreement with WTI 
who provided $300,000 and invests $25,000 dedicate to hardware provision. Zuckerberg and Moskovitz 
decided not to return to university, and hired operations and product management capability to support 
the coming growth.  
For Facebook, Phase II started with the return of college students after the summer 2004 recess. 
Deciding to stay focused on Ivy League universities, an automated process to add universities was 
established and 15 new colleges were soon added. In order to outflank emerging competitors, a 
‘surround’ strategy of opening at as many schools in the vicinity of where another social network had 
begun to take root. Very soon the service lost its elitist edge as new schools began to be loaded at pace. 
Many new features were launched, such as Wall, Groups and Student Flyers, another type of 
advertisement. Advertising revenue continued to flow, and earlier in the year Y2M has been brought on 
board, who won a breakthrough advertising deals with Paramount and Apple. 
By the beginning of 2005 the first mainstream press coverage began with the LA Times writing 
an article about the service. As usage increased, in mid-February WTI invested another $300,000 
dedicated to hardware provision, and many new servers were installed. However, at this stage they 
began reaching out to VC firms for some serious investment to enable growth, and although there was 
lots of interest from investors there was still a lot of scepticism as many were unable to view the service. 
After an unsuccessful acquisition attempt by Viacom at the end of March, and refusing investment from 
the Washington Post, VC firm Accel invested $12.7 million (valuing Facebook at about $98 million) 
and a partner joined the board. Saverin parted ways with Facebook acrimoniously as he was diluted 
from a 30 percent to 10 percent equity stake. Following this, the focus was on growth and hiring, 
including business development, sales, developers, graphic designers, data and infrastructure 
management capabilities, quite a few customer support staff to address the large backlog of customer 
support emails, and product marketing.  
Demand from schools to join the service was so great that a waiting list was created, and it was 
a constant battle to keep the service operational alongside the growth of users. In July WTI lent another 
$3 million, which was rapidly spent on hardware to accommodate the growing numbers of users. After 
purchasing ‘facebook.com’ domain, the service was re-launched at the end of September 2005 as simply 
‘Facebook’, with a new look and logo. Also in September, following a long discussion, a high school 
version was launched, and in October to universities outside the US. Two notable additional features 
206 
introduced around this time were ‘time-sorting’, which listed the most recent activities of user in reverse 
order, and photo hosting; both were met with wide acclaim by users, with the latter rapidly became the 
most popular feature. However the requirements for photo storage meant that there was a massive 
requirement for space and processing. By the end of the year there was more than 2,000 colleges and 
25,000 high schools on the system, and more than $4.4 million was spent on servers alone. However 
serious competition was arriving with StudioVZ in Germany and Xiaonei in China, and the first 
criticisms of privacy published.  
2006 saw the commencement of formal marketing activities with press releases responding to 
mixed reviews in the press, such as a critical New Yorker article in May and a mostly positive Fortune 
article in October. Although Zuckerberg maintained strong control over the placement and types of 
advertising of the service, there was much interest, and Facebook signed a significant advertising deal 
with Microsoft. There was also much interest in acquiring Facebook from a number of differing 
organisations, including News Corporation, Viacom/MTV, Time Warner and Yahoo!. In April 2006, 
Facebook raised another $27.5 million, valuing the company at $500 million, from a number of VC 
firms, including Greylock Partners and Meritech Capital, plus additional investments from Peter Thiel 
and Accel Partners.  
In early 2006, to drive ecosystem growth, membership was increasingly opened beyond schools 
and universities. With the distinction between universities and colleges was abandoned, with the result 
that any user could freely establish friendships or send messages regardless of age or grade. Adoption 
was further boosted when their college competitor CUC Community inexplicably closed down, with 
many of their 250,000 users coming over to Facebook. By the beginning of summer, building on the 
high school success, membership was opened to add work networks to muted success. However at the 
end of that summer, membership was opened to anyone with a registered email address and over the 
age of 13. Functional development continued on the service, such as the Share and News Feed features; 
however as the service gained in popularity, participants began to hack the service exposing security 
flaws. The launch of News Feed, already controversial within the firm before its launch, brought a 
strong critical response from the ecosystem, only exacerbated by a condescending email written by 
Zuckerberg. As critical media coverage grew, Zuckerberg wrote a very contrite blog post and 
participated in a live public discussion, announcing new privacy controls on the service, leading to 
lessened criticism. 
During 2007 the service was becoming increasingly visible, as were other social networks such 
as StudioVZ in Germany. Early in the year the term ‘ambient intimacy’ was coined to describe the 
dynamics of Facebook, and in the UK institutional support emerged with the Trade Unions Council 
actively encouraging employers to allow access, although the press continued to vigorously cover 
incidents of employees being fired for Facebook use. Safety and privacy issues continued to arise, with 
widespread criticism and lawsuit preparation over the release of the ability to publicly search for user 
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profiles and Beacon, a service where third party web services could include a script of Facebook to 
update users status updates. The service’s features continued to be enhanced as well as new additions 
such as Marketplace, Facebook Video and a translation program so that users could translate the service 
into their own language. They also made their first acquisition, Parakey, which added some useful 
technology and staff. To grow advertising adoption a new type of sponsored story, an extension to the 
Flyers functionality and Facebook Ads were launched. However advertising was also not without 
controversy as some firms withdraw their advertisements on discovering that they were being placed 
alongside pages managed by far-right groups. A notable extension to the ecosystem was the launch of 
the Facebook Platform which enabled third parties to develop their own applications. Launched at their 
first conference, called f8, many apps were demonstrated by high profile companies, and was met by 
an ecstatic response from the tech industry and the press. However poor management of the platform, 
exacerbated by many unscrupulous app developers, lead to additional security and privacy concerns. 
Despite strenuous efforts to control the apps on the service, such as app rating systems and the launch 
of an fbFund to encourage ‘useful’ apps, due to inexperience these efforts often impaired legitimate 
apps and the utility of this aspect of the ecosystem. Towards the end of the year, after publically stating 
their wish to remain independent, Microsoft invested $240 million for a 1.6 percent and also contracted 
for the rights for international advertising, and Li Ka-shing put in $60 million at 0.4 percent, valuing 
the company at $15 billion.  
In 2008 Facebook continued to become accepted, with some companies making Facebook 
compulsory internally to the organisation, politicians adopting the service and the courts started to 
recognise profiles as evidence. The press continued to find much interest in the service, focusing on 
user activity, functional changes and privacy. Facebook began to proactively build goodwill, 
participating in discussions of pro-tolerance and anti-terrorism groups cross-pollinate and building and 
configuring the service as communications device during Hurricane Gustav. 2008 also saw international 
expansion, launching in Spanish, French and German, and by the end of the year there was over 35 
languages available on the service. Mid-year the service surpassed MySpace, however international 
competition remained. The service continued to gain features to build participant engagement, such 
Facebook Chat, Suggest Friends, and Facebook Connect which enabled people to log into third party 
services using their Facebook login, although some of these changes lead to large ecosystem backlashes. 
Despite new staff and a number of initiatives to control spam, the platform ecosystem was still out of 
control although this did not dent its popularity. Some apps, such as Scrabulous, were proving so 
popular that they were in the top 100 services for the year, and larger organisations were also adopting 
the ecosystem such as Salesforce partnering to launch Force.com for Facebook. Material support for 
ecosystem developers continued, with the provision of a peered data-centre for app developers, a second 
f8 conference in July (where they announced many new features on the Facebook Platform), and the 
fbFund awarding funding to 25 app developers in October, and another $1 million to developers in 
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December. With the hiring of Sheryl Sandberg as its Chief Operating Officer in March, a new business 
model focused on advertising was adopted, leading to the launch of new type of ads - Engagement Ads. 
By the end of 2008, Facebook was cash flow positive for the first time, and some of the founders and 
early employees began to move on. 
For Facebook, Phase III emerged as control was finally consolidated over the apps available 
through the platform, and series of measures to better formalise ecosystem activity. In addition the 
ecosystem became the unrivalled market leader, surpassing Orkut globally in late September, and 
Friendster in Asia in November. Internationalisation continued with Arabic and Hebrew introduced in 
March, as well as customisation for particular countries. However the service was completely blocked 
in China from early June. There was continued enhancement of existing functions and the addition of 
new ones. A new addition was the ‘like’ button, a new marketplace using Oodle, integration with 
Twitter and Xbox Connect, the OpenStream API in April, Facebook credits in May, and usernames in 
June. Extending functionality further, in August Facebook both acquired FriendFeed, a real-time news 
aggregator and improved access with the launch of Facebook light for areas without good internet access 
in August. However some of these enhancements were not without criticism, such as a homepage 
redesign which lead to a strong ecosystem pushback. There were also some minor service down 
incidents later in the year, but these did not damage its popularity. The service was being deeply 
integrated with consumer services and devices, such as the Huffington post, as well as into in a mobile 
phone by Hutchinson Whampoa in 2008 and in Verison broadband television in 2009. 
Facebook was now becoming well integrated into society, with an academic paper noting that 
Facebook was fostering political engagement, a poll highlighting that employers checked Facebook 
before hiring, White House officials apologising for issues on the service and New York City using the 
service for NIH education. However a number of organisations continued to impose restraints on 
Facebook use, particularly in the UK and Finland, as well as the US Marines, among other government 
agencies. However privacy and security concerns continued. In early 2009 a change to the Terms of 
Use lead to a strong backlash, picked up the mainstream press, and complaints being prepared for the 
FTC. This resulted in the creation of a ‘Bill of Rights’, partnering with authorities to increase safety 
and launching well as a Global Advisory Board for user safety. However issues continued to arise 
related to the ongoing functional development of the service. For instance, despite notifying all users 
of a change to the default view, the actual implementation of the change lead to an outcry by users, and 
enormous criticism commentators and observers, as well as filing of formal complaint to the FTC by 
EPIC that was only resolved a couple of years later. Despite these missteps external research found that 
the service was tenth most trusted on the internet. Functionally, enhancements to the service now 
focused on continual tweaks to advertising and other value extraction techniques, as the underlying 
business model settled in. The stabilisation of operations was reflected in additional investment valuing 
209 
Facebook at $10 billion. Another founder (Moskovitz) left as the service settled into control and 
appropriation of the value in the ecosystem. 
9.3.4 Google 
For Google, Phase I commenced an original idea from the doctoral work of Stanford University 
computer science graduate students, Larry Page and Sergey Brin. During 1996 Larry Page had decided 
that analysing web links was a good idea, and similar to citations, the number of incoming links was a 
good proxy for the value of the web page. Over 1996 this theory of links evolved into what is known 
as the ‘PageRank’ algorithm. In early 1997 Brin and Page launched a search engine called BackRub, 
and, with the help of their doctoral supervisor, a couple of months later they pulled together a more 
comprehensive search engine with elements of more conventional search technology. In September 
1997, the search engine was renamed to Google and Google.com registered. The service was launched 
as google.standford.edu in October, using a very simple design and the logo that is still in use today. To 
provide the service Brin and Page began to manufacture their own computers, operating them out of 
Stanford, both their work room and Page’s dorm room, for over a year.  
By 1998 the search service was gathering popularity through word of mouth, as students and staff 
began to use the service to hunt for information online. Throughout this time they were also adding new 
features, such as caching and search summaries, and improving performance, with occasional crashes. 
When Search Engine Watch was first published in November, it also began publicising the service. To 
assist in the growth of the service, their doctoral supervisors assisted by funding $10,000 from the 
Digital Libraries Project. Furthermore, in order to grow, they tried to licence the technology to other 
portals and search engines, such as Yahoo!, AltaVista and Excite, however they were unable to secure 
the financial support of the major portal players of the day. VC firms were also not interested in search. 
As such Brin and Page sought out some investors to help assist in the growth of the company. In late 
August 1998 Andy Bechtolsheim, founder of Sun Microsystems, and friend of a Stanford faculty 
member, wrote a check to Google Inc. for $100,000, and over the next month they raised another 
$900,000 from family and friends.  
In early September they set up a workspace in the garage in Menlo Park, incorporated Google, 
Inc to cash the cheque from Bechtolsheim, and hired their first employee, a fellow computer science 
graduate at Stanford. Around this time, they were continually investing in computers as the service was 
handling 10,000 search queries a day. Brin and Page soon disengaged from their studies at Stanford but 
remained in contact, writing a paper that warned about the dangers of advertisement-funded search 
engines, lecturing a class on search engines, and presenting the search engine in a class at Stanford in 
September. By the end of the year there was a glowing review from PC Magazine.  
In 1999 the word of mouth publicity continued, and Smart Computing Magazine named them 
one of its 50 Hot Technologies in mid-January, driving more users to the service. As well as good 
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mentions in the main stream press, Search Engine Watch acted as an marketing mechanism through 
their coverage of the search sector, and the declining quality of search in their competitors. As they 
continued to add features to the service, and beginning to crawl continuously, Google.com was launched 
in February with 500,000 queries a day. Being named Best Search Engine my Yahoo! Internet Life in 
April drove more traffic to the service and soon Netscape became a customer, helping push daily traffic 
levels to over 3 million. In early June 1999 they secured $25 million in equity funding from Sequoia 
Capital and Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Buyers, with a general partner from each joining the board. 
For Google, Phase II commenced with increasing adoption, as the size of the 1999 VC deal 
resulted in much news coverage and raised the profile of the service beyond devotees. Search Engine 
Watch continued to positively mention the service and by the middle of 1999, with no advertising spend, 
the ‘Google’ brand was becoming quite well known. This was supported by some inexpensive 
marketing, such as the Google Store where participants could buy branded clothes, and some low key 
promotional press releases. Around this time the first Google Doodles, the experimental art on the 
homepage, arrived which became an artefact that inspire users to visit the service. By the end of the 
year, momentum building actions continued through participation at the Search Engine Strategies 
Conference, winning accolades, and garnering positive press coverage, such as Newsweek, USA Today 
and Business Week. Internally there, the office was still a fun filled environment, maintaining a small 
company feel. Also around this time the 20 percent rule was introduced, where software engineering 
staff could spend at least 20 percent of their time on their own projects. 
The VC investment also enabled continued investment in the core service, implementing load 
balancing and fail-safe software, as well as the launch of a new web service design. Also launched were 
WebSearch and ServiceSearch, two explicit ecosystem growth features which enabled the embedding 
of web searches, or the ability to search a service, into third party sites. The ecosystem began to grow 
rapidly, with many adopting their services across the United States, Europe and Asia. Participants were 
also involved in the design of the service as a new font resulted in a backlash, and others obsessively 
keeping an eye on the number of words on the homepage. However the company was still not making 
enough money, and by the end of 1999 a new strategy had emerged, to continue to produce free search 
results, but to profit by selling ads. This was launched in December 1999 as Google AdWords to critical 
acclaim. A couple of months later the advertising capability was enhanced with the introduction of a 
non-stop online auction. 
Word of mouth marketing continued into 2000, and the number of queries continued to increase. 
The closing of a deal with Yahoo! to become their default search engine provider brought many more 
participants and activity within the ecosystem. The service was also released internationally by the end 
of the year, available in 26 languages. Engagement also increased with ego searches, an annual April 
Fools’ joke, and promotional doodles that brought participants back to the service timed with societal 
celebrations, such as Easter and Fathers’ Day. The end of June saw the proud announcement of the 
211 
billion-page index and, with 18 million search queries per day, becoming the world's largest search 
engine. In addition, throughout 2000 they continued to win accolades and gather positive coverage in 
the press, such as from Time Digital Magazine and a New Yorker Magazine article in May. Despite their 
growth some doubt was creeping into the press, with a negative article in BusinessWeek in December, 
as well as some privacy issues being aired. 
Enhancements continued to the core service also driving more adoption, with improved 
WebSearch functionality resulting in more than 13,000 participating sites by March. The ecosystem 
was further extended with the launch of the Affiliate Programme, which enabled any service to put a 
Google search box and earn a small commission. To drive more advertising to the service a Self Service 
Ad program that could be activated with a credit card was launched, extending the advertising services 
to small to mid-size businesses. Technical enhancements continued on the service and to drive more 
ecosystem activity the service was integrated into internet infrastructure, resulting in the Google 
Toolbar, a highly popular innovative browser plug-in. By the end of the year there were more than 60 
million searches per day. 
Service adoption continued to grow throughout 2001, reaching the 100-million search mark per 
day, and the service itself continued to win accolades. Professional management was introduced, as Eric 
Schmidt became CEO and Page and Brin became President, Products and President, Technology, 
respectively. With Schmidt’s arrival many internal operations were formalised, such as a proper 
financial system. Internationally, strategic partnerships and the launch of a translation console resulted 
in 25 services and 30 portal services in 30 countries using the service over the year. Over the year the 
service became more integrated in society, with the New Yorker noting that the word Google had 
become a verb, and by the end of the year variants were also to be seen in other languages. The service 
retained its quirkiness and participant engagement, with the introduction of the Swedish Chef and 
Klingon, but also gained wider societal relevance and acknowledgement, becoming an alternative news 
outlet during 9/11. Functionally the service continued to be enhanced, such as extending the range of 
searchable file types to include PDFs and images. Acquisitions included the technology assets of 
Outride and the acquisition of Deja provided UseNet archives from 1981 for searching. By the end of 
the year, with the introduction of daily web refreshes, there was 3 billion Web documents available with 
the archive of Usenet messages dating back to 1981. The underlying PageRank algorithm was granted 
a patent in September, and at the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2001, the company was profitable. 
In 2002 many new participants, especially users and advertisers, joined the ecosystem. 
Internationally there were 77 languages and 46 language domains by the end of the year. Functionally 
the core search service continued to be developed, and, following the launch of a web API for the search 
service, its quick adoption by many other services lead to further ecosystem growth. Also released was 
Labs, enabling open access to their evolving search technologies and services. Both the search services 
and advertising businesses continued to grow. An upgraded self-service advertising system, AdWords 
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Select, was launched to wide acclaim, as well as a multi-year agreement with AOL. In addition Google 
began to support users with the launch of Google U, a series of seminars for people using their 
advertising services. Search Engine Watch maintained its warm reviews, and a whole new industry 
developed, Search Engine Optimisation, around search and advertising. To maintain ecosystem 
momentum and build user engagement, the firm attended Search Engine Strategies and Linux World, 
as well as relaunching Google Store in March and releasing Dilbert doodles. The accolades continued 
to pour in, and the service itself was becoming part of the culture, with references in both The West 
Wing, a television show, a New Yorker Magazine cartoon, and the American Dialect Society members 
voting ‘Google’ the ‘most useful’ Word of the Year for 2002. However, the ecosystem’s increasing size 
and dominance was now beginning to attract some friction. Overture, an online advertising firm that 
commenced a couple of years earlier, sued for patent infringement, and a number of organisations, such 
as the Church of Scientology, sued under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to have copyrighted 
material removed. This lead to criticism that data was being censored – particularly as evidence was 
emerging that extreme web sites (such as those from the political right wing) were also excluded from 
searches.  
In 2003 the service continued to add more languages and locations, with more than 84 country 
domains by the end of the year, as well as more functionality enhancements. The acquisitions of Applied 
Semantics provided expertise in analysing page content and Kaltix Corp. provided expertise in 
personalised and context-sensitive search technologies. Blog functionality was also added through the 
acquisition of Pyra Labs, the creators of Blogger, which was made free later in the year. Explicitly 
aimed at continuing to build ecosystem momentum, a new content-targeted advertising service was 
launched and the self-service option for AdSense augmented. Participant adoption of their advertising 
services continued to grow, with more than 100,000 firms advertising through the system in March. 
Through the affiliated program entire blog networks supported by ads, and one particular firm in the 
UK generated approximately 58 percent of orders through Google. The firm and its founders continued 
to win accolades, and the Google service was also increasingly the subject of societal dialogue, with 
many testimonials appearing on the power of its search, as well as a book called Google Hacks and a 
popular blog ‘Google Blogoscoped’ launched in March. Google was also becoming a destination for 
politicians with both Madeline Albright and Bill Clinton visiting the Googleplex at the end of the year.  
In 2004 the service continued to be internationalised and localised, supporting more than 100 
different languages. Integration into the internet infrastructure continued, becoming default settings into 
both Apple’s Safari and the Firefox browser. By February more than 6 billion documents were indexed 
and the ecosystem continued to expand, particularly on the advertising side. Both the service and 
founders continued to win accolades; 8 Awards at 4th Annual Search Engine Watch Awards, ‘Brand of 
the Year’ for Interbrand and both Brin and Page named Fellows by the Marconi Society, as well as 
debuting on Forbes 400 list. However over 2004 the service also began to be less trusted, despite the 
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much trumpeted ‘don’t be evil’ motto. The launch of Gmail, designed with advertising alongside the 
emails, lead to a strong public backlash due to privacy concerns. The announcement of the book 
digitisation project, lead to a big push-back from publishers, authors and librarians, as well as mixed 
press, particularly focused on the commercial dimension of the project. Finally, the unconventional 
approach to its IPO, which it had delayed for as long as possible, to conceal their profitability, lead to a 
lack lustre listing. The IPO was marred by a strong pushback from SEC, a huge media response as the 
scale of the firm’s profitability became known, doubt and criticism from Wall Street, and a magazine 
article that broke the mandatory media black-out.  
Following the IPO, to build a lead over its competitors, a plethora of functional innovations where 
launched to complement the core service, with a large resultant press coverage. Of note was the 
acquisition of Keyhole a digital mapping company whose technology would later become Google Earth, 
and the launch of Desktop Search was met with a large privacy concern. Despite an initially seeming to 
keep up with the flood of innovation, by November the main search competitors Yahoo! and Microsoft 
appeared unnerved and falling behind. 
For Google, Phase III commenced at the end of 2004 as it became the undisputed leader and the 
remaining competition (such as Microsoft and Yahoo!) where unable to maintain parity. This lead was 
particularly enhanced through a legal judgement that put the advertising business on a firm legal footing. 
After easing the policy on use of trademarks in March (perhaps to boost sales in the lead up to the IPO), 
the firm was sued by Geico over illegal use of their trademarks. However this case resulted in a big win 
when a federal judge ruled that the use of trademarks in keyword advertising was legal.  
In 2005 Google continued its flood of innovation and continued to release updated and new 
functionality, including new services such as Google Weather, Google Video, Google Maps, Google 
Analytics (after acquiring Urchin), Google Reader, Google Base, Music Onebox, Google Earth and 
Google Talk. They was also continued to open the APIs to its services, such as an AdWords API, Google 
Maps API, and an updated version of the Blogger API, as well as the supporting services, such as 
code.google.com and the Blogger Developers Network. The advertising business also gained additional 
functionality, such as service targeting, separate content bidding and easier sign-up, as well as new 
customers. Towards the end of the year Google announced the availability of first collection of public 
domain books, however complaints over library scanning project, now called Google Print, had 
continued throughout the year, resulting in a class action lawsuit launched by Authors Guild in 
September. The firm continued to engage with and reach out to participants, including sponsoring 
coding competition in India, the Summer of Code and the Google Code Jam, as well as the Anita Borg 
Memorial Scholarship. The media began to ask if Google would crush Microsoft, and Fortune penned 
a very favourable article. As Google settled into society, the accolades began to slow however Brin and 
Page entered the prestigious American Academy of Arts and Sciences in April.  
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9.3.5 Salesforce 
For Salesforce, the initial idea came from Marc Benioff during the period 1996 to 1998 when he 
was a SVP at Oracle. Benioff saw an opportunity to deliver Customer Relationship Management (CRM) 
using services on the Internet, central servers to store customers' data. So in 1998, after a sabbatical, he 
took a leave of absence from Oracle, wrote a business plan, met up with a couple of developers from 
Left Coat Software, who agreed to board in November 1998. In March 1999 the Salesforce was founded, 
with $6 million seeded by Benioff and based in San Francisco. The company culture was relaxed, and 
only in late April the formal strategy for the firm was written down.  
Development started in earnest, developing the code fast and simply, and Benioff planned the 
product outsiders, such as Larry Ellison of Oracle and Tom Siebel of Siebel Systems. Recruitment of 
developers followed over the following months, leading to a series of office moves. By the beginning 
of April the first prototype was built, and friends and colleges were asked to test it. A month later an 
external company was used to further test it, and the prototype was tweaked based upon the feedback 
of both. In August the service was released as a free trial. This trial allowed five users access for a year, 
and was open to anyone who expressed interest – there was no need to speak to a sales person. By the 
end of August five pilot customers were using the service, called 'design partners'. BugForce was also 
created so that users could post bugs and they could keep track of problems and new idea, and the 
service was constantly refined through pilot customer contact as well through as active monitoring of 
customer usage.  
Owing to Benioff’s experience, the firm had a marketing focus, and from very early on there was 
a two page marketing web service, which was upgraded when a WSJ article cited Salesforce as an 
example of the new trend of software as a service. With a policy of responding to any lead regardless 
of size and the active encouragement of existing staff to bring in customers, sales staff were soon hired. 
With increasing number of clients signing up to the service a monthly billing plan ($50 per month per 
user) was introduced, and one of the five pilot customers, Blue Martini, started paying the service soon 
after. Formalising the increasing number of customers trialling the service, there was an official Pilot 
Program Launch in early December, highlighting that some large companies had signed up. Also in 
early December, there was another article in the WSJ, stating that ‘Salesforce takes the lead in the latest 
software revolution’, resulting in another flood of sales leads and interest in the service. Building on 
this, Salesforce engaged OutCast Communications as PR and Marketing, and the distinctive ‘No 
Software’ logo was created, establishing Salesforce as ‘Amazon meets Siebel Systems’. To prepare for 
growth, by the end of the year, Benioff raised $17 million of angel funding and both an Advisory Board 
and a senior management team were in place.  
For Salesforce, Phase II commenced in February 2000 with high profile guerrilla marketing at 
the main competitor’s annual conference, as well as their own uniquely branded launch party. This was 
complemented with provocative advertising featuring a modern plane shooting down a bi-plane. 
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Together these led to a large influx of interest and a media firestorm, further inflamed when Siebel 
responded publically. To further drive adoption they also partnered with a range of high profile small 
business support web services as well as increasing the business development, marketing and sales staff 
throughout the year. From 1000 participants in March there had 20,000 by October. So successful was 
the marketing campaign that it was recognised by PR Week as Hi-Tech Campaign of the Year, as well 
as winning some other accolades.  
Encouraged by customer feedback, the general features of the service were enhanced, as well as 
the ability for customisation and user extension. The API was offered for free to encourage participant 
adoption of the service. The service also continued to extend functionality through partnering with 
related services, such as a Content Partners Program where partners such as Hoover could provide 
dynamic data to users, and extending the service through partnering, such as with Miller Heiman to 
integrate their sales methodology. In October the company began to have serious cash flow issues as 
the dotcom crash began to squeeze the economy. To recoup the cost of sale, the billing plan was changed 
x from monthly to annual payments. Despite a number of customers outraged by the payment terms 
change, most accepted the change. This put the company on a considerably better footing, and within a 
year the contract terms had significant financial impact, moving from cash-flow negative to positive. 
To fund continued growth an additional $35 million was raised from VC firms towards the end of 2000. 
In 2001 aggressive marketing and constant strategic alliance making continued, focused on 
building a reputation that tempted larger firms to adopt the service. Following a review of their own 
marketing activities, a city ‘roadshow’ was launched, consisting of ecosystem participants, prospects 
and the press, which gathered an almost cult-like following. When Microsoft acquired Great Plains in 
April, an interoffice memo of Benioff’s was picked up by the press and which lead to much more free 
publicity. The firm and service continued to pick up accolades throughout the year, such as Aberdeen 
Groups ‘What Works’ Award, a Five Star Rating from PC Magazine, named a Cool Company of 2001 
by FORTUNE Magazine. Salesforce also become part of the recruitment market, with employers 
specifically requesting Salesforce experience, and also the first specialist Salesforce consultancies were 
being established. The wide publicity garnered by the adoption of high profile customers, such as 
Broadvision, Times Warner, Dow Jones, USA Today, Fujitsu, and Agency.com, lead to increasing 
participant adoption. However although Salesforce generated $5 million over 2001 it was still made a 
$31.8 million loss. 
In 2002 the company launched a new vision, looking for ‘global leadership’, and the service was 
internationalised, launching in German, French, Italian, Spanish, Korean and Chinese to complement 
the Japanese service from the year before. By March there were 4,100 customers in more than 100 
countries, and the flood of accolades continued, both for the service and individuals within the 
organisation. Following a review of their sales process, the free trial was removed in August and a more 
complex trial introduced so as to build perceptions of product value. New and improved versions of the 
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service continued to be launched, such as offline and wireless capabilities, and additional functions 
were facilitated through partners, such as data-integration and workflow, multi-channel customer 
service capabilities, and email lead generation. Throughout the year, as a consequence of customer 
feedback the development team continued to add flexibility to the product, and by June additional 
customisation features meant that customers could begin to create their own applications. This further 
lead to increasing adoption and integration of participants into the Salesforce ecosystem. To fund all 
this another $13 million was raised by from VCs at the end of the year. When the ‘Success. Not 
Software.’ advertising campaign was launched in December 2002 there were more than 5,400 
customers. 
In 2003 the firm was finally profitable, and the ecosystem continued to grow, with Salesforce 
achieving than 120,000 subscribers with 8,400 customers by the end of the year. A high profile new 
customer, which signalled the maturity and increasing adoption of Salesforce by large companies was 
SunGard, a Fortune 1000 company, who were looking for a way to integrate 80 different business units 
and saw CRM as the 'unifying glue'. Salesforce continued its taunting and guerrilla marketing, 
ambushing users at both the Siebel European User Week and Seibel Systems Conference in San Diego. 
The flood of accolades continued, both for the service and Benioff, who was appointed Co-Chair of 
Presidents Information Technology Advisory Committee in May and a very positive profile in the New 
York Times.  
The main service was continually enhanced with new features and integration tools. Also released 
was Sforce, the logical extension of the customisation support that had been developing over the 
previous years, which provided services that developers could use to build business applications directly 
over the Internet. A range of complementary tool kits for a series of development environments as well 
as a supporting developer program was launched, leading to significant adoption by developers for new 
software development. The firm also began to engage with customers and developers more formally, 
with the first DreamForce Conference in November. This conference was the logical extension of the 
road shows from the previous years, bringing customers, developers and press to a single location to 
celebrate the service, as well customers through Customer Innovation Awards.  
In 2004 Salesforce listed on the NYSE, without much press coverage as the SEC queried the IPO 
filing due to revenue recognition issues. There was intense media scrutiny of the IPO, as it was viewed 
as a litmus test for a new business model. Following the IPO the company formalised many of its 
operations, adding another level of management, initiating formal career development programme, 
introducing a tax and treasury capability. The ecosystem continued to grow with 13,300 customers and 
214,000 subscribers worldwide at the end of the year. The accolades continued to arrive, in many cases 
winning the same award for the third time. As well as product awards, the service was the darling of 
industry analysts, such as winning the highest overall score in the ‘Forrester Wave: Hosted Sales Force 
Automation’ and Best Execution of a Midmarket IT Solution at a Gartner Vision Event. Ecosystem 
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participants also began to win awards for their implementation of Salesforce, celebrated at the second 
annual user and developer conference, DreamForce 2004. The service offering continued to be 
enhanced, with links to Microsoft Office, a support web service for customers who self-implemented, 
Salesforce Studio, and SupportForce. The launch of On-Demand Marketplace enabled developers to 
offer the applications that had developed on Sforce for sale, which was a precursor for AppExchange 
released the following year.  
In 2005 the accolades continued to pour in for Benioff, the service and the company, with many 
won for the fourth time in a row. The enhancements to the service continued with a focus on 
customisation and integration, including experimentations with social media for customer support, 
leading some analysts to note that customisation and integration were key differentiators for the service. 
The Third DreamForce conference celebrated customers with the announcement of CRM Success 
Heroes Award Winners, as well as being the setting for the limited release of AppExchange. Going 
beyond the sForce OnDemand Exchange released the previous year, AppExchange allowed users to 
create their own applications and sell them to others. There was a rapturous media response, with Forbes 
describing AppExchange as the iTunes of business software, and BusinessWeek the ‘eBay for 
software’. Adding to the media response was the acquisition of Seibel by Oracle on the first day of 
DreamForce 2005. With nearly more than eight times as many subscribers as the online offering of 
Siebel, CRM OnDemand, Salesforce was positively mentioned in every Siebel news story. To underline 
their success, Salesforce for Dummies topped an Amazon bestseller list in February, and the SEC 
standardised the revenue recognition as pioneered by Salesforce as the main type recognised.  
For Salesforce, Phase III commenced at the end of 2005 as the service reached the limits of its 
scalability, and some serious service disruptions followed which damaged trust and potentially 
threatened the viability of the service. Although uptime was 99 percent and the service was more reliable 
than normal software, because it was provided remotely any disruption was maddening to ecosystem 
participants. At the end of December the service went down for almost a day, followed by some other 
outages in January 2006. It was apparent there was a fundamental problem with the technology model 
and much work needed to be done to rectify it. Rather than address the issue head on, Saleforce.com 
tried to maintain a low profile, resulting in a very quick and vigorous press response. Ecosystem 
participants were outraged to the continued silence, until the firm began a rich and frequent dialogue 
with customers following the realisation that communication was the best policy. This was finally 
formalised in trust.salesforce.com, a systems status service that provides real-time and historical system 
performance information and updates, incident reports and maintenance schedules across all its key 
system components. By the end of March the company proudly announced 99.999 percent availability 
for that month. Press interest began to wane as the software service model was accepted as viable.  
In 2006 the accolades continued to pour in, both for the service and for Benioff, and in August 
the firm trumpeted the fact it delivered 50 million transactions in a single day. Adoption by government 
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was made simpler through the award of a GSA contract with reseller agreement. Internally, there was a 
shift to value appropriation with the hiring of staff to focus on revenue collection, and release of 
monetisation strategy documents. In particular there was the instigation of both a worldwide revenue 
department and an internal push to systematise and standardise process, practices and programmes. As 
if to underline their success, a small start-up SaaS company now protested outside DreamForce, echoing 
their stunt with Seibel many years earlier. 
The core service continued to be developed, and the ecosystem was extended through partnership 
with additional management consultancies. DreamForce 2006 in October was not only used to promote 
the new releases of the service, but also to celebrate the success of AppExchange, with the 
announcement of Appy Award Winners. The addition of Apex (a special programming language) and 
ApexConnect formalised and extended the mechanisms by which the service coordinated and controlled 
the ecosystem, further supported by an incubator dedicated to AppExchange applications. Throughout 
the year many companies wrote apps that became available on the platform. Soon the press was 
trumpeting companies that ran their entire business on Salesforce's AppExchange.  
9.3.6 Wikipedia 
For Wikipedia, Phase I commenced towards the end of 1999, when the founder of Wikipedia, 
Jimmy Wales, got the idea for a free online encyclopaedia after being inspired by the Open Directory 
Project of Netscape. At the time Wales was employed at the company he had co-founded a couple of 
years earlier, Bomis Inc. As Bomis was a commercial company focused on web-advertising, the idea 
for the free online encyclopaedia was to fund themselves (and make money) from advertising. At the 
beginning of 2000 Lawrence Sanger, then a doctoral student in philosophy, was hired by Bomis to 
oversee the creation of this. Nupedia, as the first incarnation of this online encyclopaedia was called, 
featured expert-written and peer-reviewed content. Despite much effort, and support from a limited set 
of qualified participants, such as PhDs, professors, and highly experienced professionals, by the end of 
2000 there were only 24 published articles. In early January 2001 it was decided that a separate service, 
where anyone could contribute to without editorial review, would be set up as a feeder project for 
Nupedia. Launched very soon after as the Nupedia Wiki, and despite activity commencing almost 
immediately, there was large push-back from the Nupedia Advisory Board. To meet their concerns, 
Wikipedia was launched as a separate service on the 15th January, and after an exchange of emails 
between Wales and Stallman, the service adopted the GNU Free Documentation license (GFDL).  
Almost immediately, the Wikipedia service took on a life of its own, and began to eclipse the 
activity on Nupedia. Mailing lists were set up to coordinate activities with contributors. As the project 
began to pass 1,000 articles, in February some rules were proposed which became the basis for most of 
the operating principles of the service into the future. These included a policy not to eject anyone except 
for the most extreme cases, a rule to ‘ignore all rules’, and, to ensure that only single articles worthy of 
an encyclopaedia were created, a policy for only a single article for any topic and a ‘not a dictionary’. 
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At the beginning of April 2001, Wales, reformulating the Nupedia ‘non-bias’ principle, formally 
defined a key principle of the service, NPOV, or Neutral Point of View, as a non-negotiable editorial 
policy. In May, ‘Administrator’ or ‘SysOp’ functionality was introduced to address an issue with 
deletion, as copyright violations, libellous speech and inappropriate private information required 
information to be completely destroyed and wiped from the public space. 
Low level marketing activity, such as the authoring of online articles by key contributors, soon 
lead to progressively larger influxes of participants. The news that online access to Britannica was 
becoming a pay service in July 2001 also incentivised participants to publicise their free alternative. 
The many new users who came from Slashdot and the community-edited technologies and culture web 
service Kuro5hin, appreciated the open nature of the service. However behaviour on the service was 
chaotic, and to address these issues participants began to organise impromptu response groups to deal 
with issues. Ongoing technical development ensured that baseline wiki functionality was enhanced to 
support the requirements of an online encyclopaedia, in the process evolving the underlying service 
away from a true wiki structure. 
For Wikipedia, Phase II commenced in mid-2001 with escalating media attention, rapidly 
increasing the number of contributors and the arrival of specialised tools and services to assist in editing. 
The mainstream press began to take notice of Wikipedia with an 'Australian PC World' article in July, 
a feature in ‘Wales on Sunday’ (a UK newspaper in August), followed by a New York Times article in 
September which was re-published in the International Herald Tribune. Towards the end of the year, 
Wikipedia began to win some accolades, and the New York Times Magazine ran an article about wikis 
and an Associates Press story prominently mentioned ‘Wales' Wikipedia encyclopaedia’ in December. 
By the end of 2001 there were over 20,000 articles in 18 languages – a rate of over 1,500 articles per 
month. In contrast Nupedia was not growing at anywhere near that rate, despite commencing its own 
wiki and setting up an approval mechanism for Wikipedia articles. Bomis began to reduce their financial 
support. 
To deal with the increasing influx of traffic, ecosystem participants established the Wikipedia 
Militia, a loose collection of users committed to converging and managing the service. The rate of 
growth and new influx of participants provoked much discussion about the future of Wikipedia, as these 
new participants also brought a new dynamic, with many essays and rants appearing on the service. 
These were making it difficult, despite the existing policies, to find an encyclopaedia on the service, as 
much content that was not appropriate for an encyclopaedia. A constant problem that had emerged was 
vandalism, where a user would deface a page and it needed to be reinstated. These was addressed over 
the months by a comprehensive ‘What Wikipedia is Not’ page, a Wikiquette page, a Statement of 
Principles and a new statement of NPOV. Complementing this, towards the end of September 
collaboration by case matter, called WikiProjects, was introduced, and meta.wikipedia.com was 
established to move discussion and essay-writing to a separate service. The new arrivals were also 
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resistant to change, not only pushing back strongly on increased centralised authority, but also ensuring 
that existing policies, such as the expulsion policy, were impossible to change. A conflict between 
anarchy and authority raged on the service, driven in part by an increasing sense of stakeholdership.  
 Technically the service was having difficulty in scaling and suffered outages and slowdowns 
until new wiki software and a load balancing solution lead to increased stability and scalability. Towards 
the end of the year functional improvements were added so as to improve the quality of articles and the 
Wikipedia experience. Other functionality enhancements also responded to needs of users, with the 9/11 
attacks resulting in a breaking news stories section on the homepage, as well as information boxes 
linking related articles. After a call by many participants for a new logo, this was launched in December. 
By the end of the year the first third party tools had arrived to support users on their use of the service, 
such as a free Wikipedia plug-in (GNU) for word processor Abiword. 
In January 2002 the first formal press was released, and the rate at which the service was linked 
to and mentioned in the press continued to escalate. The service was given a major upgrade, although 
sporadic performance issues remained, with the service either running slow or with reduced 
functionality as bugs and performance issues were addressed. Other functional enhancements to the 
service included a Featured Articles section, improved traffic graphs, improved search and a variety of 
tools to manage the service. A range of complementary service tools were also released by third parties 
throughout the year as were bots, used to import content. 
Also at the beginning of the year Sanger was officially made redundant from Bomis, and Wales 
became the primary face of Wikipedia. With Bomis also soon to cease funding of Wikipedia, there was 
some public musing about putting advertising on the service. This caused a massive shock amongst 
participants, leading to the Spanish Wikipedia leaving and starting their own service (‘Enciclopedia 
Libre’). Eventually Wales publically confirmed that Wikipedia would never run commercial 
advertising, and to underline this the service moved to Wikipedia.org in August. Despite the 
introduction of a First Formal Manual of Style and other policy enhancements, issues continued with 
problem participants throughout the year. With these ongoing issues, participants collectively organised 
to stop vandalism, and also supported one another through dedicated pages to their efforts. A particular 
type of troublesome participant was called a ‘troll’, who put up masses of rants and screeds on both 
Wikipedia and meta-wiki making the service difficult to use. How to deal with trolls caused a much 
controversy, and eventually a ‘WikiLove’ policy emerged, based around reasoning with the troll and 
only removing them from the project after a long and painful discussion. Throughout the rest of the year 
Sanger continued to push for an ‘approved’ version of the service and an expert-controlled approval 
process independent of Nupedia and Wikipedia to address these issues. By the end of year, Sanger broke 
with Wikipedia altogether. 
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In 2003 wikis began to gain more interest in the press, with Wikipedia held up as a prominent 
example, raising its profile and increasing the influx of users. Wikipedia was covered by First Monday, 
Wired News, The Guardian, CNN and Time Magazine. In addition Wikipedia was named one of the 
Top 10 reference services by The UK Daily Mirror and by May the service had reached the traffic rank 
of Brittanica.com and surpassed Slashdot itself in traffic rankings by December. The number of articles 
rose from 100,000 earlier in the year to a little less than 500,000 articles by the end. With the influx of 
new users Spanish Wikipedia overtook Enciclopedia Libre, new users not being aware of the fork in 
the previous year. By the end of the year Nupedia finally went off-line. 
However with the continuing influx of users and user activity, the service was not stable, despite 
database reorganisations, load-balancing, new software, new databases and web servers. Despite this 
effort throughout the year on an almost monthly basis there was downtime and slowdowns. 
Functionally, throughout the year there were enhancements to improve the service, such as with TeX 
math formulas support, new layouts and features on the editing pages, and other functionality was added 
to assist users in maintaining the service. In October following a vote, a new (the current) Wikipedia 
logo was ratified and adopted. Third parties continued to provide complementary assets, with the 
popular open-source editor Vim releasing a new syntax highlighting file specialised for Wikipedia. In 
addition a number of sister projects were launched, such as Wikiquote, Wikibooks and Wikisource.  
Ecosystem participants continued to collaborate in the management and operation of the service, 
and many norms and customs developed. Emphasis was placed on the communal nature, with some 
participants giving permission for their own photos to be used on the service, and others continuing to 
serve in standing action groups, such as the Wikipedia Militia, soon renamed to Volunteer Fire 
Department, and the Wikipedia Typo Department launched in November. Issues continued with rogue 
users, and a page protection feature and a Votes for Deletion Page were set up to make it more difficult 
for users to deface a page quickly. In May 2003 the first informal Wikipedia meet-ups began to occur, 
and in October the first formal meeting of Wikipedians occurred in Frankfurt. The constant activity on 
service was taking its toll, and some participants were now starting to leave. As many of these 
participants had interacted and built strong relationships with one another, as well as a Wikipedian 
identity, a Missing Wikipedians page was launched in an effort to commemorate and reach out to these 
participants. New policies supported the ongoing generation of articles, including the Verifiability (V) 
policy, a No Original Research (NOR) policy, and a prohibition against editing one's autobiography. 
In June 2003 the formal governance of the service was passed over to the Wikimedia Foundation, 
as Bomis was winding down. A formal governing board was appointed, to grumbling from participants 
that half Board Members had been appointed from Bomis Inc. Following a media focused launch in 
August, Wikipedia began to formally ask for donations, maintain an open approach, publicising their 
account balances online in December.  
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In 2004, with Alexa Internet flagging Wikipedia as a reference service and Yahoo! approving a 
data feed which drove many more participants to the service, the ecosystem continued to grow. In 
February 2004 there were more than 500,000 articles in 50 languages and by September 1,000,000 
articles in 100 languages. The press coverage continued and accolades began to arrive, such as a Top 
100 Top Webservices for PC Magazine, winning a number of Prix Ars Electronica (Golden Nicas), a 
Webby Award, and the Web User Magazine Award in UK. The ecosystem also continued to gain wider 
societal acceptance, with an internationally-renowned Harvard physicist editing string theory articles, 
the service cited and quoted in a court case, studied as part of a university course, appearing in a 
television show, and was viewed as key news source during the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in 
December. However the service was not without criticism, such as an article from ex-editor of 
Britannica gained much press about how much one can trust the articles, as well as criticisms from other 
commentators.  
Over the year the issues with service performance began to stabilise, with the introduction of 
system balancing processes, performance tweaks and new servers. To support this technical outlay the 
Foundation continued to have fundraising drives. The first formal meet-ups with WikiMedia staff 
occurred in mid-2003, and groups of users also continued to collectively organise to maintain the 
service, such as the official establishment of the RC Patrol combat Vandalism and the establishment of 
a voluntary association and forum for Encyclopaedic Standards. Around this time there were also some 
nascent attempts to focus on content quality, with the first formal projects to deliberately balance 
content and correcting syntax. However the growth of the service was not without conflict. A growing 
issue, which had started late in the previous year, were ‘edit wars’, where differing participants could 
not agree on text and kept on reverting the others edits. A number of governance structures were 
attempted to control this issue and after much conflict by November the 3RR (‘Three Reverts Rule’) 
rule was introduced which was generally accepted and calmed the edit wars. Another governance 
mechanism introduced in early 2004 was the Arbitration and Mediation Committee System and the 
assume Good Faith rule to address the ongoing issues with trolls and conflicts occurring between 
participants.  
By 2005 the service had reached 500,000 English articles in March, and continued to gain in 
stature with the award of some high profile accolades, particularly winning awards internationally and 
winning some for the second year in a row. In a landmark review, towards the end of the year a peer 
review by Nature magazine concluded that Wikipedia was comparable to Encyclopaedia Britannica in 
terms of accuracy. The press continued to follow the service and the failure of the Los Angeles Times 
‘Wikitorials’ emphasised the uniqueness of the service and ecosystem. However, criticism continued 
throughout the year, with criticism on quality of articles from the British edition of Vogue, and a 
campaign launched for personal privacy and accountability targeted specifically at Wikipedia starting 
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in October. These criticisms were exacerbated by the revelations of a fake charity promotion, 
QuakeAID, and a fake war hero.  
For Wikipedia, Phase III began with the Seigenthaler incident in late 2005, caused by a 
participant editing John Seigenthaler’s biography and falsely implicating him in the assassinations of 
John F Kennedy and R Kennedy. As a veteran journalist, he authored an op-ed piece in USA Today 
where he thoroughly upbraided Wikipedia and what it stood for. Following much self-examination 
within the ecosystem, Wikipedia tightened editorial control. This reduction of editorial privileges, in 
contrast to previous attempts, was welcomed by an ecosystem tired of the previous scandals and edit 
wars. The first official conference, WikiMania, occurred in Frankfurt in August 2005, further 
establishing the new editorial regime. Also around this time stress meters began to appear on users’ 
pages indicating the pressure some of them were feeling with their participation.  
By 2006, with the English Wikipedia reaching the million article mark, the system was 
performing well, and minor functional improvements continued. The accolades continued, and Wales 
was named one of Time Magazine’s 100 most influential people. The editorial focus on quality 
continued, and press coverage over the exposure of a fake Duke of Cleveland sex-offender and the 
Congressional Aides Biography did little to damage the ecosystems improving reputation. The 
Wikipedia Foundation formalised its fundraising process, raising US$94,000 in February, more than 
$200,000 in September and over $390,000 by the end of the year, as well as some private donations. 
The Foundation also registered the Wikipedia trademark set up a Communications Committee. In 
addition some organisations, namely Kennisnet in the Netherland and Korean Yahoo!, made donations 
in kind of server capacity. By 2007 the service remained stable and there were no notable stability or 
performance issues, reaching over 5 million registered editor accounts and 2 million English articles. 
The ecosystem continued to manage the service, notably failing to agree a single set of core policies. 
The release of the Wikimedia Tool Server provided a platform for third party complementary tools to 
be hosted, formalising the relationship of complementary services to the core service. Voted a Top 
global brand, Wikipedia continued to be adopted by wider society and win accolades, despite the 
occasional scandal. As Wales moved into a support role, fundraising raised US$1.5 million and the 
future looked rosy. 
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9.4 Appendix D – Moving average frequency analysis 
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9.5 Appendix E – Variance of code frequency from overall frequency by phase 
 
Table 33 – Phase I code frequency variance cross case comparison 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Resource 2.21 
(29.76%) 
-7.81 
(17.54%) 
5.81 
(24.10%) 
1.30 
(23.75%) 
24.82 
(40.00%) 
-1.43 
(5.62%) 
Technology 14.25 
(39.29%) 
8.01 
(26.32%) 
0.27 
(34.94%) 
7.92 
(41.25%) 
6.35 
(18.33%) 
0.80 
(30.34%) 
Institutional -8.15 
(22.62%) 
9.57 
(52.63%) 
2.89 
(26.61%) 
-8.86 
(13.75%) 
-15.93 
(36.67%) 
14.54 
(55.06%) 
Context -8.31 
(8.33%) 
-9.77 
(3.51%) 
-8.97 
(14.46%) 
-0.36 
(21.25%) 
-15.24 
(5.00%) 
-13.91 
(8.99%) 
Numbers in parentheses are actual frequency; these may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 34 – Phase II code frequency variance cross case comparison 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Resource 0.02 
(27.57%) 
-0.13 
(25.23%) 
2.08 
(20.37%) 
1.85 
(24.30%) 
-0.43 
(14.75%) 
-2.74 
(4.31%) 
Technology -5.31 
(19.73%) 
-1.19 
(17.12%) 
-1.95 
(32.72%) 
-5.71 
(27.62%) 
-0.15 
(11.84%) 
7.75 
(37.28%) 
Institutional -2.66 
(28.11%) 
-2.52 
(40.54%) 
-1.09 
(22.53%) 
2.45 
(25.06%) 
-2.17 
(50.43%) 
0.22 
(40.73%) 
Context 7.95 
(24.59%) 
3.84 
(17.12%) 
0.95 
(24.38%) 
1.41 
(23.02%) 
2.74 
(22.98%) 
-5.23 
(17.67%) 
Numbers in parentheses are actual frequency; these may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 35 – Phase III code frequency variance cross case comparison 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Resource -0.73 
(26.82%) 
4.55 
(29.91%) 
-9.81 
(8.47%) 
-6.57 
(15.87%) 
-11.48 
(3.70%) 
7.55 
(14.59%) 
Technology 2.93 
(27.97%) 
-0.55 
(17.76%) 
5.16 
(39.83%) 
12.70 
(46.03%) 
-2.72 
(9.26%) 
-19.81 
(9.73%) 
Institutional 6.40 
(37.16%) 
2.74 
(45.79%) 
0.96 
(24.58%) 
-1.98 
(20.63%) 
20.55 
(73.15%) 
-7.54 
(32.97%) 
Context -8.60 
(8.05%) 
-6.74 
(6.54%) 
3.69 
(27.12%) 
-4.15 
(17.46%) 
-6.35 
(13.89%) 
19.80 
(42.70%) 
Numbers in parentheses are actual frequency; these may not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
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9.6 Appendix F – Direct inspection analysis for each case 
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ef
f 
B
ez
os
 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
op
er
at
io
ns
 in
 S
ea
ttl
e,
 h
ir
ed
 d
ev
el
op
er
s 
an
d 
be
ga
n 
cr
ea
tin
g 
th
e 
di
gi
ta
l s
er
vi
ce
. I
ni
tia
l a
cc
es
s 
w
as
 to
 f
ri
en
ds
 a
nd
 
fa
m
ily
, a
nd
 a
ft
er
 th
ey
 h
ad
 te
st
ed
 th
e 
fu
nc
tio
na
lit
y,
 w
as
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
re
le
as
ed
 f
or
 g
en
er
al
 a
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
w
ith
 e
co
sy
st
em
s 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
 
fi
nd
in
g 
ou
t a
bo
ut
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
w
or
d 
of
 m
ou
th
. A
t t
hi
s 
ti
m
e 
th
er
e 
w
as
 a
 s
en
se
 o
f 
co
m
m
un
ity
 a
ro
un
d 
th
e 
si
te
, w
ith
 s
om
e 
de
sc
ri
bi
ng
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
as
 a
n 
ea
rl
y 
so
ci
al
 n
et
w
or
k 
w
ith
 th
e 
ab
ili
ty
 
to
 a
dd
 b
oo
k 
re
vi
ew
s,
 c
om
m
en
t a
nd
 in
te
ra
ct
. 
C
om
m
en
ce
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
de
ci
si
on
 to
 c
re
at
e 
th
e 
pe
rf
ec
t m
ar
ke
t; 
Pi
er
re
 
O
m
id
ya
r 
w
ro
te
 th
e 
in
iti
al
 s
er
vi
ce
, t
he
n 
ca
lle
d 
A
uc
tio
nW
eb
, a
nd
 
la
un
ch
ed
 it
 d
ir
ec
t t
o 
ge
ne
ra
l a
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
on
 h
is
 h
om
ep
ag
e 
al
on
g 
w
it
h 
hi
s 
ot
he
r 
pr
oj
ec
ts
. W
ith
 li
ttl
e 
m
ar
ke
tin
g,
 th
e 
ec
os
ys
te
m
 b
eg
an
 
to
 g
ro
w
 th
ro
ug
h 
w
or
d 
of
 m
ou
th
, a
nd
 a
 c
om
m
is
si
on
 f
or
 u
se
, w
ith
 
pa
ym
en
ts
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
tr
us
t, 
w
as
 o
nl
y 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
fo
r 
a 
co
up
le
 o
f 
w
ee
ks
 o
f 
op
er
at
io
n 
w
he
n 
th
e 
in
te
rn
et
 s
er
vi
ce
 p
ro
vi
de
r 
dr
am
at
ic
al
ly
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
th
ei
r 
pr
ic
es
 d
ue
 to
 e
sc
al
at
in
g 
w
eb
 tr
af
fi
c 
(t
he
 e
co
sy
st
em
 w
as
 p
ro
fi
ta
bl
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
st
ar
t)
. E
ar
ly
 o
n,
 th
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ec
os
ys
te
m
 w
as
 h
an
de
d 
ov
er
 to
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
bu
lle
tin
 b
oa
rd
s 
an
d 
m
an
y 
of
 th
e 
ea
rl
y 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
si
te
 p
ol
ic
in
g 
w
as
 d
on
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
. D
ur
in
g 
th
is
 ti
m
e 
a 
st
ro
ng
 s
en
se
 o
f 
co
m
m
un
ity
 d
ev
el
op
ed
, w
ith
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
 g
en
er
al
ly
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 c
ha
ng
es
 to
 th
e 
di
gi
ta
l s
er
vi
ce
. 
  A
m
az
on
 
eB
ay
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 C
on
tr
ol
 
E
m
er
ge
d 
as
 c
on
tr
ol
 w
as
 f
in
al
ly
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
ap
ps
 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
pl
at
fo
rm
, a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
fo
rm
al
 
ac
kn
ow
le
dg
em
en
t o
f 
th
e 
w
id
e 
ra
ng
in
g 
pr
iv
ac
y 
co
nc
er
ns
. A
 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 a
ct
io
n 
he
re
 w
as
 o
pe
ni
ng
 u
p 
th
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
 to
 a
 v
ot
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
us
er
s.
 I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 in
te
rn
al
ly
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 h
ad
 c
oa
le
sc
ed
 
ar
ou
nd
 a
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 lo
gi
c 
of
 v
al
ue
 c
o-
cr
ea
tio
n,
 a
nd
 a
dv
er
tis
in
g 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
va
lu
e 
ex
tr
ac
tio
n 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 w
er
e 
no
w
 m
at
ur
e 
an
d 
w
it
h 
co
nt
in
ua
l t
w
ea
ks
 to
 e
nh
an
ce
 r
ev
en
ue
. 
E
m
er
ge
d 
as
 th
e 
si
te
 b
ec
am
e 
th
e 
un
di
sp
ut
ed
 le
ad
er
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
(s
uc
h 
as
 M
ic
ro
so
ft
 a
nd
 Y
ah
oo
!)
 w
er
e 
un
ab
le
 to
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
pa
ri
ty
. S
oc
ia
lly
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
w
as
 n
ow
 
em
be
dd
ed
 in
 s
oc
ie
ty
, a
lth
ou
gh
 th
er
e 
w
as
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 
w
ar
in
es
s 
as
 to
 p
ri
va
cy
. T
he
 e
m
ph
as
is
 o
f 
va
lu
e 
ap
pr
op
ri
at
io
n 
w
as
 u
nd
er
lin
ed
 w
ith
 a
 c
ou
rt
 c
as
e 
w
hi
ch
 a
llo
w
ed
 tr
ad
em
ar
ke
d 
te
rm
s 
to
 b
e 
us
ed
 a
s 
ke
yw
or
ds
. 
P
H
A
SE
 I
I 
– 
M
om
en
tu
m
 
C
om
m
en
ce
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
f 
co
ll
eg
e 
st
ud
en
ts
 a
ft
er
 th
e 
su
m
m
er
 r
ec
es
s,
 a
s 
ad
di
tio
na
l u
ni
ve
rs
iti
es
 w
er
e 
ad
de
d,
 w
ith
 
ac
tiv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
(k
no
w
n 
as
 th
e 
‘s
ur
ro
un
d 
st
ra
te
gy
’)
 to
 g
ro
w
 
fa
st
er
 th
an
 th
e 
em
er
gi
ng
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s.
 A
cc
es
s 
to
 th
e 
si
te
 w
as
 
al
so
 b
ro
ad
en
ed
, s
oo
n 
op
en
in
g 
to
 h
ig
h 
sc
ho
ol
 s
tu
de
nt
s,
 w
or
k 
ne
tw
or
ks
 a
nd
 e
ve
nt
ua
lly
 c
om
pl
et
el
y 
op
en
ed
. A
ft
er
 a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t r
ou
nd
s,
 h
ir
in
g 
co
m
m
en
ce
d,
 b
ot
h 
fo
r 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
an
d 
bu
si
ne
ss
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t. 
T
ec
hn
ic
al
ly
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
to
 b
e 
en
ha
nc
ed
 a
nd
 s
tr
en
gt
he
ne
d,
 o
pe
ni
ng
 u
p 
th
e 
Fa
ce
bo
ok
 
Pl
at
fo
rm
 to
 a
pp
 d
ev
el
op
er
s’
. H
ow
ev
er
 th
er
e 
w
as
 li
ttl
e 
co
nt
ro
l 
ov
er
 th
e 
ra
pi
dl
y 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 n
um
be
r 
of
 a
pp
 d
ev
el
op
er
s 
an
d 
so
m
e 
of
 th
es
e 
fu
nc
tio
na
l c
ha
ng
es
 le
d 
to
 c
on
fl
ic
t w
ith
 th
e 
ec
os
ys
te
m
. T
he
 e
co
sy
st
em
 a
ls
o 
be
ga
n 
to
 b
e 
co
ve
re
d 
cl
os
el
y 
by
 
th
e 
pr
es
s 
an
d 
w
id
er
 s
oc
ie
ty
, p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 a
s 
pr
iv
ac
y 
co
nc
er
ns
 
ar
os
e.
 
C
om
m
en
ce
d 
w
ith
 a
 w
id
er
 a
w
ar
en
es
s 
of
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
be
yo
nd
 th
e 
co
gn
os
ce
nt
i d
ue
 a
 la
rg
e 
V
C
 in
ve
st
m
en
t, 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 
m
ed
ia
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
an
d 
th
e 
w
in
ni
ng
 o
f 
m
an
y 
ac
co
la
de
s.
 A
s 
ad
ve
rt
is
in
g 
w
as
 s
o 
pr
of
ita
bl
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l r
ou
nd
s 
of
 f
un
di
ng
 w
er
e 
no
t r
eq
ui
re
d,
 a
nd
 a
n 
IP
O
 w
as
 d
el
ay
ed
 f
or
 a
s 
lo
ng
 a
s 
po
ss
ib
le
 s
o 
as
 n
ot
 to
 g
iv
e 
si
gn
al
s 
to
 c
om
pe
tit
or
s.
 F
un
ct
io
na
lly
 th
e 
si
te
 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
to
 b
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d,
 w
ith
 e
xp
lic
it 
ec
os
ys
te
m
 g
ro
w
th
 
fe
at
ur
es
 s
uc
h 
as
 a
ff
ili
at
e 
pr
og
ra
m
s 
fo
r 
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 a
dv
er
ti
si
ng
. 
In
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 th
e 
re
le
as
e 
of
 s
el
f-
se
rv
ic
e 
fo
r 
ad
ve
rt
is
in
g 
sp
ur
re
d 
m
an
y 
m
or
e 
ad
ve
rt
is
er
s 
on
 th
e 
si
te
. T
he
 s
er
vi
ce
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
to
 b
e 
tr
us
te
d 
an
d 
po
pu
la
r,
 s
til
l r
em
ai
ni
ng
 o
n 
w
or
d 
of
 m
ou
th
 
m
ar
ke
tin
g,
 a
nd
 tw
ea
ks
 s
uc
h 
as
 G
oo
gl
e 
D
oo
dl
e.
 H
ow
ev
er
 th
e 
ec
os
ys
te
m
 s
uf
fe
re
d 
a 
cr
is
is
 w
ith
 th
e 
re
le
as
e 
of
 G
m
ai
l, 
w
hi
ch
 
ca
us
ed
 a
 p
ri
va
cy
 s
to
rm
, r
es
ul
tin
g 
le
gi
sl
at
io
n 
an
d 
lit
ig
at
io
n,
 a
nd
 
ba
d 
pr
es
s.
 H
ow
ev
er
 d
es
pi
te
 th
e 
fu
ro
r 
an
d 
a 
m
ed
io
cr
e 
IP
O
, t
he
 
ec
os
ys
te
m
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
to
 g
ai
n 
m
om
en
tu
m
. 
P
H
A
SE
 I
 -
 I
ni
ti
at
io
n 
B
eg
an
 w
he
n 
M
ar
k 
Z
uc
ke
rb
er
g 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
an
 is
su
e 
th
at
 h
ad
 
be
en
 b
ot
he
ri
ng
 H
ar
va
rd
 s
tu
de
nt
s 
fo
r 
a 
w
hi
le
, t
he
 f
ac
t t
ha
t t
ha
t 
th
ei
r 
‘F
ac
eb
oo
ks
’ 
w
er
e 
no
t o
nl
in
e.
 Z
uc
ke
rb
er
g 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
th
e 
si
te
 o
ve
r 
a 
co
up
le
 o
f 
da
ys
, a
nd
 m
ob
ili
si
ng
 h
is
 d
or
m
-m
at
es
 f
or
 
su
pp
or
t, 
la
un
ch
ed
 th
e 
so
ci
al
 n
et
w
or
k 
in
te
rn
al
ly
 a
t H
ar
va
rd
. 
W
ith
 n
o 
m
ar
ke
tin
g,
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
w
as
 a
 h
ug
e 
su
cc
es
s,
 w
ith
 
id
io
sy
nc
ra
tic
 b
eh
av
io
ur
s 
em
er
gi
ng
 a
m
on
gs
t u
se
rs
 (
su
ch
 a
s 
pr
om
ot
in
g 
on
e’
s 
po
lit
ic
al
 a
ff
ili
at
io
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
pr
of
ile
 p
ho
to
 
an
d 
fr
ie
nd
in
g 
co
m
pe
tit
io
ns
),
 a
nd
 s
oo
n 
ac
ce
ss
 w
as
 o
pe
ne
d 
to
 
ot
he
r 
el
ite
 u
ni
ve
rs
iti
es
. A
 m
aj
or
 f
oc
us
 w
as
 o
n 
de
si
gn
 s
o 
th
at
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
ab
le
 to
 s
ca
le
, a
nd
 v
er
y 
ea
rl
y 
on
 a
n 
ad
ve
rt
is
in
g 
ca
pa
bi
li
ty
 w
as
 b
ui
lt 
in
to
 th
e 
si
te
. 
T
he
 in
iti
al
 id
ea
 c
am
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
do
ct
or
al
 r
es
ea
rc
h 
of
 S
er
ge
i B
ri
n 
an
d 
L
ar
ry
 P
ag
e 
w
ho
, a
lo
ng
 w
ith
 th
ei
r 
do
ct
or
al
 s
up
er
vi
so
r,
 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
ea
rl
y 
ve
rs
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
se
ar
ch
 s
er
vi
ce
 a
nd
 e
ve
nt
ua
lly
 
re
le
as
ed
 it
 in
te
rn
al
ly
 a
t S
ta
nf
or
d.
 P
op
ul
ar
ity
 g
re
w
 b
y 
w
or
d 
of
 
m
ou
th
, f
un
ct
io
na
l e
nh
an
ce
m
en
ts
 c
on
tin
ue
d,
 a
nd
 m
or
e 
an
d 
m
or
e 
se
rv
er
s 
w
er
e 
re
qu
ir
ed
 to
 k
ee
p 
th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
ru
nn
in
g 
(f
ro
m
 
th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
B
ri
n 
an
d 
Pa
ge
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
d 
th
ei
r 
ow
n 
co
m
pu
te
rs
).
 A
ft
er
 s
om
e 
an
ge
l f
un
di
ng
, t
he
 s
er
vi
ce
 w
as
 o
pe
ne
d 
be
yo
nd
 S
ta
nf
or
d,
 a
nd
 d
ri
ve
n 
by
 w
or
d 
of
 m
ou
th
 m
ar
ke
tin
g,
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
 b
eg
an
 to
 ta
ke
 n
ot
ic
e.
 A
ft
er
 n
o 
ot
he
r 
si
te
s 
se
em
ed
 
in
te
re
st
ed
 in
 li
ce
ns
in
g 
th
ei
r 
se
ar
ch
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
, B
ri
n 
an
d 
Pa
ge
 
la
un
ch
ed
 k
ey
w
or
d 
dr
iv
en
 a
dv
er
tis
in
g.
 
 F
ac
eb
oo
k 
G
oo
gl
e 
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 C
on
tr
ol
 
E
m
er
ge
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
re
ct
if
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
te
ch
ni
ca
l i
ss
ue
s 
th
at
 
ha
d 
ca
us
ed
 s
er
io
us
 s
er
vi
ce
 d
el
iv
er
y,
 a
nd
 la
un
ch
 o
f 
tr
us
t.s
al
es
fo
rc
e.
co
m
, a
 s
er
vi
ce
 th
at
 p
ub
lic
al
ly
 d
et
ai
le
d 
th
e 
st
at
us
 o
f 
th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
de
liv
er
y.
 P
re
ss
 in
te
re
st
 b
eg
an
 to
 w
an
e 
as
 th
e 
so
ft
w
ar
e 
as
 a
 s
er
vi
ce
 m
od
el
 w
as
 a
cc
ep
te
d 
as
 v
ia
bl
e.
 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, t
he
re
 w
as
 a
 s
hi
ft
 to
 v
al
ue
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
tio
n 
w
ith
 
th
e 
hi
ri
ng
 o
f 
st
af
f 
to
 f
oc
us
 o
n 
re
ve
nu
e 
co
ll
ec
tio
n,
 a
nd
 
re
le
as
e 
of
 m
on
et
is
at
io
n 
st
ra
te
gy
 d
oc
um
en
ts
.  
E
m
er
ge
d 
fr
om
 th
e 
m
ed
ia
 c
ri
si
s 
of
 th
e 
Se
ig
en
th
al
er
 
in
ci
de
nt
, w
ho
 w
ro
te
 a
n 
op
-e
d 
pi
ec
e 
in
 U
SA
 T
od
ay
, 
en
tit
le
d 
‘A
 F
al
se
 W
ik
ip
ed
ia
 B
io
gr
ap
hy
’.
 T
hi
s 
cr
is
is
 le
ad
 
to
 a
n 
im
po
si
tio
n 
of
 ti
gh
te
r 
ed
ito
ri
al
 c
on
tr
ol
, w
hi
ch
 in
 
co
nt
ra
st
 to
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
at
te
m
pt
s,
 w
as
 w
el
co
m
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
ec
os
ys
te
m
 ti
re
d 
of
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 s
ca
nd
al
s 
an
d 
ed
it 
w
ar
s.
 I
n 
ad
di
tio
n 
th
e 
W
ik
ip
ed
ia
 F
ou
nd
at
io
n 
fo
rm
al
is
ed
 it
s 
fu
nd
ra
is
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s 
an
d 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
lly
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
w
as
 
st
ab
ili
se
d.
 
P
H
A
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I 
– 
M
om
en
tu
m
 
C
om
m
en
ce
d 
w
ith
 h
ig
h 
pr
of
ile
 g
ue
rr
ill
a 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
at
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
co
m
pe
tit
or
’s
 a
nn
ua
l c
on
fe
re
nc
e,
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
th
ei
r 
ow
n 
un
iq
ue
ly
 b
ra
nd
ed
 la
un
ch
 p
ar
ty
. A
gg
re
ss
iv
e 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
an
d 
co
ns
ta
nt
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
 a
ll
ia
nc
e 
m
ak
in
g 
th
en
 f
ol
lo
w
ed
; a
n 
el
em
en
t o
f 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
w
as
 a
 c
ity
 ‘
ro
ad
sh
ow
’,
 
co
ns
is
tin
g 
of
 u
se
rs
, p
ro
sp
ec
ts
 a
nd
 th
e 
pr
es
s,
 w
hi
ch
 
ga
th
er
ed
 a
n 
al
m
os
t c
ul
t-
lik
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g.
 T
hi
s 
so
on
 e
vo
lv
ed
 
in
to
 f
or
m
al
 c
on
fe
re
nc
es
, b
ut
 m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
th
e 
hi
gh
 le
ve
l 
di
sc
ou
rs
e 
an
d 
id
en
tit
y 
bu
ild
in
g 
th
at
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ed
 th
e 
ro
ad
sh
ow
s.
 A
ft
er
 a
 r
e-
pr
ic
in
g 
of
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
w
he
n 
th
e 
do
tc
om
 c
ra
sh
 a
dv
er
se
ly
 a
ff
ec
te
d 
ca
sh
 f
lo
w
, t
he
re
 w
as
 
ex
pl
os
iv
e 
gr
ow
th
 a
cc
om
pa
ni
ed
 b
y 
fa
w
ni
ng
 p
re
ss
 
co
ve
ra
ge
 a
nd
 th
e 
aw
ar
d 
of
 m
an
y 
ac
co
la
de
s.
 T
ec
hn
ic
al
ly
 
th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
w
as
 c
on
tin
ua
lly
 e
nh
an
ce
d,
 p
ro
gr
es
si
ve
ly
 
op
en
in
g 
th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
us
er
 c
us
to
m
is
at
io
n 
an
d 
th
en
 e
ve
nt
ua
lly
 th
e 
su
pp
or
t o
f 
3r
d  p
ar
ty
 a
pp
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
(s
uc
h 
as
 s
Fo
rc
e 
an
d 
A
pp
E
xc
ha
ng
e)
. A
 c
on
su
lti
ng
 in
du
st
ry
 
al
so
 e
m
er
ge
d 
ar
ou
nd
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e.
 W
ith
 th
is
 g
ro
w
th
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
so
on
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9.7 Appendix G – Ecosystem creation optimal matching analysis 
 
Table 36 – Complete sequence optimal matching comparison for hub / ecosystem interaction 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay -0.020 
(0.370) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook 0.015 + 
(0.407) 
0.016 
(0.388) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google -0.001 
(0.357) 
-0.018 
(0.346) 
0.030 ** 
(0.400) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce 0.031 *** 
(0.621) 
0.039 *** 
(0.530) 
0.014 + 
(0.489) 
0.046 *** 
(0.589) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia 0.065 *** 
(0.516) 
0.051 *** 
(0.452) 
0.041 *** 
(0.436) 
0.077 *** 
(0.508) 
0.038 *** 
(0.444) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; numbers in parentheses are actual distances. 
 
Table 37 – Within case cross phase comparison for hub / ecosystem interaction 
Amazon  eBay 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III   Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
   Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Phase II 0.000 
(0.785) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  Phase II 0.000 
(0.852) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Phase III 0.000 
(0.718) 
-0.011 
(0.361) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 Phase III -0.004 
(0.540) 
0.000 
(0.679) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Facebook  Google 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III   Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
   Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Phase II 0.000 
(0.646) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  Phase II 0.000 
(0.800) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Phase III 0.215 *** 
(0.619) 
0.000 
(0.674) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 Phase III 0.024 
(0.442) 
0.000 
(0.704) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Salesforce  Wikipedia 
 Phase I Phase II Phase III   Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
   Phase I 0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Phase II 0.000 
(0.895) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  Phase II 0.000 
(0.820) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Phase III 0.513 *** 
(0.955) 
0.000 
(0.831) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 Phase III 0.097 *** 
(0.639) 
0.000 
(0.608) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; numbers in parentheses are actual distances. 
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Table 38 – Phase I optimal matching case comparison for hub / ecosystem interaction 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay 0.036 
(0.477) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook 0.023 
(0.429) 
0.029 *** 
(0.571) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google -0.063 
(0.333) 
-0.028 
(0.419) 
0.068 * 
(0.468) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce -0.230 * 
(0.352) 
-0.141 
(0.420) 
-0.023 
(0.484) 
-0.221 ** 
(0.323) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia -0.182 * 
(0.318) 
-0.041 
(0.405) 
0.121 ** 
(0.571) 
-0.142 * 
(0.333) 
-0.014 
(0.417) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; numbers in parentheses are actual distances. 
Table 39 – Phase II optimal matching case comparison for hub / ecosystem interaction 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay -0.014 
(0.356) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook -0.015 
(0.366) 
0.002 
(0.378) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google 0.000 
(0.356) 
-0.006 
(0.361) 
-0.025 + 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce -0.012 
(0.498) 
0.013 
(0.508) 
0.005 
(0.505) 
-0.005 
(0.498) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia 0.001 
(0.435) 
0.003 
(0.413) 
0.012 
(0.413) 
-0.010 
(0.439) 
0.079 *** 
(0.500) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; numbers in parentheses are actual distances. 
Table 40 – Phase III optimal matching case comparison for hub / ecosystem interaction 
 Amazon eBay Facebook Google Salesforce Wikipedia 
Amazon 0.000 
(0.000) 
     
eBay 0.000 
(0.596) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
    
Facebook 0.000 
(0.628) 
0.075 * 
(0.476) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Google 0.000 
(0.558) 
-0.027 
(0.362) 
0.151 *** 
(0.551) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Salesforce 0.006 *** 
(0.651) 
0.410 *** 
(0.960) 
0.070 
(0.612) 
0.477 *** 
(1.022) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Wikipedia 0.154 *** 
(0.638) 
0.277 *** 
(0.705) 
0.071 ** 
(0.508) 
0.411 *** 
(0.836) 
-0.048 * 
(0.393) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; numbers in parentheses are actual distances. 
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9.8 Appendix H – Ecosystem creation moving average frequency analysis 
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